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ix
introduct ion
The development of early modern natural law theories is an integral part
of the Enlightenment,1 and the writings of Johann Gottlieb Heineccius
(1681–1741) are an important example of this close relationship. Hei-
neccius wrote when the modern European natural law tradition was al-
ready long established, especially through the important works of Hugo
Grotius (1583–1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94), and Christian Tho-
masius (1655–1728). Notably the works of Grotius and Pufendorf had
gained significant influence throughout Europe, assisted by congenial
translations and annotations from the Huguenot refugee Jean Barbeyrac
(1674–1744).2
Heineccius drew on the works of these theorists and responded to
them, but hisMethodical System of Universal Law:Or, the Laws of Nature
and Nations was far more than a synthesis and a commentary on the
salient writings of the previous generations. It was a distinctive system
of natural jurisprudence, which, together with his writings on Roman
law, helped to secure Heineccius a certain international fame already in
his lifetime. In the Netherlands, where he taught for several years, he
enjoyed a considerable academic reputation, which was reinforced by
his personal acquaintance with the house of Orange. He held prestigious
positions at two leading German universities of the early Enlighten-
ment, Frankfurt an der Oder and Halle. In England and Scotland,
1. This link is best accounted for in Hochstrasser,Natural LawTheories in theEarly
Enlightenment. See also Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, especially p. 174. This view is
restated in Tuck’s The Rights of War and Peace.
2. On Jean Barbeyrac, see Rathlef, Geschichte jetzlebender Gelehrten, Johan Bar-
beirak, 1–65; Othmer, Berlin und die Verbreitung des Naturrechts in Europa; and
Hochstrasser, “Conscience and Reason,” pp. 289–308.
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George Turnbull’s translation of Heineccius’s System was issued twice,
in 1741 and 1763, making Heineccius’s natural jurisprudence more ac-
cessible to English-speaking audiences. Turnbull expressed great admi-
ration for Heineccius in the preface to his translation, saying that “[t]he
author of this system of the law of nature and nations is so well known,
and in so high esteem in the republic of letters, that it would bearrogance
in me to say any thing in recommendation of his works. Nor need I
make any apology for translating into our language so excellent a book
upon a subject of such universal importance.”3 As late as 1799 the Scot-
tish lawyer Sir James Mackintosh paid Heineccius a slightly back-
handed compliment by describing him as “the best writer of elementary
books with whom I am acquainted on any subject.”4 Heineccius even
played an important and lasting role in the Spanish, South American,
and Italian academic worlds, where purified editions (editiones castiga-
tae ) suppressed those quotations and statements that could be seen as
challenging the Catholic Church but where his divine voluntarism was
welcome.5
Heineccius’s Life
Heineccius began his academic career by studying theology in Leipzig
and then law in Halle, where he became a pupil of the controversial jurist
and philosopher Christian Thomasius. The University of Halle was
newly founded (1694) and one of the most important centers of theearly
Enlightenment in Germany. It was an intellectually thriving institution,
which Heineccius took advantage of by attending lectures on a variety
of subjects, including philosophy and rhetoric, taught by Samuel Stryck
(1640–1710) and Johannes Franz Budde (1667–1729). His intellectual
curiosity clearly was stimulated, as was his talent for free oration and
3. Turnbull, preface, p. 5.
4. Quoted in Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, p. 88.
5. There were no fewer than five editions of the collected works: 18 volumes, Ven-
ice 1743, 2nd edition 1761; 8 volumes, Geneva 1744–48, 2nd edition 1768–71; 12 vol-
umes, Naples 1759. See Luig, “Gli elementa iuris civilis di J. G. Heineccius,” pp. 259–
74.
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lecturing, which his son later praised in a laudatory biography. In 1723
Heineccius accepted a professorship at the Frisian University of Fra-
neker. From this small but distinguished university Heineccius’s repu-
tation quickly spread to most of Europe, especially because of his text-
books on Roman law, which was his main area of research and teaching
at Franeker. Despite all attempts to keep him in Franeker, Heineccius
changed to a professorship at the University of Frankfurt an der Oder
in 1727.6
Two years later he declined a position at the University of Utrecht,
but a royal order forced him to return to Halle in 1733 because the
Brandenburg-Prussian government hoped to reestablish the reputation
of this university. Halle had suffered severely from the disputes between
theologians at the university and the philosopher ChristianWolff (1679–
1754), who had been forced to leave Halle in 1723 after he had been ac-
cused of denying the existence of free will. Heineccius spent the rest of
his career in Halle and developed an impressive range of lectures. One
of the products of these was his System, which was first published in 1738
as Elementa iuris naturae et gentium and which saw at least four further
editions.
Heineccius’s Natural Jurisprudence
In the original preface, which Turnbull did not translate, Heineccius
modestly explained that he wanted to provide a short commentary on
the law of nature and nations for his students and pupils. In fact, Hei-
neccius in the System developed a distinctive theory of natural law. He
disagreed, for example, with the view of the state of nature which had
been put forward by Samuel Pufendorf, whose De officio hominis et civis
6. All biographical accounts rely on the information provided by Heineccius’s son,
J. C. G. Heineccius, in De vita, fatis et scriptis Jo. Gottlieb Heineccii iurisconsulti. The
most recent biographical account of Heineccius with detailed information about the
dissemination of his writings is to be found in Bergfeld, “Johann GottliebHeineccius
und die Grundlagen seines Natur- und Vo¨lkerrechts.” On Heineccius’s critique of
Grotius see Reibstein, “Johann Gottlieb Heineccius als Kritiker des grotianischen
Systems.”
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(1673) had become the textbook on natural law throughout much of
northern Europe.7 Humans, Heineccius wrote, were subject to natural
law in the state of nature. It was not enough to say, as Pufendorf did,
that the law of nature was derived from the obligation to cultivate so-
ciality, to which men were compelled by necessity. The law of nature
included duties of humans toward themselves and toward God—duties
which would be applicable even to a solitary human being.8Heineccius’s
tripartite division of the duties of humans into those toward self, others,
and God had its roots in a long intellectual tradition, and it is likely that
Heineccius encountered it in the writings and lectures of his teacher
Christian Thomasius in Halle.9 Heineccius’s definition of the morally
good as “whatever tends to preserve and perfect man” and of a “good
action” as that “which contributes to human preservation and perfec-
tion”10 is also very similar to Thomasius’s definition of the morally good
in his second work on natural law, the Foundations of the Law of Nature
and Nations of 1705: “Do that which makes human life as long-lasting
and happy as possible, and avoid that which makes life unhappy and
hastens death”;11 so is Heineccius’s definition of love as the central prin-
ciple of natural law: “Love in us is the desire of good, joined with delight
in its perfection and happiness.”12 There are only three possible objects
7. Hutcheson suggested that “the learned will at once discern how much of this
compend [his Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria ] is taken from the writings
of others, from Cicero and Aristotle, and to name no other moderns, from Puffen-
dorf ’s smaller work, de officio hominis et civis” (p. i of the 1747 translation, A Short
Introduction to Moral Philosophy ). For Hutcheson’s “struggle with the Pufendorfian
legacy” as Haakonssen puts it on p. 90 of his Natural Law andMoral Philosophy, see
also Schro¨der, “Natural Law and Enlightenment in Comparative Perspective.” For
the widespread influence of Pufendorf throughout the eighteenth century, see Luig,
“Zur Verbreitung des Naturrechts in Europa,” and Dufour, “Die ecole romande du
droit naturel—ihre deutschen Wurzeln.”
8. Heineccius, System, p. 327.
9. See, for example, Thomasius’s Institutiones jurisprudentiae divinae, bk. II,
chaps. 1–3.
10. Heineccius, System, p. 11.
11. “Facienda esse, quae vitam hominum reddunt & maxime diuturnam & feli-
cissimam: & evitanda, quae vitam reddunt infelicem & mortem accelerant” (Tho-
masius, Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium, p. 21.
12. Heineccius, System, p. 68.
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of the offices of love, which correspond to the tripartite division of du-
ties: “God, the creator of all things; ourselves, who are certainly the near-
est to ourselves; and other men, whom we plainly perceive to be bynature
equal to us.”13
Love, as a motive, created an “internal” obligation to perform moral
actions, which, Heineccius is suggesting, are generally also to the ad-
vantage of the agent. But this internal obligation was insufficient, be-
cause mankind was often mistaken about the nature of moral goods and,
like Ixion in ancient mythology, who tried to seduce a cloud in the shape
of the goddess Juno, often embraced false goods. Immorality could be
a reflection of mistaken beliefs, rather than vicious intentions. Heinec-
cius thereby modified the ideas of Christian Thomasius, whohadargued
that the desire for the true good was prior to any beliefs in the intellect.
Once the desire for good, which Thomasius identified with the love for
God, had established itself in human nature, true beliefs about the na-
ture of the morally good followed spontaneously.14 Heineccius, how-
ever, argued that the general desire for what was morally good was not
enough. It was necessary to have a prior rule or standard, which defined
what was to be considered morally good and which directed the abstract
desire for morality toward the right ends. This rule constituted the ex-
ternal obligation arising from the will of some “Being whose authority
we are obliged to acknowledge.”15 In the case of the law of nature this
Being was God: “The law of nature, or the natural rule of rectitude, is
a system of laws promulgated by the eternal God to the whole human
race by reason.”16 Heineccius’s notion of a “rule of rectitude” may well
have been motivated by the desire to correct the radical anti-
intellectualism of Christian Thomasius’s moral theory. Thomasius’s
emphasis on the pre-intellectual guidance of the heart, rather than the
understanding, in moral actions was a position many contemporaries
13. Ibid., p. 68.
14. Thomas Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment,
chap. 7.
15. Heineccius, System, pp. 16–17.
16. Ibid., p. 19.
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associated with “enthusiasm,” a label Heineccius would have been keen
to avoid.17
Turnbull’s Life and His Response to Heineccius
George Turnbull (1698–1748) was one of the key figures of the Scottish
Enlightenment who was familiar with contemporary developments in
European theories of natural law. His education and intellectual for-
mation took place in Edinburgh, where he graduated from the university
there in 1721.18 In 1721 he became a regent at Marischal College, Aber-
deen, where Thomas Reid was among his students.19 Leaving the uni-
versity in 1727, he traveled as tutor of young aristocrats in Europe. After
joining the Anglican Church (bachelor of civil law, Oxford University,
1733) he was ordained in 1739, became chaplain to the Prince of Wales,
and, finally, served as a minister in County Derry. During this period
he started to draw his experiences together in a wide range of different
writings, including his translation of Heineccius.20 His extensive notes
surveyed modern natural law and introduced his readers to significant
authors, such as Johann Franz Budde, who were barely known inBritain.
At the same time, Turnbull’s notes added substantially to the ideas he
found in Heineccius’s work. Often Turnbull developed Heineccius’s
theory to his own liking, telling the reader what the latter really should
have said.
17. On enthusiasm and the Enlightenment see Pocock, “Enthusiasm: The Anti-
Self of Enlightenment,” pp. 7–28; Ahnert, “Enthusiasm and Enlightenment”; and
Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment, especially chap. 2.
18. On Turnbull’s biography and intellectual development see Norton, “George
Turnbull and the Furniture of the Mind,” and Stewart, “George Turnbull and Edu-
cational Reform.”
19. See the introduction by Knud Haakonssen in Reid, Practical Ethics, especially
pp. 7ff.
20. Apart from the work we are concerned with, the most important writings by
Turnbull include A Treatise on Ancient Painting (1740), in part in Education for Life,
edited by Stewart and Wood; Principles of Moral Philosophy (1740) and Christian
Philosophy (1740), which were joined to becomeThe Principles of Moral andChristian
Philosophy (1740), new edition by Broadie; and Observations upon Liberal Education
(1742), new edition by Moore.
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Turnbull accepted Heineccius’s definition of love, for example, as the
central ethical principle of natural law, but criticized his distinction be-
tween internal and external obligation, a distinction which he regarded
as artificial and unnecessary. There was no need for an externalobligation
in the sense of a rule imposed by a superior. The obligation of natural
law was reinforced externally by the natural connection between virtue
and temporal happiness or prosperity. There were exceptions, but on the
whole “the far greater part of the evils and miseries complained of in
human life, are the effects and consequences of vicious passions, and
their pursuits. Whence else is it that honesty is so universallypronounced
the best policy, and dishonesty folly?”21 Punishments for immorality and
rewards for morally good actions were part of the natural order created
by God, not imposed in individual cases by particular acts of the divine
will. There was no need to add another, “external” obligation, a “rule of
rectitude,” to this,22 because the existing, natural connection between
morality and happiness was already a sufficient indication of God’sprov-
idential will for humanity. Moral philosophy, therefore, involved the
study of natural causes and effects, in the same way as natural philoso-
phy.23 The consequence of this natural connection or tendency in hu-
man affairs was that the actual distribution of goods, such as happiness
or wealth in this world, on the whole reflected the virtue and merit of
those who owned or enjoyed them. It is important to note, however, that
although morality was also advantageous, of course not every self-
interested action was automatically virtuous. Turnbull distinguished the
advantages of morality from vulgar notions of self-interest, which were
attributed to Epicureans and the followers of Mandeville and which im-
plied that actions were morally justified because theywere self-interested.
Turnbull’s emphasis on the advantageousness of morality was intended
to prove the existence of a theodicy, in a loose sense, a belief that tem-
21. Turnbull, Principles, ed. Broadie, p. 383. See also Ahnert, “Pleasure, Pain, and
Punishment in the Early Enlightenment.”
22. See Heineccius, System, Turnbull’s comments following bk. I, chap. III (pp.
71–74).
23. Turnbull, Principles, vol. I, “Preface.”
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poral affairs reflected the benevolent influence of a divine justice and
providence.
The rewards for virtue in this life included property. Although the
truly virtuous person knew how to be happy without material goods,
only he or she could “have true happiness from them.”24 It was “a fact
too evident to be called into question” that “man is made to purchase
every thing by industry, and industry only, every good, internal or ex-
ternal.”25 The actual distribution of property, in general, reflected the
merit of its owners, for if “we own a blind fortuitous dispensation of
goods, and much more, if we own a malignant dispensation of them,
or a dispensation of them more in favour of vice than of virtue, we deny
a providence, or assert bad administration.”26 In fact, however, “the uni-
verse is governed by excellent general laws, among which this is one,
‘That industry shall be the purchaser of goods, and shall be generally
successful.’”
This “general law of industry”27 had important implications forTurn-
bull’s political theory. Turnbull believed that political society was essen-
tial for humans to reach the highest degree of happiness possible for
them in this life.28 As Turnbull explained in another work, “many of the
goods of life are by our social constitution dependent upon the right
government of society,” that is, on “a good politic constitution, and the
impartial execution of good laws.”29 Constitutional structures and the
distribution of property were closely related because “a greater share of
external goods, or of property, naturally begets power. And hence it will
and must always hold as a general law, That dominion will follow prop-
erty or that changes in property will beget certain proportional changes
in government.”30 It is this belief in the close connection between gov-
24. Turnbull, Principles, vol. I, part II, chap. iii, p. 390.
25. Turnbull’s remarks on Heineccius, System, bk. I, chap. IX, p. 200.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. “[T]here is a perfection and happiness attainable by a rightly constituted civil
state, to which mankind can no otherwise attain” (Turnbull’s remarks on bk. II, chap.
VI, p. 425).
29. Turnbull, Principles, vol. I, part II, chap. III, p. 392.
30. Ibid.
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ernment and property ownership which helps to explain Turnbull’s
strong interest in the political theory of James Harrington (1611–77),
whom he often quotes at length in his comments on Heineccius’s text.
Harrington’s central aim had been to solve the same problem as his
contemporary Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), the threat of anarchy fol-
lowing from constitutional collapse. However, Turnbull’s interest in
Harrington was more the Englishman’s view of the relationshipbetween
property and political power. Harrington, he said, “reasons from natural
causes in these matters, as natural philosophers do about phenomena
commonly called natural ones.”31 Like Harrington, Turnbull arguedthat
the ownership of property, especially of landed property, was the natural
basis of power. If one man owns far more land than all others taken
together, then the constitution will be that of an absolute monarchy. If
a small group of people holds the greatest proportion of land, this leads
either to aristocracy or a regulated monarchy. Popular government
emerges when “neither one nor the few over-balance the whole peo-
ple.”32 This connection between political power and propertymeant that
Turnbull made his theory of government into a part of his theory of
divine providence and justice. Any form of government which did not
reflect the prevailing balance of property in a society was unnatural and
had to be based on violence. It was possible for humans to influence the
distribution of property, but “wherever, thro’ causes unforeseen by hu-
man prudence, the balance comes to be intirely changed, it is the more
immediately to be attributed to divine providence: And since God can-
not will the cause, but he must also will the necessary effect or conse-
quence, what government soever is in the necessary direction of the
balance, the same is of divine right.”33 Ultimately, the providential dis-
tribution of material goods determined the balance of power within the
state.
Thomas Ahnert
Peter Schro¨der
31. Turnbull’s remarks on bk. II, chap. VI, p. 438.
32. Ibid., p. 430.
33. Ibid., pp. 432.

xix
a note on the text
The present edition is based on the text of the 1741 London edition,which
was a translation of the first edition, published in Latin, in Halle, in 1738.
Heineccius’s and Turnbull’s notes are indicated by asterisks, daggers,
and single square brackets; editorial notes within original notes are con-
tained within double square brackets. All other new editorial notes and
references are indicated by arabic numerals. The “Remarks” sections at
the end of some chapters are by Turnbull.
The original references by Johann Gottlieb Heineccius and George
Turnbull are often incomplete or inaccurate. We have thereforeprovided
the full title when a work is first mentioned by Heineccius or Turnbull,
though it is not always possible to determine the precise editions they
used. In the case of classical authors we refer to modern editions, unless
indicated otherwise in the notes. Full publication details for works cited
in the notes are provided in the bibliography to the extent that this has
been possible. The exact sources of quotations and paraphrases are iden-
tified whenever possible. References to Roman civil law and the Bible
are not explained in the footnotes, unless there are specific reasons for
doing so. The archaic spelling of the 1741 text has been retained, though
printer’s errors have been silently corrected. Page breaks in the original
text are indicated by the use of angle brackets. For example, page 112
begins after <112>.
A general note on references to Roman law: Roman civil law, theCor-
pus Iuris Civilis, includes the Digest, the Code of Justinian, and the In-
stitutes. In references these texts are abbreviated as “D.,” “C.,” and
“Inst.,” respectively. The rest of the reference is to the relevant book and
title of a law—“1. 24. D. de ritu nupt.,” for example, refers to the laws
on the rites of marriage (“de ritu nuptiarum”) in book 24 of the Digest.
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of the law of nature

A METHODICAL SYSTEM
of
Universal Law:
or, the
Laws of Nature and Nations
Deduced
From Certain Principles, and applied
to Proper Cases.
Written in Latin by the celebrated
JO. GOT. HEINECCIUS,
Counsellor of State to the King of Prussia,
and Professor of Philosophy at Hall.
Translated, and illustrated with Notes and Supplements,
By GEORGE TURNBULL, LL. D.
To which is added,
A DISCOURSE upon the Nature and Origine of Moral and Civil
Laws; in which they are deduced, by an Analysis of the Human Mind in
the experimental Way, from our internal Principles and Dispositions.
Natura enim juris ab hominis repetenda natura est.1 Cic.
vol. i.
london:
Printed for J. Noon, at the White-Hart, near Mercer’s Chapel, Cheapside. MDCCXLI.
1. The nature of law has to be derived from human nature.

to
His Royal Highness,
WILLIAM
Duke of Cumberland,
This Translation of
A System of the Law of Nature and Nations, Written in
Latin by the celebrated Jo. Got. Heineccius, Counsellor of
State to the late King of Prussia, and Professor of Philosophy
at Hall: With the Supplements and Discourses added to it,
Is most humbly dedicated,
In Veneration of His Royal Highness’s many great and
amiable Qualities, so becoming His high Birth and exalted
Rank, the suitable Care bestowed upon His Education, and
the Royal Example He has daily before His Eyes, of true
Greatness, and the best Use of Power,
By His Royal Highness’s
most devoted and
most obedient Servant,
George Turnbull.

5preface
The author of this system of the law of nature and nations is so well known,
and in so high esteem in the republic of letters, that it would be arrogance
in me to say any thing in recommendation of his works. Nor need I make
any apology for translating into our language so excellent a book upon a
subject of such universal importance. For the knowledge of justice and equity
must be owned to be necessary in some degree to every one; but to those, in
a particular manner, whose birth and fortunes afford them time and means,
and call upon them to qualify themselves for the higher stations in civil society.
Man, and the rights and duties of man, are certainly the most proper objects
of human study in general. And surely Socrates had reason to say, “That if
no man can be fit to undertake a trade, how mean and mechanical soever,
without having been educated to it, and bestowed some considerable time
upon the learning of it, it must be absurd to think one can be qualified for
discharging public trusts and duties, without having taken great pains to
instruct themselves in the principles of equity, the ends and interests of civil
society, and the nature, spirit, and intention of laws.” I shall only add, that
every science hath its elements; and this treatise at least well deserves to be
called an excellent introduction to the science of laws. As for the notes and
supplements I have added, how far they are necessary, I must leave it to the
reader to judge. The greater part of them relates to one question, viz. The
origine of civil government, which hath not been set in its true light by any
other writer besides him from whom the illustration of this point is here
borrowed. The discourse upon the origine and nature of laws, is an attempt
to introduce the experimental way of reasoning into morals, or to deduce
human duties from internal principles and dispositions in the human mind.
And hence certainly must the virtues belonging to man be deduced: hence
certainly must the laws relating to the human nature and state be inferred,
6 preface
as Cicero in his excellent treatise of laws, has long ago told us.—Quid sit
homini tributum natura, quantam vim rerum optimarum contineat; cu-
jus muneris colendi, efficiendique causa nati, & in lucem editi simus,
quae sit conjunctio hominum, & quae naturalis societas inter ipsos;—
his enim explicatis fons legum & juris inveniri potest. i.e. “’Tis by dis-
covering the qualities and powers with which men are endued by nature;
and the best ends within human reach; the purposes or offices for which we
are fitted and made; and the various bonds by which mankind are knit and
united together, and thus prompted to, and formed for society.—’Tis only by
discovering and unfolding these important matters, that the source of human
rights and duties can be laid open.” I have not translated our author’s preface;
because it is principally designed to shew that the Roman law can now have
no other authority in deciding controversies between independent nations or
states, than as it is founded upon principles of natural equity; and it is filled
up with an enumeration of the titles in the civil law, some have vainly
thought sufficient to determine all questions of this kind, which it would
have been of very little use to have attempted to english.
October 28.
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book i
Of the Law of Nature.
chap. i. Of the origine and foundation of the law of
nature and nations, from page 1. to page 16. with a
supplement to page 19. containing observations upon the
different senses in which obligation is taken by moralists,
and the properest method of proceeding in the deduction
of moral duties. [11]
chap. ii. Concerning the nature and distinguishing
qualities or characteristics of human actions, from page
19. to page 39. with a supplement to page 40.
containing remarks upon the controversy about liberty
and necessity. [30]
chap. iii. Of the rule of human actions, and the true
principle of the law of nature, to page 62. with a
supplement to page 65. containing observations on the
different methods philosophers have taken in deducing
moral obligations, and the justness of our author’s
principle. [51]
chap. iv. Of the application of this rule to actions, and
the differences of actions proceeding from thence to page
81. with a supplement to page 84. containing some
1. In the Contents, the page numbers given in the chapter descriptions are those
from the 1741 edition. The bracketed page numbers in the margin are those from the
Liberty Fund edition.
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observations upon the imputation of actions in foro
divino. [75]
chap. v. Of the duties of man to God, from page 84.
to page 95. with a supplement to page 98. containing
observations upon the evidence, certainty, and manifold
usefulness of true religion. [93]
chap. vi. Of the duties of man to himself, to page 120.
with a supplement, to page 123. containing further
remarks on the moral effects of necessity, and upon the
competition between self-love and duty. [107]
chap. vii. Concerning our absolute and perfect duties
towards (others in general) and of not hurting or
injuring others (in particular) to page 150. with a
supplement to page 153. containing observations on the
moral equality of mankind, and their natural
inequalities, and the necessity of reasoning in morals
from fact, or the real constitution of things. [131]
chap. viii. Concerning our imperfect duties to others, to
page 164. with a supplement, containing observations
upon the distinction between perfect and imperfect
duties, and the equity and perspicuity of the golden
rule, (as it is justly called ) “Do as you would be done
by,” to page 169. [159]
chap. ix. Concerning our hypothetical duties towards
others, and the original acquisition of dominion or
property, to page 196. with a supplement to page 201.
upon the origine, foundation, and necessary effects of
property. [175]
chap. x. Of derivative acquisitions of dominion or
property made during the life of the first proprietor, to
page 215. [206]
chap. xi. Of derivative acquisitions by succession to
last-will, and to intestates, to page 230. [219]
chap. xii. Concerning the rights and duties which arise
from property or dominion, to page 243. with a
orig inal contents 9
supplement upon prescription, and the distinctions used
by writers on the law of nature and nations about
belonging to the law of nature, directly and indirectly,
&c. to page 250. [232]
chap. xiii. Concerning things belonging to commerce to
page 295. with a supplement to page 299. upon usury,
and the different regulations civil states may make about
money. [252]
chap. xiv. Concerning pacts, to page 314. [296]
chap. xv. Concerning the means by which contracts are
dissolved, to page 322. with a supplement upon pacts,
and remarks upon the progress our author hath made in
this first book. [309]
book i i
Of the Law of Nations.
chap. i. Concerning the natural and social state of
man, from page 1. to page 18. with a supplement to
page 23. in vindication of the constitution of things as
they relate to mankind; and concerning the method of
determining all questions about the duties of societies to
societies. [323]
chap. ii. Of the duties belonging to the matrimonial
state or society, to page 44. [346]
chap. iii. Of the duties that belong to parents and
children, to page 63. [366]
chap. iv. Concerning the duties belonging to masters
and servants, to page 73. [383]
chap. v. Of the complex society called a family, and the
duties to be observed in it, to page 80. with a
supplement in answer to those who derive absolute
monarchy from family government, the origins of civil
government, to page 85. [393]
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chap. vi. Of the origine of civil society, its constitution,
qualities, or properties, to page 109. with a supplement,
containing remarks on the natural causes of government,
and of changes in government, to page 119. [405]
chap. vii. Of sovereignty, and the ways of acquiring it,
with notes interspersed relative to the measures of
submission to civil government, to page 145. with a
supplement to shew the true end of civil government,
and to vindicate mankind from the aspersion of their
being incapable of government truly equal, to page 150. [439]
chap. viii. Concerning the immanent rights of majesty,
and the just exercise of them, to page 184. [468]
chap. ix. Concerning the transeunt rights of majesty, to
page 214. [498]
chap. x. Of the duties of subjects, to page 222. [523]
With a supplement concerning the duties of magistrates
and subjects, to which are prefixed some observations on
the study of the laws of nature and nations, to page
247. [531]
To all which is added a discourse on the nature and
origine of moral and civil laws, in which moral and
civil laws are deduced, in the experimental way, by an
analysis of human nature, from our internal dispositions
and principles, and our situation. [551]
11
the laws of
Nature and Nations deduced, &c.
book i
Of the Law of Nature
u ch a p t e r i u
Concerning the origine and foundation of
the Law of Nature and Nations.
s e c t i on i
Whatever tends to preserve and perfect man is called good with respect
to man: whatever hath a contrary tendency is called ill with regard to
him:* every action therefore which contributes to human preservation
and perfection is a good action; and every action is evil which tends to
hurt and destroy man, or to hinder his advancement to the perfection
of which his nature is capable.
* This is the true idea of perfection according to Simplicius, who upon Epictetus
Enchir. cap. 34. observes, to have not only a beginning and a middle, but likewise an
end, is the characteristick of perfection. [[Simplicius, On Epictetus’ Handbook (Com-
mentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti ).]] So Aristotle likewise, in Meta. c. 4. 16. where
having examined the meaning of several different terms, he reduces them all to the
same idea. [[Aristotle, The Metaphysics.]]
What consti-
tutes a good,
and what a
bad action?
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s e c t i on i i
Whatever conduces in any manner or degree towards our duration, or
the continuance of our present state, is said to be preservative of man:
whatever promotes and augments those properties, which belonging to
human nature, and constituting our state and rank, admits of degrees,
is called perfective of man.* Whence it is easy to under-<2>stand what
may be said to hurt, wrong, or degrade us.
s e c t i on i i i
Such being the nature of human will, that it always desires good, and
abhors ill; † it cannot but like those actions which tend to ourpreservation
and perfection, and it cannot but dislike those actions which tend to our
hurt and imperfection: But because good and ill may be really what they
appear to be, and on the other hand, a seeming good may be a real evil,
and a seeming evil may be a real good; † it very often happens, that like
Ixion in the fable, we embrace an empty cloud instead of Juno; 1 i.e. we
are deceived by appearances, and mistake seeming for solid good, and a
false semblance of ill for real ill; and thus we may make a bad or a good
choice, be right or wrong in our elections, and consequently in our
actions.†
* [[See note on previous page.]]
† This is observed by Simplicius upon Epictet. Enchir. cap. 34. where he greatly
exalts human liberty, and defines it to be that free constitution of the human mind,
in consequence of which it voluntarily, and without any constraint, sometimes pur-
sues true, and sometimes imaginary good.
1. Ixion was invited to a banquet by Jupiter but planned to seduce Jupiter’s wife,
Juno. Jupiter, however, deceived him by shaping an image of Juno out of a cloud.
When Ixion embraced the cloud, he was caught by Jupiter and punished.
What preserva-
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s e c t i on i v
Now the power of preferring one or other of two possibles, and by con-
sequence of acting well or ill, is called liberty: this power we experience;
wherefore it cannot be denied that there are, with regard to us, free ac-
tions which are good, and free actions which are bad. But since all things,
which may be <3> rightly directed or perverted, stand in need of a rule
by which they may be rightly directed, it follows that our free actions
ought to be directed by some rule.*
s e c t i on v
By a rule here we understand an evident criterion by which good and ill
may be certainly distinguished. And in order to answer that end, a rule
must be true, right or just, clear, certain and constant. For suppose the
rule not to be just, and that which is ruled by it will not be just or right.
Suppose it not to be clear and certain, and it cannot be a sure criterion
of good and evil. Finally, if we suppose it to be uncertain and variable,
an action regulated by it will sometimes be good and sometimes be bad:
and therefore in none of these cases would it deserve the name of a rule.†
* Thus Epictetus reasons in Arrian, l. 2. c. xi. Do you think all things are right
which appear to be such to any one? but how can things, which are directly repugnant
to one another, be both right? it is not therefore enough to make a thing right that
it appears to some one to be such, since in weighing or measuring things we do not
trust to appearances, but apply a standard. For shall there be a certain measure with
regard to these things, and none other with respect to our actions besides fancy or
appearance? How can it be that there should be no rule, or none which can be as-
certained with respect to human conduct, than which nothing is so necessary? [[Ar-
rian (ca. 95–180), Greek historian. See Epictetus, The Discourses . . . , the Manual, and
Fragments, vol. 1, bk. II, chap. xi, 287.]]
† So true is that of Lucret. de rerum nat. l. 4. v. 515.
Si prava est regula prima,
Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,
Et libella aliqua si ex parte claudicat hilum:
Omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa, necessum est,
Prava, cubantia, prona, supina atque absona tecta,
Jam ruere ut quaedam videantur velle, ruantque,
Prodita judiciis fallacibus omnia primis.
Wherefore
men stand in
need of some
rule by which
they may
direct their
actions.
And this rule
must be right
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s e c t i on v i
Further, a rule of action would be but of little advantage to mankind,
if it were not of such a kind, <4> that it carried with it some motive (as
it is called) by which human will might be impelled to make use of it,
and apply it. Because man never acts without something present to his
mind, by which he is excited or impelled to act; he will therefore not
apply a rule, or at least he will be very indifferent whether he applies it
or no, unless he be stimulated by some motive to apply it. But since we
call the connection between a motive and a free action obligation, that
a rule for the direction of human actions may answer its end, it must be
obligatory.
s e c t i on v i i
Obligation is a connection between motives and free actions, (§6) and
motives must consist either in the intrinsic goodness and pravity of ac-
tions themselves, or arise from the will of some Being whose authority
we acknowledge, commanding and forbidding certain actions under a
penalty. And therefore the former species of obligation is called internal;
the latter is called external. * The first excites to good actions, the other
[[Lucretius, De rerum natura 4.513–19: “Lastly, as in a building, if the original
rule is warped, if the square is faulty and deviates from straight lines, if the
level is a trifle wrong in any part, the whole will necessarily be made in a
faulty fashion and be falling over, warped, sloping, leaning forward, leaning
back, all out of proportion, so that some parts seem about to collapse on
the instant, and some do collapse, all betrayed by false principles at the
beginning.”]]
* We don’t deny that the internal is the nobler species of obligation, being that
which influences all wise and good men, according to the noted maxim:
Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore.
[[Horace, Epistles 1.16.52, in Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica: “The good hate
vice because they love virtue.”]]
It is true the ancients praise the primitive race of mankind in the early ages of the
world chiefly on this account, that they acted well, and did good and right, without
any law compelling them to such conduct, from a virtuous disposition, and with free
It must
likewise be
obligatory.
What is obli-
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to just actions. But right is the correlate (as it is called in the schools) to
both. For if one person be under an obligation, some other person hath
a right or title to exact something from him.
s e c t i on v i i i
Hence it is manifest, that a rule which carries only an internal obligation
with it, is not sufficient with respect to mankind: for since this obligation
solely arises from the goodness of the action, (§7), and therefore only
excites a person to act by this motive, viz. that his action may be good;
but man is so framed by nature, that he often embraces a false appearance
of good for what is really such:* (§3). Such a rule must be uncertain, and
for that reason it is not deserving of being called a rule (§5). <5>
s e c t i on i x
But if a rule only carrying an internal obligation with it, would be un-
certain, there is need of one which may produce an external obligation
arising from the will of some Being whose authority we acknowledge.
Since therefore that Being may oblige us to the practice of virtue and
honesty, either without co-action, or may command and forbid certain
choice. (Seneca, Ep. 90. “The first of mankind, and their progeny, followed the dic-
tates of pure uncorrupted nature as their law and guide.” [[Seneca (the Younger), Ad
Lucilium epistulae morales, vol. 2, 397.]] So Ovid likewise, Metam. l. 1. v. 90. [[Ovid,
Metamorphoses, vol. 1, 1.90: “Golden was the first age, which, with no one to compel,
without a law, of its own will, kept faith and did the right.”]] So Tacitus Ann. 3. 26.
[[Tacitus, The Annals of Tacitus, vol. 1, bk. 3, chap. 26]] and Salust. Catil. cap. 9.
[[“The War with Catiline,” chap. 9, in Sallust]]). But we deny it to be sufficient to
constitute a rule, because we are enquiring after one founded in nature, and common
to the good and bad, wise and foolish, in such a manner, that when reason is not able
to keep them to their duty, an external obligation, or which comes to the same thing,
the fear of suffering may restrain them.
Ne vaga prosiliat fraenis natura remotis.
Horat. l. 2. Serm. sat. 7. v. 74.
[[Horace, Satires II, 7.74: “Lest, when the reins are removed, nature should
break out and [go] wandering.”]]
* [[See preceding note.]]
Internal obli-
gation is not
sufficient.
An external
obligation
either perfect
or imperfect
is therefore
wanting.
16 the laws of nature and nations
actions with penalties and rewards, the former species of external obli-
gation is properly denominated imperfect, and the latter perfect. Now
the will of a superior commanding and forbidding under penalty is
called a law: and therefore a rule for the direction of our free actions, to
conform to which we are under perfect obligation, must consist of laws,
and a system of such is termed by way of eminence law. * <6>
s e c t i on x
Now, since that Being may be justly denominated our superior, upon
whom our being and happiness absolutely depend, and whose authority
we are obliged to acknowledge, because he has a just title to exact obe-
dience from us, and hath power to propose penalties to us in case of our
refusing to obey him; and, it appears by many most evident arguments,
that he never hath renounced, nor never can renounce his authority to
rule and command us:† That superior Being whose authority we are
* ( Jus ) Law, when it is used to signify a rule of human action, is a system of all
the laws of one and the same kind. (Elem. Inst. §33.) [[Heineccius, Elementa iuris
civilis secundum ordinem institutionum ]] ( Jus ) Law therefore, ’tis plain from the or-
igine of the word itself, cannot be conceived, without referring it to the will of a
superior, and supposing an external obligation. For it is not derived from De´on, as
Menage would have it, Amoen. Juris. cap. 39. p. 295 [[Me´nage, Iuris civilis amoeni-
tates ]]; nor from Jove, as Scipio, Gent. Orig. p. 270 [[Gentili, Originum ad Pandectas
liber singularis ]] has asserted, and after him Grotius, Proleg. Jur. belli & pacis, §12
[[Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, Prolegomena, §12]]; but from the Word jubendo. For
instead of Jura, the ancients used jusa or jussa. Festus, jusa, jura. [[Festus, De ver-
borum significatu. ]] So Hieron. Magii, var. lect. 4. 1. [[Magius, Variarumlectionum. ]]
In like manner, the German word Recht is shewn by Jo. Geo. Wachter. Gloss. p. 1251
[[Wachter, Glossarium Germanicum ]], to include in it the idea of law, or the will of
a superior directing human actions.
† Not only is the perfection and goodness of a Being a just title to exact obedience,
as is affirmed by Mos. Amyraldus Disser. de jure Dei in res creatas [[Amyraldus, De
jure dei in creaturas dissertatio ]], agreeably to that well known saying of Democritus:
fu´sei to` a⁄rxein oi◊kh´i¨on t d◊ krei´ssoni. Authority falls by nature to the share of whatw˜Ÿ
is best. Stob. Serm. 37. [[Democritus (ca. 460–370 b.c.), Greek philosopher. The
saying quoted by Heineccius was included in the Sermones, an anthology of excerpts
from poets and prose writers compiled by Joannes Stobaeus (fl. fifth century a.d.)
and intended for the instruction of his son. The standard modern critical edition is
Stobaeus, Anthologium. ]] But dependence is also such. For who will deny that he hath
Of this law
there can be
no other au-
thor but God.
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obliged to acknowledge, can be no other than the most great and good
God; and he therefore is the sole author of that law, which ought, as we
have said, to be the rule of action to all mankind. <7>
a just claim to our obedience to whom we owe our existence and preservation? God
therefore hath a right to command our submission and obedience: He in whom we
live, move, and have our being, Acts 17. 28. Besides, that he can inflict punishments
on the disobedient and rebellious, his omnipotence and justice leave no room to
doubt. (Elem. phil. mor. §185 & seq.) Finally, if he had, or should ever renounce his
authority over men, and all created beings, that would be unworthy of his wisdom
and goodness; because, being infinitely wise, he must know that we would be most
miserable without his government and rule, and being infinitely good, he cannot
abandon his creature, which cannot guide itself, and so expose it to the greatest mis-
ery. But what is repugnant to his wisdom and goodness, that he can neither will nor
do, it is allowed. Wherefore, he neither will nor can renounce his supreme jurisdiction
over men and all creatures. It is proper to observe this in opposition to the celebrated
Leibnitz [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), German philosopher and math-
ematician]], who, the illustrious Sam. a Cocceis [[Samuel Freiherr von Cocceji (1679–
1755), Prussian jurist]], Disser. de principio juris naturalis unico vero adaequato, pub-
lished at Francf. 1699, having by solid arguments demonstrated that there can be no
other principle of natural law but the will of God, in the 1700, Ephemeridibus Han-
overanis for the month of July, objected against that hypothesis, among other things,
“That according to it, if we suppose a creature to have so much power, that being
once produced by its creator, it could not be compelled by him; such a creature must
be considered as manumitted by its creator, in the same manner as children, when
they come to such a degree of power, that they cannot be compelled by their parents.”
For to suppose such a case, is the wildest extravagance, since it implies a manifest
contradiction, to imagine a finite Creature arrived to such power that it can no longer
be compelled by its Creator, an infinitely powerful Being. And no less absurd are all
the other fictions he puts, in order to invalidate that learned man’s doctrine, as this
for instance, “That if we suppose an evil genius to have supreme uncontroulable
power, such an evil genius would not, because irresistible, cease to be wicked, unjust
and tyranical.” For we cannot suppose an evil genius to have supreme power, if we
believe the divine existence. And if we deny the existence of God, it is absurd to
suppose an evil genius, or indeed any created thing to exist. It is a strong argument
of truth, when a proposition cannot be overturned but by suppositions which include
a manifest contradiction.
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s e c t i on x i
Because we are enquiring, as appears from what hath been said, for no
other rule of right but what <8> God hath given to the whole human
race for the rule of their conduct, (§10) hence it follows that this rule
must be intelligible to all mankind. But since what is intelligible to, or
may be known by all mankind, must be discovered to them either by a
divine revelation, which all men acknowledge and receive as such, or
must be discoverable by the use of natural reason; because such a reve-
lation as hath been mentioned never existed: it is obvious that the law
of nature must mean laws within the discovery of all mankind by the
use of reason common to all mankind, and which therefore are by nature
promulgated to all mankind.*
* Hence Cicero in his oration for Milo, c. 4. calls it Jus non scriptum sed natum.
“Law, or a rule of rectitude not written but cogenial; a rule which we have not learned,
read, received by tradition, but which nature itself hath impressed upon us, andwhich
we imbibe and draw from it; to the knowledge of which we are not formed andtrained
by education or example, but we are originally tinctured and stamped with it.” [[See
Cicero, Pro Annio Milone, in The Speeches, trans. Watts.]] So the apostle likewise
says, “The Gentiles, which have not the law, are a law unto themselves, which shew
the works of the law written in their hearts” [[a reference to Romans 2:14]]. This
cannot be otherwise than by reasoning; and therefore by the right use of reason: this
is the unanimous doctrine of all, who have, as it were, by compact, placed the law
of nature in the dictates of right reason; a few only excepted, who have maintained
there is nothing just or right by nature, as Archelaus in Laertius, 2. 16. [[Diogenes
Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers ]] Aristippus, according to the same writer, 2.
93. Carneades in Lactantius, Instit. divin. c. 14. & 19. [[Lactantius, The Divine Insti-
tutes ]] Pyrrho in Sextus Empyricus, Hypot. 3. 24. [[Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scep-
ticism (Pyrroneioi hypotyposeis )]] and to those Aristotle may be added, who, as Menage
has proved at the 7. 128. p. 311. of Laertius [[a reference to the comments by Gilles
Me´nage on an edition of Diogenes Laertius’s Lives, the De vitis et dogmatis et Apo-
phtegmatis eorum qui in philosophia claruerunt ]], was not far from that opinion.
This law is
made known
to mankind in
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s e c t i on x i i
The law of nature, or the natural rule of rectitude, is a system of laws
promulgated by the eternal God to the whole human race by reason. But
if you would rather consider it as a science, na-<9>tural morality will
be rightly defined the practical habit of discovering the will of the su-
preme legislator by reason, and of applying it as a rule to every particular
case that occurs. Now, because it consists in deducing and applying a
rule coming from God, it may be justly called divine jurisprudence.
s e c t i on x i i i
Since the law of nature is a system of laws (§12) whatever properly be-
longs to laws may be ascribed to the law of nature, as to prohibit, permit,
punish.* It may be divided as a body of laws is by the Roman lawyers
into the permissive part, which obliges all men not to disturb any person
in the use and exercise of his right and liberty; and the preceptive, which
obliges all men to do good actions, and to abstain from bad ones; and
it is also evident, that with respect to the preceptive part, there is no
liberty left to mankind; whereas, with regard to the permissive, any one
may renounce his right to what is permitted to him.* <10>
* The permissive part of the law of nature constitutes therefore a rule: The pre-
ceptive makes an exception. For God leaves all to human liberty, which he hath nei-
ther commanded nor forbid. Thus, e.g. God having only prohibited our first parents
the tree of knowledge of good and evil, they had good reason to infer that they were
permitted to eat of all the other fruits, Gen. iii. 2, 3. Where no obligation of law takes
place, there liberty is entire. But hence it must not be concluded, that a permissive
law carries no obligation with it. For it obliges all mankind not to disturb any one in
the use of his liberty. Thus, e.g. because God has permitted every one to appropriate
to his use whatever is not yet appropriated by any person, or belongs to none, and
thus to constitute dominion and property, theft, rapine, fraud, depredation, &c. can-
not but be unlawful and unjust.
A definition of
the law of
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s e c t i on x i v
Now seeing the law of nature comes from God (§12) as the supreme
legislator, it follows by consequence, that tho’ a person may do a good
action, without any regard to the law of nature as such, being excited to
it by the internal goodness or obligation of the action, and by his good
disposition; tho’ even an atheist, who hath no sense of religion, may do
a good action thro’ the influence and guidance of his reason, because he
knows it to be good in itself, and advantageous to him; yet such a person
cannot on that account be said to act justly, i.e. conformably to the law
of nature considered as such; much less then can it be said, that there
would still be a law of nature,* tho’ it should be granted, which cannot
be done without impiety, that there were no God, or that God did not
take any care of human affairs. See Grotius proleg. jur. belli & pacis, §xi.
s e c t i on xv
Since the rule of rectitude we are now speaking of signifies laws pro-
mulgated by right reason, <11> (§12) and reason is nothing else but the
faculty of reasoning, or of inferring one truth from others by necessary
* They cut the nerves, so to speak, of the law of nature, who conceive or define
it independently of all regard to God, and thus feign a law to themselves without a
lawgiver. All who have philosophized about it with accuracy as well as religiously,
have acknowledged, that it proceeds from God as its founder and author, and that
if the divine existence be denied, there remains no difference between just and unjust.
God, in order to incite Abraham to the love and practice of justice, says to him, “I
am the Almighty God, walk before me, and be thou perfect,” Gen. xvii. 1. And the
Apostle, Heb. xi. 6. says, “He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that
he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” Yea Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, l.
2. says, “I don’t know whether piety towards God being removed, all sociality and
fidelity among men, and justice, the most excellent of virtues, would not likewise
be destroyed.” [[Cicero, De natura deorum 1.2, in Cicero, De natura deorum, Aca-
demica. ]]
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consequence,* it is therefore plain why the apostle affirms that the
knowledge of this rule is engraved on our hearts, Rom. ii. 15. For he at-
tributes to man the power or faculty of reasoning concerning just and
unjust; which power, since it does not necessarily include in it actual
exercise, why some should ascribe even to infants a certain innate sense
of just and unjust, is not difficult to be comprehended.
s e c t i on xv i
Hence it follows that the law of nature is not derived from the sacred
writings, nor from any divine positive laws, such as the seven precepts
given to Noah, of which the Jews boast so much;† tho’ at the same time
we readily grant, that the author of reason and revelation being the same,
not only many things which reason dictates are to be found in the sacred
* Grotius insists much on the emphasis of this phrase, Grot. upon the Epistle to
the Romans, ii. 15. and Joan. Clericus Art. Crit. part. 2. sect. 1. cap. 4. §10. [[ Jean le
Clerc ( Johannes Clericus) (1657–1736) was born in Geneva but lived most of his life
in Amsterdam. He was a central figure in the republic of letters with close connections
to England, including Locke and Addison, and a biblical scholar who became pro-
fessor of ecclesiastical history in the Remonstrant seminary. The work referred to
here is his Ars critica of 1697. A German edition appeared in three volumes in Leipzig
in 1713.]] who maintain that it means no more than that the law of nature may be
easily discovered and retained without the assistance of a teacher, and they have ac-
cumulated several passages of ancient authors in which e◊ggra´fein [[e◊ggra´fein: to
write, to inscribe]] signifies nothing else. But this subject has been fully treated by
Jo. Franc. Bud. Inst. Theo. mor. part. 2. c. 2. §5. where he has also examined Mr.
Locke’s opinion with great accuracy. [[ Johann Franz Budde (1667–1729), German
theologian and philosopher; professor of moral philosophy at the newly founded
University of Halle, where he taught Heineccius. He professed an eclecticism which
rested on a broad historical foundation and was very critical of the “atheist” Spinoza.
The work referred to here is Budde’s Institutiones theologiae moralis. ]]
† How the Hebrews derive the law of nature and nations from the seven precepts
given to Noah, is shewn by Jo. Selden, de jure nat. & gent. secundum discipl. He-
braeorum. [[ John Selden (1584–1654), lawyer, politician, humanist scholar. The ref-
erence is to De jure naturali et gentium juxta disciplinam Ebraeorum. ]] But tho’ the
learned Budaeus Introd. ad philosoph. Heb. p. 14. and 15 [[Budde, Introductio ad
historiam philosophiae ebraeorum ]], thinks that tradition concerning the seven pre-
cepts given to Noah, does not want some foundation; yet it cannot be now proved,
that ever any such precepts were given to Noah, and tho’ some things that were com-
manded or forbidden by these precepts be now known to the posterity of Noah; they
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writings, but there is every where a perfect harmony between them; nor
can there indeed be any thing forbidden or commanded in the sacred
oracles which is repugnant to the rule of right discoverableby reason.<12>
s e c t i on xv i i
Further, from the same principle it is evident that the law of nature is
no less immutable than right reason it self, which cannot but remain
unchangeably the same: and therefore God, who cannot do any thing
contrary to his will, cannot give any indulgence repugnant to that eternal
law in any respect; and much less can any among mortals arrogate to
himself any power over that law.*
s e c t i on xv i i i
Nor will it now be difficult to find out the difference between the law
of nature and civil law. For the former is discovered by right reason, the
latter is promulgated and made known either viva voce or by writing.
The former extends as far as right reason: the other is the law of a par-
ticular state: The former hath for its object all actions internal as well as
external, which are by nature good or evil: The other respects indifferent
and ex-<13>ternal actions, so far only as the good of any people or state
requires their regulation and adjustment.†
are known to them not by tradition but by reason, and therefore they are not positive
laws, but laws promulgated by right reason.
* Cicero says elegantly, The law of nature cannot be altered, nothing can be der-
ogated from it, much less can it be totally abrogated. We cannot be discharged from
it by the senate or by the people; neither are we to look out for any explainer or
interpreter of this law, besides reason itself. There is not one law of equity for Rome,
another for Athens; one for former and another for present times, but the same law
binds all nations at all times. All men have one common universal Lord, Ruler, and
Lawgiver, God the founder, the establisher of reason, and the judge of all reasonable
Beings. [[Cicero, De re publica 3.22, in Cicero, De re publica, De legibus.]] To this
Ulpian consents as we have shewn elsewhere. L. 6. pr. D. de just. & jure. [[Domitius
Ulpianus (ca. 160–228), Roman jurist.]]
† Cicero de Invent. l. 38. “All laws ought to be referred to the publick interest of
the state, and to be interpreted not according to the letter, but as the end of laws,
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s e c t i on x i x
But notwithstanding this difference, it is beyond all doubt, that the
knowledge of the law of nature must be of the greatest use to all who
apply themselves to the study of the civil law; because many of its pre-
cepts are adopted by civil law, and by it are fortified with additional pen-
alties;* several conclusions are drawn from the law of nature by civil law;
publick good, requires. Such was the wisdom and virtue of our ancestors, that they
proposed no other end to themselves in making laws but the safety and happiness of
the state: they either never enacted into laws what was hurtful, or if they happened
to do so, such a law was no sooner known to be hurtful than it was abolished. No
person desires the observation of laws for their own sake, but for the good of the
republick.” [[Cicero, De inventione 1.38, 112–13, in Cicero, De inventione, De optimo
genere oratorum, Topica.]] They are therefore much mistaken who will have what they
call natural law to be founded merely on interest, according to that sayingof Epicurus,
Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum,
Sola est utilitas justi prope mater & aequi.
Hor. Ser. l. 3.
[[Horace, Satires I 3.113: “Nature cannot distinguish between the just and
the unjust [right and wrong]; utility is almost the only mother of what is just
and right.”]]
It is true God being infinitely wise and good commands nothing by the law of nature,
but what is useful; but he does not command it because it is useful, but because it is
agreeable to his nature and will. An action is not just because it is advantageous, but
it is advantageous because it is just. For, as was nobly said by Mar. Ant. Imp. l.7.74.
“Every action agreeable to nature is advantage or interest.” [[Marcus Aurelius, Med-
itations, vol. 1, 144–45.]] But this error hath been sufficiently refuted by Grotius, Pro-
leg. jur. bell. & pac. §16. Puffendorff de jur. nat. & gent. L. 2, 3, 10, 11. and the illustrious
Sam. de Coccei, de princip. jur. nat. & gent. §2, 9.
* This is observed by Hesiod in that celebrated passage of his book, Oper. & Dier.
v. 274. To´nde gar, &c. [[Hesiod, Works and Days, lines 276ff.]] The meaning of
which is, Brute animals devour one another, because they have no idea of justice, but
to men nature hath given a sense of justice, which far exalts them above the brute
creation. Jac. Cujacius hath not removed the difficulty in his notes ad Inst. p.8. tom.
1. by saying, “What the brutes do by a natural impulse, if men do the same by reason,
they act according to the law of nations.” [[A reference to the notes on Justinian’s
Institutes by the French humanist jurist Jacques Cujas, or Jacobus Cujacius (1522–
90), which are included in vol. 1 of his collected works (Cujas, Opera omnia ).]] For
thus an action will not be agreeable to the law of nature and nations merely because
brute animals do the same, but because it is acting by the direction of right reason.
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and natural equity must never be severed from civil law, lest according
to the ancient saying, Strict law become severe injustice. Summum jus
summa injuria. <14>
s e c t i on xx
Moreover from the same principle it is visible, that no other creatures
besides men are subject to this law; since God hath dignified man alone
with the prerogative of reason; and therefore that definition of Ulpian
is false. Natural law is a law which nature hath taught all animals. L. 1.
§3. Dig. de just. & jure. *
s e c t i on xx i
Further, since the law of nature comprehends all the laws promulgated
to mankind by right reason; and men may be considered either as par-
ticulars singly, or as they are united in certain political bodies or societies;
we call that law, by which the actions of particulars ought to be gov-
erned, the law of nature, and we call that the law of nations, which de-
termines what is just and unjust in society or between societies. And
therefore the precepts, the laws of both are the same; nay, the law of
nations is the law of nature it self, respecting or applied to social life and
the affairs of societies and independent states.† <15>
* [[See preceding note.]]
† The law of nature is therefore of a larger extent than the law of nations; for
there is nothing dictated or prescribed by right reason, to which every particular is
not obliged in some manner to conform himself. But there are certain parts of the
law of nature, which cannot so properly be applied to whole societies, e.g. The laws
and rights belonging to matrimony, paternal power, &c.
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s e c t i on xx i i
Hence we may infer, that the law of nature doth not differ from the law
of nations, neither in respect of its foundation and first principles, nor
of its rules, but solely with regard to its object. Wherefore their opinion
is groundless, who speak of, I know not what, law of nations distinct
from the law of nature. The positive or secondary law of nations devised
by certain ancients, does not properly belong to that law of nations we
are now to treat of, because it is neither established by God, nor pro-
mulgated by right reason; it is neither common to all mankind nor
unchangeable.*
s e c t i on xx i i i
It will not therefore be an useless attempt to treat of both these laws,
which have the same foundation <16> in the same work, in such a man-
ner however, as carefully to distinguish the one from the other, since they
differ from one another in respect of their objects and application. We
shall therefore handle them separately in this order; in the first book, we
* Many things which are referred to the positive law of nations, arise either from
the law of nature itself, or from customs, or from some certain law common to many
nations. Thus the rights of ambassadors, for the greater part, are deducible from the
law of nature. Many things were observed among the Greeks, which barbarous na-
tions payed no regard to, v.g. giving a truce to the vanquished to carry off their killed.
The manners and customs of the Germans became afterwards common almost to all
nations, as Grotius has observed, de jure belli & pacis, 2. 8. 1. 2. In fine, even among
christian customs, some have so far fallen into desuetude, that there is no remaining
vestige of them. Leibnitz, praefat. Cod. jure gent. dipl. p. 8. who observes, that many
things established by the pope of Rome as head of the christian state, are held for the
common law of christian nations. [[See Leibniz, Codex iuris gentium diplomaticus,
vol. 1, Praefatio ad Lectorem, 9.]] This Hertius & Puffend. de jure nat. & gentium,
l. 2. c. 3. §23. illustrates by an example, from the use of cross-bows against christians.
[[Heineccius’s reference is to the notes by the German jurist Johann NikolausHertius
(1651–1710) on Samuel Pufendorf, Acht Bu¨cher vom Natur- und Vo¨lkerrecht. A phi-
losopher, jurist, and historian, Pufendorf (1632–94) was one of the most influential
theorists of natural law in the early European Enlightenment. This work is a German
translation of his seminal De jure naturae et gentium of 1672.]]
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shall enquire into the law of nature; and in the second, into the law of
nations.
Remarks on This Chapter
Tho’ our Author proceeds more distinctly and methodically than most
other writers on the law of nature and nations, yet some steps of the
reasoning of this chapter do not intirely satisfy me. For §8. he reasons
thus, “A rule carrying along with it no more than internal obligation
would be uncertain, and so would not deserve the name of a rule; be-
cause internal obligation only means the intrinsic goodness of an ac-
tion, but man is so framed that he may mistake seeming for real
good.”—Whence he concludes §9. “That no rule can be certain, and
thus sufficient for our direction, but that which carries along with it an
external obligation, i.e. according to his definition, the command of a
superior invested with sufficient power to enforce his commands.”
Now it is plain, that the command of God to do, or to forbear an action
can only be inferred from the intrinsic goodness or pravity of that ac-
tion, i.e. in our author’s language, the external obligation of an action
can only be inferred from its internal obligation. Our author acknowl-
edges this §5, and afterwards §60, and §77, & seq. But this being true,
it evidently follows, That we cannot be more certain about the external
obligation of an action, than we are about its internal obligation:what-
ever uncertainty our apprehensions of the latter are liable to, our ap-
prehensions of the former must be liable to the same uncertainty. It
appears to me very odd reasoning to say, That considering how ob-
noxious men are to mistakes about good and evil, there must be a more
certain rule for human conduct than the intrinsic goodness of actions,
even the divine will; when at the same time we are told, that we cannot
come at the knowledge of the divine will with respect to our conduct,
otherwise than by first knowing what an action is in itself; or that we
can only infer the divine will concerning an action from its intrinsic
nature, its intrinsic goodness or pravity. In order to cut off many verbal
disputes, with which the moral science hath been hitherto perplexed
in its very first steps, it ought in my opinion to set out in this manner.
1. If there be such a thing as good or evil belonging to, or arising from
actions, there is an internal obligation or a sufficient reason to choose
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the one and to abhor the other. But that some actions are good and
others evil, must be true if preservation and destruction, pain <17> and
pleasure, happiness and misery, perfection and imperfection, be not
words without meaning, which will not be said. This is the substance
of what our author says in his first section, and thus the better antients
deduced and explained the essential differences of actions, or the nat-
ural difference betwixt virtue and vice. See my Principles of moral and
christian philosophy, T. 1. c. 5. t. 2. §3. introduction. In other words, if
there be any such thing as natural good and evil, there must be moral
good and evil; for actions tending to good must be good, and actions
tending to evil must be evil; or if there be any such thing as perfection
and imperfection with respect to any quality, any being, as a vine, a
horse, &c. there must likewise be such a thing as perfection and im-
perfection with respect to moral powers and moral agents and their acts
or exertions. 2. If there be a God, he must will that we should regulate
our actions by, and act conformably to the internal obligation of ac-
tions. But that there is a God is the universal plain language of nature.
3. Wherefore wherever there is internal obligation to act in such or such
a manner, there is likewise an external obligation to act in the same
manner, i.e. there is an extrinsic reason for acting so, arising from the
will of God, who is infinitely perfect, and upon whom all our interests
here and hereafter absolutely depend. 4. Whatever therefore in respect
of its internal obligation may be called a proper rule of conduct, is at
the same time a law, in the proper and strict sense of the word, i.e. it
is the will, the command of a superior who hath right to command,
and power to enforce the obedience of his commands, being the will
of God the creator. 5. A system of rules or of directions for our conduct,
having internal obligation, may be properly called a system of laws, of
natural laws, of divine laws, because it is a system of precepts discov-
erable from their natural fitness, or internal obligation to be the will or
laws of God concerning our conduct. And therefore the whole enquiry
into rules of moral conduct, may be called an enquiry into the natural
laws of God concerning our conduct.
It is not properly the business of such an enquiry to prove the being
of a God, and that where there is internal obligation to an action, there
must also be external obligation to it. It supposes that done, and pro-
ceeds to enquire into internal obligations; or to unfold the goodness
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and pravity of actions, and from hence to deduce general rules or laws
of conduct. Now if the preceding propositions be attended to, and the
difference between a rule and a law, or between internal and external
obligation, according to our author’s definition, be kept in mind; it
may be asserted without any ambiguity, that abstractly from all con-
sideration of the will of the supreme Being, there is no law for our
conduct; there is a rule, but that rule is not a law, in the strict sense of
that word. It would have prevented much jangling about the founda-
tions of morality, if writers had carefully distinguished, with a late ex-
cellent writer, Dr. Sykes,2 in his <18> Essay on the Connexion of Natural
with Revealed Religion, between the law and the sanction of the law.
cap. 2.
Our author’s reasoning will proceed very clearly, if we understand
the meaning of his 8 § to be to this purpose. “A rule of conduct while
it is merely apprehended under the notion of reasonable, will not be
sufficient to influence men; in order to have due influence upon them,
it must be considered as having external, as well as internal obligation,
arising from the will of God which never changes.” See howPuffendorf
reasons, b. 2. of the law of nature and nations, ch. 3. §20. “But to make
these dictates of reason obtain the dignity and power of laws, it is nec-
essary to call into our consideration a much higher principle, &c.”
With respect to what is said, §22. of the law of nations, ’tis well
worth while to add an excellent remark of the author of the Persian
Letters, 94 and 95.3 “As the law of nature and nations is commonly
doctored, one would imagine there were two sorts of justice; one to
regulate the affairs of private persons, which prevails in the civil law;
the other to compose the differences that arise between people and peo-
ple, which plays the tyrant in the law of nations: as if the law of nations
were not itself a civil law, not indeed of a particular country, but of the
world. The magistrate ought to do justice between citizen and citizen;
every nation ought to do the same between themselves and another
nation. This second distribution of justice, requires no maxims but
what are used in the first. Between nation and nation, there is seldom
2. Arthur Ashley Sykes (1684–1756) was an Anglican clergyman and latitudinarian
controversialist who wrote The Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Re-
ligion Distinctly Considered.
3. Montesquieu, Persian Letters, letters 94 and 95.
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any want of a third to be umpire; because the grounds of dispute are
almost always clear and easy to be determined. The interests of two
nations are generally so far separated, that it requires nothing but to be
a lover of justice to find it out: it is not the same with regard to the
differences that arise between private persons as they live in society,
their interests are so mingled and confounded, and there are so many
different sorts of them, that it is necessary for a third person to untangle
what the covetousness of the parties strives to tie knots in, &c.”
30
u ch a p t e r i i u
Concerning the nature and
distinguishing qualities or characteristics
of human actions.
s e c t i on xx i v
From what hath been said of the foundation and origine of the law of
nature and nations, it is obvious, that it hath for its object and <19>
scope the direction of human conduct; and therefore ordermakes it nec-
essary to enquire accurately into the qualities and characteristics of hu-
man actions.
s e c t i on xxv
Experience, the fountain of all knowledge, teaches us, that various mo-
tions and changes happen in the human mind; but since nomotion can
be produced or conceived without a sufficient moving cause, the mo-
tions which happen in the mind of man must have some sufficient
cause, which must either be within or without man. And thereforemo-
tions, the sufficient cause of which is inman himself, are called actions;
and those the cause of which must be sought after without man, are
termed passions. But because the motion called action, either produces
nothing without the mind, but rests there, or produces by will some
effect in the body, the former are denominated internal, the latter ex-
ternal actions.
Transition to
treat of human
actions.
What is meant
by action and
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external and
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s e c t i on xxv i
Passions not proceeding from us, but from some external cause, are so
far without our power, and therefore are not unfrequently excited in us
against our will or inclination; yet they may sometimes be as it were
repulsed and prevented, if we are provided with sufficient force to resist
the external exciting cause; and on the other hand, in certain circum-
stances we can assist the external mover, so as that the motion it tends
to producemay bemore easily excited in us.Whence it follows that some
passions are within our power, and others are not.* <20>
s e c t i on xxv i i
Because the law of nature hath only free actions for its object, (§4) it
cannot have for its object, in order to be directed by it, passions which
are not within our power. Tho’ it may lay down some rules relative to
our passions, so far as they are in our power, yet, properly speaking, these
rules are not directions to our passions, but to those free actions, by
which we can resist or assist these passions, shewing what we ought to
do with regard to hindering or forwarding them.†
* All this may be illustrated by clear examples. To be warmed is a passion; some-
times we cannot avoid it, as when we are making a journey in very warm air: some-
times we can, as when in winter we remove farther from the fire: and sometimes we
can as it were assist the cause, as by drawing nearer to a fire that we may become
warmer. To be warmed is therefore sometimes in our power, and sometimeswithout
our power.
† Thus laws cannot be prescribed to the passion of anger, but reason can give rules
to our free actions, and directs us not to give loose reins to anger, but to resist its first
motions, lest it should become impetuous and ungovernable, and to forbear acting
while the mind is in too great a ferment and perturbation, &c. Who will deny that
he acts contrary to the law of reason who does not observe these rules? Nothing can
be more true than what Cicero says, Tusc. qu. l. 3. “All the diseases and disturbances
of the mind proceed from the neglect or despight of reason, i.e. from not observing
those prescriptions which reason dictates to us for hindering the mind from being
overpowered by violent commotions.” [[Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes (Tusculan
Disputations ), bk. 4, xiii.31.]]
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s e c t i on xxv i i i
The law of nature therefore only extends to our actions; but let it be
observed, that tho’ the sufficient cause of all these be in man himself,
(§25) yet experience teaches us, that of some actions we are conscious
and are absolute masters; others are of such a nature that they proceed
from some mechanical disposition, in such a manner that we are not
always conscious of them, nor have themnotwholly inourpower.*<21>
s e c t i on xx i x
Actions of which we are conscious, andwhich are within our power, and
subject to our direction, are properly termed human or moral actions;
those of which we are not conscious, or not masters, are called physical
or natural actions; whence it is plain, that the former are free, the latter
necessary; and therefore that human or moral actions alone can be di-
rected by the law of nature (§4), and not natural ones, except so far as
it is in our power to assist and promote, or contrariwise to avoid and
prevent them.† <22>
* Thus it is in our power to sit, stand, or walk; to be silent or speak, to give or not
give, &c. as we will. And of all these actions we are conscious whenwe perform them;
but, on the other hand, the playing of the lungs, the peristaltic motion of the intes-
tines, the circulation of the blood, &c. do not depend on us; they are motions which
we often neither feel nor know to be performed in us. The Stoicks use that distinction
somewhat differently when they assert that some things are ta` e◊f◊ hÿmi˜n, within our
power; and others are ta` ou◊k e◊f◊ hÿmi˜n, without our power. To the former class they
refer opinion, appetite, desire, aversion, in one word, all our actions; to the other they
refer bodily goods, possessions, glory, power, and whatever in fine is not our own
acquisition or work. Epict. Enchirid. c. 1. [[Epictetus, “Manual,” chap. 1, inDiscourses
and Manual, vol. 2.]] Their division is therefore a distribution of things, and not of
actions only.
† Tho’, as we have just now observed, we have no command over the circulation
of our blood, the motion of the heart, &c. yet it is plain from experience that we can
assist those motions by temperance and medicines; and that we can disturb them by
intemperance, or put a period to them by poison, the sword, and other methods.
Who therefore can doubt, but the law of nature may prohibit whatever tends to
disturb or destroy these natural motions, and with them life itself? The ancient phi-
losophers have agreed to this truth. For tho’ some have commended self-murder as
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s e c t i on xx x
Human ormoral actions being free or within our power, and every thing
being in our power which is directed by our will; it follows that human
or moral actions are actions which may be directed by our will. But be-
cause the will never determines itself, unless it be excited to desire or
reject by the understanding;* hence it is justly concluded, that the un-
derstanding likewise concurs in the exertion of free human actions; and
therefore there are two principles of free human or moral actions; the
understanding and the will.
s e c t i on xx x i
Understanding is the faculty by which the mind perceives, judges, and
reasons. When this faculty takes the name of imagination, we have suf-
ficiently shewn in another treatise, (in the elements of rationalphilosophy ).
s e c t i on xx x i i
But since the will cannot exert itself, unless it be excited by the under-
standing, (§30) it follows <23> that it cannot prefer a just action as such,
nor abhor an unjust one as such, unless the understanding hath first
distinctly perceived the action to be just or unjust, by comparing it with
noble and heroic; yet Democritus elegantly says in Plutarch de sanitate tuenda, p. 135.
“If the body should bring an action of damage against the soul, for an injury done
to it, it could not escape condemnation.” [[Plutarch, “De tuenda sanitate precepta”
(“Advice about Keeping Well”), in Plutarch, Moralia, vol. 2, 213–93.]]
* The will hath good or evil for its object, and therefore it always tends towards
good, and flies from evil. Whence it is plain, it cannot choose but what is represented
to it by the understanding, under the appearance of good, just, or advantageous; nor
reject but what is exhibited to it under the semblance of evil, unjust, or hurtful. So
Simplicius upon Epictetus, cap. 1. “But it is certain that the acts of the willing power,
are preceded by some judgment or opinion. If an object be represented to the mind
as good or evil, propensity or aversion are excited, and appetite or desire succeeds,
For before we desire any agreeable object and embrace it, or fly from any thing con-
trary to what is desirable, the mind must necessarily be previously prone or averse
towards it.” [[Simplicius, On Epictetus’ Handbook, vol. 1, 41.]]
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the rule of action, i.e. by reasoning. And therefore moral actions pre-
suppose the capacity of perceiving a rule of action, and of comparing
actions with the ideas of just and unjust.*
s e c t i on xx x i i i
That faculty by which we reason about the goodness or pravity of our
actions is called conscience, concerningwhichwe have discoursed at large
in another treatise. Here however it is necessary to repeat, or rather add
some observations upon conscience.
s e c t i on xx x i v
Because conscience reasons concerning the goodness and pravity of ac-
tions; (§33) but actions are called just, in respect of an external obligation
arising from a law; conscience must therefore compare the one with the
other, the law and the fact; that is, form twopropositions, and fromthem
deduce a third; which, since it cannot be done but by syllogism, it follows
that every reasoning of <24> conscience is a syllogism, consisting of
three propositions, the law, the action, and the conclusion.†
* Hence it is manifest that the law of nature does not extend to infants incapable
of discerning good from evil; much less to the actions of mad persons, changelings,
or such as are disordered in their judgments by any disease; because such cannot
reason about just and unjust. Aristotle therefore justly observes, Ethic. c. 34. “With
respect to things of which ignorance is the cause, man is not unjust. For in the case
of inevitable ignorance, one is as an infant that beats its father without knowingwhat
it does. On account of this natural ignorance children are not reckoned unjust.
Whenever ignorance is the cause of acting, and one is not the cause of his ignorance,
men are not to be deemed culpable or unjust.” [[This is presumably from Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, though the reference is not clear.]]
† Such was that reasoning of Judas’s conscience, Mat. xxvii. 4. “I have sinned in
that I betrayed innocent blood.” In which the first proposition expresses a law, the
second Judas’s action, and the last the conclusion or sentence of his conscience. Nor
does any thing else pass in ourmindwhen conscience reasonswithin us. It is therefore
most wickedly misrepresented by Toland [[ John Toland (1670–1722); Heineccius
presumably refers to Toland’s controversialChristianity Not Mysterious of 1696]] and
others, as an empty name, made a bug-bear by priests.
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s e c t i on xx x v
Since conscience in its reasonings always terminates in a sentence which
it draws (§34): but every sentence either condemns or absolves according
as the action is found to be conformable or disagreable to the law. Con-
science, when it absolves, is called good, and when it condemns, it is
called evil; the former is attended with tranquillity and confidence; the
latter with suspiciousness and dread.*
s e c t i on xx x v i
We may reason either about past or future actions, and therefore con-
science reasoning about actions not yet performed, is called antecedent
conscience, and when it reasons about actions already done, it is called
consequent conscience.
s e c t i on xx x v i i
In both cases conscience compares the action with the law. But because
the good and upright man, <25> who hath a due sense of virtue and
duty alone sets himself to conform his future actions to the divine law;
such only exercise antecedent conscience. The consequent exerts itself
even in the breasts of the most profligate.†
* Hence St. Paul, Rom. ii. 15. calls the acts of conscience logismou`c, &c. thoughts
excusing or accusing; and St. John, 1 Ep. iii. 21. says, if our hearts condemn us not,
then have we confidence towards God, &c. So speak the Poets likewise,
Prima haec est ultio, quod, se
Judice, nemo nocens absolvitur: improba quamvis
Gratia fallaci Praetoris vicerit urna.
Juv. Sat. 13.
[[ Juvenal, Satires, 13.2–4, in Juvenal and Persius: “This is the first vengeance:
no onewho is guilty is acquitted by his ownverdict, even though thepraetor’s
corrupt favor may have won the case with a rigged vote.”]]
† Virtue is always united with an earnest indefatigable care to understand the di-
vine law. The greater progress one has made in virtue, the more ardent is this desire
in his breast. And hence it is, that rightly disposed minds are strict inspectors into
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s e c t i on xx x v i i i
Further, as often as we compare a future action with the law, we find it
either to be commanded, forbidden, or permitted. In the first case con-
science excites us to perform the action. In the second it restrains us from
it. In the third, having wisely examined all its circumstances, it advises
what ought to be done. Conscience is therefore divided into exciting,
restraining, and admonishing.* <26>
s e c t i on xx x i x
Moreover, because conscience is a reasoning, the same things agree to it
which are true of a syllogism; wherefore as reasoning, so consciencemay
be either right or erroneous; and as every reasoning is either faulty in the
form or in the matter, so conscience errs, either because the law, or be-
cause the action is not rightly represented; or because the rules of just
reasoning are not observed.†
the nature even of those actions which appear trivial and indifferent to others; for
which reason, their conscience is said to be tender and delicate. Plutarch says ele-
gantly, de profectu virt. sent. p. 85. “Let this likewise be added, if you please, as a
mark of no small moment, that he who is making proficiency in virtue, looks upon
no sin as venial, but carefully shuns and avoids every appearance of evil.” [[Plutarch,
“How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue,” in vol. 1 of Plutarch,
Moralia: in Fourteen Volumes, p. 455.]]
* Thus conscience excited Moses and Zippora to circumcise their son, recalling
to their mind the divine precept about circumcision, Exod. iv. 24. Conscience re-
strained David from perpetrating his intended murder of Nabal, setting before him
the divine command, “Thou shalt not kill.” 1 Sam. xxv. 32. Finally, conscience ad-
monished St. Paul not to eat meat which he knew had been consecrated to idols, and
to give the same counsel to the Corinthians. For tho’ he knew that christians could
not be defiled by meats and drinks; yet his conscience advised him to act prudently,
lest he should give offence to any one, 1 Cor. x. 28. and hence his goldenmaxim: “All
things are lawful to me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful, but all
things edify not.”
† To illustrate this by examples. The Jews erred in the matter, when they thought
they could without sin with-hold from their parents what was due to them, provided
they devoted it to God. For the major, in their reasoning, set forth a false law. “But
ye say, whosoever shall say to his father or his mother, it is a gift by whatsoever thou
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s e c t i on x l
Again, as in other reasonings, so likewise in those of conscience chiefly,
it happens that an argument is sometimes taken from a certainprinciple,
and sometimes from an hypothesis, a probable proposition, but yet
merely hypothetical. Hence conscience is called certain, when it argues
upon an indisputable law; and probable, when it founds upon the prob-
able opinion of others.* Now, because there are various degrees of
probability, conscience must sometimes be more, and sometimes less
probable. <27>
s e c t i on x l i
Because what is probable may be true, or may be false (§40): therefore
it happens that probable arguments present themselves to us on both
sides of the question; now in this case we think more deliberation is
required, the affair being dubious; and conscience is then said to be
mightest be profited by me.” Mat. xv. 5. So likewise Abimelech, when he imagined
he could innocently take Sarah into his bed. For he made a false state of the fact,
imagining he was to lie with an unmarried woman, Gen. xx. 2. To conclude, the
Pharisees erred in the form, when they inferred from the law relative to the sabbath,
this false conclusion, that no work of necessity and mercy was to be done on it. Mat.
xii. 10.
* Probable conscience must not therefore be opposed to right conscience, because
probable conscience may be right. But it may be false; for as in reasoning we may be
deceived by a specious shew of certainty, and mistake a paralogism for a demonstra-
tion; so we are much more liable to have a false appearance of probability put upon
us by sophisms: whence we see the slipperiness of that doctrine maintained by certain
modern casuists concerning the sufficiency of probable conscience, to exculpate from
sin, of which see Lud. Montalt. Litt. ad provincial. Ep. 5. and Sam. Rachel. Disser.
de probabilismo. [[Pascal, Ludovicii Montaltii litterae provinciales de morali & politia
Jesuitarum disciplina. The 1664Helmstedt edition includes the dissertationbyRachel
to which Heineccius refers.]] For unless we admit a rule which is a mere proteus to
be a good one: We cannot possibly imagine we have done our duty, if we take prob-
able conscience for our guide, which is neither always right, nor certain, nor constant
(§5): especially, since these doctors measure probability by the opinions of others;
whereas the apostle forbids us to trust to the judgment of others in matters of so
great moment. “Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind.” Rom. xiv. 5.
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doubtful; but if the perplexity we are in, and cannot get totally rid of,
be of smaller consequence, it is then called scrupulous. * <28>
s e c t i on x l i i
Besides, it may happen that the mind, precipitated into vice by impet-
uous appetites, and as it were enslaved by evil habits, is not able to reason
freely about actions; but is strongly biassed towards the side of its pas-
sions; in which servile state conscience is not a free and impartial rea-
soner. But the mind which hath delivered itself from such miserable
bondage into a state of liberty is free. This distinction is accurately ex-
plained by Wolfius ’s Ethic. §84.†1
* That doubting of the mind, which suspends it between two opinions, is not
improperly called by the learned Wolfius Scrupulus: [[Christian Wolff (1679–1754)
was professor of mathematics and then of philosophy at the University of Halle and
one of the key figures of the German Enlightenment. Wolff had to leave Halle in
1723 because of controversies with the Lutheran Pietists and went to the University
of Marburg, returning to Halle in 1740 as a prote´ge´ of Frederick the Great.]] But
our definition seems more agreeable to the primitive meaning of the word. For Scru-
pulus signifies a very small pebble, which yet getting into the shoe creates no small
pain. So Servius explains it, ad Aen. 6. v. 236. [[Servius (fourth century a.d.) was the
author of a commentary onVirgil’sAeneid (Servii Grammatici qui feruntur inVergilii
carmina commentarii ).]] Apuleius opposes (scrupulum) to amore perplexing anxiety
which he commonly calls lancea. See Scip. Gent. ad Apuleii Apolog. p. 150. [[Pre-
sumably Scipione Gentili, In L. Apuleii Philosophi & Advocati Romani Apologiam.
This appeared in an edition in Hanau in 1607, though it is not certain whether this
is the edition Heineccius used.]]
1. Wolff, Philosophia moralis sive ethica, vol. 1.
† Hence that paradox of the Stoics: “Every wise man only is free: and every fool
is a slave.” Cicero. Parad. 5. [[Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, “Paradox V,” 285.]] He
whose virtue hath rescued him from slavery to vice, into a state of freedom, despises
and tramples upon every disorderly passion, and says with great magnanimity: “Iwill
not receive arbitrary commands: I will not put my neck under a yoke: I must know
what is greatest and noblest; what requires most strength of mind: the vigour of the
soul must not be relaxed: If I yield to pleasure, I must succumb to pain, to toil, to
poverty. Nay, ambition and anger will claim the same power over me,” Seneca. Ep.
51. [[Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, vol. 1, 341.]] Upon which place Lipsius ad
Philos. Stoic. l. 3. Disser. 12. [[ Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), Flemish humanist scholar;
the work referred to is his Manuductio ad stoicam philosophiam libri tres, first pub-
lished in Antwerp in 1604]] discourses to this purpose: “Mark, says he, how many
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s e c t i on x l i i i
We know by experience that men are sometimes lulled so fast asleep by
their vices, that they have no feeling of their misery, and never think
upon duty, or right and wrong. Now, as we then say, conscience is in a
deep lethargy; or if it is, by a long habit of vice, become quite obdurate
and <29> callous, we say it is seared as with a burning iron.* So con-
science seems as it were to awake, when a person rouzed by calamity, or
a sense of danger, begins to examine and ponder his actions with some
attention, and to reflect and reason about their goodness or depravity.
s e c t i on x l i v
We have already remarked that every one’s conscience condemns or ab-
solves him (§35): but because absolution must be accompanied with the
highest satisfaction of mind, and condemnation with the bitterest un-
easiness and disquiet; hence it follows, that a good conscience, acting
upon certain evidence, is for the most part quiet and easy; an evil con-
science is disturbed by racking remorse; (which torment the antients
compared to the burning torches of the furies): and a dubious one is very
anxious and restless, to such a degree, that it knows not to what hand to
turn itself. These affections however belong more properly to the effects
masters he had already rid himself of? Add to these, lust, avarice, and other vicious
passions, and you will have a multitude of what may properly be called tyrants.How
wretched is the slave who is in subjection to them! How free and great is he who hath
put them under his feet? What liberty can we say remains to a conscience which so
many vitious disorderly appetites and passions have fettered and enshackled?”
* Cauterı´o usta, an emphatical way of speaking by St. Paul, 1 Tim. iv. 2. For as
the finger, or any member of the body burnt with a hot iron loses all sensibility; so
the mind inured to a vitious course, does not feel its misery which others beholdwith
horror: the same apostle, Ephes. iv. 19. calls such persons past feeling. See Beza’s com-
mentary on the place. [[Theodor Beza (1519–1605), Calvinist theologian; his com-
mentary on the New Testament first appeared in 1565.]]
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of conscience than to conscience itself, as every one will immediately
perceive.* <30>
s e c t i on x l v
Whence we see what judgment we are to form of the opinion of those
who assert that conscience is to be held for the internal rule of human
actions. For if a rule cannot answer the end of a rule unless it be right,
certain, and invariable (§5); whowill admit conscience to be a rulewhich
is sometimes erroneous (§39); sometimes only probable (§40); some-
times doubtful and wavering; (§41) and frequently overpowered by per-
verse appetites (§42); wherefore, tho’ he be guilty who acts contrary to
conscience, whether certain or probable; yet he cannot for that reason
be said to act rightly and justly, who contends that he has acted according
to his conscience.† <31>
* So Cicero pro Sex. Rosc. Amer. cap. 24. [[Cicero, Pro Roscio Amerino, chap. 24,
in Cicero, Defence Speeches.]] Now these remorses of conscience are an irrefragable
argument against those who absurdly maintain, that the uneasiness of conscience
arises wholly from the fear of civil punishment, to which criminals are obnoxious.
For in the first place, ’tis not private persons only who are harrassed day and night
by these terrible furies; but even those whom birth and grandeur have set above all
liableness to punishment in this world, such as a Nero, according to Sueton. cap. 34
[[Suetonius (ca. 69–ca. 140), author of several biographies of Roman emperors (Sue-
tonius, Suetonius, vol. 2, 171)]]. And secondly, if any should rather imagine he feared
the just resentment of the people, there are not wanting examples of persons who in
their dying moments, when they could have nothing to fear from men, have been
inexpressibly tortured by a secret consciousness of crimes unknown to the world: as
Chilo Lacedemonius, who in Aulus Gell. Noct. Att. l. 3. thus speaks, “I surely,” said
he, “at this moment do not deceive myself, when I think I have committed no crime
the remembrance of which can create me any uneasiness, one only excepted,” &c.
[[Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights ), vol. 1, bk. I, chap. iii, 3.]] And Sueton
relates a saying of the emperor Titus to the same purport. Tit. cap. 10.
† Conscience is not the rule, but it applies the rule to facts and cases which occur;
wherefore, it is safer to omit an action concerning the pravity of which we reckon
ourselves fully convinced, than it is to do an action which conscience esteems just
and good, without being certain of the law. He then who follows an erroneous con-
science sins on this very account, that he follows it rather than thewill of the legislator:
tho’ he be more excusable than one who acts directly against conscience, yet he is
guilty. For which reason, I cannot go along with the opinion of Limborch, who in
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s e c t i on x l v i
Hence we may conclude, that while conscience is uncertain, and fluc-
tuates between contrary opinions, action ought to be suspended. This
we assert in opposition to Ger. Gottl. Titus,2 in his observations on Puf-
fendorf de off. hom. & civ. l. 1. C. 1. §6. And for one to do any thing
with such an obstinate obdurate mind, as to be very little concerned
about knowing the divine will, and determined to do the same, even tho’
he should find it to be prohibited by God, is the heighth of perverse-
ness.*
s e c t i on x l v i i
From what hath been laid down, it is plain that ignorance and error are
the great hinderances to conscience in the application of a law to a fact.
By the former is understood the mere want of knowledge; by the other
ismeant the disagreement of an idea, a judgment, or a reasoning to truth,
or the nature of the thing. One therefore is said to be ignorant who hath
no idea before his mind; and one is said to err, who hath either a false
idea of the object, that is, an idea not conformable to it; an obscure,
confused, or unadequate idea. For an error in the idea must of necessity
his Christian Theol. l. 5. c. 2. §8. maintains, that even an erroneous consciencemust
be obeyed. [[Philipp Limborch (1633–1712), Dutch Arminian theologian and friend
of John Locke. His Theologia Christiana first appeared in 1686 in Amsterdam.]]
* To this purpose it is well said by Cicero de Off. l. 9. “For this reason it is a good
precept which forbids us to do any thing, of the goodness or iniquity of which we
are in doubt. For honesty quickly would shew itself by its own native brightness: and
the doubting about it is a plain intimation that at least we suspect some injustice in
it.” i.e. He who ventures to do what he doubts whether it be honest or dishonest, by
so doing bewrays a propension to do an injury. Hence the apostle says, Rom. xiv. 23.
“And he that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith, andwhat-
soever is not of faith is sin.”
2. Gottlieb Gerhard Titius (1661–1714) was professor of law at the University of
Leipzig. He developed Pufendorf ’s and Thomasius’s natural law theories and advo-
cated the reform of criminal law. Heineccius refers to Titius’s Observationes in Sam-
uelis L. B. de Pufendorfii De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem libros duos.
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infuse itself into the judgment made concerning an object, and from
thence into all the reasonings about it. <32>
s e c t i on x l v i i i
But because all men are not under an obligation to find out the more
abstruse truths which may be said to lie at the bottom of a deep well;
and in reality the ignorance of some things is rather attended with ad-
vantage than detriment;* (yea, as Terence observes, Hecyra.3 the igno-
rant and illiterate often do more good in one day, than ever the learned
and knowing do;) hence it may be inferred, that ignorance and error of
every kind is not evil and blameable.
s e c t i on x l i x
Yet since the will makes no election unless it be excited to it by the un-
derstanding; and therefore the understanding concurs in producing
moral actions (§30), the consequence from this is, that they are not
blameless who are grosly ignorant of those truths relative to good and
ill, just and unjust, which it was in their power easily to understand, or
who err with regard to these matters, when error might have been
avoided by due care and attention to acquire right and true knowledge.
* An example of this might be brought from the ignorance of certain crimes,
which ought not so much as to be named; for there themaxim holds, ignotorum nulla
cupido; what is unknown is undesired. Who would not wish many were in a state of
ignorance, which would effectually shut out and render the mind quite inaccessible
to certain vile concupiscences? Justin. Hist. 2. 2. says, “the Scythians were better
through their ignorance of several vices than the Greeks were by their knowledge of
virtue.” [[Marcus Junianus Justinus’s History, bk. 2, at the end of chap. 2 ( Justini
Historiae Philipicae ). ]] Nor does Quintilian seem to have less admired the ancient
Germans, when speaking of amost enormous vice, he says “theywere totally ignorant
of it: their manner of living was more pure, &c.” [[Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (ca.
35–ca. 100), Roman rhetorician and author of the Institutio oratoria (Education of
an Orator).]]
3. Terence, The Mother-in-Law, lines 879–80, in vol. 2 of Terence.
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s e c t i on l
Hence arise various divisions or classes of ignorance and error, so far as
it is or is not in our power <33> to escape ignorance, it is vincible or
invincible. * So far as one is or is not the cause of it himself, it is voluntary
or involuntary. Finally, if one does any thing he would not have done
had his mind not been obscured by ignorance, such ignorance is called
efficacious or effectual. But if he would have done the same action tho’
he had not been in the state of ignorance in which he did it, it is called
concomitant. Repentance is the mark of the former; but the latter dis-
covers itself by the approbation given to the action done in a state of
ignorance, when that ignorance no longer takes place. Now all this is
equally applicable to error.
s e c t i on l i
We proceed now to consider the other principle of human ormoral free
actions, viz. the will, (§30) which <34> is that faculty of our mind by
which we choose and refuse. Hence it is justly said, that truth and fals-
* Ignorance and error are said to be invincible, either in regard of their cause or
in themselves; or in both respects at the same time. Thus the ignorance of a drunken
person is in itself invincible, so long as his madness continues; but not in respect of
its cause, because it was in his power not to have contracted that madness. On the
other hand, the hurtful actions of mad men proceed from ignorance, which is invin-
cible, both in itself and in regard of its cause, since they not only do not know what
they are doing, but it was not in their power to have escaped their madness. All this
is true, and hath its use in the doctrine of imputation: But the first cannot so properly
be called invincible, since it might and would have been avoided, had not the mind
been very regardless of duty. The matter is admirably explained by Aristotle in his
books to Nicomachus, 3. 7. where speaking of that law of Pittacus which inflicted a
double punishment upon the crimes committed by drunkenpersons, he immediately
adds: “A double punishment is appointed for the crimes of drunken persons; because
these actions are in their source from them. It was in their power not to get drunk.
But drunkenness was the cause of their ignorance.” Concerning this law of Pittacus
see Diogenes Laertius, 1. 76. [[Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol.
1, 79]] and Plutarch in Conviv. sept. sap. p. 155 [[Plutarch, “Septem SapientumCon-
vivium” (Dinner of the Seven Wise Men), in Plutarch, Moralia, vol. 2, 403]].
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hood are the objects of the understanding; but that thewill is conversant
about good and ill. For the will only desires truth as it is good, and is
averse to falshood only as it is ill.*
s e c t i on l i i
From this definition we may conclude that the will cannot choose any
thing but what is exhibited to it by the understanding under the shew
of good, nor turn aside from any thing but what appears to it to be ill.
The greater good or ill there seems to be in any thing, the stronger in
proportion is our inclination or aversion; and therefore the desire of a
lesser good or a lesser evil may be overpowered by the representation of
a greater good or evil. Aversion does not consist in a mere absence of
desire, but hath something positive in it, which is called by Koehler,
exerc. jur. nat. §167.4 noluntas vel reclinatio, refusing or aversion. † <35>
s e c t i on l i i i
From the same definition it is clear that man, with regard to his will, acts
not only spontaneously but freely. For spontaneity being the faculty of
* Thus no wise man desires to know his future calamities, because it would only
serve to anticipate his suffering. And therefore, however true his foreknowledgemight
be, it would not be good. Children, on the other hand, are very fond of fables, even
tho’ they know they are feigned, because they perceive them to be fit lessons for their
instruction; or at least very entertaining: and on these accounts, they look upon them
as good.
† As the Civilians accurately distinguish between non nolle & velle, l. 3. D. de reg.
Juris; so we ought to distinguish between not willing, and not desiring and refusing,
or having an aversion. There are many things which a wise man does not choose or
will, tho’ he does not abhor them. Thus he does not desire immortality on earth,
because nature hath not granted it; nor empire, because fortune hath not allotted it
to his birth: But he has no aversion to these things, but on the contrary pronounces
them great and noble goods. He does not desire what his rank puts beyond his power
to attain, but he would not dislike it if he could obtain it. Thus Abdolominus, intent
upon his daily employment, dressing and weeding his little garden, had no thoughts
of royalty: he did not desire it, yet he did not refuse and despise it, when he was
saluted king, and presented with the royal robes and ensigns. Cur. de gest. Alex. 4.
1. [[Curtius Rufus, De gestis Alexandri Magni (History of Alexander, Rolfe, vol. 1,
167).]]
4. Koehler, Exercitationes juris naturalis.
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directing one’s aim to a certain end, but liberty being thepowerof choos-
ing either of two possibles one pleases; it is plain from experience, that
both these faculties belong to our minds. The servile subjection one is
under to his perverse appetites and affections till virtue makes him free,
is not inconsistent with these properties. For these obstacles are of such
a kind, as hath been observed, that they may be removed and overpow-
ered by the representation of a greater good or evil to the understanding
(§52).* <36>
s e c t i on l i v
Hence it is evident, that bodily constitution, (which philosophers call
temperament ) does not infringe upon the liberty of humanwill. For tho’
the mind be variously affected by the body, so as to be rendered by it
more propense to certain vices; yet that propensity hathnomoreof com-
pulsion or force in it than there is in the inducement to walk out when
fine weather invites one to it. But who can deny that the will is left intire,
and not hindered or prevented from choosing either to walk out or not
as it shall appear most reasonable, when inticed by all the charms of
spring?
* Thus, whatever propension a thief may have to steal, yet he would not yield to
that wicked cupidity, could he set before his eyes the dismal effects of his crimes, the
horrors of a dungeon and shackles, and the ignominy of a gibbet. And those who are
most highly charmedwith indolence and voluptuousness, would quickly be inflamed
with the love of a nobler life and more honourable pursuits, if, calling in reason to
advise them, they could fully perceive the excellence of wisdom, its agreeableness and
manifold advantages on the one hand, and on the other side the irreparable ignominy
and detriment which are inseparable from sloth and ignorance. Epictetus dispatches
the whole matter with great brevity. Arrian. l. 17. “Can any thing overcome an ap-
petite? Another appetite can. Can any thing get the ascendant of an inclination or
propensity? Yes really another can.” And he illustrates it by the same example of a
thief we have just nowmade use of. [[Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian,
the Manual, and Fragments, vol. 1, 1.17.24.]]
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s e c t i on l v
The same is true concerning all the affections andmotions excited in the
mind by the appearances of good and ill. For tho’ themind, with respect
to the first impression, be passive, every thing else is however intirely in
its power; to resist the first impulse, not to approve it, nor to suffer it to
gain too much force. And it likewise holds with regard to habits, i.e.
propensions confirmed by long use and practice. For tho’ these gradually
become so natural, that tho’ expelled with never so much force, they
recoil, Hor. ep. 1. 10. v. 24. (si expellas furca, tamen usque recurret )5 yet
they are not incorrigible, but may be amended, if one will but exert his
liberty.* <37>
s e c t i on l v i
External violence is so far from taking away the liberty of the human
mind, that it affords a strong proof of our liberty. For tho’ one may be
hindered by force from doing what he chooses to do; yet no force can
* Habits are affections and propensities become strong by daily repetition or cus-
tom. Now what has been contracted by practice may by disuse be abolished and
erazed, if we will but give as great pains to destroy it as we did to establish it into
strength. There is an elegant passage to this effect in Aristophanes in Vespis. thus
translated into Latin.
Usus quo fueris diu,
Mutare ingenium, grave est.
Multos invenias tamen,
Qui mores moniti suos
Mutarunt melioribus.
[[Aristophanes, Wasps (Vespae ), 1457ff.; trans. (though not exactly) into
Latin. Aristophanes, Wasps, ed.MacDowell: “It is a serious matter to change
the nature of a habit which you’ve had for a long time. However, you would
find that many people who have taken advice and changed their ways have
done so for the better.”]]
5. Horace, Epistles 1.10.24, in Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica: “Youmay drive out
Nature with a pitch-fork, yet she will ever hurry back.”
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make one will what he does not will, or not choose what he chooses.*
If the understanding represents the good attending an action as greater
than the imminent evil, no external violence can force one to quit his
resolution, he will remain unshaken by all the menaces of power or
cruelty.
Nec civium ardor prava jubentium
Nec vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatiet solida.6
s e c t i on l v i i
Hence we see that the distinction between antecedent and consequent
will ought not to be rejected; the former of which decides without a
view of all the circumstances which may happen at the time of acting;
the other suits itself to the circumstances which appear at that instant.
The one therefore is not opposite to the other, tho’ they be verydifferent.
Thus it is true thatGod loves peace, and yet that in certaincircumstances
he does not disapprove war. <38>
s e c t i on l v i i i
Further, it is equally plain that those actions are spontaneous which are
performed by a mind determining itself to a certain known proposed
end; these are not spontaneous which do not proceed from such a de-
termination of the mind, but are done without intention. Again, even
spontaneous actions are voluntary, to perform which no external neces-
* This is likewise observed by Epictetus in Arrian, l. 1. 17. After he had asserted,
that an appetite can only be overcome by another appetite, he adds: “But it may be
said, he who threatens me with death forces me. Truly the cause is not that which is
threatened, but it is owing to your thinking it better to do the action than to run the
risk of dying: it is therefore your opinion which forces you, i.e. one appetite over-
comes another.”
6. Horace, Odes 3.3.2–4 in Odes and Epodes: “Theman of integrity who holds fast
to his purpose is not shaken from his firm resolve by hot-headed citizens urging him
to do wrong, or by the frown of an oppressive despot.”
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sity compels; and such are forced, to which one is necessitated by some
external urgent circumstances. We need not add mixed, because actions
called such, being performed under some external necessity urging to it,
coincide with those which are called forced actions.*
s e c t i on l i x
Hence it is obvious that no action which is not spontaneous is voluntary
(§58); but forced actions may be voluntary. For tho’ we would rather not
act were not a very great evil set before us, yet it is the will which deter-
mines to act; whence it follows, that the antient lawyers were in the right
when they affirmed, that one who is forced, wills. D. l. 21. §5. quod met.
causa, “coactum etiam velle.” <39>
Remarks on This Chapter
Our Author doth not enter at all into the dispute about necessity and
free agency. It would have been a digression fromhis subject. The ques-
tion is most accurately handled by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Power,
in his Essay on human understanding. See likewise what I have said of
it in my Introduction to the principles of moral philosophy; and in the
Christian philosophy, sect. 3. prop. 4. But I think thewholemattermay
* Those are called by some mixed actions, which one does under an urgent ne-
cessity, so as that he would rather not do them. Such as that case described by Lu-
cretius de rer. nat. l. 2. v. 277.
Jamne vides igitur, quamquam vis extima multas
Pellit, & invitos cogit procedere saepe,
Praecipitesque rapit, tamen esse in pectore nostro
Quiddam, quod contra pugnare obstareque possit?
[[Lucretius, De rerum natura 2.77–80: “In this case do you see then that,
although an external force propels many men and forces them often tomove
against their will and to be hurried headlong, yet there is in our breast some-
thing strong enough to fight against it and to resist?”]]
The same happens in every forced action. For no external violence can force us to
will or not to will (§56) and therefore there is no use for the distinction between
compelled or forced and mixed actions.
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be dispatched in a few words. It is as much a matter of experience as
any other whatever. That several things depend upon ourwill as to their
existence or non-existence; as to sit, or stand, or walk; to write or not
write: to think or leave off thinking on this or the other subject, &c.
But so far as it depends in this manner on our will, or pleasure to do,
or not to do, we are free, we have power, dominion, agency; or we are
not passive but active beings. To saywe are not free, but necessary,must
be to assert either that we are not conscious, which is contrary to ex-
perience; or that we never will, which is also contrary to experience; or
that our will never is effective, which is equally so, since many things
depend on our will: For necessity must mean one or other of these
three, or all of them together. There is no other property included in
the idea of a free agent; there is no other conceivable property belong-
ing to action or agency, besides willing with power to effect what is
willed. To say that the will is not free, because it must desire good and
hate ill as such, is to say freedom or activity cannot belong to a mind
endued with the power of willing; since willingmeans complacency in
good, or preferring it, and aversion to evil, or desire to avoid it, i.e. it
is to say freedom means some property that can’t exist, because it im-
plies a contradiction, viz. willing without willing. Freedom is the very
idea of agency: it is that which constitutes an agent; and it signifies
having a certain degree or extent of power, efficiency, or dominion by
our will. And that we have a certain degree or extent of power, effi-
ciency, or dominion by our will, is as manifest to experience as that we
think: nor can a proof of it be demanded, unless at the same time a
proof of thinking and consciousness be demanded.
As for what our Author says about erroneous conscience, it will be
better understood by what is said in the fourth chapter about impu-
tation, and our remark added to that chapter. Mean time we may ob-
serve, 1. That if to acquire knowledge for the direction of our actions
be not among our ta` e◊f◊ hÿmi`n, or within our power, the direction of
our actions cannot be in our power, that is, we are not agents. If we are
not accountable for our not having knowledge sufficient to direct our
actions rightly, we cannot be accountable for our actions. 2. Our views,
our judgments of things must be our rule; we can have no other: yet
ultimately, the nature of things is the rule, because the natures of things
are stubborn, and will not yield to our misapprehensions <40> of
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them. It is the same here as with regard to mechanicks, where no dif-
ficulty is started. The nature of mechanical powers and properties will
not submit to our notions; yet we must work in mechanical arts ac-
cording to our apprehensions of mechanical laws and properties. Our
ideas and judgments are our immediate guide; but the natural qualities
and relations of things are the ultimate standard. The formermay vary,
but the latter are unchangeable. The ultimate measure of opinions,
which is truth or nature, is constant, immutable.
51
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Of the rule of human actions, and the
true principle of the law of nature.
s e c t i on l x
Such, we have already seen, is the nature of our free actions, that they
must have a rule to direct them (§4); there we likewise shewed that a
rule could not serve the purposes of a rule, if it be not streight or right,
certain, evident, and invariable, and have external as well as internal ob-
ligation. Let us now enquire a little more accurately what this rule is
which hath all these properties essential to a rule for human, free, moral
actions.* <41>
* Let us not confound the rule of human actions with the principle of natural
law. The former is what philosophers call the (principium essendi) because it con-
stitutes the principle or source of obligation to us. By the latter we understand prin-
cipium cognoscendi, i.e. the principle, the truth or proposition from which our ob-
ligation to any action appears or may be deduced. These are different, even with
regard to civil states. For the source or principle of the obligation under which all
the members of any state whatsoever lie, is the will of the supreme authority in that
state, and that is also the rule to which every member of a state is obliged to conform
himself. But if it is asked whence or how that supreme will may be known, in every
state you will be referred to its laws; and therefore, these are likewise in every state
the sole and adequate principle or source of knowledge with respect to civil duties
and obligations.
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s e c t i on l x i
The rule of human actions must either be within us or without us. If it
be within us, it can be none other but either our own will, or our un-
derstanding and conscience. But neither of these faculties is always right,
neither of them is always certain, neither of them is always the same and
invariable; wherefore neither any of them, nor both of them together,
can be the rule of human actions; whence it follows that the rule of
human actions is not to be found in ourselves; but if there be any such,
it must be without us.
s e c t i on l x i i
Now without us exist other created beings, and likewise a God, the au-
thor of all things which exist. But since we are enquiring after a rule of
human actions, carrying with it an external obligation (§9) and made
known or promulgated to all mankind by right reason (§11); and since
external obligation consists in the will of some being, whose authority
we acknowledge (§9), there being no other whose authority we are
obliged more strictly to acknowledge than the infinitely perfect and
blessed God (§10); and seeing he alone can promulgate any thing to us
by right reason, of which he is the author, it follows, by necessary con-
sequence, that the will of God must be the rule of human actions, and
the principle or source of all natural obligation, and of all virtue.* <42>
s e c t i on l x i i i
That this rule is right cannot be doubted, since an infinitely perfectBeing
cannot will what is not perfectly good and right: it must be a certain rule,
since reason discovers it to all men; and it must be unvariable, because
the will of God can no more change, or be changed, than God himself,
* We therefore fall in with the opinion of the celebrated Sam. a Cocceis, who in
his dissertations already cited (§10) has demonstrated this truth by solid arguments,
and likewise defended it against objections and censures with great judgment and
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or right reason, by which it is discoverable. Finally, it must be obligatory,
since God hath the justest claim and title to our obedience; and men
have no reason or right to decline his authority, and cannot indeed if
they would. Hence at the same time it is evident, that every will of God
is not the rule of human actions, but his obligatory will only.*
s e c t i on l x i v
Since therefore the obligatory will of God, which we have shewn to be
the only rule of human actions, is his will with respect to the actions of
his rational creatures, as to acting or forbearing to act (§63); it is evident,
that this rule, considered with relation to man, may properly be called
a divine law, because it is the will of the supreme Being, commanding
or forbidding certain actions with rewards and penalties (§9). But be-
cause there are other laws of <43> God to mankind which are made
known by revelation, and are therefore called positive, those which are
known to man by natural reason, are justly denominated natural; and
according as they either command, prohibit, or permit, they are with
good reason divided into affirmative, negative, or permissive.
erudition, Dissert. 1. qu. 2. §6. & seq. where he has gathered together very many
passages from ancient authors to prove this to have been the more general opinion
of ancient moralists, the chief of whom are Xenophon, Sophocles and Cicero.
* The will of God is of a large extent, and its various divisions are fully explained
in treatises of natural theology; by none more accurately than by Ruardus Andala,
Theolog. nat. part. 2. c. 8. §6. & seq. [[Ruardus Andala (1665–1727), DutchCartesian
philosopher and theologician; Syntagma theologico-physico-metaphysicum,complectens
Compendium theologiae naturalis ]] and Wolfius Theolog. nat. part. 1. c. 3. [[Wolff,
Theologia naturalis ]]. It is sufficient for us to observe, that God himself being the
primary object of his will, as he loves, approves, and delights in his own perfections,
and the whole universe, to which he gives being by his will, is upheld, governed and
moved according to certain laws chosen and approved of by him, and is therefore
the object of his will; wherefore here we understand by the divine will, the will of
God relative to the actions of his intelligent creatures, either with respect to doing,
or not doing: and this will we call moral or obligatory.
This rule may
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with regard to
mankind.
54 the laws of nature and nations
s e c t i on l x v
Now since this divine will, or divine natural law, is the source and prin-
ciple of all justice (§63), it follows that every action, not only human,
but divine, which is conformable to this divine will, is just; and therefore
it is objected, without any reason, against this doctrine, that there could
not be any such thing as divine justice, were there no other principle or
source of the law besides the divine will. * <44>
* The author of the Observat. Hanover. ob. 8. objects against this doctrine of
Sam. de Cocceis in this manner: “Other dangerous consequences would likewise fol-
low from this position, such as have indeed been thrown out by some most rashly
and unwarily; as for instance, that there is no such thing as divine justice. For if justice
only means the command of the Creator, or of one who hath power to enforce his
will; it is manifest that justice cannot belong or be ascribed to God, since he cannot
be forced or compelled; and therefore he may without any injustice damn an innocent
person, and make the greatest scelerate immortally happy. Upon which hypothesis,
the fear of God will indeed remain, but the love of him cannot take place.” [[The
author is probably Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, though it is not clear which work
Heineccius is referring to here.]] But since God wills nothing but what is right and
just, why may not the divine justice be explained from the consideration of his will?
There is indeed, with respect to God, no command, no co-action, and therefore no
external obligation: but the same holds true with regard to supreme authority instates,
in relation to the laws constituted by it. For tho’ a prince who has supreme absolute
power be not strictly speaking bound by his own laws; yet we call him just, when he
renders to every one conformably to his own laws. Why then may we not call God
just, because he renders to every man what is due to him, according to his own will
and law? Man therefore is denominated just, when he gives obedience to the will of
God promulgated as a law. But God is just, because he renders to every one his due
without law, without co-action or external obligation. God cannot damn an innocent
person, or make an abandoned scelerate happy. Because by so doing, he would act
not according to his own will, by which he wills nothing but what is just, equitable,
and suitable to his own perfection.
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s e c t i on l x v i
Herein chiefly lies the difference between divine and human justice, that
with regard to the former there is no law or co-action; whereas the latter
includes in it a respect to a law, and external obligation or co-action (§65
& §64). Wherefore the divine will, as it is a rule of action to men, carries
with it a commination of some evil or punishment to transgressors; tho’
that punishment be not, as in human laws, defined and ascertained, but
be, for the greater part, indefinite, and reserved to God himself, to be
inflicted according to his wisdom and justice.* <45>
s e c t i on l x v i i
But since it cannot be doubted that there is no other rule of human
actions but the will or law of God (§63), it is to be enquired how we may
come to the certain knowledge of this law. But since it is universally
acknowledged to be promulgated to all men by right reason (§11), and
since right reason is our faculty of reasoning, by which we deduce truths
from other truths by a chain of consequences (§15), it is obvious that
there must be some truth or proposition, from which what is agreeable
to the will of God, and therefore just, may be ascertained by necessary
* Those who call every suffering or evil which attends a bad action, or is connected
with it, punishment, rightly divide punishment into natural and positive. So the
learned Koehler. exercitat. jur. nat. §362, & seq. But if by punishment be understood
the suffering or evil which the law itself threatens against offenders, it is positive pun-
ishment only which properly falls under the name of legal or authorative punishment.
Natural punishment is acknowledged even by atheists. Positive punishment those only
can acknowledge who believe the divine Being, and providence: Now, tho’ particular
positive punishments be not defined; yet right reason sufficiently proves that God can-
not but render to mankind according to their actions, whether they be good or bad,
suitable rewards and punishments. For that plainly and directly follows from the idea
of the divine justice, and is admitted by all who do not call divine providence into
doubt. Xenophon Memorab. Socrat. l. 4, 16. “Do you think the Gods would have
impressed human minds with an opinion that they can inflict punishments and be-
stow rewards upon them, if they really could not do it; and if men being for ever
deceived never felt any such thing?” [[Xenophon, Memorabilia (Xenophon, Memo-
rabilia and Oeconomicus, 1.4.16).]]
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consequence. There must then be some universal principle of science
with regard to the law of nature.*
s e c t i on l x v i i i
Every principle of science must be true, evident, and adequate; wherefore
the principle of science, with respect to natural law, must be true; lest
being false or fictitious, the conclusions inferred from it be such likewise:
it must be evident, and that not only in this sense, that it is intelligible
to the literate; but universally, to the unlearned as well as the learned, all
being equally under obligation to <46> conform themselves to the law
of nature. In fine, it must be adequate, or of such an extent, as to include
in it all the duties of men and citizens, not Christians only, but those
also who have not the benefit of divine revelation.†
* How that differs from the rule itself, hath been already explained (§60). Tho’
the celebrated Sam. de Cocceiis hath taken the term principle in a larger acceptation,
yet what is objected to him by Jac. Frid. Ludovici is a mere logomachy. [[Presumably
this is Ludovici’s Delineatio historiae juris divini naturalis et positivi unversalis. ]] For
how the will of God may be discovered by us, he shews Disser. 1. qu. 3. and he has
there clearly distinguished between the will of God, as a rule and principle essendi,
i.e. of moral obligation, and the means of science, or the proofs by which the will
of God may be ascertained to us, which are the principles of science with respect to
the law of nature.
† In like manner therefore, as the more subtile demonstrations of the divine ex-
istence are suspected, because that truth must be capable of an evidence that may be
understood by the most ordinary understanding (and therefore the apostle says, “God
may be found out by searching, and is not far from any of us,” Acts xvii. 27). So a
too subtle principle of natural law is suspicious, since all are, a◊napolo´ghtoi, without
excuse, even the illiterate, and those who are strangers to subtle refined philosophy,
if they offend against the law of nature.
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s e c t i on l x i x
Therefore we must not expect to find this principle of the law of nature
in the conformity of our actions to the sanctity of God: for tho’ the
proposition should be granted to be true, yet it is not evident enough,
nor of such a nature, as that all the duties of men and citizens can be
inferred and proved from it.*
s e c t i on l x x
Nor is this a sufficient principle, “that what is in its own nature just is
to be done, and what is in its own nature unjust is not to be done.” For
tho’ we have already admitted, that certain actions are <47> in their own
nature good, and others evil, and that man is therefore obliged to per-
form the one, and to avoid the other, by an intrinsic obligation (§8); yet
an action antecedently to, or independently of a law, is not just (§7); not
to add that this principle is not evident enough, nor that all human of-
fices are not deducible from it.†
* How obscure the idea of the divine sanctity is, whether in a theological or ju-
ridical sense, hath been already proved by Sam. Puffendorf. Specim. controvers. 4.
4. and Thomas. fundam. juris. nat. & gent. [[Pufendorf, Specimen controversiarum
circa jus naturali ipsi nuper motarum. Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), Germanphi-
losopher and foundational figure in the German Enlightenment, professor at Halle.
The work referred to is his Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium. ]] And because there
are many human duties, of which there is no archetype in God, as for instance, grat-
itude towards our benefactors, reverence toward our superiors, paying debt, and such
like: For these reasons it is not the principle of moral knowledge.
† To just actions we are impelled by an external obligation (§7). External obli-
gation consists in the will of an acknowledged superior, commanding under penalty
(§9): such a will is a law (§9). Wherefore, no action can be just or unjust but in
reference to a law: and hence every sin is called a◊nomi´a, i.e. a transgression of a law.
1 Ep. John iii. 4.
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s e c t i on l x x i
None, I think, will rashly go into the opinion of those learned men, who
held the consent of all nations, or of all the more civilized nations, to
be the principle of natural law. For it is not true, that what all nations
agree in, is also conformable to the divine will;* nor is this universal
consent evident to all, since it must be collected from various testimonies
of authors, antient and modern; nor is it sufficiently adequate to point
out all duties.* <48>
s e c t i on l x x i i
But as those who endeavour to establish the law of nature and nations
from the consent of nations, not only lay down a false, unevident, and
unadequate principle; but likewise go out of the question into one of
another kind, while they derive the law of nature not from nature itself,
* Thus Cicero thought the voluntary law of nations, as it is called, must be es-
tablished, Tusc. quest. disp. 1. 13. “The agreement of all nations in a thing is to be
held a law of nature.” Grotius lays great stress on this principle de jure belli & pacis,
proleg. §11. where speaking of the way of establishing the laws of nature and nations,
he says, “I have made use of the testimonies of Philosophers, Historians, Poets, and
in the last place Orators; not that we are rashly and implicitly to give credit towhatever
they say (for it is usual with them to accommodate themselves to the prejudices of
their sect, the nature of their subject, and the interest of their cause): But that when
many men of different times and places unanimously affirm the same thing for truth,
this ought to be ascribed to an universal cause; which, in the questions treated of by
us, can be no other than either a just conclusion drawn from the principles of nature,
or an universal consent. The former points out the law of nature, the other the law
of nations.” But we find a wonderful consent almost of all nations in many things
which none will assert to be of the law of nature or nations; as in polytheism, idolatry,
sacrifices, robbery committed in a foreign territory. Besides this agreement of nations
is not easily shewn, as Grotius himself confesses, l. 1. 1. 15. “But the more extensive
is the law of nations, which derives its authority from the will of all, or at least, of
many nations. I say, of many, because there is scarce any right found, except that of
nature, which is also called the right of nations, common to all nations. Nay, that
which is reputed the right or law of nations in one part of the world, is not so in
another, as we shall shew hereafter, where we come to treat of prisoners of war and
postliminy, or the right of returning.” How many duties therefore cannot be deduced
from the consent of nations?
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but from the traditions or opinions of nations: so the opinion of those
who have attempted to deduce the law of nature and nations from the
precepts given to Noah, labours under the same defects, as hath been
sufficiently proved (§16).
s e c t i on l x x i i i
What shall we then say of the whole philosophy of Hobbes1 in his books
de Cive, or his Leviathan? when he asserts the right of every man in a
state of nature to all things, he affirms a proposition which is neither
true, nor evident, nor adequate, since the duties of men to God and
themselves cannot be deduced from that principle; yea, while he goes
about in <49> that manner, pretending to establish the law of nature,
he really subverts it, as Hen. Cocei.2 def. de jure omnium in omnia, has
shewn. Hence it is plain what we are to think of this other principle,
viz. “that external peace is to be sought and studied if it can be obtained,
and if not, force and war must be called to our aid.” For here likewise
Hobbes lurks behind a curtain.*
* First of all, this principle is far from being evident. For what means this limi-
tation, if it can be had? How liable is it, however it may be explained, to be abused
by litigious persons, who will complain that they cannot enjoy peace, if others will
not suffer them? like the wolf in the fable, who pled that the lamb had troubled his
water. Phaed. Fab. 1. 1. Some poet has justly said,
Sic nocet innocuo nocuus, caussamque nocendi
Invenit. Heu regnant qualibet arte lupi.
[[“Some poet”: this is Aesop’s story, “The Wolf and the Lamb.” Phaedrus’s
version (Fabulae 1.1) is somewhat different. This version has been attributed
to Walter of England (though with hi rather than heu in the last line): “Thus
the harmful harms the harmless and finds a reason for harming him. Alas
wolves rule by whatever means they like.”]]
This defect in this principle hath been already observed by Thomas. in Fundam. Jur.
nat. & gent. 1. 6. 18.
1. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). See On the Citizen (De cive ), 1.10, andLeviathan,
chap. 13.
2. Heinrich Freiherr von Cocceji (1644–1719), father of Samuel Freiherr von Coc-
ceji (see note p. 17). Heinrich von Cocceji promoted a natural law theory based on
an extreme theocratic voluntarism.
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s e c t i on l x x i v
That principle laid down by Val. Alberti3 professor of divinity and phi-
losophy at Leipsic, hath a specious shew of truth and piety, viz. a state
of integrity. But Puffend. Specim. controv. 4. 12. and Thomas. jurisp.
divin. 4. 40 & seq. have proved it to be false. And granting it to be true,
that whatever is agreeable to a state of primitive integrity, is truly of the
law of nature; yet how unevident this principle must be, not only to
Pagans, but even to Christians, is manifest. Further, since the laws of
citizenship, of war, of contracts, and many others, for which there was
not place in that most happy state, cannot be deduced from the idea of
it, who can call this principle adequate? * <50>
s e c t i on l x x v
Grotius, Puffendorf, and several antients, were wonderfully pleasedwith
the principle of sociability; nor can it be denied, as we have afterwards
expressly proved, that men are so framed that they must live socially: but
that this is not the true, evident, and adequate principle of the law of
nature, hath been already demonstrated by the learned and worthy Sam.
* How few things are told us in the sacred records that can give us an image of
that state of integrity? About what is revealed to us in scripture concerning that state,
Christians are divided into various sects and very differing opinions. What then shall
we say of the Heathens, ancient and modern? They have a fable among them about
a golden age, which some imagine to have taken its rise from a tradition concerning
the paradise-state. They have other fictions with which they are highly delighted,
which have some resemblance to the Christian doctrine concerning God, of which
Pet. Dan. Huet. Quaest. Alnet. p. 172. hath treated in the learned manner so peculiar
to him. [[Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630–1721), Alnetanae quaestiones. ]] But so dissonant
and widely differing are all these things, that no Christian will ever be able to persuade
a Pagan, nor no Pagan a Christian, that this or the other thing is of the law of nature,
which the one derives from his traditions and the other from his revelation, with
relation to a state of integrity. We must therefore find out some principle common
to Jews, Christians and Pagans, which can be no other but that right reason which is
common to all mankind.
3. Valentin Alberti (1635–97), an orthodox Lutheran theologian at the University
of Leipzig, who strongly opposed the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius, Samuel
Pufendorf, and Christian Thomasius. Heineccius sides clearly with the last.
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de Coccius de principio juris nat. diss. 1. qu. 2. §9.4 I shall only add this
one thing, that many of our duties to God, and to ourselves, would take
place, even tho’ man lived solitary, and without society in the world.* <51>
s e c t i on l x x v i
Other principles of natural law are highly boasted of by others; such as
the order of nature, which the Creator intends in his works; the interest
of mankind; a moral Theocracy, and other such like principles.† But it
is agreed to by all, that these principles are not evident or adequate; and
some of them indeed cannot be admitted without some cautions and
restrictions.
* Cicero de legibus 1. 5. de off. 1. 16. & seq. Seneca de Benef. 4. 18. Iamblichus in
Protrept. cap. 20 [[Protrepticus ]], and several others, have considered the preservation
of society as the true fountain of justice, and the foundation of natural law: many
authors of this sentiment are accumulated by Puffendorf de jure nat. & gent. 2. 3.
15. and Jo. Hen. Boecler. in Grotii proleg. p. 48. [[ Johann Heinrich Boecler (1611–
72), professor of law at Strasbourg and author of a commentary on Grotius’s Law of
War and Peace (In Hugonis Grotii Ius Belli et Pacis . . . Commentario ).]] But however
many, formerly or at present, may have concurred in this opinion, we cannothowever
choose but observe there is a great difference amongst them in their account of the
reason by which men are obliged to sociability: Some assert we are instigated to it by
nature; some that we are bound to it by the will of God: others again maintain, that
necessity alone compels men to a social life.
† After Sfort. Palavicinus [[Sforza Pallavicini, cardinal (1606–67)]], Hen. Bodinus
in Disser. de jure mundi, maintained the order of nature to be the first principle of
natural law. But the latter hath been refuted by Thomasius de fundam. definiendicauss.
matr. hact. recept. insufficient. §18. The utility of mankind hath been asserted to be
the first principle by the famous Leibnitz and others, who with Thomasius have set up
this proposition as fundamental, “That all things are to be done which tend to make
human life more happy and more lasting, and that all things are to be avoided which
tend to render it unhappy, or to accelerate death,” Thom. fund. jur. nat. & gent. 1. 6.
21. A moral theocracy was asserted to be the first principle in a dissertation to that effect,
by Jo. Shute an Englishman; from which ingenious dissertation, several observations
are excerpted by the often cited Sam. de Cocceis de princip. juris nat. & gent. diss. 1.
qu. 3. §8. [[Bodinus (praeses ), Becker (respondens ), Jusmundi seu vindiciae juris naturae;
Thomasius (praeses ), Buhle (respondens), Dissertatio juridica de fundamentorum defi-
niendi causasmatrimoniales hactenus receptoruminsufficientia; JohnShute,firstViscount
Barrington (1678–1734), was an English politician and Christian apologist.]]
4. Heinrich von Cocceji and Samuel von Cocceji, Dissertatio de principio iuris
naturae.
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s e c t i on l x x v i i
But to give the opinion, which, upon a mature examination of this sub-
ject, appears to me the most solid, first of all I would observe, that God
being infinitely wise and good, cannot will any thing else with relation
to mankind but their happiness. For being perfect, he stands in no need
of any thing; and therefore men, who of all the beings within our cog-
nizance, alone are capable of felicity, were not created by him <52> for
his own advantage, but that he might render them capable of true
happiness.*
s e c t i on l x x v i i i
This being the will of God, that man should aim at and pursue true
happiness, and his will being the rule of human free actions, and there-
fore the source of the law of nature and justice (§62); by consequence
whereas, human legislators being themselves indigent in several respects,
have their own advantage no less in view than that of their subjects in
making laws, God, on the contrary, must have made laws to men solely
for their own benefit, and have intended nothing by them but their at-
tainment to true happiness, by conforming themselves to them.† <53>
* We do not exclude the primary end, which is the glory of the Creator, and the
manifestation of his perfections, which so clearly appear in his works. But this end
is universal, and extends to the whole universe. Wolf. von den Absichten der Dinge.
cap. 1. §2. cap. 2. §1. [[Wolff, Von den Absichten der natu¨rlichen Dinge (1726).]] The
particular end for which God created man, must be inferred from the essential parts
and properties of which man consists or is composed. Since therefore, he is endued
with understanding, by which he may come to the knowledge of God and of true
good; with will, by which he is capable of enjoying God and true good; and he hath
a body, by means of which he can produce various actions, which tend to acquire
and preserve his true happiness; hence it is manifest that God made man that he might
be a partaker of true felicity.
† Therefore utility cannot be said, with Carneades and others, to be the sole source
of justice and equity (§76). [[Carneades (ca. 214–ca. 129 b.c.), Greek philosopher
who presided over the New Academy at Athens.]] For the law of nature would thus
not be obligatory, but might be renounced by any one at his pleasure, or by all man-
kind, as Sam. de Cocceiis has proved, Diss. 1. qu. 2. §9. But whatever we do for the
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s e c t i on l x x i x
If therefore God intend the happiness of mankind, and the lawof nature
be directed towards it as its end (§78), and true happiness consist in the
enjoyment of good, and the absence of evil; the consequence must be,
that by the law of nature God must intend that we may attain to the
enjoyment of true good, and avoid evil. But since we can only enjoy
good by love, hence we infer that God obliges us to love, and that love
is the principle of natural law, and, as it were, a compend of it.*
s e c t i on l x x x
Love in us is the desire of good, joined with delight in its perfection and
happiness. Hatred is <54> aversion from evil, joined with satisfaction in
its unhappiness; wherefore what we love, we receive pleasure from its
perfection and happiness, and we are disposed to promote that perfec-
sake of our true happiness, according to the law of nature, we do it agreeably to the
divine will and command, and therefore, according to obligation not merely internal,
but likewise extrinsical: and for that reason, so far is any one from having a right to
renounce his happiness, that on the contrary, any one would no less deserve punish-
ment by violating a natural law constituted for his good, than any one who in a
common-wealth should offend against a law established for the public good.
* Here we see a wonderful harmony and consent, between the natural andrevealed
law or will of God. Our Saviour gives us a summary of revealed law in these few
words: “Thou shalt love God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, with all thy
mind, and with all thy strength: and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self.”Matt.
xxxii. 37. Luke x. 27. and he adds, “upon these hang the law and the prophets.” Agree-
ably to this doctrine of our Saviour, the apostles call love sometimes a◊nakefalai´wsin
tou no´mou, the sum of the law; sometimes plh´rwma no´mou, the fulfilment of the law;
at other times, sundesmon th˜c teleio´thtoc, the bond of perfectness; and sometimes,
to` te´loc th˜c paraggeli´ac, the end of the commandment, Rom. xiii. 9. Coloss. iii.
14. 1 Tim. i. 5. But right reason teaches the same truth, and inculcates no other prin-
ciple of natural law but love, as the sole mean by which we can come to the enjoyment
of that happiness or true good, which is the intention of God and of his law; whence
Leibnitz also, Praef. t. 1. cod. juris gentium diplom. defines justice to be, the love of
a wise man. [[Leibniz, Codex iuris gentium diplomaticus, Praefatio ad lectorem, vol.
1, 6.]]
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tion and happiness to the utmost of our power. What, on the contrary,
we hate, we rather desire its misery than its happiness.
s e c t i on l x x x i
Since we receive satisfaction from the excellence and happiness of what
we love (§80) it is obvious that the lover does not will to give uneasiness
to what he loves; nay, he rather suffers pain if any other should attempt
any such thing. For because he who gives uneasiness to one, or suffers
it to be done without feeling any pain, takes pleasure in another’s un-
happiness; but to take delight in the suffering of any one, is the same as
to hate (§80); and to love and hate the same object at one and the same
time is a contradiction; the consequence is, that it is inconsistent or im-
possible at the same time to love one, and to hurt him; or to bear his
being hurted by another without disturbance and pain.
s e c t i on l x x x i i
One may be hurt two ways, either by doing something which makes him
more unhappy than he is by nature, or by depriving him of some hap-
piness he is already possessed of. But seeing to do something which con-
duces to render one more unhappy than he is, is to hurt one; and to
dispossess one of something he hath justly acquired, and which con-
tributes to his happiness, is to deny one, or to take from him something
that belongs to him; hence it follows, that he violates the law of love in
the highest manner who hurts one, and disturbs his possession, or takes
it away, and hinders his enjoyment of it; and, on the other hand, the
lowest degree of love is to hurt no person, but to render to every one
<55> what is due to him, or leave him in the undisturbed possession and
enjoyment of what he hath; which degree of love we call the love of
justice. *
* This is observed by Seneca in his Ep. 95. where he says, how small a thing is it
not to hurt him whom we ought to profit! [[Seneca, Epistulae morales, ep. 95, 51:
“[Q]uantulum est ei non nocere cui debeas prodesse.” (Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae
morales, vol. 3).]] He who does not hurt any one is only not a scelerate: he has not
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s e c t i on l x x x i i i
But because a lover receives pleasure from the happiness of him whom
he loves (§80), it follows that he renders to him whom he loves chearfully,
even that which is not strictly due to him, or his right, if he perceives it
to be conducive to his happiness: and this is a more sublime degree of
love, which we call love of humanity, or beneficence. * But because we call
the capacity of discerning things which are contributive to our own hap-
piness and that of others, prudence or wisdom; it is obvious that this love
of humanity or beneficence must have wisdom for its guide and direc-
tor.* <56>
s e c t i on l x x x i v
Moreover, whereas he who does not observe the love of justice, whohath
it not, or does not act conformably to it, is a profligate person; he, on
the other hand, who hath not the love of humanity and beneficence,
yet attained to that kind of justice which the law of love requires, even to do good
to others to the utmost of our abilities, and therefore he hath no virtue to glory in.
Whence Leibnitz, in Praef. cod. dip. distinguishes three gradations in the law of na-
ture. Strict justice, which is to do no hurt; equity or love, which is to render to every
one what is due to him; and piety, which disposes to observe all the rules of virtue;
but we must differ from him with regard to his second gradation, because he likewise
gives to another his due or his own, who renders what is due to him in strict justice,
and therefore rendering to every one his own, is not to be referred solely to distributive
justice.
* Humanity and beneficence differ in this, that by the former we render to others
whatever we can do, without any detriment to ourselves, for their advantage: the latter
makes us not spare our own goods in order to benefit others, but disposes us to do
kind offices to them to our own prejudice. Of the former Cicero speaks de off. 1. 16.
“All these things seem to be common to all men, which are of the kind described by
Ennius in one instance. He that directs the wandering traveller, doth, as it were, light
another’s torch by his own, which gives never the less light, for that it gave another.”
By this single example he clearly points out to us, that we ought to render even to
strangers, whatever good offices may be done to them without prejudicing ourselves.
Whence these following, and others of the same nature, are called common benefits,
“To suffer any one to take from our fire to kindle his: To give good and faithful advice
to one who is deliberating: And all things, in one word, which are beneficial to the
receiver, and nowise hurtful to the giver.” [[Cicero, De officiis, 1.16.]] Of the latter
Seneca has wrote a book which is entitled De beneficiis, concerning benefits.
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can only be said not to perform the nobler and greater virtues (§82).Now
none may be forced to do virtuous actions, but all acts of wickedness
may be restrained by punishments (§9). Whence it is plain, that men
may be compelled to acts of justice, but not to acts of humanity and
beneficence. But when obligation is joined with coaction, it is perfect;
when it is not, it is imperfect (§9). We are therefore perfectly obliged to
the love of justice, and but imperfectly to the love of humanity and be-
neficence.* <57>
s e c t i on l x x x v
Since love always tends towards good (§80). But whatever we embrace
with affection as good, must either be a more perfect being than our
selves, equal, or inferior to us, and less excellent. Love of the first kind,
we call love of devotion or obedience; love of the second kind, we call love
of friendship; and love of the third sort, we call benevolence.
s e c t i on l x x x v i
Love of devotion or obedience, is love towards a more excellent andperfect
being, with whose excellence and happiness we are so delighted, that we
look upon such a being, as to be honoured and obeyed with the highest
complacency and veneration. The love of friendship is the love of our
equal, or satisfaction and delight in his happiness, equal to what we per-
* Those who fulfil their imperfect obligations are said by Seneca to be good men
according to the letter of the law; but elsewhere he shews it to be a very small attain-
ment to be good in that sense only; and that in order to merit the character of a wise
and virtuous man much more is required, even the love of beneficence, to which one
knows he is not strictly obliged. “Many good offices,’’ says he, “are not commanded
by law, and do not found an action, which however the circumstances and condition
of human life, more powerful than all law, render fit or lay a foundation for. No
human law forbids us to discover our friend’s secrets; no human law commands us
to keep faith with our enemy. What law obliges us to fulfil our promise to any one?
Yet I will complain of him, and quarrel with him, who hath not kept the secret en-
trusted to him, and will look upon him with indignation who does not keep his
pledged faith.” Seneca de beneficiis, v. 21.
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ceive in our own. The love of benevolence, is the love of an inferior and
more imperfect being, which disposes us seriously to promote its hap-
piness, as much as the nature of the being permits.
s e c t i on l x x x v i i
From these definitions it follows, that we cannot have love of devotion
or obedience towards a being, unless we be persuaded of its superiority
and greater perfection; nor can this love take place, unless such a being
be of such a character and temper as to desire to be loved by us. And
this love ought <58> always to be joined with veneration and obedience
suitable to the perfections of such a being.*
s e c t i on l x x x v i i i
Further it is plain that the love of friendship arises from equality. Now
equality is either an equality of nature, or an equality of perfections.
Wherefore, where the former takes place, equal offices of love are recip-
rocally due; and for that reason, amongst all who are by nature equal,
these incomparable rules ought to obtain. “Whatever you would not
have done to yourself, do it not to other.” And, “Whatever you would
have another do to you do unto them.” Matt. vii. 12. Luke vi. 31. Tob.
iv. 16. The first of which is the foundation of the love of justice; the
other, of the love of beneficence and humanity. But because, however
equal the being beloved, and the being loving may be by nature, yet the
one may be either more perfect, or more imperfect than the other; it may
happen that we may be obliged to have at the same time a love of friend-
ship towards a man, as equal to us by nature, and a love of devotion and
* For veneration or honour is a just esteem of the perfections belonging to a being;
obedience is a disposition to perform with readiness, whatever another as superior
hath a title to exact from us, and to with-hold from doing what he forbids. But since
there may be various degrees of perfection and superiority, there will also be as many
various degrees of veneration and obedience; and the more sublime the perfection
of a being is, the greater veneration and obedience are due to that being.
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obedience, or of benevolence towards him as being more perfect or more
imperfect.* <59>
s e c t i on l x x x i x
Finally, since benevolence seeks the enlargement and promotion of the
happiness of a more imperfect being, as much as its nature is capable of
happiness (§86). Hence it follows, that we ought not to hurt such a being,
or refuse to it what is its right and due; but that we ought to do good to
it, to the utmost of our power, with prudence however; and therefore
whatever kindness is not agreeable to reason, or conducted by prudence,
is not benevolence and liberality, but profusion, or any thing else you
please to call it.
s e c t i on xc
Now if we consider accurately the beings with which we are surrounded,
we shall find there are three only, to which we are under obligation to
render the offices of love: God, the creator of all things; ourselves, who
are certainly the nearest to ourselves; and other men, whom we plainly
perceive to be by nature equal to us. For as to spirits, such as angels, we
know not their nature, nor have we such commerce with them, as to be
under the obligation of certain duties towards them. And between men
and brutes there is no communion of right, and therefore no duty is
properly owing to them; but we owe this to God not perversely to abuse
any of his creatures.† Puffend. de jure nat. & gent. 4. 3. 6. <60>
* Thus, tho’ a prince as superior hath a right to our veneration and obedience,
that does not hinder but that he is obliged to render to us the good offices founded
upon equality of nature: as for instance, not to do us any injury; not to fix ignominy
upon what does not deserve it; and in one word, to do what Pliny commends in
Trajan, i.e. “to remember no less that he is a man, than that he is set over other men
to rule them.” [[Pliny, “Panegyricus,” 2.4 in Pliny, Letters and Panegyricus.]]
† For such a communion of right must, as we shall shew afterwards, arise from
compact. But brutes are not susceptible whether of active or passive obligationarising
from compact. We cannot therefore assent to the Pythagoreans, Porphyry, in his
books, peri` a◊poxh˜c, who not only ascribe sense and memory, but a rational mind to
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s e c t i on xc i
Since we cannot conceive otherwise of God than as a most excellent,
most perfect, and infinitely good Being, upon whom depends absolutely
our existence and felicity, of whose superiority we are absolutely per-
suaded, as well as of his will and desire to be loved by us (§87), it follows,
that we owe to him a love of devotion and obedience, which that it may
be worthy or suitable to a most perfect Being, this rule or maxim im-
mediately occurs, “That God, upon whom we absolutely depend, ought
to be adored by us with all the vigour of our mind; and that to him
ought to be rendered the most perfect and sincere obedience.”*
s e c t i on xc i i
Our love to ourselves must consist in satisfaction and delight in our own
perfection and happiness (§80). Hence therefore we are obliged topursue
<61> the preservation and augmentation of our perfection and happi-
ness with all our might. But since the more perfect a being is, the more
honour and obedience we owe to it (§87); we must take care that we do
not love ourselves more than God, least our self-love should thus de-
generate into immoderate and unproportioned selfishness. Whence
flows this other maxim, “That man is obliged to omit nothing, that may
brutes. However so far as men perceive any affection in brutes, so far do they render
a love of benevolence toward them; so as not to abuse their power of killing them,
but to take pleasure in rendering their life more commodious to them, as we see in
the instance of domestic dogs. Plutarch elegantly observes in Caton. major. “But we
see benignity hath a much larger field than justice; we sometimes extend beneficence
to brute animals thro’ the largeness of bounty; for a merciful man looks upon himself
as obliged to take care of horses which work for him, and not only of young animals
but of old ones.” [[Plutarch, “Cato Major” (Cato the Elder), in Plutarch, Plutarch’s
Lives, vol. 2, 301–85.]]
* For since the veneration we pay to a superior Being ought to be suitable to it
(§87); we cannot but hence infer that the highest veneration is due to the most perfect
Being. And because God knows most perfectly, not only our external actions, but
likewise all the inward motions of our mind; we owe to him, not merely external
signs of veneration, but inward reverence and piety. And this is that worship and love
which the sacred writings require of us.
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conduce to preserve, promote, or augment his perfection and happiness,
which is consistent with his love of God.”*
s e c t i on xc i i i
Since moreover all men are by nature equal, and that natural equality
requires a reciprocal obligation to equal love (§88); the consequence of
this is, that we are obliged to delight in the happiness of others, not less,
but not more than in our own; and therefore to love others as ourselves;
but ourselves not less than our neighbour. Whence flows a third maxim,
“That man is obliged to love his fellow-creature no less than himself, and
consequently not to do to any other, what he would not have him do to
him; but, on the other hand, to do to others all those offices of kindness
which he can reasonably desire them to render to him.”
s e c t i on xc i v
In fine, upon a due consideration of the pre-requisites to a principle of
moral science which have <62> been explained, we will find that this is
the most genuine principle of moral science. Nothing can be more cer-
tain, it necessarily flows from the divine will and the nature of man; and,
which is very satisfactory to me, it is authorised by the sacred writings.
Nothing can be more evident, since it is such as may be easily conceived
by the unassisted reason of every man, even among Pagans. Nothingcan
be more adequate, for in fact we shall soon see, that there is no duty of
a man as such, or of a citizen, which may not be easily and clearly de-
duced from this first principle.
* For God obliges man to seek after the enjoyment of good (§79), and therefore
to promote and preserve his own happiness; because therefore sometimes goods are
presented to him, of which one is greater than the other; and that lesser good which
deprives us of a greater one, ought to be esteemed an evil, it is obvious that God
obliges us to choose that which of many goods is the greatest.
A third axiom
concerning
love to others.
This principle
is true, evident
and adequate.
book i , chapter i i i 71
Remarks on This Chapter
I can’t help thinking that our excellent author is not so distinct in this
chapter as he ought to have been, and withal too tedious. It was indeed
necessary to distinguish between the principle which constitutes external
or legal obligation, and the principle which is the medium of knowledge
with regard to it; or themean bywhich itmay be knownanddemonstrated.
Now it is the will of God which constitutes external or legal obligation.
But what is the medium by which the divine will may be known? Our
author had already often said, that right reason is the faculty by which
it may be known. But hence it follows, that conformity to reason, is
the mean by which agreeableness to the divine will may be known and
demonstrated. Why then does he dispute against those who say con-
formity to Reason, or which comes to the same thing, to our rational
nature, is the principle or mean of moral knowledge? Or why does he
not immediately proceed to enquire what is, and what is not agreeable
to reason or our rational nature? Why does he dispute against those
who in their reasonings about the laws of nature, infer them from the
divine sanctity or moral rectitude, which must mean reason, or our
rational nature compared with the rational nature of the supreme Be-
ing? For if the law of nature be discoverable by reason, conformity to
reason, to the reason of God, and the reason of man, must be the prin-
ciple of knowledge with regard to the law of nature. Nor can the divine
sanctity or divine moral rectitude be an obscure idea, unless conformity
to reason, or to a reasonable nature, be an obscure idea. Our author
seems to have forgot what he said (§1), when he says (§86), that the
happiness and perfection of mankind is not a principle from which the
law of nature can be inferred; and what he here refutes, he afterwards
(§77) returns to, as a necessary first principle in demonstrating the law
of nature, viz. “That God intends the happiness and perfection of
mankind.” For if his reasoning, <63> (§77) be just, the business of the
moral science is to enquire what tends to the perfection and happiness
of man, and what is necessary to it; and these will be good moral rea-
sonings, which shew an action to be conducive to human happiness
and perfection, or contrariwise: For thus they shew what the divine will
commands, and what it forbids: nay, according to his reasoning in that
section, we can not advance one step in morals, without first deter-
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mining what our happiness and perfection requires, and what is re-
pugnant to it. He seems likewise (§70) where he says, “That the intrinsic
pravity or goodness of actions, is not a sufficient principle for deducing
and establishing the moral laws of nature,” to have forgot what he had
said in the former chapter, and frequently repeats in succeeding ones,
of the priority in nature or idea of internal to external obligation. And
indeed, to say that the laws of nature concerning human conduct, can-
not be deduced from the consideration of the internal nature of ac-
tions, is in other words to say, that they cannot be deduced by reason;
for it is to say, that they cannot be deduced from the conformity or
disconformity of actions to reason. All I would infer from this is, 1.
That it is impossible to make one step in moral reasonings, without
owning a difference between conformity and disagreeableness to rea-
son, and using that general expression, or some one equivalent to it;
for the will of God cannot be inferred but from conformity to reason,
or something equivalent to it, i.e. from some principle, which however
it may be expressed, ultimately signifies conformity to the nature of
things, or to reason. 2. That conformity to reason, to a reasonable na-
ture, to moral rectitude, to the divine nature, and conduciveness to the
perfection and happiness of a rational being, or conduciveness to the
perfection and happiness of man, as such, and several other such
phrases used by moralists, have and must all have the same meaning,
or terminate in the same thing. 3. That to ask why a reasonable being
ought to act agreeably to reason, is to ask why it is reasonable to act
reasonably; or why reasonable is reasonable. This must be the meaning
of that question, as it is distinguished from this other, “Is there good
ground to think, that the supreme Being, the maker and governor of
the universe, wills that his reasonable creatures should act reasonably,
and will proportion their happiness according to their behaviour?”
which question does likewise amount in other terms, to asking whether
it is agreeable to supream reason, to approve acting according to reason?
There is therefore no necessity of dwelling long upon either of these
questions in moral philosophy; but it is its business to enquire what
rules of conduct, what methods of action are agreeable, and what are
disagreeable to reason, to the nature of things, to the qualities of rea-
sonable beings, to the perfection and happiness of mankind as such;
all which phrases, as hath been said, must have the same meaning, and
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may therefore be promiscuously used: And indeed about them there
can be no dispute, unless <64> one has a mind to make a particular
favourite of some one of them in opposition to all the rest; in which
case, the dispute, ’tis evident, will be merely about a phrase; as in fact,
most disputes in the moral science realy are, for that very reason, viz.
through a particular liking to some favourite words.
Our author’s method of reasoning is, when he brings it out, plain
and just enough. It amounts to this, “If we own the being of a God,
and have a clear and just idea of his perfection, we must own that he
wills the perfection and happiness of all his creatures, his moral crea-
tures in particular: man therefore being a moral creature, God must
will the happiness and perfection of man. He must then for that reason,
will that man pursue his own perfection and happiness. But such is the
nature of man, and so are things relating to him constituted and con-
nected, that the pursuit of his perfection and happiness consists inwhat
may properly be expressed in one word, Love, the love of his Creator,
the love of his fellow creatures, those of his own kind in particular, and
the love of himself.” Now according to this way of reasoning what our
author hath to prove, is the latter proposition; and accordingly he goes
on in the succeeding chapters to prove it.
In other words, our author’s manner of deducing human duties
amounts to this, “Every obligation which man can be under as a rational
agent, external or internal, may be expressed by one word, Love. For
we can owe nothing to any being but love: all our obligations must
therefore be reducible to these three; the love of our Creator, the love
of our fellow-creatures, of those of our own kind, or with whom we
are more nearly and immediately connected in particular; and the love
of ourselves.” And accordingly our author proceeds to explain the du-
ties belonging to these three classes. The principle upon which he
founds may justly be called clear, certain, and adequate. For if there be
any such thing as obligation upon a rational agent, external or internal,
it can be nothing else, but obligation to love: internal obligation can
belong to nothing else but the dictates and offices of reasonable love;
and therefore external obligation can belong to nothing else.Wherefore
love is justly said in the sacred writings, to be the fulfillment of the law;
of the law of nature, of the law of reason, of the law of God. But let
me observe, that this method of our author’s, is the same in otherwords
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with some of them he refutes. For is it not evidently the same thing as
to say “that duty, obligation, or what is reasonable with regard tohuman
conduct, must be inferred from the human nature, and the constitution
of things relative to man. But according to the frame of man and the
constitution of things, the chief happiness and perfection of everyman
arises from the love and the pursuit of order within and without him;
or from the observation of the prevalency of wisdom and good order,
and consequently of greater happiness in the administration of theuni-
verse; and from such an orderly discipline of his <65> affections as tend
to produce universal happiness, order, and perfection, as far as his af-
fections, and the actions they lead to, have any influence?’’ According
to which state of the question, the remaining enquiry will be what the
love of good order and general happiness requires.
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Of the application of this rule to actions,
and the differences of actions proceeding
from thence.
s e c t i on xcv
Having considered the nature of human free actions, and the rule ac-
cording to which they ought to be regulated; the next thing to be con-
sidered, is the application of this rule to free actions. The application of
a law to a fact is called imputation, and therefore we shall in this chapter
treat of it.
s e c t i on xcv i
Imputation being the application of a law to a fact (§95), which cannot
be done otherwise than by comparing a law and a fact, i.e. by two prop-
ositions compared together, and with a third by a syllogism; the con-
sequence is, that imputation is a syllogism or reasoning, the major prop-
osition of which signifies a law; the minor a certain action: and the
conclusion is the sentence, with regard to the agreement or disagreement
of the action with the law.* <66>
* To impute, properly signifies to place something to the account or charge of
another person. Sen. epist. 8. “Hoc non imputo in solutum de tuo tibi.” [[Accurately:
“Hoc non imputo in solutum; dedi de tuo tibi” (“I shall not charge this to the expense
account, because I have given it to you from your own stock”). Seneca, Ad Lucilium
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s e c t i on xcv i i
Having said much the same thing above concerning conscience (§94),
which however is not the same with imputation, let us observe wherein
the difference between them consists; and it lies in this: Whereas con-
science is a reasoning about the justice and injustice of one’s ownactions:
imputation is a reasoning about the agreement or disagreement with law
of another’s actions. In the first case, every one is his own judge: in the
other, another person judges of our actions, and compares them with
the law.* <67>
epistulae morales, vol. 3, 42.]] Now as that can’t be done without ballancing accounts
with one, hence it came about, that this term seemed proper to express that appli-
cation of a law to facts, which is done in like manner by a similar comparison. Thus
when, as the story is told by Livy, Horatius had killed his sister, and a question arose,
whether the law against murder, ordaining that the person guilty of it should have
his hands tied, and his head veiled, and be whipped either within or without the walls,
and then be hanged upon a tree, ought to be applied to that action? The Duumviri
legally appointed by Tullius Hostilius the king, to judge of the matter, were of opin-
ion, that the law extended to the fact, upon which one of them pronounced this
sentence: “I find you, Publius Horatius, guilty of murder. Go, lictor, bind his hands.”
But Horatius appealing, and the father himself appearing for him, the people ab-
solved him. The Duumviri therefore reasoned in this manner, “He who knowingly
with evil design kills a person, is as a murderer to be punished so and so. This is the
law. Publius Horatius by running his sister through with his sword, has willingly and
with evil intention killed a person. This is the fact. He is therefore to be punished so
and so. Here is the sentence.” But the people computed or stated the account in
another manner thus: “He who kills an enemy to his country, is not to be punished
as a murderer. Here is the law. Publius Horatius in killing his sister, killed an enemy
of her country. Here is the fact. Therefore he ought not to be punished as a murderer.
Here is the sentence, and it is a sentence of absolution.” [[Livy, The Early History of
Rome, 1.26, pp. 61–62.]] The Duumviri therefore imputed the fault to Publius Hor-
atius, but the people did not impute it.
* But because it does not belong to every one to judge of the actions of others,
and yet such is the weakness of human nature, that most persons are very indulgent
to their own faults, and not very severe in searching their own consciences, and yet
are very quick-sighted and rigid with regard to the failings and blemishes of others;
it is no wonder that judging others is reprehended as unjust and wicked, not only by
our Saviour, Matt. vii. 1. Luke vi. 37. and by his apostle, Rom. ii. 1. xiv. 4. 1 Cor. iv.
5. but likewise by profane writers, who had only right reason to guide them in their
determinations. Hence the pleasant witty fable of the two budgets, one of which
filled with his own faults a man carried on his back, the other filled with the faults
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s e c t i on xcv i i i
Every application of law to fact is called imputation (§9), whether an
action be compared with the divine law or with a human law; and in
like manner, whether God himself, or men, whose office it is, apply law
to a fact. The former, however, moralists are accustomed to call impu-
tation in foro divino; the latter in foro humano. But there is this very
considerable difference between the two, that in the latter none suffers
punishment for thoughts, l. 18. D. de poenis; but God being omniscient,
and requiring internal obedience (§91), he justly imputes to us even
thoughts which are disagreeable to his law.* <68>
s e c t i on xc i x
Further, whereas the law which is applied to human actions is enforced
by a sanction (§64), hence it follows, that to impute is the same as to
declare, that the effect which a certain law assigns to an action, agrees to
such a particular action. This effect is called in generalmerit; punishment,
of others he carried on his breast: To which Phaedrus subjoins this moral, fab. 4. 9.
v. 4.
Hac re videre nostra mala non possumus:
Alii simul delinquunt, censores sumus.
[[Phaedrus, Fabulae 4.10: “For this reason we are unable to see our own vices;
but as soon as others commit errors we become their critics.”]]
Several parallel passages of ancient authors are collected by Is. Casaubon, ad Pers.
p. 340. [[probably a reference to Casaubon, Auli Persii Flacci Satirarum liber ]] and
by learned men upon this fable, whose coffers we will not pillage.
* The ancient philosophers were not ignorant of this truth, and have asserted that
God seeth not only all our outward acts, but likewise our most secret thoughts. So
Thales Milesius, Socrates, Plato and his followers, Pythagoras and his disciples, and
all in general who entertained juster and sublimer conceptions concerning God. Tes-
timonies to this purpose are collected by Huet. in qu. Alnet. ii. 2. 16. Hence we see,
how reasonable the interpretation of the Mosaic law is, which our Saviour gave,Matt.
v. 22, 28.
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if the effect of an action exhibited by the law be evil; and reward, if the
effect be good.*
s e c t i on c
Imputation therefore is a reasoning by which an action of another per-
son, being, in all its circumstances, compared with a law, whether divine
or human, is declared to merit, or not merit a certain effect proposed by
a law. From which definition it is manifest, that we cannot certainly
pronounce whether an action be imputable or not, unless we have a dis-
tinct comprehension both of the law and of the action in all its circum-
stances: and that one circumstance often alters the whole state of the
case.
s e c t i on c i
Since the law must be known to him who would form a right judgment
of the imputability of actions, the consequence is, that he ought to be
sure there is a certain law, and ought rightly to under-<69>stand the
whole of that law, and therefore to interpret it rightly, if it be conceived
in concise or obscure terms; i.e. he ought distinctly to comprehend the
mind of the law-giver declared by words, or by whatever other signs.†
* But since a legislator is not obliged to propose rewards, hence it is manifest that
even actions in themselves just are not meritorious. To this purpose belongs that
remarkable saying of Christ: “So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all these things
which are commanded you, say, we are unprofitable servants: we have done that
which was our duty to do,” Luke xvii. 10. But if a law-giver promises rewards, as God
has done, who has enacted his laws, not for his own sake, but for the advantage of
mankind, because he wills their perfect happiness (§78); rewards may be said to be
merited, not in respect of the law-giver, who of free-goodness proposed them, but
in respect of imputation.
† Interpretation therefore does not properly belong to the law of nature, but only
to positive laws, whether divine or human. For since legal interpretation is a distinct
representation of the law-giver’s mind, declared by words or other signs (§101): and
the law of nature is not conceived in words, but is promulgated by right reason (§11):
it follows, that the mind of the supreme law-giver cannot be collected from words
or other signs; and therefore this law does not admit of interpretation. Reason suf-
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s e c t i on c i i
Seeing an interpreter represents distinctly the law-giver’s meaning, de-
clared by words or other signs; it follows, that in interpreting laws, great
attention must be given both to the proper and the metaphorical sig-
nification of words; to their connection with what precedes and what
follows, and to the nature and character of the subject itself; and yet
more especially to the scope and intention of the law-giver, which in-
duced him to enact the law; wherefore they judge well, and we agree
with them who assert the reason of the law to be its spirit or soul. See
our preface ad Elem. Pandect.*1 <70>
s e c t i on c i i i
Further, since the reason of a law is as it were its soul, hence it must
follow, that the law ceases when the sole reason of it wholly and abso-
lutely ceases: that if it do not agree to a certain case, that case cannot fall
under the law on account of the very reason of the law; and this is the
foundation of what is called restrictive interpretation; to which may be
rightly referred equity, i.e. a power of correcting the law in respect of
ficiently understands itself without an interpreter. Arrian. Diss. Epict. 1. “The rea-
soning faculty being conscious to itself, clearly perceives what it is, and what it can
do, and of what price and value it is, if it applies itself to the direction of our other
faculties.” [[Epictetus, “Discourses,” 1.17 in The Discourses as Reported by Arrian.]]
* We have a remarkable example of the utility of this rule in our Saviour’s expli-
cation of the law about the sabbath, when he was censured by the Jewish doctors for
teaching, that works of charity and mercy ought not to be intermitted on the sabbath-
day. He on that occasion shews the source whence the interpretation of that law must
be brought. He says, “The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath,”
Mar. ii. 27. From which reason of the law it clearly follows, that all works which tend
to disturb the tranquillity and piety of mankind were forbidden to be done on that
day; but not such as conduce to human preservation and happiness. But take away
this sole and adequate reason of that law, and it is most certain that in the words of
the law themselves, there is nothing from which one would have inferredourSaviour’s
doctrine.
1. Heineccius, Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem Pandectarum.
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universality: Grot. de Aequit. indulg. & facilit. c. 1. n. 3.2 that if the
words of a law do not quadrate with a certain case, and yet the reason
of the law be applicable to it, then there is place for what is called ex-
tensive interpretation: Finally, that when the words and reason of the law
keep as it were pace together, then there is only room for declarative
interpretation. * <71>
s e c t i on c i v
Besides, because the law is interpreted either by the legislator or judge,
or some other, to whose office it belongs to apply the law to facts, or by
a lawyer, interpretation on these accounts is therefore called authentic,
customary, or doctrinal; the foundation of the first is the will of the leg-
islator; of the second, practice in courts of justice; and of the last, the
application of the rules of interpretation abovementioned.†
* For example, our Saviour interprets the law of the sabbath restrictively; the laws
concerning adultery and homicide extensively, Mat. v. which not being done by the
Pharisees, they reasoned ill concerning the imputation of actions. Hence it was, that
they accused the apostles of impiety for plucking ears of corn on the sabbath; and
our Saviour himself for healing the sick on the sabbath; and that they reputed those
righteous who fulfilled the traditions of the Rabbins, and washed, e.g. their cups
carefully, paid tithes, gave alms to the poor, fasted frequently, though they did all this
thro’ vain-glory, neglected the weightier matters of the law, and committed gross
crimes.
† We have examples of all these three in the sacred writings: Thus, after God,
Numb. xxvii. 7. had given this law: “If a man die and have no son, then ye shall cause
his inheritance to pass unto his daughter,” the supreme legislator himself adds this
interpretative clause, Numb. xxxvi. 5, 6. “So shall not the inheritance of Israel move
from tribe to tribe.” This is an example of authentic interpretation, which is fre-
quently the same as a new law. We have an instance of customary interpretation,Ruth
iv. 7. where the plucking off and casting the shoe, which was originally restricted to
a particular case, Deut. xxv. 7. is by judicial interpretation extended to rejection of
inheritance; with relation to which custom we have a curious disquisition by An.
Bynaeus de Calc. Heb. l. 2. c. 7. [[Bynaeus, De calceis Hebraeorum libri duo. ]]Finally,
there is an instance of doctrinal interpretation, Nehemiah viii. 13.
2. Grotius, De aequitate, indulgentia, et facilitate liber singularis.
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s e c t i on cv
Because he who would interpret a law aright, ought to know all the cir-
cumstances of the fact, (§108), and the principal circumstance is the per-
son acting; hence we conclude, that an action is to be imputed to him
who is the author or cause of it; and, on the contrary, imputation ceases
if any thing be done, of which the doer is neither the cause nor the
author, tho’ we sometimes impute the merits of one to others; which
imputation is commonly called imputation by favour, in contradistinc-
tion to that which is of debt or merit, strictly so called. Puffend. de jur.
nat. & gent. 1. 9. 2.* <72>
s e c t i on cv i
If therefore an action be imputed to none, unless he be the cause or
author of it (§105); but a person cannot be called the author of any action
which is not human; i.e. which is not done by the will, under the direc-
tion of the understanding (§30); hence it is obvious, that neither pas-
sions, nor natural actions, nor events wholly providential, nor things
done in a fit of madness, nor natural imperfections either of body or
mind, nor things done in sleep or drunkenness can be imputed to any
person, but so far as it depended upon the agent to prevent them (§26,
29, 49).† <73>
* And this is the origine of hereditary nobility; yea, sometimes of hereditary king-
doms. Thus among the Germans, the distinguishing nobleness, or the eminent ser-
vices of fathers, gave dignity even to striplings, Tacitus, de moribus Germ. c. 13. And
of hereditary kingdoms, Polyb. Hist. 6. 5. “This is the origine of hereditary sover-
eignty: hence it is, subjects obey for a long time, not only kings but their Offspring,
through a persuasion that being descended from them, and educated by them, they
will be like to them in temper and disposition.” [[Tacitus, Germania, 82; Polybius,
The Histories, vol. 6, bk. 6, chap. 7 (not 5), p. 283.]]
† Thus impudence is imputed to one, if he neglect the decorum with regard to
natural actions. Thus shipwreck is imputed to the commander of the ship, if by his
fault the ship was lost; whereas in other cases, what can be more true than whatTacitus
says, Ann. 14. 3. “Who is so unjust as to make a crime of what the winds and waves
have done?” [[Tacitus, The Annals of Tacitus, vol. 2.]] Thus deformity is imputable
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s e c t i on cv i i
As for what relates to ignorance and error, since both these imperfections
of the understanding are either culpable or inculpable (§48, 49), vincible
or invincible, voluntary or unvoluntary (§50), it follows from the same
principles, that inculpable, invincible, involuntary ignorance cannot
justly be imputed to a person; but that an action done thro’ culpable,
vincible, and voluntary ignorance is justly imputable: and the sameholds
to one who has sacrificed his nose to Venus [[that is, been deformed as a result of
venereal disease]], whereas in other cases Phaedrus justly pronounces, Fab. 3.
Sed quid fortunae, stulte, delictum arguis?
Id demum est homini turpe, quod meruit pati.
[[Phaedrus, Fabulae 3.11, the Eunuch to a wicked man: “But why, fool, do
you bring as a charge against me that which is the fault of Fortune? What is
really disgracful is what he has deserved to suffer.”]]
Much more reasonably still is ignorance imputed as a fault to a man who had op-
portunity of a good education in his youth, which is not reckoned criminal in the
vulgar; yea, dreams are imputed, which are occasioned by waking thoughts and ac-
tions throughout the day; of which kind of dreams called by the antients e◊nu´pnia,
according to Macrobius in Somn. Scip. 1. 13. [[Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream
of Scipio, bk. 1, 13.]] Claudian justly asserts,
Omnia, quae sensu voluuntur vota diurno,
Pectore sopito, reddit amica quies.
Furto gaudet amans, permutat navita merces,
Et vigil clapsas quaerit avarus opes.
Hon. Aug. Praef. v. 1.
[[Claudian, Panegyric on the Sixth Consulship of Honorius Augustus (Pane-
gyricus de sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti ), Preface, 1–2 and 7–8: “All the de-
sires that are turned over in our senses during the day are brought back to us
by the friendly quiet of the night when our breasts are stilled. The lover
rejoices in secret activity, the sailor exchanges his merchandise and the miser
searches for the wealth he has lost while awake.”]]
To which Gasp. Barth. in his notes, p. 714. has added more examples. [[Caspar Barth
(1587–1658), German poet who produced a commentary on Claudian, which was
published in several editions. The edition used here appears to be the 1650 Claudii
Claudiani poetae praegloriosissimo quae exstant. ]] In fine, wilful drunkenness, and the
actions perpetrated in that condition, are imputed for a reason that needs not be
mentioned, it is so obvious.
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with regard to error: much less can ignorance or error be any excuse to
one, if the action itself be unlawful, or be done in an unlawful place,
time, or manner; because, in such cases, it not only was in the agent’s
power not to be ignorant or not to err, but he was absolutely obliged to
omit the action.* <74>
s e c t i on cv i i i
Further, one may err either in point of fact or in point of law. To the
former belong the rules already laid down (§107), because a circumstance
in a fact may escape the most prudent persons, and therefore his error,
in point of fact, may be inculpable, invincible, involuntary. But error, in
point of law, with relation to the law of nature, does not excuse, because
right reason promulgates this law to every one, unless, perhaps, when
age, stupidity, and the more subtle nature of a particular law dictate a
milder sentence. But as for civil law, ignorance of it is so far imputable,
as it is so framed and promulgated that the person might know it.† <75>
* Judah, when he went into Thamar his Daughter-in-law, could not plead igno-
rance, because the action was in itself unlawful, Gen. xxxviii. 15, 16. Nor is he ex-
cusable, who sporting with darts in an unlawful time and place, ignorantly wounds
a man, because an action done in a place and time in which it ought not, is in itself
unlawful, §4. Inst. de lege Aquilia. Nor is an injury done to one who was pruning a
tree near the highway, if he be charged with killing a man, whom he might have saved
by calling out to him, §5. instit. eodem. Those who were thus employed among the
Romans used to cry aloud cave, take care: among the Athenians fu´laqai [[Fu´laqai:
“Watch out!” / “Be on your guard!”]], as Theod. Marcil. ad §5. instit. eod. shews.
[[ Justinian, Imp. Caes. Iustiniani P. P. Augusti institutionum quatuor. ]] Wherefore
the sentence of the Areopagites mentioned by Aristot. mag. mor. 1. 17. [[Aristotle,
Magna moralia, in The Works of Aristotle, vol. 9]] absolving a woman who killed a
young man by a love-charm which she gave him, because it was not done designedly,
having given him the draught out of love, and missed her aim, was blameable, since
it proceeded upon a supposition that it was not unlawful to give such love-making
medicines. How much more justly does the Roman lawyer Paullus, l. 38. §5. D. de
poenis, condemn such practices, as giving medicines to create love or abortion: Qui
abortionis aut amatorium poculum dant, etsi dolo non faciant, tamen quia mali ex-
empli res est, &c. [[“They who give a drink that causes either miscarriage or another
person to fall in love, and do so without deceit, yet, because it sets a bad example,
etc.” (trans. Eds.)]]
† For who would rigidly exact an accurate knowledge of the law of nature from
infants, or those hardly arrived beyond the infant state, from deaf and dumb persons,
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s e c t i on c i x
Since the free will of man must concur to render an action such of which
one can be called the author and cause (§30); but unintended actions are
such, that they do not proceed from the determination of themind(§58);
hence it follows, that an action which one does against his will, or with-
out intention, cannot be imputed to him; on the contrary, whatever is
done spontaneously, is imputable, and much more whatever is done of
one’s own free accord: yea, what one is forced to do is imputable to him,
if he who forced him had a right to force him; but not, if he who forces
him was not in the exercise of his right, or if the person forced was,
previously to the force used, under no obligation of doing it.* <76>
from changelings, or from stupid persons brought up among the brutes? Besides, tho’
the law of nature be as it were written or engraved on the minds of men, yet it cannot
be otherwise known than by reasoning about just and unjust (§15): now, because some
precepts of the law of nature flow immediately from clear principles of reason, others
are derived from principles of reason by many intermediate steps, and a long chain
of reasoning, none can doubt that precepts of the first sort may be known by every
person who is not quite stupid; whereas those of the latter sort are more difficultly
understood, and require a more improved and perfect understanding. Hence by the
Roman law, tho’ it reckoned incest forbidden by the law of nations, l. 38. §2. D. ad
L. Jul. de adult. c. 68. D. de rit. nupt. yet the punishment was sometimes mitigated,
both with respect to men and women; as, for instance, if a son-in-law should after
divorce lie with his mother-in-law, l. 38. §5. D. ad L. Jul. de adulterio: of which no
other reason can be given but because the unlawfulness of incest cannot be inferred
immediately, or without a long train of reasoning from the principles of natural law.
* Because, tho’ a person compelled or forced wills (§58), yet right and obligation
are correlates, which mutually found or destroy one the other (§7); and therefore,
when right ceases, obligation must also cease: the consequence from which is, that if
the one hath no right to compel, the other can be under no obligation to do what he
was unjustly compelled to. Hence it is, that the promise of a stubborn debtor, ex-
torted by the magistrate by threatning execution is valid, because the magistrate is in
the exercise of his right when he forces stubborn debtors to pay: But if a robber forces
a traveller to promise him a certain sum of money, because the robber hath no right
to force him, the traveller can be brought under no obligation to perform what he
was thus compelled to promise. To this effect is that famous Epigram of Martial.
Quid si me tonsor, dum curva novacula supra est,
Tunc libertatem divitiasque roget?
Promittam, nec enim rogat illo tempore tonsor,
Latro rogat: res est imperiosa timor.
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s e c t i on cx
But seeing neither temperament, affections, propensions, habits, nor ex-
ternal force, hinder the free exercise of the will (§54 & seq.) it is abun-
dantly manifest, that neither bodily constitution, which hath so great an
influence commonly on the affections of the mind, nor passions, how-
ever impetuous and vehement, nor habit, tho’ become a second nature,
can hinder the imputation of an action; tho’ sometimes, in humancourts,
he be reckoned an object of just commiseration, who was transportedinto
a bad action by the violence of just grief, or any afflictive passion.*
s e c t i on cx i
Hence it is easy to see whether one be in any degree excusable, who
being overpowered by fear, to which the bravest mind may succumb,
commits <77> any action contrary to law. For if the fact be such that
there is no room to plead necessity, in vain is it pretended. But in what
Sed fuerit curva quum tuta novacula theca:
Frangam tonsori crura, manusque simul.
Epig. 11. v. 5.
[[Martial, Epigrams 11.58.5–10: “What if the barber, while the curved/drawn
[stricta in original rather than curva ] blade is over me, should at that moment
ask for freedom and riches? I should promise, for at that moment it’s a robber
asking, not a barber, and fear is an imperious thing. But when his razor is
safe in its curved sheath, I shall break the barber’s legs, and his hands too.”]]
* It is easier, as Aristotle has observed, to resist lust, or any voluptuous appetite,
than the afflictive passions. See Nicomach. 3, 12. 3, 15. 7, 7. Mag. moral. 2. 6. The
same is observed by Marcus Antoninus, e◊ic e◊auto´n, 2. 10. [[Ei◊c eÿauto´n (To himself ),
that is, Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations.]] So that one cannot but wonder to find Ar-
istotle, as if he had forgot himself, asserting, ad Nicom. cap. 2. “That it is more dif-
ficult to resist the impulses of pleasure than of anger,” since to be deprived of pleasure
is only a privative evil, and that only for the greater part but apparent, not real;whereas
to feel pain is a positive, and very frequently a real ill. Who does not think parricide
more to be imputed to Nero, who was not excited to that wickedness by any afflictive
passion, but by mere cruelty and wickedness, than to Orestes, who giving the reason
why he killed Clytemnestra, says, Now is she who betrayed my father’s bed killed. Eurip.
Orest. v. 937. [[Euripides, Orestes.]]
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cases necessity cannot be pleaded, we shall enquire more accurately
afterwards.*
s e c t i on cx i i
Whensoever the understanding and will, and the physical motion of the
body concur to an action, then he who does it is called the physical cause
of the action; but if the mind alone acts without any corporeal motion,
he is called the moral cause. Since therefore understanding and will are
the only principles of human actions (§30), hence it follows, that an
action is no less imputable to the moral cause than to the physical cause,
if the concurrence of the will and understanding in both be equal; more
imputable to the moral than to the physical cause, if one induces another,
who is under obligation to obey him, to act, by commanding or com-
pelling him; less imputable to the moral than to the physical cause, if
one concurs with the action by advice or approbation only.† <78>
* Truly, if any thing be commanded contrary to piety and justice, that then no
pain or force ought to be yielded to, both the scriptures and reason teach. This is
acknowledged by several Pagan writers. So Juvenal, §8. v. 80. [[The following verse
is quoted slightly inaccurately.]]
Ambiguae si quando citabere testis,
Incertaeque rei: Phalaris licet imperat, ut sis
Falsus, & admoto dictet perjuria tauro,
Summum crede nefas, animam praeferre dolori,
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere caussas.
[[ Juvenal, Satires 8.80–84, in Juvenal and Persius: “If you’re summoned as a
witness in some tricky, murky case, even if Phalaris commands you to com-
mit perjury and dictates his lies with his Torture-bull close by, think it to be
the worst evil to put survival ahead of honour and for the sake of life to lose
the reasons for living.” Phalaris was a tyrant of Agrigentum who slow-roasted
his victims in a bronze bull.]]
† Hence that distinction of Hen. Koehlerus, in his Exercit. juris natur. §108. &
seq. between efficacious will, when the effort is sufficient to produce or suspend the
action, and inefficacious will, when the effort alone is not sufficient, is to be admitted
as of great use: wherefore, if the will of the moral cause be efficacious, the action is
justly imputed to him; and in proportion as the will is more or less such, the action
is more or less imputable to one. For who doubts, for instance, that if a father com-
mand his son to steal, the theft is more imputable to him than to a stranger, either
commanding or persuading to do it?
When and
how an action
is imputed to
the moral
cause?
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s e c t i on cx i i i
To the circumstances of the person to whom an action is imputable
(§105), belong his dignity, rank, and quality; and therefore it is indis-
putable, that when many persons concur in the same action, if the action
be just it is less imputable, and if the action be unjust, it is more im-
putable to him whom relation, prudence, duty, age, dignity, ought to
influence to good conduct, and restrain from bad, than to a stranger, an
ignorant, stupid person, one under no particular tie, a boy, a stripling,
or, in fine, a person of no rank or dignity.* <79>
s e c t i on cx i v
Since, in the imputation of actions, regard ought to be had not only to
the person of the agent, but to all the other circumstances; but that con-
currence of circumstances in the object, of time and place, togetherwith
sufficient abilities, without which an action cannot be done, is called
occasion or opportunity; it follows necessarily, that he is not excusable
* Thus, whatever good service was done to a relative, the ancients called a good
office, what was done to a stranger they called a benefit. Seneca de Benef. 3. 18. The
latter is more imputable than the former. On the other hand, an injury done to a
father by a son, whom filial duty ought to have restrained from such a crime, is more
imputable than one done by a stranger is to him. And who does not blame the faults
committed by a prudent person well instructed in the thing, more than those done
by a stupid ignorant person: those committed by a person of age and experience, or
even by a man arrived at the years of discretion, than those done by a youth: those
committed by a theologue skilled in sacred matters, than those done by an illiterate
person: those, in fine, committed by a person of distinction, or placed in any hon-
ourable station, more than those done by a vulgar person of lower life? So Hieron-
ymus in Ezech. 2. Salvianus de gubern. Dei, p. 118. [[Hieronymus, Commentarius in
Ezechielem et Danielem, Homiliae in Jeremiam, in Hieronymus, Opera, vol. 5; Sal-
vianus, De gubernatione Dei ]] and so likewise Juvenal in these well known lines.
Omne animi vitium tanto conspectius in se
Crimen habet, quanto, qui peccat, major habetur.
Sat. 8. v. 140.
[[ Juvenal, Satires 8.140 in Juvenal and Persius: “[T]he higher thewrongdoer’s
status, the more glaring the criticism.”]]
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whom occasion tempts to commit any crime; nor he who loses the op-
portunity of doing a good action thro’ indolence or negligence; but an
omission of an action is not to be imputed to one who had no oppor-
tunity of doing it.*
s e c t i on cxv
Much less then can the omission of these actions be imputed to one,
which are either impossible in the nature of things, or contrary to laws
and good manners, or at least which he had not sufficient ability to per-
form, except so far as one had weakened the abilities with which he was
endowed by his own fault, or had rashly, with bad intention, promised
what he might have foreseen to be impossible for him to perform.† <80>
s e c t i on cxv i
Moreover, actions compared in this manner with a rule of action, take
different names. If they, in all their circumstances, be agreeable to right
reason, not obliging by external obligation, or to internal obligation
merely (§7), they are good; but if in one or more circumstances they
* For the occasion of committing a fault or temptation to it, ought to be avoided;
and one ought to resist the allurements of vice. He who does it not is blameable, if
he yields to sinful appetites or passions. He is therefore the author and cause of that
action; and it ought to be imputed to him. It is therefore a wretched excuse Chaereas
offers for himself in Terence: “Should I lose so desirable, a so much longed for, so
favourable an opportunity?” [[Terence, The Eunuch, lines 604–6, in vol. 1 of Ter-
ence. ]] For he suffered himself to be tempted to sin. On the other hand, how blame-
able the not taking hold of an opportunity of doing well is, Christ elegantly sets forth
to us in the parable of the servants, Matt. xxv. 14.
† Hence it is plain, why a debtor who had squandered his estate is still liable, and
is not excusable on account of his indigence, because he reduced himself by his own
fault: and why an alchymist, who had promised mountains of gold, when he was
found to have deceived, was as justly condemned of fraud, as one who had knowingly,
and with evil intention promised a treasure. See an example in Tacitus, Annal. 16. 1.
in the story of Cesellius Bassus. [[Tacitus, Annals 16.1, tells the story of a Carthaginian
(said to be a madman) who convinced Nero that he had discovered, through a dream,
Dido’s treasure buried in a cave.]]
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deviate from right reason to whatever side, they are bad. From which
definitions it follows, that an action must be both materially and for-
mally good (as the schools speak) in order not to be classed with bad
actions.*
s e c t i on cxv i i
Again, if we compare actions with a law, those which are in all things
agreeable to law are just; those which are, in any one circumstance, dis-
agreeable to law, are unjust, and are therefore called sins. Whence we
may learn why St. John places all sin in a◊nomi´a, i.e. a transgression of a
law.
s e c t i on cxv i i i
Finally, since the divine law or will obliges us to love (§79), and love is
either love of justice, or love of beneficence (§82), an action agreeing in
<81> all circumstances with the love of justice, is a just action, and one
ever so little repugnant to it, is an unjust action; but those which proceed
from the love of humanity and beneficence, are called honest, and those
which are not agreeable to that love, are called dishonest, base, inhumane;
and hence it is easy to understand wherein the difference lies between
expletive and attributive justice.
Remarks on This Chapter
Our Author’s positions concerning the interpretation of laws, and the
imputation of actions in foro humano, are very clear and just. But it
* Hence the largesses, the fastings, and all the austerity of the Pharisees were not
good actions, tho’ materially conformable to right reason, because not done from a
good motive, but from ostentation and vain-glory. We ought not only to do good
things, but we ought to do them in a right manner. The just man is rightly described
by Philemon in Stobaeus, Serm. 9. thus: “Not he who does good things in whatever
manner he does them, but he who sincerely desires not merely to be thought, but
really to be upright in all his conduct, is good.”
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may not be improper to add the following observations concerning the
effects of ignorance and error in foro divino, i.e. with respect to the
good and bad consequences of actions occasioned by ignorance or er-
ror, according to the laws of God in his government of the world.
1. It must be as true in morals as it is confessed to be in mechanics,
that deviation from truth will lead into a wrong manner of acting; and
all action must be liable to all the consequences of the laws of nature,
i.e. to all the consequences connected with it in the regular and wise
constitution of things, according to which every cause operates, means
are proper and effectual, and different operations have different effects.
And in fact we know no mistakes in action through ignorance, rash
judgments, or whatever way it happens, which do not produce hurtful
consequences; insomuch that there is good reason to conclude, that
more of the misery of mankind is owing to wrong methods of action
which are the effects of ignorance or error, than to any other cause. It
must be true in general, that in a world governed by general laws; or in
which connexions are invariably established, every deviation from
truth, every mistake about the connexions of things in it, must be in
some degree hurtful.
But, 2. Since all the interests of intelligent agents require govern-
ment by general laws, or fixed connexions which operate invariably, the
government of the world will be perfectly good, if the connexions or
general laws which constitute it are the best adapted that may be, to
promote the greater good of rational agents in the sum of things. Now,
that it is so, must be certain, if the being and providence of an infinitely
good God can be proved a` priori. And there is sufficient reason to con-
clude that it is so a` posteriori, because the more examples we find by
enquiring into the government of the world, of such good general laws,
the greater is the presumption that the whole is governed by the best
general laws. But the further we enquire, the further we search, the
more and clearer instances do we find <82> of good, of perfect gov-
ernment. See my Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy.
3. Our great business therefore is to endeavour to acquire just no-
tions of the connexions of things; or of the good and bad consequences
of actions, in order to act agreeably to them. If getting knowledge to
direct our conduct were not in our power, directing our conduct could
not be in our power: wherefore, if ignorance, want of knowledge, error,
book i , chapter iv 91
false notions or judgments be not imputable to us, wrong actions are
not imputable to us. So that ultimately, whether we speak of the im-
putation of actions in the juridical stile, or in other words, as we have
now spoken of it, (both of which must mean the same thing) it is
ignorance or error in judgment that is imputed, when action is im-
puted; it is ignorance or error that brings evil upon us, when wrong
action does it; because every action is directed by our present opinion
and judgment, and the affection corresponding to it. And for that rea-
son, our chief business, interest and duty, must be to have just or true
ideas of the nature and consequences of actions; or of the connexions
of things, according to which our actions ought to be regulated, since
it is according to them that actions have certain effects or consequences.
4. False judgments, which tend to direct into a wrong course of
action, or to introduce a wrong temper into the mind, must, (as hath
been said) be hurtful. But, on the one hand, it is as sure as that there
is a God, and that the world is governed by good laws, for the greater
general good of the whole, that a virtuous reasonable temper, and vir-
tuous reasonable conduct, are, upon the whole of things, the most ad-
vantageous course of acting. It is so in fact in the present life considered
by itself without any regard to futurity; and it must be so in a special
manner in a future state. And, on the other hand, it is as sure as that
there is a God, that no opinions, tho’ false, which do not tend to corrupt
the temper, or to lead into a wrong course of action, can render us
obnoxious to the divine displeasure, can be provoking to him, as such,
if the bent of the heart be sincerely towards truth and right; or can as
such involve in any hurtful consequences appointed to be punishments
of false opinions, not tending to corrupt the temper, nor to lead to
vitious behaviour; and not proceeding from want of love to truth and
right in any degree, or from want of impartial, honest diligence, as far
as that is in our power, to find out truth and avoid error.
How moral conscience, or our sense of right and wrong may be,
and only can be impaired, corrupted, or overpowered, is explained at
great length in the Enquiry concerning virtue, Characteristicks, T. 2.
p. 40, &c.3 And to improve it, and preserve it pure and untainted, must
3. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), An Enquiry
Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699), in Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners,
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be our chief duty and interest. Enquiries therefore into right andwrong
conduct are of the utmost importance. They are enquiries into the na-
tures and consequences of things, and are in that sense philosophy. But
which is more, they are enquiries into the natures and consequences of
<83> things which ought to direct our conduct; and therefore they are
moral philosophy, or compose the science of life, the science of right
conduct, the science and art of living suitably to our nature and rank,
suitably to our dignity; agreeably to the will of our Creator, manifested
by the connexions of things established by him; and agreeably to our
own best interest. For this must be certain, that it is the established
connexions of things which constitute our best interest. And if the
established connexions of things be according to the best order, acting
according to virtue or the best order, must be in the sum of things our
best interest. And why should we doubt that it is really so in a future
state, and for ever, since it is really so at present, even while virtue is
but in its first state of education, culture and discipline; since the com-
pleat natural effect of highly improved virtue cannot take place till vir-
tue be brought to a great pitch of perfection by gradual culture, because
the effect cannot precede the cause. But that virtue is our best interest,
as well as acting according to the best order, and easily discoverable to
be such, will appear as our author proceeds in his deduction and dem-
onstration of particular duties or virtues. I thought it proper to add this
remark, as well on account of those who speak vaguely and loosely
about the imputability of ignorance and error, as of those who main-
tain opinions which result in asserting, That sincere love of truth, and
impartial diligence to discover it, is not the best temper, the best part
we can act, nay, all the good within our power, with regard to knowl-
edge, speculative or practical. And if this be not the temper and con-
duct which leads to happiness, according to the constitution of things,
what a terrible, what a wretched constitution of things must it be!
Opinions, Times, 163–230. This is one of the rare references by Turnbull to
Shaftesbury.
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Of the duties of man to God.
s e c t i on cx i x
Hitherto we have but premised some of the first principles of the beau-
tiful moral science; let us now proceed to consider the offices or duties
which the law of nature prescribes to mankind; to all and every one of
the human race. What the Greek philosophers called to` De´on, and the
Stoics to` kajh˜kon, Tully afterwards, in explaining this part of philoso-
phy in the Roman language, called <84> officium, not without delib-
erating about the matter a long time, and consulting his friends.*
* That the Stoics called it to` kajh˜kon, and held the doctrine of duties as the chief
part of moral philosophy, we are assured by Diogenes Laertius, who has not only
briefly and clearly explained the chief precepts of the Stoics with relation to human
duties, but has likewise commended their treatises on the subject, as that of Zeno, l.
7. 4. of Cleanthes, cap. 7. of Sphaerus ibidem, &c. Plutarch mentions a book of
morals by Chrysippus de repugn. Stoic. [[Plutarch, “On Stoic Self-contradiction”
(De Stoicorum repugnantiis), in Plutarch,Moralia: in Seventeen Volumes, vol. 13, pt.
2, 412–602. Plutarch refers to a number of works by Chrysippus in the text.]] Cicero
mentions one of Panaetius upon duties (de off. 3. 2.) and in his letters to Atticus, 16.
11. he speaks of one by Posidonius. When, after their example, Cicero had wrote a
treatise of the same kind in Latin, after long deliberationwhat title to give it, all things
duly considered, he could not find a more proper word to express the to` kajh˜kon of
the Stoics than the Latin word officium. So he writes to Atticus, 16. 6. “Quod de
inscriptione quaeris, non dubito, quin kajh˜kon officium sit, nisi quid tu aliud. Sed
inscriptio plenior de officiis.” [[Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 16.6: “As to what you
enquire about my writing, I do not doubt that kajh˜kon is to be translated officium
(duty). But there will be a fuller writing ‘de officiis ’ (‘On Duties’).”]]
A Transition
to the doctrine
of duties.
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s e c t i on cxx
By office or duty I understand an action conformable to the laws,whether
of perfect or imperfect obligation. Nor can I entirely approve the defi-
nition given by the Stoics, who say, it is an action, for the doing which
a probable reason can be given; or, in otherwords, an actionwhichreason
persuades to do.* Diog. Laert. 7. 107. 108. Cicero de finibus, l. 3. 17.1
<85>
s e c t i on cxx i
But since office or duty means an action conformable to law, it is plain
that duty cannot be conceived without a law; that he does not perform
a duty, who imposes upon himself what no law commands; that an ac-
tion ceases to be duty, when the law, or the reason of the law enjoining
it ceases; and that when a law extends to certain persons only, of two
persons who do the same action, the one performs his duty, and theother
acts contrary to his duty.†
* For since nothing is done even rashly, for which a probable reason may not be
given, whatever is done, not only by men, but by brutes, may be called officium, office
or duty. And thus the Stoics understood the word, of whom Laertius says, l. 7. 107.
“They extended the word to plants and animals, for with regard to these there are
offices.” [[Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7.107.]] It is true, an office ought to be founded
upon a reason, but it ought to be a reason which is proper to determine men to act
or forbear acting, and not brutes, i.e. an obligatory reason.
† It is proper to illustrate these propositions by examples. None will say that Or-
igen did a duty when he emasculated himself, whether by an instrument, as Hi-
eronym. [[St. Jerome (ca. 342–420), one of the four Latin doctors of the church]]
relates, ep. 65. or, as others have narrated, by medicines. Epiph. Haer. 64. [[Epi-
phanius, The Panarion of St. Epiphanius, 215.]] For there is no divine precept com-
manding it, insomuch that Origen himself afterwards acknowledged he had mis-
understood that passage in St.Mat. xix. 12. SeeHuet. Origeniana I. 1. 13. p. 8. [[Huet,
Origeniana. ]] None will deny that a christian would act contrary to his duty, if he
should not submit to the law of circumcision, or offer sacrifice to God, tho’ formerly
both were duties, Gal. iii. 23, 25. iv. 3, 4, 5. 2 Col. ii. 20. Heb. ix. 9, 10. Finally, if a
priest usurps the office of a judge, he acts contrary to his duty, and is guilty of in-
trusion into a charge not committed to him; whereas a judge doing the same action,
does his duty, 1 Peter iv. 15.
1. Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum.
Office or duty
defined.
The nature
of duty.
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s e c t i on cxx i i
The obligation binding one to do his duty being either perfect or im-
perfect (§120), duty must likewise be divided into perfect and imperfect;
the former being done in obedience to perfect obligation, or a law; the
other being performed in consequence of imperfect obligation, or from
virtue.* <86>
s e c t i on cxx i i i
Further, law being the rule of duties (§121), because law is either divine
or human, and divine law is either natural or positive, there are so many
corresponding divisions of duties. Those which are commanded by the
divine natural law, are called natural duties. Those commanded by the
divine positive law, are called christian duties; and those, in fine, which
are enjoined by human laws, are called civil offices or duties. †
s e c t i on cxx i v
But the principal division of duties is taken from their object. For as
there are three objects to whom we owe certain duties, God, ourselves,
and other men (§90), so there are duties of three kinds; duties to God,
duties to ourselves, and duties to other men; of all which we are to treat in
order.
* Accordingly, to do hurt to no person, to fulfil contracts, to repair damage done
by us, and such like duties, are perfect. To relieve the indigent, give alms, shew those
who are gone out of their way the right road, give counsel to those who are in doubt,
and such like duties, are imperfect. See Cicero de off. 3. 12. & seq.
† To worship God with religious reverence, to honour our parents, to defend
ourselves against injuries, are natural duties, l. 2. l. 3. Dig. de just. & jure: To deny
ourselves, take up our cross, and follow Christ, are christian duties: to pay civil taxes,
to observe particular forms and times in law-suits, and such like, are civil duties.
Duty divided
into perfect
and imperfect.
Into natural
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Into duties
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s e c t i on cxx v
As to our duties towards God we have already observed, that they must
be inferred from the consideration of the divine perfections (§87); and
hence we concluded, that God ought to be loved with a love of devotion
and obedience, and therefore ought to be worshipped with all the powers
of our soul, as the most perfect of Beings, upon whom we wholly de-
pend, and to be obeyed with the most sincere and perfect obedience
(§91). <87>
s e c t i on cxx v i
Since the duties we owe to God must be deduced from his infinite per-
fections (§125), it follows, by necessary consequence, thatman is obliged
not only to acquire the most lively knowledge of God, and of his per-
fections, but daily to encrease this knowledge, and advance in it, that he
may attain daily to greater and greater certainty and perfection in it;
which, since it cannot be done but by dailymeditationupon those truths
which reason is able to discover concerning God, by the careful and se-
rious contemplation of his works of creation and providence, so full of
evident marks of his infinite wisdom and goodness; hence it is manifest
that we are obliged to these exercises, and that those who neglect these
means of coming to the knowledge of God, which are in every one’s
power who has a sound mind, are in a state of inexcusable ignorance;
and those who ascribe any imperfection to God, are in a state of inex-
cusable error (§107).* <88>
* Hence the apostle says what may be known of God is manifest to theHeathens,
because the invisible perfections of God from the beginning of the world are clearly
discovered by his wonderful works, and therefore they are without excuse who know
him not, Rom. i. 20. And whence else indeed that universal consent in the acknowl-
edgment of his being and perfections urged by Cicero, Qu. Tusc. 1. 13. de nat. deo-
rum, 2. 2. Maxim. Tyr. diss. 38. Aelian. Var. hist. 2. 31. Sen. ep. 117? [[Maximus of
Tyre, Dissertationes, 303–12; Aelian, Varia historia (Historical Miscellany ).]] For tho’
this universal consent be not a demonstrative argument of the Being of God (§71),
yet hence it is manifest, that as the apostle says, “Whatmay be known of God is easily
discoverable.” For which reason, Cicero de nat. deorum, 2. 2. affirms, “If any one
The founda-
tion of our
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God.
Our obligation
to know God.
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s e c t i on cxx v i i
Hence it likewise follows, that we are obliged, or that it is our duty to
have just apprehensions of the divine perfections, and to know and be-
lieve that he is the Creator and Governor of all things, that all things
are made by him, and are under his providence and government, human
affairs principally; and that he is one pure, eternal, independent, omnip-
otent, incomprehensible, intelligent, wise, omniscient, free, active, good,
true, just, and most excellent Being. *
s e c t i on cxx v i i i
He who obstinately denies the being, or any of the perfections of God,
is impious: he who ascribes imperfections to God, repugnant to his na-
ture, is called a blasphemer: since therefore they, who do not know the
perfections of God, are inexcusably ignorant, and they, who attribute
any imperfection to him, inexcusably err; it is incontrovertible that all
blaspheming and impiety are inexcusable. But they are therefore impious,
and without excuse, who, with a hardened mind, deny the divine exis-
tence or providence; and they are blasphemers, who, with Homer, and
other poets, assert a plura-<89>lity of Gods, and represent them as con-
tending and quarrelling one with another; as adulterers, incestuous, or
deformed, lame, in pain, and groaning in an effeminate manner; and
who have not only professed inwords such absurd opinions of theGods,
doubt whether there is a God, I cannot comprehend why the same person may not
as well doubt whether there be a sun or not.” [[Cicero, De natura deorum.]]
* Epictetus Enchirid. c. 38. tells us, “The chief thing in religion is to have just
ideas of the immortal powers, and of their infinitely wise and good administration.”
[[Epictetus, Enchiridion, but chap. 31, rather than 38 (Epictetus, The Discourses and
Manual, vol. 2:226).]] And they are in a great error indeed, who think that the whole
of our duty consists in probity and integrity, of life, and that it is a matter of indif-
ference what one thinks of God, or what notions he entertains of divine things. For
since our duties to God can only be inferred from his perfections (§125), how can one
render to God the homage and reverence due to him, or that sincere and universal
obedience to which he is justly entitled, if he be ignorant of his perfections, or has
imbibed false and corrupt notions of them?
And to have
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but have not hesitated to set them forth to the eyes of menunderhorrible
images, and by wicked and vile ceremonies.*
s e c t i on cxx i x
He who has a just and lively notion of any perfections, cannot but be
highly delightedwith the contemplationof them, andwill sparenopains
to persuade others to pay the same regard to theBeingpossessedof them;
it is therefore our duty to endeavour to bring others to the knowledge
of the divine perfections, and to restore those who err to a right appre-
* The ancient writers of apologies for the christian religion have severely re-
proached the Pagans for this impiety and blasphemy, as JustinMartyr, Athenagoras,
Theophilus Antiochenus, Tatianus, Hermias, Tertullian, Cyprian, Minucius Faelix,
Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Julius Firmicus Maternus, and others. But which is
more surprizing, some Pagan authors have likewise reproved this madness of their
contemporary countrymen. Not to quote several passages of Lucian and other Hea-
then writers to this effect, I shall satisfy my self with mentioning one of Sophocles
preserved to us by Justin Martyr Paraenes. ad Graec. p. 17. and de monarchia Dei,
p. 104, and by Eusebius, Praep. Evang. p. 348, and some others. “In truth, there is
one God who made heaven and the spacious earth, the ebbing and flowing sea, and
the mighty winds. But many of us having lost our understanding, for a consolation
in our calamities, make to ourselves Gods, and endeavour to propitiate lifeless images
by sacrifices to them: we celebrate festivals foolishly, imagining ourselves pious in so
doing.” Is it not truly wonderful to find Sophocles reproaching his fellow Pagans for
the same impiety the apostle charges themwith,Rom. i. 21, 22, 23. [[For the references
to Sophocles in the Paraenesis (or Cohortatio ) ad Graecos and De monarchia dei, see
Pseudo-Iustinus, Cohortatio ad Graecos, DeMonarchia, Oratio ad Graecos, 48 and 88.
The same passage, with very small alterations, is attributed to Sophocles by Eusebius
in his Praeparatio evangelica, 680b (Eusebius, Praeparationis evangelicae libri XV ).
The passage by Sophocles is as follows:
There is in truth One God, and One alone,
Who made the lofty heavens, and wide-spread earth,
The sea’s blue wave, and might of warring winds.
But we poor mortals with deceived heart,
Seeking some solace for our many woes,
Raised images of gods in stone or bronze,
Or figures wrought of gold or ivory,
And when we crowned their sacrifice, and held
High festival, we thought this piety.
(Trans. E. H. Gifford)]]
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hension of them; and, as much as in us lies, to convince the impious,
by solid and per-<90>suasive reasoning with them, of their absurdity
and wickedness, and bring them to render due reverence to God: and
they who do so, are said to exert themselves to promote the glory of God. *
s e c t i on cxx x
Because he who has a just conception of the divine perfections, cannot
but highly delight in them (§129), and the desire of good to an object,
with delight arising from the consideration of its perfection and hap-
piness, is love (§8), the consequence is, that God must be loved. And
because of the more excellent and sublime a nature a Being is, the more
love and veneration is due to it (§87): God ought to be loved with the
most perfect love; i.e. as the scripture expresses it, “with all our heart,
with all our soul, and with all our strength,” Mat. xxii. 37. Luke x. 27.
Because goodness is one of the divine perfections (§127); God is in him-
self, and with regard to mankind, infinitely good: he is therefore to be
loved for both these reasons.† <91>
* I have said by solid and persuasive arguments, not menaces and penalties. For
since ignorance and error are vices not of the will, but of the understanding, there
is no other remedy for them, but to convince persons of the truth, and to excite them
by proper arguments to embrace it; and hence it is evident, that those can never be
serviceable to the ignorant or erring, who are for employing fire and gibbets against
atheists, especially since it hath never been an uncommon practice to brandwith that
name (to use the words of Clemens Alex. in Protrept.) “men living regularly and
modestly, who were quicker-sighted in discerning impostures about the Gods than
the generality of mankind.” [[Clement of Alexandria, “Protreptikos pros Hellenas”
(The Exhortation of the Greeks), in Clement of Alexandria, 3–263.]] Of this many
examples are brought by the learned. See Aelian. Var. Hist. 2. 31.
† What the Epicurean philosophers and the Sadduceans in ancient times said of
the pure love of God, is well known to the learned: And in our own times, some
mystick divines have renewed that doctrine, the chief of whom is Franc. Saignac de
Fenelon, Archbishop of Cambray, whose treatise entitled, “The maxims of the
saints,” gave rise to a controversy, of which I have elsewhere given a short history
(Elem. Philos. moral. §198). [[Heineccius, Elementa philosophiae rationalis et mor-
alis.]] [[Franc¸ois de Salignac de La Mothe-Fe´nelon (1651–1715) was archbishop of
Cambrai and tutor of Louis Duke de Bourgogne, grandson and heir to Louis XIV.
He is best known for hisLes aventures deTe´le´maque (1699) [Telemachus,Sonof Ulysses,
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s e c t i on cxx x i
Among the divine perfections are omnipotence and omniscience (§127);
but none can keep these perfections in view without being excited to the
diligent, unintermitted study of doingwhatevermaybepleasing toGod,
and of avoiding whatever may be disagreeable to him; which study and
endeavour we call obedience to God. And since none can represent God
to himself as a most just Being, without being seriously concerned not
to offend him; not to do or say any thing that is dishonourable to him,
or tends to create his displeasure; it must be our duty to fear him: for
this concern not to incur his anger is fear, and when united with the love
of him above described (§130), it is properly called filial fear. *
s e c t i on cxx x i i
He who fears God with a servile fear, separates the love of God from the
fear of him (§131); but because love of God consists in delight in the
consideration of the divine perfections (§130); he therefore who fears
God without any knowledge of his perfections, is called superstitious;
and hence it follows, that a good man ought carefully to avoid <92> all
superstition, because it proceeds from ignorant servile fear.†
1994]. Heineccius refers here to Fe´nelon’s Explication des maximes des saints sur la vie
inte´rieure (1698), which was condemned by the pope.]] But who can conceive God
otherwise than as good to all his creatures? How idle then is the question about the
pure love of God? nay, how dangerous? This hath been shewn by Leibnitz, in Praef.
prodrom. & mantissae codicis juris gentium, by Wolfius and others.
* Filial fear, is therefore attendedwith love, and servile fear withhatred: it excludes
love. But since it is our duty not only to fear God, but likewise to love him (§130),
the consequence is, that the law of nature requires filial not servile fear of God, the
latter of which wicked men and evil spirits cannot shake off.
† Superstition is fear of God, which results not from the contemplation of the
divine perfections, but from false conceptions of God. This is Theophrastus’smean-
ing, Charact. p. 47, where he defines superstition, “Deili´an pro`c to` daimo´nion, a
trembling dread of the Divinity.” [[Theophrastus,Theophrastus: Characters, 97.]]By
Deili´an, Casaubon in his notes understands fear different from that which becomes
good men who have just ideas of the Deity; and by to` daimo´nion, the Gods and
Demons, and whatever in times of ancient ignorance was thought to have any share
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s e c t i on cxx x i i i
All superstition, internal and external, being inconsistent with just ap-
prehensions of the divine perfections (§132), one who has just notions
of them, will keep himself carefully from all slavish fear of created be-
ings, and from those absurd errors, whereby God is represented as avar-
itious and placable by gifts; and likewise from magical arts and divina-
tions, from idol-worship; and, in fine, from this absurd opinion, that
Godmaybe propitiated bymere externalworship, tho’notaccompanied
either with internal fear or love.* <93>
of Divinity. This absurd dread, as it is in the mind, is called internal superstition, and
as it discovers itself in outward acts, it is called superstitious worship.
* These are the principal branches of superstition, to which all its other effectsmay
be reduced. See Budd. de Super. & Atheismo, cap. 7 & 8. [[Buddeus, Theses theo-
logicae de atheismo et superstitione variis observationibus illustratae. ]]Hence it appears
how idle the comparison between superstition and atheism is, both being equally re-
pugnant to true piety, as the same learned writer has proved against Bayle, cap. 4. §5.
None however will deny, that very many great evils proceed from superstition, in-
somuch that there is reason to cry out with the Poet,
Quantum religio possit suasisse malorum.
[[“So potent was superstition in persuading to evil deeds!” (See Lucretius,De
rerum natura 1.101.)]]
If by religio be meant the dread of God, disjoined from love, i.e. superstition. Upon
this subject Juvenal’s fifteenth satyr is well worth our reading. For it often happens,
that as the Poet there says,
Inter finitimos vetus atque antiqua simultas,
Immortale odium, & nunquam sanabile vulnus
Ardet adhuc Ombos & Tentyra. Summus utrimque
Inde furor vulgo, quod numina vicinorum
Odit uterque locus, quum solos credat habendos
Esse Deos, quos ipse colit.
[[ Juvenal, Satires 15.33, in Juvenal and Persius: “Between the neighbours
Ombi and Tentyra there still blazes a lasting and ancient feud, an undying
hatred, a wound that can never be healed. On each side the height of mob
fury arises because eachplace detests the gods of their neighbours.They think
that only the gods they themselves worship should be counted as gods.”]]
Its effects.
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s e c t i on cxx x i v
Further, since none can represent the divine perfections to himself with-
out presenting to hismind the ideas of perfectwisdom, power andgood-
ness; such a person cannot but place his confidence and trust in God,
and be satisfied in his mind with the divine administration; and thus be
disposed to submit to whatever may happen to him in the course of
divine providence with a firm and cheerful soul; nor will he be stumbled
because evils fall upon the good, and good things fall to the share of the
wicked, but be persuaded that all things shall co-operate to the good of
the virtuous, to good in the whole.
s e c t i on cxx x v
In these and the like offices does that internal worship of God consist,
by which we understand the love, fear and trust, with whichwe embrace
God in our pure minds. But man being so framed, that his affections
naturally exert themselves in certain external actions, his internal love of
God could not be thought sincere unless it exerted itself in external love;
i.e. in such external acts as express love, fear, and resignation towards
God.* <94>
* Some have denied that the necessity of external worship can be proved from
principles of reason, partly, because God does not stand in need of it; (as the phi-
losopher Demonax in Lucian, in Demonacte, tom. 1. p. 861, asserts, when being ac-
cused of impiety, for not offering sacrifice to Minerva, he answered, “I did not think
she stood in need of sacrifice”). [[A reference to a life of the philosopher Demonax
by the Greek satirist Lucian (a.d. ca. 117–80), republished in several editions in the
early modern period (see, for example, Demonactis philosophi vita ex Lutiano latine
conversa a Christophoro Hegendorphino ).]] Partly because human society, and the
tranquillity of human life, is not hurt by the omission of external worship: (SeeTho-
masius, Jurisprud. divin. 2. 1. 11. and his introd. in Ethic. 3. 37. & seq.) [[Thomasius,
Einleitung zur Sittenlehre. ]] But neither does God stand in need of internal worship,
which none will deny to be a duty. And the other argument falls to the ground,when
that fundamental error is refuted, which asserts that nothing is of the law of nature
but what can be inferred from sociability (§75). See Hochstet. Colleg. Pufend. Ex-
ercit. 3. 38. [[Hochstetter, Collegium Pufendorfianum. ]]
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s e c t i on cxx x v i
Since therefore the external worship of God consists in actions flowing
from love, fear, and resignation towards God (§135), but love must nat-
urally exert itself in praising theBeing inwhoseperfectionandhappiness
we highly delight, it must be our duty always to speak honourably of
God, and with due reverence, and to excite others by our actions to love
him, to sing praises to him, and not to dishonour his nameby rash swear-
ing, by perjury, or by whatever irreverent discourse.
s e c t i on cxx x v i i
From the fear and obedience we owe to God as the most perfect of Be-
ings, we may justly conclude that all our actions ought to be conformed
to his precepts, and that we ought always to have in mind his omni-
presence and omniscience, by which he discerns our most secret
thoughts; whence it follows, that all hypocrisy and dissimulation ought
to be avoided, as being necessarily accompanied with injurious and con-
temptible apprehensions of God.* <95>
s e c t i on cxx x v i i i
In fine, he who places his trust in God (§134), will never cease to send
up pure devout prayers to him, and will cheerfully embrace every oc-
casion of speaking well of and with God privately and publicly. For this
is what right reason prescribes concerning the external worship of God.
As for the external rites, it is likewise obvious, that publicworshipcannot
* Thales Milesius, acknowledged this sublime truth, when being asked, “whether
God saw unjust actions,” he answered, “yea and unjust thoughts likewise,” Clemens
Alexand. Strom. 5. p. 594. [[Clement of Alexandria, Les Stromates (Stromateis),Stro-
mate V, vol. 1, chap. 14, 96.4, p. 113.]] But who can choose but fear an omnipotent
God, who knoweth and seeth all things? Epictetus says elegantly in Arrian, “Where-
fore, doors and windows being shut, or when you are in darkness, say not you are
alone; for you are not. And you certainly are not, becauseGod is present.” [[Epictetus,
The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, bk. 1, 14.13–14.]] We are therefore under the
strongest obligation to sincere piety, since we are always in the sight of God.
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be performed unless certain times and places be devoted to it; and a duty
of such importance ought to be done with all decency; but as to the rites
or ceremonies themselves, reason can lay downnoother rule about them,
but in general, that they ought to be in every respect such as are proper
to recal to our minds those sentiments in which divine worship consists.
Remarks on This Chapter
I have but little to add to what our Author hath said of Religion. Our
Harrington justly lays down the following truths relative to religion as
aphorisms. “Nature is of God: some part in every religion is natural;
an universal effect demonstrates an universal cause; an universal cause
is not so much natural, as it is nature itself; but every man has either
to his terror or his consolation, some sense of religion: manmay there-
fore be rather defined a religious than a rational creature; in regard that
other creatures have something of reason, but there is nothing of re-
ligion.”2 So we frequently find ancient philosophers reasoning about
human nature and religion, as I have shewn from several authorities in
the 7th chapter of my Principles of Moral Philosophy, the whole of
which treatise is designed to be a demonstration a` posteriori, i.e. from
the wisdom and goodness of providence, that the whole world ismade
and governed by an infinitely perfect mind, in the contemplation, ad-
oration and imitation of whom the chief happiness of man consists,
according to hismake and frame.The arguments, a` priori, for theproof
of aGod, are shewn in the conclusion of that essay not to be so abstruse
as is said by some; and they are more fully explained in my Christian
Philosophy. The end, the happiness, the duty of a Being (all whichways
of speaking must mean the same thing) can only be inferred from its
frame and constitution, its make and situation. But nothing can be
more evident than, “That man is made to love order, to delight in the
idea of its universal prevalence throughout nature, and to have joy and
satisfaction from the <96> consciousness of order within his own
breast, and in the conduct of his actions.” All the joys of which man
is susceptible, which never nauseate or cloy, but are equally remote from
2. Harrington, “Political Aphorisms,” nos. 30–35 in Harrington, Political Works,
pp. 765–66.
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grossness and disgust, or remorse, may be reduced to the love of order
and harmony: nothing else can give him any pleasure in contemplation
or in practice, but good order; the belief of good administration in the
government of the world; the regular exercises of those generous af-
fections which tend to public good; the consciousness of inward har-
mony; and the prevalence of good order and publick happiness in so-
ciety, through regular and good government: to these classes are the
principal pleasures for which man is framed by nature, reducible, as
might be shewn, even from an analysis of the pleasures belonging to
refined imagination or good taste in the polite arts: but whence such a
constitution? Does it not necessarily lead us to acknowledge an infi-
nitely perfect author of all things; an universal mind, the former and
governor of the universe, which is itself perfect order and harmony,
perfect goodness, perfect virtue? Whence could we have such a make?
whence could we have understanding, reason, the capacity of forming
ideas of general order and good, and of delighting so highly in it, but
from such a Being? Thus the ancients reasoned. Thus the sacredwriters
often reason. And this argument is obvious to every understanding. It
is natural to the mind of man. It is no sooner presented to it than it
cleaves to it, takes hold of it with supreme satisfaction, and triumphs
in it. And what part of nature does not lead us naturally to this con-
ception, if we ever exercise our understanding, or if we do not wilfully
shut our eyes? But having fully enlarged upon this and several other
arguments for the Being of a God inmy Principles of Moral Philosophy;
I shall here only remark, 1. That Polybius, Cicero, and almost all the
ancients, have acknowledged that a public sense of religion is necessary
to the well-being and support of society: society can hardly subsist
without it: or at least, it is the most powerful mean for restraining from
vice, and promoting and upholding those virtues bywhich society sub-
sists, and without which every thing that is great and comely in society,
must soon perish and go to ruin. 2. That with regard to private persons,
he who does not often employ his mind in reviewing the perfections
of the Deity, and in consoling and strengthening his mind by the com-
fortable and mind-greatning reflexions to which meditation upon the
universal providence of an all-perfect mind, naturally, and as it were
necessarily lead, deprives himself of the greatest joy, thenoblest exercise
and entertainment the human mind is capable of; and whatever obli-
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gations there may be to virtue independent of, or abstract from such a
perswasion, he cannot make such progress in virtue, he cannot be so
firm, steady and unshaken in his adherence to it, as he who being per-
suaded of the truth just mentioned, is daily drawing virtuous strength
and comfort from it. This is fully proved by an excellent writer onmor-
als, who, not-<97>withstanding hath been often most injuriously re-
proached for aiming at a scheme of virtue without religion.3 This au-
thor hath fully proved that the perfection and heighth of virtue must
be owing to the belief of aGod; since, where the latter is wanting, there
canneither be the samebenignity, firmness or constancy; the samegood
composure of the affections, or uniformity of mind, Characteristics,
T. 2. p. 56, &c. 3. I would remark, that the being and providence of an
universal, all-perfect mind, being once established, it plainly follows
from hence, by necessary consequence, that all the duties of rational
creatures may be reduced to this one, with several antient moralists,
viz. “to act as becomes an intelligent active part of a good whole, and
conformably to the temper and character of the all-governing mind.”
This is acting agreeably to nature; to the nature of an intelligent crea-
ture enduedwith active powers, a sense of public goodandorder; agree-
ably to the nature of the Supreme Governor of all things, and to the
order of his creation and government. All our duties may be reduced to,
or comprehended under that one general article of acting as becomes an
intelligent part of a good whole: for to do so, we must delight in the
author of the world, and resign to his will cheerfully the management
of all things independent of our will; and by our will cheerfully co-
operate with him in the pursuit of publick good, as far as we are active
and have power, or as things are made by him dependent upon our will
and conduct. He who is incapable of receiving pleasure from the belief
of a God, and the contemplation of general order and harmony, must
be a very imperfect creature: for he wants the noblest of senses or fac-
ulties. And he who can delight in the contrary persuasion, i.e. in the idea
of a fatherless world and blind chance, or, which is yet more horrible,
malignant administration, must have a very perverted mind, if perver-
sion has any meaning: he must be as properly a monster, in respect of a
moral frame, as any deformity is monstrous in regard to bodily texture.
3. That is, the Earl of Shaftesbury.
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Of the duties of man to himself.
s e c t i on cxx x i x
Nothing is nearer to man, besides the ever-blessed God, than he is to
himself; nature having inlaid into his frame such a sensibility to his in-
terests, and so tender a love of himself, that we justly look upon him to
be out of his senses and distracted, who <98> hates and wishes ill to
himself. Nor is this self-love unjust, while it does not disturb good order.
For it is that love with which one delights in his own perfections and
happiness, and is concerned to procure and augment these goods. But
since God hath created us, and adorned us with many excellent perfec-
tions, and given us the means of improving in perfection and happiness,
he must be concluded to will that we should endeavour to promote our
happiness and perfection, and be delighted with it; i.e. that we should
love our selves (§92).
s e c t i on cx l
From which we have already inferred (§92), that man is bound to pursue,
promote, and preserve his own perfection and happiness, as far as is con-
sistent with the love of the supreme Being.*
* Therefore, we do not perform these duties to ourselves that we may be happy
(for we have shewn above, that this tenet is false, that utility is the only source or rule
of just and unjust) but because God wills that we study to promote our happiness
and perfection: and therefore to promote our perfection and happiness is itself our
duty; and is not the cause which impels or obliges us to it.
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s e c t i on cx l i
Since man is obliged, by the will of God, to all and every thing which
tends to promote, preserve, and enlarge his happiness and perfection
(§140); and man consists, not only of mind, but of body likewise, in
such a manner, that he is a compound of body and mind; the conse-
quence is, that man is obliged to promote the perfection of both his
constituent parts; and because the faculties of the mind are two, under-
standing and will, he is obliged to study the perfection of both; where-
fore the duties of man, with respect to himself, are relative partly to the
whole man, partly to the understanding, partly to the will, and partly to
his body and external state. * <99>
s e c t i on cx l i i
Whence we conclude, that these duties ought not to be severed from one
another; and therefore, that neither the mind nor the body ought totally
to be neglected: but if it should happen that the duties due to both can-
not be performed, we ought, of many perfections and goods, which can-
not be obtained at one and the same time, to choose the most excellent
and necessary (§94). And therefore the mind being more excellent than
* It is proper to observe this, in opposition to the doctrine of Socrates and others,
who maintained that the body is not a part of man, but his instrument only, and that
external things do not properly appertain to man, or in the least concern him. So
Simplicius, in his preface to his commentary on Epictetus, “If a man commands his
body, and the body doth not so much as command itself, then man is not body, and
for the same reason, he is not both mind and body, but wholly mind.” [[Simplicius,
Commentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti (On Epictetus’ Handbook, Introduction, 37–
40).]] Whence he a little after reasons thus: “He who bestows his care upon the body,
bestows it upon things which belong not to man, but his instrument: But he, whose
study and cares are set upon riches, and such like external things, bestows his care
neither upon man, nor his instrument, but upon things subservient to that instru-
ment.” Many other such foolish boasts we find in some ancient writers, which are
equally false and hurtful.
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the body, we ought to be more diligent about the perfecting of ourminds
than our bodies, yet so as not to neglect the latter.* <100>
s e c t i on cx l i i i
As for what relates to the whole man, as consisting of soul and body, his
felicity and perfection as such, consists in this, that the union of his mind
and body be safe, because these parts being separated, tho’ the mind,
being immortal, survive, yet the man no longer subsists. Man therefore
is obliged to take care to preserve his life, and to avoid the dissolution
of the union between his body and mind, which is death, unless the
mind be persuaded of a greater good to be obtained by death: in which
case one ought not indeed voluntarily to choose death, but to suffer the
menaces of it and itself with a brave and intrepid magnanimity.†
* They therefore act contrary to their duty, who are so taken up about the body
that they suffer their mind, as it were, to brutalize. But, on the other hand, they do
not fulfil the whole of their duty, who impair their bodies by their too sedulous
uninterrupted application to the culture of their minds in knowledge and wisdom.
Neither of these duties is to be neglected.
† There is reason therefore to pronounce Hegesias peijija´natoc, to have been
mad, who thought man obliged to put an end to his life, and went about urging men
to destroy themselves, by so many arguments that his hearers threw themselves in
great numbers into the sea. Cic. Tusc. 1. 34. Valer. Max. 8. 9. [[Valerius Maximus,
Memorable Doings and Sayings, vol. 2, 249.]] For if it be true, that one must be dis-
tracted and out of his senses to hate himself (§139), we must say of Hegesias’sdoctrine
and conduct with a poet on another occasion,
Non sani esse hominis, non sanus juret Orestes;
[[Persius, Satires 3.118: “which the mad Orestes himself would swear were
the acts of a madman.”]]
especially, since he reduced all human obligations to pleasure, and admitted not of
a future existence, from which any consolation could be drawn to make death more
desirable than an afflicted life. On the other hand, the apostle’s desire was notcontrary
to his duty, when he longed to be dissolved: nor are the martyrs to be blamed, who,
supported by the hopes of immortal glory after death, feared no tortures; because an
evil which delivers us from a greater one, and procures us a very great good, is rather
to be accounted good than ill.
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s e c t i on cx l i v
Hence moreover we infer, that he acts contrary to his duty who lays
violent hands on himself. And this may be proved from other consid-
erations, as, that this action is repugnant to the nature of <101> love,
and to a right disposition of mind, and therefore involves an absurdity
or contradiction in it; that it is inconsistent with that trust and resig-
nation which are due to God, and that acquiescence in the divine will,
which we have already shewn to be commanded by the law of nature
(§134). But it will be sufficient to add this one argument. Man is obliged
to love man as himself; and therefore himself as others (§93). But the
love of justice does not permit us to kill a man, therefore self-love does
not permit us to destroy ourselves.*
s e c t i on cx l v
From the same principles laid down (§143), it is evident that they act no
less contrary to their duty who hasten their death by immoderate labour,
or by luxury and lasciviousness, or who do not take proper care of their
health; and who, when neither duty calls, nor necessity urges, voluntarily
expose themselves to danger, and bring themselves into peril or pain by
their own fault.† <102>
* Thus we ought to reason with those who are capable of reasoning; as for those
who are furious and out of themselves, the fatal action is not to be imputed to them
(§106). Nothing can excuse self-murder but madness: not a guilty conscience, since
there are means of quieting it, viz. by reformation: nor the greatest distress and pain;
for tho’ it be true, that of two evils the least ought to be chosen; yet voluntary self-
murder is not a physical but a moral evil, which cannot be chosen; and no calamity
or pain is so great, but it may be alleviated by resignation to the divine will: let me
add, that it is not the least species of madness to die for fear of dying. See Wolf.
Philosoph. Moral. §340 & seq. [[Wolff, Philosophia moralis sive ethica, vol. 1.]]
† For whoever is the author or cause of an action, to him that action is justly
imputable (§105). But who will call it into question, that he is the cause of his death
who destroys and tortures himself by excessive toil? he who wears out and wastes the
strength of his body by riotous living? He who takes no care of his health, but exposes
himself unnecessarily to manifest dangers? Since therefore, even in foro humano, by
the Lex Cornelia, not only he is guilty of murder, who with premeditated evil inten-
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s e c t i on cx l v i
The perfection of human understanding certainly consists in the knowl-
edge of truth and good; to acquire, enlarge, and preserve which man
being obliged (§140), the consequence is, that every one is bound to exert
himself to strengthen and cultivate his understanding, or to improve his
faculty of discerning truth from falshood, and good from evil; and to
let no opportunity pass neglected, whether of instruction from others,
from books, or from experience, of learning useful truths, and whole-
some precepts and maxims concerning good and evil,* that thus he may
attain to all the useful knowledge within his reach; and if he be in that
condition of life that does not allow him to learn all that it is useful to
know, he may at least be master of what it is most necessary and advan-
tageous for him to understand, and have that at his command as ready
coin, so to speak.
s e c t i on cx l v i i
From which last proposition (§146), it follows, that whereas all persons
are equally obliged to the <103> duties hitherto mentioned; every one
is for himself in particular obliged to that special culture of his under-
standing, which is suitable to his particular talents and genius, and to
his rank and condition in life; and therefore every one ought to know
his force and genius, and one is hardly excusable if he chooses a way of
tion directly kills a man, but even he who was the cause of his death; (I. 16. §8. Dig.
de poenis, I. 1. D. ad L. Corneliani de Sicar.) who can doubt but he must be guilty
of self-murder in foro divino, who was the cause of his own death?
* This knowledge is equally necessary to all men, partly because the will cannot
pursue but what the understanding represents to it as good, nor decline but what the
understanding hath discerned to be evil (§30); and partly because even actions done
through ignorance are imputed, so far as the law might, and ought to have been
understood (§108). Sophocles therefore says with good reason in his Antig. v. 1321.
“To have wisdom is the principal thing with regard to happiness.” [[Sophocles, An-
tigone, line 1348, in Sophocles, ed. and trans. Lloyd-Jones.]]
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life to himself for which he is not qualified, or if he forces any in his
power,* under his authority, or committed to his direction, so to do.
s e c t i on cx l v i i i
The perfection of the will consists in the desire and fruition of good.
But since we cannot pursue good, unless we have first conceived a just
notion of its excellence, nor avoid evil, unless we know it to be such
(§30); hence it is manifest, that we ought not to acquiesce in any knowl-
edge of good and evil whatsoever, but exert ourselves with all our power
to have a true and lively conception of them; that not every good is to
be chosen, but of <104> many goods that which is best and most nec-
essary: yea, that evil ought not to be avoided, if it be necessary to our
attaining to a greater good: and finally, that our chief good ought to be
desired and pursued above all things; and that we ought to bear the want
of other goods with a patient and satisfied mind, if we cannot attain it
without being deprived of them.†
* The culture therefore of our understanding, to which we are obliged, is either
general, to which all men are equally bound, of which §146; or special, of which in
this section. The foundation of this distinction is, that all men have reason in com-
mon; but every particular person has his particular cast and genius, his particular
talents; understanding, memory and judgment not being common to all in the same
degree. All men are therefore obliged to cultivate their reason, but all men are not
equally well qualified for the same way of life, the same profession and business.
Whence we may, moreover, conclude, that an internal special call (if we set aside
divine inspiration) is nothing else but the will of God concerning the particular kind
of life one ought to choose, manifested to one by the gifts and talents with which he
is endued, of which Perseus speaks, Sat. 3. v. 71.
Quem te Deus esse
Fussit, & humana qua parte locatus es in re,
Disce. ——
[[Persius, Satires 3.71: “Learn what god has ordered you to be and in what
part of the human condition you have been placed.”]]
† They are therefore mistaken, as we have already observed, who place our chief
happiness, which we ought to pursue in this life, in the enjoyment of all goods; as
Plato in Cicero. Qu. Acad. l. 6. [[Cicero, “Academica Libri,” I.19–21 in Cicero, On
Academic Scepticism.]] For because such enjoyment is above human power, and the
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s e c t i on cx l i x
Further, since he who is obliged to the end, is likewise obliged to the
means, it follows, that none of these means ought to be neglected which
right reason shews to be necessary or proper for attaining to our greatest
happiness; but that we ought to apply ourselves with uninterrupted care
daily to amend and perfect our minds, to obtain the right government
of our affections, and to rescue ourselves from every vitious appetite and
passion.* <105>
s e c t i on c l
It now remains to speak of our body, the perfection of which consists in
the fitness of all its parts to perform their necessary functions; and it is
plain that we are obliged to take care of our health, and therefore todirect
our eating and drinking, labour, exercise, and every thing to that end;
to the preservation of our health, and the increase of our strength and
condition of this life, the consequence is, that we should apply our endeavours to
attain to our best and greatest good, what our Saviour elegantly calls, “th`n a◊gajh`n
meri´da, the good part,” Luke x. 42.
* For these often so mislead a man, that he falls short of his end; is deprived of
true happiness, and makes a sad shipwreck of it. Besides, in general none can perform
his duty aright who is not master of his passions and appetites, because these so distort
and pervert the judgment, that nothing can be done in order, or according to the
right rule. Hence that excellent advice of the poet,
Ne fraenos animo permitte calenti:
Da spacium, tenuemque moram, male cuncta ministrat
Impetus. Pap. Stat. Theb. l. 10. 626.
[[Statius, Thebaid, vol. 2, bk. 10, 703–5 (not 626).]]
The case is this: “Reason, to which the reins are committed, is strong, while it is
undisturbed by the affections: but if these mix with it they darken and pollute it; it
cannot govern or keep within due bounds what it cannot restrain or withdraw: the
mind, when it is shaken and agitated by any passion, is a slave to it, and driven by it
at its pleasure.” Seneca de Ira, v. 7. [[Seneca, De ira, 1.7, in Moral Essays, vol. 1, 125.]]
The amend-
ment of the
will is chiefly
necessary.
Our obligation
to preserve and
perfect our
body.
114 the laws of nature and nations
agility;* and, on the other hand, to avoid, as much as lies in our power,
whatever tends to maim, hurt, or destroy our bodies, or any of its mem-
bers, in any degree.
s e c t i on c l i
But all this is enjoined in vain, if one be so distressed by poverty, that
he has it not in his power either to live in a wholesome manner, nor to
regu-<106>late his labour as his health requires; and therefore it is ob-
vious, that a person must have a right to seek after the things that are
necessary to subsistence and decent living. When the provision of these
things is abundant, it is called wealth or riches; and every one is obliged
to acquire as large a share of them as he can by just means, and topreserve
and use prudently what he hath justly acquired.†
* But in this every one ought to have regard to his rank and station in life. For
one degree and kind of vigour, agility and dexterity is requisite in one station, and
another in another; one, e.g. to a wrestler, another to an artist, another to a soldier,
and another to a man of letters. Whence it follows, that the same kind of exercise is
not proper to every person; and therefore that prudence ought to have its end before
its eyes, and to choose means suited to it. Regard ought also to be had to different
ages of life. “An old man, if he be wise, does not desire the strength of a young man,
no more than a young man does that of a bull or elephant,” says Cicero, Cato major.
c. 9. [[Cicero, Cato maior de senectute 9.27, p. 66.]] And for this reason, one kind of
exercise is proper to old men, and another to young. “As we ought to fight against
diseases,” says he, “so ought we likewise against old age. We ought to take care of
our health, to use moderate exercise, and to eat and drink so as to refresh, not oppress
our bodies.”
† We do not by saying so approve of avarice, the basest and most pernicious of
vices. For an avaricious person desires riches for riches sake; but a person who is wisely
selfish, only desires them for the sake of living decently. To the former, no gain, nor
no means of increasing wealth appear base and sordid; nay, so much as unjust; but
this is the constant language of his heart,
O cives, cives, quaerenda pecunia primum:
Virtus post nummos.
[[Horace, Epistles 1.1.53, in Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica: “O citizens, cit-
izens, money you first must seek; virtue after pelf.”]]
The other does not scrape riches, but takes hold of every allowable opportunity of
gaining them. In fine, whereas the miser is insatiable, and yet does not enjoy his
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s e c t i on c l i i
But because the end cannot be acquired without the means, and there is
no other mean of acquiring what is necessary to supply our necessitiesbut
labour and industry, it is manifest that every one is bound to go through
with the labours of the business <107> in life he hath chosen with a cheer-
ful mind, and to give all diligence to get a comfortable subsistence; and
therefore he acts contrary to duty who lives in idleness, and thus brings
poverty and misery upon himself; for such distress is ignominious;
whereas poverty is not criminal or shameful, when one, who does all in
his power, is overwhelmed by some private or public calamity; or when
one, without his own fault, can find no occasion of doing for himself.*
possessions, the other manages his affairs quite otherwise; and this is the genuine
language of his soul,
Haud paravero,
Quod aut avarus ut Chremes terra premam,
Discinctus aut perdam ut nepos.
[[Horace, Epodes 1.32, in Odes and Epodes: “I do not mean to amass some-
thing simply to bury it in the ground like that miser Chremes, or to squander
it like a slovenly wastrel.”]]
He manages his estate with prudent oeconomy, that he may not be forced to live at
the expence of others, or shamefully to spunge them; that he may not be a burden
or a shame to his friends; that he may not be continually harassedby dunningcreditors
or squeezing usurers; that he may have wherewithal to relieve the indigent, and assist
his friends, and that his children may have no cause to reproach him after his death
for their distress. And who will deny that these duties are incumbent upon every good
man?
* Both therefore belong to the duty of a good man, not to let any occasion slip
of bettering his fortune without profiting by it, and to bear honest poverty with an
equal mind. Job did both. And Horace joins both these duties together, who thus
complains, in his elegant way, of the instability of fortune:
Laudo manentem. Si celeres quatit
Pennas: resigno, quae dedit, & mea
Virtute me involvo, probamque
Pauperiem sine dote quaero.
Carm. l. 3. 29. v. 53.
[[Horace, Odes 3.29.53, in Odes and Epodes: “I praise her [Fortune] while she
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s e c t i on c l i i i
Since a person ought not to neglect any of those things which are nec-
essary to increase or preserve his happiness (§140); and none can doubt
but a good name, which consists in the favourable opinion of others with
regard to our virtue and accomplishments, is necessary to preserve and
increase our happiness. [For one, of whose virtue and accomplishments
all think well, all think worthy of happiness, and all are therefore sollic-
itous to promote his happiness.] For these reasons, every one is obliged
to take care of his reputation, as a mean of his happiness; and therefore
to act in every affair, private or public, as reason directs, and not only to
preserve his good name by worthy actions, but, as much as lies in his
power, to increase it.* <108>
s e c t i on c l i v
But if it be one’s duty to take care to preserve his good name unblem-
ished (§153); since calumnies, i.e. false reports, may blacken it; the con-
stays, but if she shakes her swift wings, I return her presents, wrap myself in
my virtue, and go in search of honest Poverty, though she brings no
dowry.”]]
* But if this be the interest and duty, even of those who have never diminished
or sullied their reputation by any base action, how much more are those, whose youth
is not free from blemishes, obliged to endeavour to wipe them off, and procure a good
reputation by virtuous deeds? Themistocles is an example to us of this, of whom
Cornelius Nepos, c. 1. says, “This reproach did not break but erect his spirit. For
perceiving it could not be overcome but by the greatest virtue, he devoted himself
wholly and zealously to the service of the public and of his friends, by which means
he soon became illustrious.” [[Cornelius Nepos, “Themistocles,” 23, in Cornelius Ne-
pos, trans. Rolfe.]] Sueton observes of Titus, “That he was recovered from the vices
into which his mind had strayed in his youth, by shame and the fear of ignominy,”
Tit. c. 7. [[This appears to be a—not entirely accurate—paraphrase of, rather than a
quotation from, a passage in Suetonius’s life of Titus (Suetonius, Suetonius, vol. 2,
330–31).]] Other Examples are to be found in Valerius Maximus, c. 9. and Macrobius,
Saturn. 2. 9. [[Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings, vol. 1, bk. II, chap.
9; Macrobius, Saturnalia, though the reference to bk. 2, chap. 9, appears to be in-
correct, and it is not clear which passage Heineccius has in mind here.]]
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sequence is, that we ought to omit nothing that is necessary to wipe off
aspersions cast injuriously upon us, unless they be so groundless and
malicious, or the author of them so contemptible, that it is better to
overlook them with generous contempt.* <109>
s e c t i on c l v
Tho’ so far the love of ourselves be most just and lawful; yet, no doubt,
it becomes vitious, so soon as it exceeds its due bounds, and gets the
ascendant over our love to God, the most perfect of Beings (§92); and
hence we concluded above, (§140), that all our duties to ourselves keep
their due rank and place, if they are performed in proper subordination
to the love of God, or do not encroach upon it; whence it is manifest,
that the common maxim, “That necessity has no law,” is not universally
true.†
* Those are called manifest calumnies, which it is not worth while to give one’s
self the trouble of confuting. These no more disturb a good man than the barking
of little dogs. And he who shamefully spits out such against one, does not hurt an-
other’s reputation, but wholly destroys his own. So Simplicius upon Epictetus, c. 64.
teaches us: “As, if it be day, the sun is above the earth, and he who denies it does hurt
only to himself, and not to the truth. So he who injures you, or throws false calumnies
upon you, wrongs himself, he does not hurt you, or do you any mischief.” [[Simpli-
cius, On Epictetus’ Handbook, vol. 2, p. 110.]] The case is different if the calumny be
specious, i.e. attended with some probability, which may not only deceive the unwary,
but even the most prudent and cautious. For he who does not take proper methods
to refute such reproaches and clear himself, must appear diffident of his cause, and
therefore he falls short of the care he is obliged to, with respect to maintaining his
good character and name entire and unblamed. For that ought to be as dear to one
as life.
† This aphorism is in every one’s mouth, and produced on every occasion as an
oracle, as if there were nothing so base and criminal but necessity would render it
excusable. Euripides, in a fragment of Hippolyt. obtect. says,
Quoties periclum est, ex mea sententia
Necessitati debet & lex cedere.
“In my opinion, in cases of imminent danger, even law ought to give way to neces-
sity.” [[Euripides, Hippolytus (translated into Latin).]] And if this maxim were ab-
solutely true, the martyrs must have sinned, who paying no regard to the indulgence
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s e c t i on c l v i
But seeing this rule is not always true; and yet in some cases it ought to
be admitted (§155); different cases must be distinguished: now, because
in <110> an action imposed upon us by sovereign necessity, no other
circumstance can vary the case, but either necessity itself, the nature of
the law, or the nature of the duty to be omitted, these circumstances
ought therefore to be a little more accurately and distinctly considered,
in order to be able to determine how far necessity has the power of a
law, and when it has not.
s e c t i on c l v i i
By necessity we understand such a situation of a person, in which he
cannot obey a law without incurring danger. This danger, as often as it
extends to life itself, is extreme; and when it does not, it ought to be
measured by the greatness of the impendent evil. Again, necessity is ab-
solute, when it cannot be avoided by any means but by violating a law;
and it is relative, when another might avoid it, but not the person now
in the circumstances.*
necessity affords, could not be induced to offer the smallest quantity of incense to
false deities, to escape the severest tortures: nor did Joseph act less foolishly, whochose
rather to expose his life and liberty to the greatest danger than satisfy the lust of his
mistress: Nor would any wise man blame a soldier for deserting his station, when
attacked by an enemy whom he was not able to resist. And I might addmoreexamples,
but these are sufficient to shew, that this maxim about necessity cannot be absolutely
true in every case.
* The martyrs were in the case of extreme necessity, being obliged to renounce
Christ, or to undergo the most violent tortures. But it was not extreme necessitywhich
forced the Christians to apostacy, when Julian excluded them from all opportunities
of liberal education, from civil honours, and from military service. [[ Julian (“the
Apostate”) was Roman emperor from 355 to 363. He reversed the religious policies of
his Christian predecessors and restored pagan religion.]] Daniel was in the case of
absolute necessity, when he was to be exposed to savage beasts, unless he gave over
praying to God. The necessity with which David struggled when he must have per-
ished by hunger, or have eat the shew-bread, was relative. For another who had un-
dertaken a journey without flying precipitantly, would certainly have found other
bread to satisfy his hunger.
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s e c t i on c l v i i i
Now every one may easily perceive, that not only extreme necessity, but
even necessity in which life is not in danger, comes here into the account.
For because some calamities are bitterer than death, who can doubt but
such may strike terror into the most <111> intrepid breast; such as being
deprived of one’s eyes, and other such like distresses. Besides, since of
two physical evils the least is to be chosen, the consequence must be,
that not only absolute necessity deserves favour, but even relative ne-
cessity, if one had no hand in bringing himself into the strait.*
s e c t i on c l i x
Law being either divine or human, and both being either affirmative or
negative (§64); because even a sovereign cannot oblige one to sufferdeath
without a fault, the consequence is, that all human laws ought regularly
to be understood, with the exception of necessity. And the same is true
of divine affirmative laws, because the omission of an action cannot be
imputed to one, if the occasion for performing it was wanting (§114),
unless the omission be of such a nature and kind, that it tends directly
to reflect dishonour on God; in <112> which case, the negative law, for-
* If one unnecessarily exposes himself to danger, he is the cause of the necessity
he is brought under, and therefore the event ought to be imputed to him (§105). And
for this reason, the necessity into which one threw himself, who having torn an edict
against the Christians into pieces, was most terribly tortured, scarcely merited favour.
Lactant. de mort. persequut. cap. 13. [[Lactantius, De mortibus persecutorum, 21.]]But
if one should commit any thing contrary to probity and justice, even to escape death
and tortures, who will deny that he does ill? Quintus, mentioned by the church of
Smyrna, in a letter concerning the martyrdom of Polycarpus, is an example of this,
who having voluntarily offered himself to martyrdom, and persuaded others to do
the same, so soon as he saw the beasts, swore by the genius of Caesar, and defiled
himself by offering an idolatrous sacrifice: upon which occasion the Smyrneans thus
express themselves, “We do not approve, say they, our brethren who unnecessarily
or imprudently expose and betray themselves, since it is otherwise commanded in the
gospel.” And we find the like admonitions in Origen upon John xi. [[Origen (ca. 185–
ca. 254): early Greek Father of the Church and author of a commentary on the Gospel
according to John.]]
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bidding all such actions likewise concurs (§131). And to this case belongs
the action of Daniel, Dan. vi. 10.*
s e c t i on c l x
Divine negative laws bind us either to duties towards God, towards our-
selves, or towards other men (§90 & 124). Those which respect our duties
towards God are of such a nature, that they cannot be intermitted with-
out dishonouring God. But we are strictly bound to avoid whatever
tends to dishonour God; the consequence of which is, that no necessity
can excuse the violation of the negative laws relating to our duties to-
wards God.† On the other hand, in a collision of two duties respecting
* All this is clear. Men when they submit themselves to civil government, transfer
to the magistrate all power, without which the end of government cannot be ob-
tained. They therefore transfer to him the power of life and death, notpromiscuously,
because that is contrary to the end of government, but only so far as the public safety
requires it. Therefore the supreme magistrate cannot oblige his subjects to sufferdeath
without a reason, but then only when the public safety or good requires it; and there-
fore, his laws are regularly to be understood, with the exception of necessity. Hence
Grotius says elegantly, de jure belli & pacis, 1. 4. 7. 2. “Laws ought to be, and com-
monly are made by men with a sense of human weakness.”
† Hence it is plain, that there is no excuse for him, who suffers himself to be tempted
by any necessity he may be under to blaspheme God, sacrifice to idols, or contaminate
himself by perjury. This the Pagan writers have acknowledged. So Juvenal,
Ambiguae si quando citabere testis
Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet, ut sis
Falsus, & admoto dictet perjuria tauro,
Summum crede nefas, animam praeferre pudori
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere caussas.
Sat. 8.
[[ Juvenal, Satires 8.80–84, in Juvenal and Persius: “If you’re summoned as a
witness in some tricky, murky case, even if Phalaris commands you to com-
mit perjury and dictates his lies with his Torture-bull close by, think it to be
the worst evil to put survival ahead of honour and for the sake of life to lose
the reasons for living.”]]
But tho’ those who succumb under such a direful necessity are not excusable, yet the
sense of human weakness obliges us to pity their lot who were shaken by such a cruel
necessity, since we know that Peter found pardon for having denied Christ, after he
had repented, Matt. xxvi. 75.
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ourselves, the safest course is to choose the least of two physical evils.
<113>
s e c t i on c l x i
As to our duties towards other men, affirmative laws, ’tis certain, admit
of favour in the case of necessity; partly because an omission cannot be
imputed when the occasion of performing a duty was wanting (§114);
partly because the law of benevolence does not oblige us to delight in
the happiness of others more than our own, or to love others better than
ourselves (§94); and so far the maxim holds just, “Every one is nearest
to himself.”*
s e c t i on c l x i i
Moreover negative laws, relative to our social duties, in the case of prov-
idential necessity, interfere either with the duty of self-preservation, or
with the duty of defending and increasing our perfection and happiness.
Now in the former situation, since we are not obliged to love othersmore
than ourselves, (§94), without doubt, in the case of necessity, every way
of preserving ourselves is allowable, when a man hath not fallen under
that necessity by his own neglect or default; or if the condition of the
persons be equal; for equality leaves no room to <114> favourorprivilege.
In the latter case, it is better for us to want some perfection, or some
particular kind or degree of happiness, than that another should perish
that we may have it.†
* Thus, e.g. the divine law does not oblige one to ruin himself to save another, or
to give to another the small morsel of bread that remains to himself, when he is
starving. That, the most holy and strict law of love inculcated by theChristianreligion
does not require, 2 Cor. viii. 13. Wherefore Seneca says rightly, de benefic. 2. 15. “I
will give to the needy, but so that I may not want myself: I will relieve him who is
ready to perish, but so that I may not perish myself.” [[Seneca, “On Benefits,” in
Seneca, Moral Essays, vol. 3.]] And this was the meaning of the scholastic doctors,
when they pronounced this rule, “Well ordered charity begins at home.”
† For to want any perfection is a physical evil, if it be not our fault that we have
it not. But to make another perish is a moral evil, which is always to be reckoned
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s e c t i on c l x i i i
All this holds true, if the necessity we are under be merely providential
(§142); but if it proceeds from the malice of men, they do it either that
we may perish, or that they may lay us under the necessity of acting
wrong. And in the former case, since we are not bound to love any other
better than ourselves, much less a bad person (§94); he is justly excusable
who suffers another to perish rather than himself. In the latter case, the
cruelest things ought to be submitted to, rather than do any thing dis-
honourable to God (§131).* <115>
s e c t i on c l x i v
Having mentioned these rules, most of which have been fully explained
by others,† it will not be difficult to determine the cases proposed by
Pufendorff and others. Indeed, if we attend narrowly to the matter, we
will find that many proposed on this subject are such as very rarely hap-
pen, and many others are of such a nature, that all is transacted in an
instant, so that there is hardly time or room for calling in reason to give
greater than any physical one. But since the least of two physical evils ought to be
chosen, and therefore a physical evil is to be undergone rather than any moral one is
to be acted, he certainly doth no evil, who in such a case chooses to save another
person with some detriment to himself; wherefore, tho’ he is not to be blamed who
in a shipwreck catching hold of a plank which will not hold two, hinders another
from getting upon it, yet he is altogether inexcusable, who by the hopes of greater
happiness to himself, is induced to betray his friend against all honour andconscience.
* Thus, for example, if we should fall into the ambuscades or hands of robbers,
every way of extricating ourselves out of this danger is allowable, because no reason
binds us to prefer the safety of a robber to our own. But Joseph would have acted ill,
if he had feared a prison, and chains more than adultery, to which Potiphar’s wife
endeavoured to seduce him.
† Most of the preceding rules have been already treated of by Thomasius, Jurisp.
divin. 2. 2. 143. & seq. but not upon the same principles we have here laid down. But
the same author afterwards is for sequestrating them from the law of nature, and for
recalling this one rule, “That all laws include a tacite exception of necessity”: but we
can see no ground for omitting or sequestrating exceptions, which, what hath been
said, fully proves to be founded upon, and to flow from right reason itself.
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its judgment of the justice, or injustice of an action; to which cases, we
may not improperly apply what Terence says,
Facile omnes, quum valemus, recta consilia aegrotis damus,
Tu, si hic esses, aliter sentires. Andr. 1. 1. v. 9.1
For which reason, it is better to leave many of these cases to the mercy
of God, than to enter into too severe a discussion of them.
s e c t i on c l x v
Thus none can doubt but necessity will excuse a person who must let a
member be cut off to prevent his perishing; or that the other parts may
not be endangered by it. For tho’ we owe both these duties to ourselves,
viz. to preserve our life, and to preserve every member intire, yet the
least of two physical evils is to be chosen (§160); and it is certainly a lesser
evil to be deprived of a member than to lose life. It is therefore a lawful
<116> mean of saving life to do it by the loss of a member.*
* But it is a more difficult question, whether it be a preceptive law of nature, and
whether he does contrary to his duty, who being in the direful necessity above men-
tioned, chooses rather to die than to bear pain, to which he feels himself unequal;
especially when it is not certain what may be the event of the amputation, seeing not
fewer who have undergone the torment with great constancy have perished than have
been saved. Old age, bodily infirmity, the dangerous nature of the disease, the dif-
ference in opinion among the physicians, the unskilfulness or want of experience in
the surgeon, all these considerations may easily determine one to think the cure more
uneligible than death itself, and to judge it better to die without suffering such ex-
quisite pain, than run the risk of undergoing it without success. Wherefore, I would
have us to remember the admonition given above, and to leave such cases to the divine
judgment and mercy, rather than to pronounce hardily and rashly about them.
1. “We can all readily give good advice to the sick when we’re well. If you were
in my place, you would feel differently.” (The Woman of Andros, lines 309–10, in vol.
1 of Terence, Terence.)
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s e c t i on c l x v i
There is no doubt but that they are excusable, who in extreme hunger
and want have recourse to any food, even to the flesh of dead men: for
since here there is a contest between two duties towards ourselves; of
two physical evils, death and detestable food, the least ought to be chosen
(§160). But he is by no means excusable who kills another, that he may
prolong a little his own miserable life by eating his flesh; for however
direful and imperious the necessity of long hunger may be, it does not
give us a right to another’s life that we ourselves may be saved, because
here the condition and necessity* of both persons are equal (§162). <117>
s e c t i on c l x v i i
The case is not the same, when one in shipwreck, having got upon a
plank only sufficient to save himself, keeps others from it with all his
force; or with those who leaping first into a boat, will not allow others,
whom it cannot contain with safety, to come into it, but precipitate them
into the sea; because in these cases, he who first seized the plank, or they
who first got into the boat, are in possession, and therefore others have
no right to deprive them of it, tho’ they be in the same danger. And who
will not own, that it is a less evil that a few, than that all should perish,
or a greater good that a few, than that none should be saved?† <118>
* But what if all the persons being under the same fatal necessity shouldbyconsent
commit it to lot to determine which of them should be sacrificed to the preservation
of the rest, (as in the case of the seven Britons, quoted by Ziegler upon Grotius de
jure belli & pacis, 2. 1. 3. [[Caspar Ziegler (1621–90), German jurist, professor at
Wittenberg. He published In Hugonis Grotii De jure belli ac pacis libros. ]] from the
observations of Tulpius, Obser. medic. 1. 43.) [[Tulp, Observationes medicae. ]] Here
I affirm the same thing. For none hath a right to take away another’s life. And he
who consents to his own murder is as guilty as he who kills himself or another.Ziegler
justly asserts, ibidem p. 189. “That none ought so far to despise his own life, as to
throw it away to satisfy another’s hunger, nor ought others to attack their neighbour’s
life to quell their own cravings.” To which Pufendorff hath not given an answer
altogether satisfactory, de jure nat. & gent. 2. 6. 3.
† Upon the same principle may the case be decided of soldiers flying into a for-
tified camp or city, who shut the gates against those who arrive a little later, lest the
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s e c t i on c l x v i i i
I can by no means think an executioner, or any other, excusable, who
being commanded to put an innocent person to death, thinks he ought
to obey, and that his own danger is sufficient to exculpate him. For this
necessity proceeds from the wickedness of men; and in such a case every
one ought to bear every thing, rather than do any thing tending to dis-
honour God (§163).*
s e c t i on c l x i x
But an innocent person, to save his life, may, in flying from his enemy,
push out of his way, or throw down any person who stops or hinders
his flight, even tho’ he may have reason to suspect the personmay thereby
be hurted. For if one stops the person who flies with a bad intention,
this necessity proceeds from human malice, and such a person reallydoes
what he can to make the person flying perish. And if one be in his way,
without any intention to hurt him, this necessity is providential in re-
enemy should get in at the same time with them. Such was the deed of Pandarus,
described by Virgil, Aen. 9. v. 722. & seq. [[Virgil, Aeneid, bk. 9, l. 722 (Virgil, trans.
Fairclough, vol. 2, 163)]] and of others, of which cases, see Freinsh. ad Curt. 4. 16.
8. [[This refers to a commentary by Johann Frenshemius on Quintus Curtius Rufus’s
history of Alexander the Great (Alexander magnus ), which was reprinted in several
editions in the seventeenth century.]] But in all these, we are carefully to consider
whether the necessity be extreme and absolute (158), or the danger be more remote,
and such as might otherwise be avoided. Hence the humanity of Darius, flying from
Alexander, is very commendable, who, when he was pressed to cut the bridge over
the Lycus, answered, “That he would much rather leave a passage to the pursuers,
than cut it off from the flyers,” Curt. 4. 16.
* Besides, nothing ought to be done in opposition to the certainty of conscience
(§45): but here the executioner is supposed to know certainly the person whom he is
commanded to put to death to be innocent: who then can absolve him from guilt?
Nor does Pufendorff ’s distinction alter the case: “For tho’ he says, that when an ex-
ecutioner merely executes the command of another, the action can no more be im-
puted to him than to the hatchet or sword,” jur. nat. & gent. 1. 5. 9. 8. 1. 5. 6. yet
certainly there is a wide difference between a sword or a hatchet, mere inanimate
things, and a man endued with reason, whose conscience tells him the sentence he is
to execute is unjust.
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spect of the flyer. But in both cases, every way of saving one’s self is
allowable (§163).* <119>
s e c t i on c l x x
The same must be said of those cases in which one is necessitated by
hunger or cold to lay hold of the goods belonging to others;† or when,
in the danger of shipwreck, the goods of others must be thrown over
board. For, in the first case, the necessity arises from the malice of men
in suffering any to be in imminent danger from hunger or cold, (§163);
and, in the last case, of two physical evils the least is chosen, when, in
the danger of shipwreck, men perceiving that they must either perish
themselves together with the goods, or make reparation to others for
their goods which are cast in this necessity into the sea (§160),‡ throw
them over board. <120>
s e c t i on c l x x i
But numberless such cases may happen, or at least may be put, some of
which are truly perplexed and dubious; and therefore let us not forget
* We need not stay to refute the contrary opinion of Albertus. Comp. jur. nat.
orthod. conform. cap. 3. §17. [[Alberti, Compendium juris naturae, orthodoxae theo-
logiae.]] For his argument taken from the unlawfulness of killing an innocent person
in the state of integrity, is nothing to the purpose; because neither is the principle of
natural law to be deduced from that state (§74); nor in that state can any danger be
conceived that must be avoided by such an unhappy flight.
† Those who differ from us in this matter call these actions theft, which they pro-
nounce so great a crime that it can never be committed without guilt, even in cir-
cumstances of the most urgent necessity. But if killing a man, even according to the
principles those very authors go upon, cannot be imputed to one as a crime, in the
case of unblameable self-defence, why should theft be reckoned criminal by them,
in the case of self-preservation? Besides, who imagines theft to be a crime when done
without any malicious intention, nay without so much as any design to make profit
by it? Finally, since persons in the meanest circumstances may easily, after they have
extricated themselves out of their pinching straits, make reparation for the very small
matter necessity can force them to take from another, who can make a crime of choos-
ing to take a little from its lawful owner, that may be estimated and repaid, with a
serious design to make reparation, so soon as it possibly can be done, rather than to
perish? Add chap. 3. 10. of theft.
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the admonition already mentioned (§164). We shall add no more upon
the subject, leaving other questions to those who assume to themselves
the province of commanding or guiding mens consciences.
Remarks on This Chapter
The principles our author hath laid down in this chapter, are most ex-
act, and proper to decide all questions which can be proposed con-
cerning the right, the privilege, the favour, the leave, or whatever we
call it, that arises from necessity. It is however well worth while to look
into what the learned Barbeyrac2 hath said upon this difficult subject
in his notes upon Pufendorff ’s sixth chapter, book second, of the law
of nature and nations. Pufendorff, in the beginning of that chapter,
quotes an excellent passage of Cicero with regard to necessity, in which
the general rule is very clearly stated. It is towards the end of his second
book of invention; too long indeed to be inserted here, but deserving
of attentive consideration. The chief design of our Author’s scholia
being to refer his readers to passages in ancient authors, where moral
duties are rightly explained and urged by proper arguments, in order
to shew that the duties of the law of nature are discoverable by reason,
and were actually known in all ages to thinking persons, at least, he
might very properly have on this occasion referred us to that place in
Cicero. For this is no doubt the most perplexed subject in morals, The
right and priviledge of necessity. And upon it we find Cicero reasoning
with great accuracy and solidity: insomuch, that if we compare with
this passage the 25th chapter of his second book of offices, where he
treats of comparing things profitable one with another; and the 3, 4, 5,
and following chapters in the third book, where he considers compe-
tition between honesty and interest, or profit, we will find full satisfac-
tion upon this head. In the 4th chapter of the 3d book he hath this
remarkable passage.—“What is it that requires consideration on this
subject? I suppose it is this, that it sometimes happens men are not so
very certain, whether the action deliberated upon be honest or not honest.”
For that which is usually counted a piece of villainy is frequently
2. The Huguenot refugee Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744) gave Grotius’s and Pufen-
dorf ’s works considerable circulation throughout Europe by his heavily annotated
translations from Latin into French.
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changed by the times or circumstances, and is found to be the contrary.
To lay down one instance, which may serve to give some light to a great
many others: pray what greater wickedness can there be upon earth (if
we speak in general) than for any one to murder not only a man, but
a familiar <121> friend? And shall we therefore affirm that he is charge-
able with a crime who has murdered a tyrant, tho’ he were his familiar?
The people of Rome, I am sure, will not say so, by whom this is counted
among the greatest and most glorious actions in the world. You will say
then, Does not interest carry it against honesty? No, but rather honesty
voluntarily follows interest. If therefore, we would upon all emergen-
cies be sure to determine ourselves aright, when that which we call our
advantage or interest seems to be repugnant to that which is honest,
we must lay down some general rule or measure, which, if we will make
use of in judging about things, we shall never be mistaken as to point
of duty. Now this measure I would have to be conformable to the doc-
trine and principles of the Stoics, which I principally follow through-
out this work. For tho’ I confess, that the ancient Academics and your
Peripatetics, which were formerly the same, make honesty farpreferable
to that which seems one’s interest: yet those who assert, that whatever
is honest must be also profitable, and nothing is profitable but what is
honest, talk much more bravely and heroically upon this subject than
those who allow, that there are some things honest which are not prof-
itable, and some things profitable which are not honest. The principle
of the Stoics he explains more fully a little after, where he asserts with
them, “Certainly greatness and elevation of soul, as also the virtues of
justice and liberality, are much more agreeable to nature and right rea-
son than pleasure, than riches, than even life itself: to despise all which,
and regard them as just nothing, when they come to be compared with
the public interest, is the duty of a brave and exalted spirit: whereas to
rob another for one’s own advantage, is more contrary to nature than
death, than pain, or any other evil whatever of that kind.” This ques-
tion concerning the interferings which may happen between duty and
private interest, or self-preservation, will clear up, as we go on with our
Author in the enquiry into our duties to others, and into the rights and
bounds of self-defence; I shall only add to what our author asserts, in
opposition to Pufendorff, about executioners, that if we consult the
apology of Socrates by Plato, and that by Xenophon, we will find sev-
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eral fine passages, which shew that we ought never to obey our superiors
to the prejudice of our duty; but very far from it; and unless we are in
an entire incapacity to resist them, we ought to exert ourselves to the
utmost of our power, and endeavour to hinder those who would op-
press the innocent from doing them any mischief. See Grotius, l. 2. c.
26. §4. 9. as also Sidney’s discourse upon government, ch. 3. §20,3 and
Mr. Barbeyrac’s notes on Pufendorff, of the law of nature and nations,
b. 8. c. 1. §6. I beg leave to subjoin, that I know nothing that can better
serve to prepare one for wading through all the subtleties, with which
morality in general, and this particular question about the contrariety
or competition that may happen between self-love and benevolence in
cer-<122>tain cases, are perplexed, than a careful attention to two dis-
courses upon the love of our neighbour, by Dr. Butler (Bishop of Bris-
tol) in his excellent sermons,4 to copy which would take up too much
room in these notes, and to abridge them without injuring them is
hardly possible, with such conciseness and equal perspicuity are they
wrote. These sermons make the best introduction to the doctrine of
morals I have seen; and the principles laid down in them being well
understood, no question in morals will afterwards be found very dif-
ficult. It is owing to not defining terms, or not using terms in a deter-
minate fixed sense, (the terms self-love, private interest, interested and
disinterested, and other such like, more particularly) that there hath
been so much jangling about the foundations of morality. They who
say, that no creature can possibly act but merely from self-love; and that
every affection and action is to be resolved up into this one principle,
say true in a certain sense of the term self-love. But in another sense,
(in the proper and strict sense of self-love, ) how much soever is to be
allowed to it, it cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward con-
stitution; but there are many other parts and principles which come
into it. Now, if we ought to reason with regard to a moral constitution,
as we do with respect to a bodily frame, we must not reason concerning
it from the consideration of one part singly or separately from the rest
with which it is united; but from all the parts taken together, as they
are united, and by that union constitute a particular frame or consti-
3. Algernon Sidney (1623–83), Discourses Concerning Government.
4. Joseph Butler (1692–1752), Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel.
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tution. The final cause of a constitution can only be inferred from such
a complex view of it. And the final cause of a constitution is but another
way of expressing what may properly be called the end for which it was
so framed, or the intention of its Author in so constituting it. The end
of our frame therefore, and by consequence the will of our Maker with
regard to our conduct, can only be inferred from the nature of our
frame, or the end to which it is adapted: But if we are to infer our end
from our frame, no part of this frame ought to be left out in the con-
sideration. Wherefore, tho’ self-love ought to be taken into the account,
yet several particular affections must also be taken into the account;
benevolence must likewise be taken into the account, if it reallybelongs
to our nature; a sense of right and wrong, and reason must also be taken
into the account; and whatever is taken into the account must be taken
into it as it really is, i.e. affections must be considered as subjects of
government, and reason must be considered as a governing principle,
for such they are in their natures. But of this more afterwards, in the
remark upon the duties reducible to benevolence. <123>
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u ch a p t e r v i i u
Concerning our absolute and perfect duties
towards (others in general), and of not
hurting or injuring others (in particular).
s e c t i on c l x x i i
Let us now proceed to consider our duties towards others, the foundation
of which lies, as was observed above, in this, that man is by nature equal
to man, and therefore every man is obliged to love every other with a
love of friendship (§85 & 88). And because equality of nature requires
equality of offices, hence we concluded, that every man is obliged to love
every man no less than himself (§93).
s e c t i on c l x x i i i
We have also shewn that there are two degrees of this love, one of which
we called love of justice, and the other love of humanity and beneficence
(§82 & seq.) But because the former consists in doing nothing that may
render one more unhappy, and therefore in not hurting any person, and
in giving to every one his own, or what is due to him; and the latter
consists in endeavouring, to the utmost of our ability, to increase and
promote another’s perfection and happiness, and in rendering to him
even what we do not owe to him by strict and perfect obligation; the
consequence of this is, that of the duties we owe to others, some are
duties of justice, which are of perfect obligation, and others are duties
of humanity and beneficence, which are of imperfect obligation. <124>
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s e c t i on c l x x i v
Therefore those are perfect duties, to which one is bound by such perfect
obligation, that he may be forced to perform them; such as to injure no
person, and to render to every one what is due to him: those are imperfect,
to which we cannot be forced, but are only bound by the intrinsic good-
ness of the actions themselves; such as, to study to promote the perfec-
tion and happiness of others to the utmost of our power (§84).*
s e c t i on c l x x v
Since perfect duties may be reduced to not injuring any one, and rendering
to every one his due (§174); but to injure, is to render one more unhappy
than he is by nature, or would otherwise be (§82); and one may call that
his due, or his own, which he hath justly acquired (§82); it follows, that
obligation not to injure any one is natural; and obligation to render to
every one his due is acquired; whence the former is called absolute, and
the latter we call hypothetical. † <125>
* Perfect duties therefore lay us under a necessity of not rendering any one more
imperfect or more unhappy: imperfect duties shew us, that we then only arrive to the
glory of being truly good and virtuous, when we delight in promoting the perfection
and happiness of others, as much as in us lies. These duties were accurately distin-
guished by ancient lawyers, when with Paullus they said, some were rather of good
will and virtue than of necessity (voluntatis & officii magis quam necessitatis) l. 17.
§3. D. commodati. Add to this a passage of Seneca quoted above in the scholium
upon §84.
† Absolute duty is what one man has a right to exact from another, without any
right acquired to himself by any previous deed: hypothetical duty is what one can
exact from another, in consequence of a right acquired by some deed. Thus a man
has a right, to exact from every other that he should not take away his life, which is
not acquired by any particular deed: But no person hath a right to complain, that
things are taken from him by another unjustly, unless he hath acquired a right or
property in them by some deed: therefore, not to kill any one is a duty of an absolute
nature: but not to steal, is a duty of a hypothetical kind. If Salmasius had attended
to this distinction (Salmasius de usur. cap. 9.) [[Claude Saumaise (Claudius Salmas-
ius), De usuris liber ]] he would easily have understood why the lawyers said that theft
is forbidden by natural law (furtum admittere jure naturali prohibitum esse) l. 1. §3.
D. de furt. §1. Inst. de oblig. quae ex delict.
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s e c t i on c l x x v i
Further, since the right we acquire to any thing arises either from do-
minion, or from compact or convention, it follows that all hypothetical
duties spring either from compact or from dominion; and therefore this
will be the properest order we can follow, to begin first with considering
perfect absolute duties, and then to treat of imperfect ones; next to speak
of those hypothetical duties, which arise from dominion or property; and
lastly, to handle those which arise from compact. But imperfect ones
ought to be considered before we come to the hypothetical ones, because
after dominion and compacts were introduced into the world, humanity
becoming very cold and languid, men have sadly degenerated into
selfishness.
s e c t i on c l x x v i i
First of all, it ought to be laid down as a maxim, that men are by nature
equal (§172), being composed of the same essential parts; and because
tho’ one man may share perfections, as it were by his good lot, above
others, yet different degrees of perfection do not alter the essence of
man, but all men are equally men: whence it follows, that every one
ought to treat every other as equally a man with himself, and not to
arrogate to himself any privilege in things belonging to many by perfect
right, without a just cause; and therefore not to do to <126> any other
what he would not have done to himself (§88).*
* This rule is so agreeable and so manifest to right reason, that it was known to
the Pagans. Lampridius [[Aelius Lampridius was the alleged author of several em-
perors’ biographies (see, for example, Boxhorn, ed.,HistoriaeAugustae scriptoresLatini
minores.)]] tells us, that Alexander Severus delighted in this maxim. cap. 1. “He had
this sentence,” says he, “frequently in his mouth, which he had learned from Jews or
Christians: ‘Do not to others what you would not have done to yourself.’ And he
ordered it to be proclaimed aloud by a public crier, when he was to correct or ani-
madvert upon any person. He was so charmed with it, that he ordered it to be in-
scribed every where in his palace, and on all public works.” It is not improbable, as
Lampridius observes, that Alexander had learned this maxim from Christians: For
we find it in the affirmative sense, Mat. vii. 12. and Luke vi. 31. But it does not follow
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s e c t i on c l x x v i i i
Since therefore we ought not to do to any one what we would not have
done to ourselves (§177); but none of us would like to be deprived by
any other of our perfection and happiness which we have by nature, or
have justly acquired; i.e. to be injured or hurt (§82); the consequence is,
that we ought not to render any one more imperfect or unhappy, i.e.
injure any one. And because to what constitutes our felicity and perfec-
tion, belongs not only our body, but more especially our mind, this pre-
cept must extend to both these parts, and an injury to our mind must
be as much greater than an injury to our bodily part, as the mind is more
excellent than the body.* <127>
s e c t i on c l x x i x
The perfection and happiness of man consists in life, i.e. in the union
of his soul and body (§143), which is of all he hath received from nature
the most excellent gift, and is indeed the basis or foundation of all the
rest: since therefore it is unlawful to deprive any one of the perfection
and happiness he hath received from nature, and we would not choose
to have our life taken away by another, (§178), it is self-evident, that it
is our duty not to kill any person; not to do the least detriment to his
health; not to give any occasion to his sickness, pain, or death, or not to
from hence, that reason could not have discovered this truth. We find similarprecepts
and maxims in Simplicius upon Epictetus Enchirid. cap. 37.
* Hence Epictetus severely reproaches those who look upon that only as an injury
by which their body or their outward possessions are impaired, and not that by which
their mind is rendered worse. “When we have received any damage in what belongs
to our bodies or estates, we immediately think we have suffered a great loss. But when
any detriment happens to us with respect to our will or temper, we think we have
suffered no damage, for as much as he who corrupts or is corrupted by another, hath
neither an aking head, stomach, eye or side, nor hath not lost his estate; and we look
no farther than to these outward things. But with us it admits no dispute, whether
it be better to have a pure and honest will, or an impure and dishonest one, &c.”
Arrian. Diss. Epict. 2. 10.
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expose him to any danger, without having a right to do it, or with an
intention to have him killed.*
s e c t i on c l x x x
Yet since none is obliged to love another more than himself (§94), and
it may often hap-<128>pen that either one’s self or another must perish;
the consequence is, that in case any one attack us, in this doubtful state
of danger, every way of saving one’s self is lawful (§163); and therefore
we may even kill an aggressor, provided we do not exceed the limits of
just self-defence.
s e c t i on c l x x x i
But what are the limits of just self-defence none will be at a loss to un-
derstand, who calls to mind, that absolute or inevitable necessity merits
favour, (§158): For hence it follows, That blameless self-defence takes
place, if one be in absolute necessity, or even in relative necessity, pro-
vided he be so, not by his own fault (§158): That all danger being past,
there is no further any right of defence: That when danger can be
avoided without hurting the aggressor, or by a lesser evil, there is no right
to kill him;† because of two evils the least ought always to be chosen.
* For he who exposes a person, over whom he hath no authority, to danger, is no
less guilty than he who, abusing his right and power to command, exposes one whose
death he desires, to danger, purposely that he may get rid of him. There are examples
of this in Polybius, 1. 9. Diod. Sic. Bibl. 14. 73. 19. 48. Justin. Hist. 12. 5. Curt. 7. 2.
[[Polybius, The Histories; Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica; Justinus, Justini
Historiae Philipicae; Curtius, History of Alexander ]] and likewise in the sacred writ-
ings, 2 Sam. xi. 15. and xii. 9. where Nathan accuses David of murder for having
placed Uriah in a most dangerous situation, with intention that he might perish. See
Pufend. de jure nat. & gent. 8. 2. 4.
† Man is always bound to choose that which is best, (§92); but that is best which
is the safest and easiest mean for obtaining our end. We are therefore obliged to take
the safest and least hurtful mean of saving ourselves, and therefore to avoid killing a
person, if there be any other way of delivering ourselves from danger. Theocritus
says rightly, “It is fit to remove a great contention by a small evil.” [[Theocritus (ca.
310–250 b.c.), Greek pastoral poet.]]
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s e c t i on c l x x x i i
These evident principles being attended to, nothing can be more easy
than to answer all the questions which are commonly proposed with
relation to due moderation in self-defence. For if it be asked against
whom it is allowable, you will answer rightly, if you say, against all by
whom we are brought into danger without any fault of our own (§81);
and therefore even against mad persons, persons disordered in their
senses, and even against those <129> who attack you by mistake, when
they are intending to assault another. For as Grotius of the rights of war
and peace, 2. 1. 3. has well observed, the right of self-defence in such
cases does not proceed from his injustice or fault, by whom the danger
is occasioned, but from our own right of repelling all danger by any
means, and of not preferring in such circumstances the life or safety of
another to our own.*
s e c t i on c l x x x i i i
Nor will it be less easy to determine how long this right of defenceagainst
an aggressor continues. For here doctors justly distinguish betweenthose
living in a state of nature, and subject to no magistrate, by whom they
may be defended and protected, and those who live in a civil state, and
under magistracy. For since, in a state of natural liberty, there is none to
protect us against injuries, our right of self-defence cannot but begin the
moment our danger commences, and cannot but continue while it lasts,
or till we are absolutely secure, (§181). But our danger begins the moment
* And to this belongs the fable of Oedipus, who having unknowingly killed his
father, who attacked him, in his own defence, thus excuses himself in Sophocles, in
Oedip. v. 1032. [[Sophocles,Oedipus at Colonus, lines 991–99, inSophocles. ]]“Answer
me one thing. If any one should attack you, even a just person, to kill you, would
you ask whether it was your father, or would you not immediately defend yourself?
I think, if you loved your life, you would defend yourself against the aggressor, and
not stay to consider what was just. I fell into such a misfortune by fate, as my father,
could he revive, would himself acknowledge.”
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one shews a hostile disposition against us, and while that continues, our
right of self-defence lasts.* <130>
s e c t i on c l x x x i v
On the other hand, in a civil state, one who shews enmity against an-
other, trapps, or lays snares for him, may be coerced by the civil mag-
istrate; the consequence of which is, that a member of a civil state, hath
not a right, by his own force and arms, to resist another member who
attacks him, or lays snares for him; nor, when the danger is over, to take
that revenge at his own hand which he might expect from the magistrate.
And therefore, the space or time of just self-defence is confined within
much narrower limits in that state; it begins with the danger, and lasts
no longer than the danger itself lasts.†
s e c t i on c l x x x v
Moreover, from these principles (§181), you may easily see that self-
defence to the point of killing the aggressor is not lawful; if one was
forewarned of the assault, or foreseeing it in time, could have kept at
home, or retired into a safer place, or could, by wounding or maiming
the injurious person, disable him:‡ tho’ no person, when he is assaulted,
* And this is the foundation of the whole rights of war, viz. that we may carry
on acts of hostility against any person who hath clearly shown his hostile disposition
against us, and refuses obstinately all equal terms of peace, till having laid aside his
enmity, he is become our friend: of which afterwards in its own place.
† And therefore the lawyers rightly permit violent self-defence, only in the mo-
ment of assault. Ulpian, l. 3. §9. D. de vi & armis. “We may repel him by force who
assaults us with arms, but in the moment, and not some time after.” And Paullus
more expressly in another place, where he says, “That one who throws a stone against
one rushing upon him, when he could not otherwise defend himself,” was not guilty
by the Lex Aqu. l. 45. §4. D. ad leg. Aquil.
‡ Much less then can one with right have recourse to force and killing, after the
aggressor desists, and shews he is reconciled to his adversary. Whence Aristides in
Leuctric. 1. justly observes, “That the Thebans being disposed to all that was equal,
and the Lacedemonians being obstinate, the goodness of the cause was transferred
from the latter to the former.” [[Publius Aelius Aristides (117–after 181), sophist and
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be absolutely obliged to betake himself to flight, because of the danger
or uncertainty of it, unless there be near at hand a place of most secure
refuge, <131> (Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 2. 5. 13.).
But upon this head it is proper to observe, that under civil governments,
the time of making an unblameable self-defence being confined within
very narrow bounds, and indeed almost reduced to a point or instant,
since, in such a perturbation of mind, one cannot think of all the ways
of escaping; therefore, with good reason, such cases ought not to be too
rigidly exacted, but great allowances ought to be made.
s e c t i on c l x x x v i
Hence we may likewise perceive for what things one may proceed to self-
defence by force and violence: for since some calamities are bitterer to
man than death, and not only extreme necessity, but even that which
may be undergone with safety to our life, merits favour (§158); the con-
sequence is, that what is allowable for the sake of life, is permitted like-
wise in defence of health, the soundness of our bodies, and even our
chastity;* and likewise in defence of magistrates, parents, children,
friends, and all others whom we find in danger. <132>
man of letters. His Leuctrian orations are historical declamations, which consider the
arguments for and against an alliance of Athens with either Sparta or Thebes. See
Aristides, The Complete Works, vol. 1.]] See Grotius, 2. 1. 18. and Pufendorff, 2. 5. 19.
* But here many differ from us, as Augustinus de libero arbitrio, 1. 5. [[Augustine,
On Free Choice of theWill (De libero arbitrio)]] Thomasius, Jurisp. 2. 2. 114. Buddeus
Theolog. mor. part. 2. c. 3. §3. [[Budde, Institutiones theologiaemoralis ]]becausechas-
tity being a virtue of the mind, cannot be forced or extorted from us. But tho’ the
chastity of the mind be secure enough, yet no injury is more attrocious to a chaste
virgin or matron than a rape. Wherefore, Quintilian says justly, Declam. 349. “You
have brought an injury upon the girl, than which war hath nothing more terrible.”
[[Quintilian, Declamatio 349, in Quintilian, Declamationes quae supersunt CXLV,
p. 347.]] Who then will blame an honest woman for defending herself against so high
an injury, even at the expence of the ravisher’s life?
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s e c t i on c l x x x v i i
The question, whether one is excusable for killing another in defence of
his honour and reputation, e.g. for a box on the ear, or some more slight
injury, is more difficult. But tho’ nothing be more valuable, life only
excepted, than honour; and therefore some think, that in this caseviolent
self-defence is not unlawful; (see Grotius of the rights of war and peace,
2. 1. 10.) yet because the danger of losing life, or other things upon an
equal footing with life, alone give us the right to blameless self-defence
(§186); and because honour and reputation are not lost by an injury done
to us; and there are not wanting in civil governments lawful means of
revenging an injury; we cannot choose but assent to their opinion, who
prudently affirm, that the right of violent self-defence ceases in these
cases.
s e c t i on c l x x x v i i i
Again, the absolute duty of not hurting any person extends no less to
the mind than to the body (§178), and the faculties of the mind are will
and understanding: as to the first therefore, none can deny that he greatly
injures a person, who seduces into error a young person, or any one of
less acute parts than himself by falshood and specious sophistry; or who
prepossesses any one with false opinions, or he who, even by a tedious
disagreeable method of teaching, or affected severity, begets, in any one
committed to his charge, an aversion to truth and the study of wisdom.*
<133>
* Thus Petrus did a very great injury to Maximilian I. Emp. of whom Cuspinianus
relates, p. 602. “Maximilian when he was of a proper age for being instructed in
letters, was put under the care of Petrus, where he learned Latin for some time with
other fellow scholars of quality. But his teacher employed all his time in inculcating
upon him certain logical subtleties, for which he had no disposition or capacity; and
being often whipped on that account by one who better deserved to be whipt himself,
seeing such usage is for slaves and not free-men, he at last conceived an utter disgust
at all learning, instead of being in love with it.” [[Probably Cuspinianus, De Caesar-
ibus atque imperatoribus Romanorum . . . opus. ]] He never forgot what a detriment
that was to him. The same Cuspinianus tells us, that he often complained veryheartily
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s e c t i on c l x x x i x
Now because that injury done to the will, which is called corruption, is
no less detrimental to one; the consequence is, that they act contrary to
their duty who corrupt any person, by alluring him to pursue unlawful
pleasures, or to commit any vice, and either by vitious discourse or ex-
ample, debauch his mind; or when they have it in their power, and ought
to restrain one from a vitious action, and reclaim him into the right
course of life, either do it not, or set not about it with that serious con-
cern which becomes them; but, on the contrary, do all that lies in them
to forward him in his vitious carrier.* <134>
of his fate, and sometimes said at dinner, while many were present, “If my preceptor
Petrus were alive, tho’ we owe much to our teachers, I would make him repent his
having had the care of my institution,” Add. Ger. a Roo. l. 8. p. 288. [[Probably
Gerardus de Roo (d. 1589), Annales rerum belli domique ab Austriacis Habsburgicae
gentis principibus. ]]
* How great an injury this is, Dionysius the Sicilian tyrant well knew, who being
desirous to give pain to Dion, who he heard was levying an army, and preparing to
make war against him, ordered his son “to be educated in such a manner, that by
indulgence he might be corrupted with the vilest passions: for which effect, while he
was yet a beardless boy, whores were brought to him, and he was not allowed to be
sober one minute, but was kept for ever carousing, reveling and feasting. He after-
wards, when he returned to his father, could not bear a change of life, and guardians
being set over him to reform him from this wicked way of living he had been inured
to and bred up in, he threw himself from the top of the house, and so perished.”
Corn. Nep. Dion. cap. 4. [[Cornelius Nepos, “Dion” in Cornelius Nepos.]] This art
was not unknown to the Romans. Examples of treating their enemies, or their sus-
pected friends in this manner, are to be found in Tacitus Hist. 4. 64. and Agricola’s
life, 21. 1. [[Tacitus, The Histories; Tacitus, Tacitus, vol. 1: Agricola, Germania, Dial-
ogus.]] This secret tyranny is taken notice of by Forstner upon Tacitus’s annals, l. 1.
[[Christoph Forstner (1598–1667) produced an annotated edition of Tacitus’s An-
nals.]] I wish then, that from such examples, youth easily corrupted into a vitious
taste and temper, and averse to admonitions, would learn this profitable lesson, to
look upon those as their worst enemies who endeavour to seduce them from the paths
of virtue into luxury and softness, and to consider them as tyrants to whom they are
really in bondage, who set themselves to deprave their morals.
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s e c t i on cxc
Since it is not more allowable to hurt one’s body than his mind (§178),
it is certainly unlawful to beat, strike, hurt, injure, wound any one in
any manner or degree, or to maim any member or part of his body; to
torment him by starving, pinching, shackling him, or in any other way;
or by taking from him, or diminishing any of the things he stands in
need of in order to live agreeably and comfortably; or, in one word, to
do any thing to any one by which his body, which he received from
nature sound and intire, can, by the malice or fault of another, suffer
any wrong or detriment. Because since we ourselves certainly are so ab-
horrent of all these things, that death itself does not appear less cruel to
us than such injuries do; surely what we would not have done toourselves
by others, we ought not to do to them, and we must, for that very reason,
or by that very feeling, know that we ought not to do so to them.* <135>
s e c t i on cxc i
As to the state or condition of man, to this article chiefly belongs rep-
utation, not only a simple good name, or being looked upon not as a
bad person, but likewise the superior reputation one deserves by his su-
perior merits above others; (for of wealth and possessions, which cannot
be conceived without dominion or property, we are afterwards to speak).
Now, seeing one’s fame cannot but be hurt by calumnies (§154), or deeds
and words tending to disgrace one, which we call injuries; it is as clear
* And hence it seems to be, that by many ancient laws, retaliation was proposed
against those who broke or hurt any member of another person. See Exod. xxi. 23.
Lev. xxiv. 50. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Attic. xx. 1. Diod. Sicul. xii. 17. For tho’ it be not
probable, that either among the Hebrews or the Romans, this law of retaliation took
place (kata` to` rÿhto`n) strictly: ( Joseph. antiq. Jud. 4. 7. [[Flavius Josephus, Antiqui-
tates Judaicae ( Judean antiquities 1–4, trans. Feldman)]] Gellius 20. 1.) yet by this it
appears, that the best law-givers acknowledged it to be most just, that one should not
do to another what he would not have done to himself.
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and certain that we ought to abstain from all these, as it is, that we our-
selves take them in very ill part.*
s e c t i on cxc i i
Besides, the condition of a person may be wronged in respect of chastity,
because being thus corrupted by violence, or by flattery, one’s goodname
suffers, and the tranquillity of families is disturbed, (§178); whence it is
plain, that we ought not to lay snares against one’s chastity, and that all
uncleanness, whether violently forced, or voluntary; and much more,
adultery, and other such abominable, cruel injuries, are absolutely con-
trary to the law of nature.† <136>
* Therefore Simplicius upon Epictetus Enchirid. cap. 38. p. 247. calls contumelies
and such injuries, evils contrary to nature, nay diseases, spots in the soul. But what
is contrary to the nature of the mind is certainly an evil, and what is such, cannot
but be contrary to the law of nature, which obliges us to do good.
† For tho’ when both the parties consent, the maxim, “Do not to another what
you would not have done to yourself,” ceases; yet, first of all, in general, none desires
any thing to be done to him that would render him less happy. But he is more un-
happy, who is allured by temptations to pleasure, or to any vice. His will is hurt or
injured (§189). Again, others very often are wronged, such as parents, husbands, re-
lations, and at least, with regard to them, the debaucher violates the maxim, “Do not
to another what you would not have done to you.” Finally, he who seduces a woman
into lewdness, corrupts her. But since, if we are wise, we would not choose to be
corrupted ourselves by guileful arts, neither ought we to have any hand in corrupting
any person. So far is seduction of a woman by flattery into unchastity from being
excusable, that some lawyers have thought it deserving of severer punishment than
force, “Because those who use force, they thought, must be hated by them to whom
the injury is offered; whereas those who by flattering insinuations endeavour to per-
suade into the crime, so pervert the minds of those they endeavour to debauch, that
they often render wives more loving and attached to them than to their husbands,
and thus are masters of the whole house, and make it uncertain whether the children
be the husband’s or the adulterer’s.” Lysias, Orat. 1. [[Lysias, “On the Murder of
Eratosthenes,” chap. 33 in Lysias.]]
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s e c t i on cxc i i i
From what hath been said, it is plain enough that a person may be
wronged even by internal actions; i.e. by thoughts intended to one’s prej-
udice, as well as by external actions, as gestures, words, and deeds (§18);
whence it follows, that even hatred, contempt, envy, and other such vices
of the mind, are repugnant to the law of nature. And that we ought to
abstain from all gestures shewing hatred, contempt, or envy, and what
may give the least disturbance to the mind of any person. But that hurt,
which consists in words and deeds, is accounted greatest (in foro hu-
mano ) in human courts of judicature.* <137>
s e c t i on cxc i v
Because a person may be hurt by words or discourse (§193), it is worth
while to enquire a little more accurately into our duties with relation to
speech. For such is the bounty of the kind author of nature towards us,
that he hath not only given us minds to perceive, judge and reason, and
to pursue good, but likewise the faculty of communicating our senti-
ments to others, that they may know our thoughts and inclinations. For
tho’ the brutes, we see, can express, by neighing, hissing, grunting, bel-
* Because the author of the law of nature is kardiognw´sthc, a discerner of hearts,
he undoubtedly no less violates his will, who indulges any thought contrary to his
commands, than he who transgresses them by words or deeds: and for that reason we
have observed above, that the law of nature extends to internal as well as external
actions (§18). Besides, love being the genuine principle or foundation of the law of
nature (§79), which does not consist principally in the external action, but in the
desire of good to the object beloved, and delight in its happiness and perfection(§80),
it must needs be contrary to the law of nature to hate any person, and to delight in
his unhappiness and imperfection: or to have an aversion to his happiness and per-
fection, though it should consist merely in thought and internal motion, must be
repugnant to that law. Hence our Saviour, the best interpreter of divine law, natural
or positive, condemns even thoughts and internal actions repugnant to the law of
nature, Matt. v. 22. 28. And this we thought proper to oppose to those who assert,
that the law of nature extends to external actions only.
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lowing, and other obscure ways, their feelings,* yet to man is given the
superior faculty of distinctly signifying his thoughts by words, and thus
making his mind certainly known to others. <138>
s e c t i on cxcv
Seeing what peculiarly distinguishes us from the brutes, with relation to
speech, consists in our being able clearly to communicate our thoughts
to others, (§193), which experience tells us we do by articulate sounds;†
i.e. by sounds so diversified by our organs of speech as to form different
words, by which all things, and all their affections and properties or
modes may be expressed; therefore discourse is articulated sound, by
which we impart the thoughts of our minds to others distinctly and
clearly. <139>
* Thus a dog expresses anger by one sound, grief by another, love to mankind by
another, and other affections by other sounds: but he does not distinctly or clearly
express his particular thought, nor can he do it, tho’ dogs and many other animals
have almost the same organs of speech with which man is furnished. The more im-
perfect an animal is, the less capable is it of uttering any sound whereby it can give
any indication of its sensations, as fishes, oisters, for instance, and other shell-fish.
And therefore Pythagoras really affronted men’s understandings when he pretended
to understand the language of brute animals, and to have had conversationwiththem,
and by this shewed either a very fantastical turn of mind, or a design to impose upon
others. See Iamblichus’s life of Pythagoras, cap. 13. [[Iamblichus, Iamblichus on the
Mysteries . . . and Life of Pythagoras. ]]
† Human genius hath not rested in finding certain and determinate names for all
things, but hath invented other signs to be used in place of discourse, when there is
no opportunity for it. Thus we have found out the way of communicating our minds
to distant persons by the figures of letters so distinctly, that they do not hear but see
our words: which is so surprising an invention, that some have ascribed it to God.
There is also a method of speaking, as it were by the fingers, invented in Turkey by
the dumb, and very familiar to the nobles in that country, as Ricaut tells us in his
description of the Ottoman empire, cap. 7. 12 [[see Ricaut, The History of the Present
State of the Ottoman Empire ]]: Not to mention speaking with the eyes and the feet,
upon which there are curious dissertations by Mollerus Altorffensis. [[Daniel Wil-
helm Moller (1642–1712) was praeses of a number of dissertations at the university
of Altdorf. It is not evident here to which one Heineccius is referring.]] Tho’ all these
do not deserve to be called speech, yet they supply the place of it; and therefore,
whatever is just or obligatory with regard to speech, holds equally with regard to them.
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s e c t i on cxcv i
From this definition it is obvious enough, that the faculty of speech is
given us, not for the sake of God, nor of brutes, but for our own ad-
vantage, and that of our kind; and therefore, that God wills that by it
we should communicate our thoughts to others agreeably to the love he
requires of us: for which reason, he wills that we should not injure any
one by our discourse, but employ it, as far as is in our power, to our own
benefit, and the advantage of others.*
s e c t i on cxcv i i
The design of discourse being to communicate our sentiments to others
(§196), which is done by articulate sounds, denominating things, and
their affections, modes, qualities, and properties (§195); it follows, that
being to speak to others, we ought not to affix any meaning to words
but what they are intended and used to signify in common discourse;
<140> or if we make use of uncommon words, or employ them in a less
ordinary acceptation, we ought accurately to explain our mind. But no
person has reason to be displeased, if we use words in a sense they have
been taken in by those acquainted with languages, or which is received
at the present time, if the construction of words and other circumstances
admit of it.
* We say rightly, that the faculty of speech was not given us for the sake of God,
since God without that assistance intimately knows our most secret motions and
thoughts: nor for the sake of the brutes, who do not understand our discourse as
such, or any otherwise than they do other signs to which they are accustomed. And
therefore it remains, that it can be given us for no other reason but for the sake of
ourselves and other men. But it cannot be given us for our own sake, in order to our
communicating our thoughts to ourselves, of which we are immediately conscious;
but that we may inform others what we would have done to us, and in what they
may be useful to us. And for the sake of others it is given to us, that we may signify
to them what it is their interest to know, or what may be of use to them. Since
therefore we ought to love others equally as ourselves, and what we would not have
others to do to us, we ought not to do to others; the plain consequence is, that we
are obliged not to hurt any one by our discourse, but to endeavour to be as useful as
we can to others by it.
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s e c t i on cxcv i i i
And since God wills that we communicate the sentiments of our mind
to others by speech, agreeably to the love of others he requires of us by
his law (§196); which love does not permit us to hurt any person by our
discourse: but it is to injure a person, to detract any thing from his per-
fection or felicity (§82): hence it follows, that we ought, not to hide from
any one any thing, the knowledge of which he hath either a perfect or
imperfect right* to exact from us; not to speak falshood in that case: not
to mislead any person into error, or do him any detriment by our dis-
course. <141>
s e c t i on cxc i x
He who conceals what another has a perfect or imperfect right to de-
mand certain and true information of from him, dissembles. He who in
that case speaks what is false, in order to hurt another, lies. Finally, he
who misleads any one to whom he bears ill-will into an error, deceives
him. Now, by these definitions, compared with the precedingparagraph,
* Perfect right is the correlate to perfect obligation, imperfect right to imperfect
obligation. The former requires that we should not wrong any person, but render to
every one his own (§174): And therefore every one can as often demand from us by
perfect right the truth, as he would be hurt by our dissimulation, by our speaking
falsely, or by our disguising and adulterating the truth: or as often as by compact, or
by the nature of the business itself which we have with another, we owe it to him to
speak the truth. And since the latter obliges us by internal obligation, or regard to
virtue, to promote the perfection and happiness of others to the utmost of our power,
it is very manifest that we are obliged to speak the truth openly, and without dissim-
ulation, as often as another’s happiness or perfection may be advanced by our dis-
course. He therefore offends against the perfect right of another, who knowing snares
to be laid for him by an assassin, conceals it, or persuades him that the assassin only
comes to him to pay his compliments; as likewise does he, who having undertaken
the custody of another’s goods, knowingly hides the breaking in of thieves, or en-
deavours to make them pass for travellers come to lodge with him. He acts contrary
to the imperfect right of another, who when one is out of his way, denies he knows
the right road, tho’ he know it, or directly puts him into the wrong one.
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it is abundantly plain, that dissimulation, as we have defined it, and all
lying and deception, are contrary to the law of nature and nations.
s e c t i on cc
But since we are bound to love others, not with greater love than our-
selves, but with equal love, (§94); the consequence is, that it is lawful to
be silent, if our speaking, instead of being advantageous to any person,
would be detrimental to ourselves or to others: and that it is not unlawful
to speak falsly or ambiguously, if another have no right to exact the truth
from us (§198); or if by open discourse to him, whom, in decency, we
cannot but answer, no advantage would redound to him, and great dis-
advantage would accrue from it to ourselves or others; or when, by such
discourse with one, he himself not only suffers no hurt, but receivesgreat
advantage.* <142>
s e c t i on cc i
Hence we may infer, that all dissimulation is unjust (§199), but not all
silence: (by which we mean, not speaking out that to another which we
are neither perfectly nor imperfectly obliged to discover to him (§200);
that all lying is unjust (§199), but not all false speaking (§200); that all
* Thus, none will blame a merchant, if being asked by some over curious person
how rich he might be, he should not make any answer, or should turn theconversation
some other way. Nor ought a General more to be blamed who deceives the enemy
by false reports or ambiguous rumours, because an enemy, as such, hath no right,
perfect or imperfect, to demand the truth from an enemy as such. Moreover, the
prudence of Athanasius is rather commendable than blameable, who detained those
who were pursuing him with such ambiguous conversation, that they knew not it
was Athanasius with whom they were conversing, Theodoret. Hist. Eccl. 3. 8. [[Theo-
doretus (393–458), Ecclesiasticae historiae libri quinque. ]] For he could not remain
silent without danger, and plain discourse would not have been of any advantage to
his pursuers, and of great hurt to himself. Finally, none can doubt but a teacher may
lawfully employ fables, fictions, parables, symbols, riddles, in order to suit himself
to the capacity of his hearers, and insinuate truth into their minds through these
channels, since these methods of instruction are far from being hurtful to anypersons,
and are very profitable to his hearers.
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deception is unjust (§199); but not all ingenious or feigned discourse
(§200). And therefore all these must be carefully distinguished, if we
would not deceive ourselves, and make a false judgment concerning
them.* <143>
s e c t i on cc i i
The same holds with respect to truth and veracity. For since one is said
to be a person of veracity, who speaks the truth without dissimulation,
whenever one has a perfect or imperfect right to know the truth from
us; the consequence is, that veracity always means a commendable qual-
ity. On the other hand, speaking truth may be good, bad, or indifferent;
because it consists in the agreement of words and external signs with
our thoughts, and one does not always do his duty who lays open his
thoughts.†
* Amongst the Greeks the word yeu˜doc was somewhat ambiguous, signifyingboth
a lie and false speech. Demosthenes [[Demosthenes (384–322 b.c.), considered the
greatest Athenian orator of classical antiquity]] takes it in the first sense in that saying
so familiar to him, “That there is nothing by which we can hurt others more than by
(h◊ yeu´dh le´gwn) lies.” Chariclea understands by it false speech, in that famous apo-
phthegm of his, “That false speaking (to` yeu˜doc) is sometimes good, viz. when it is
in such a manner advantageous to the speaker as to hurt no other body.” Heliod.
Aethiop. l. 1. c. 3. p. 52. [[Heliodorus, Aethiopica (An Ethiopian Romance, trans.
Hadas). Charicles is one of the main characters in Heliodorus’s story.]] But the word
lie is not one of these ambiguous words, but being always used to signify a base and
detestable vice, ought to be distinguished from false speaking, and the other words
we have above mentioned.
† It is a known apophthegm of Syracides. (sapienti os in corde, stulto cor in ore esse,
a wise man’s mouth is in his heart, and a fool’s heart is in his mouth). A rich person
who discovers his treasures to thieves tells truth, but none will on that account com-
mend his virtue and veracity: whereas, on the other hand, he would not be reproached
with making a lie who kept silent to a thief, or turned the discourse another way
(§200). Hence the saying of Simonides, “That he had often repented of speaking,
but never of silence.” And that of Thales, “That few words are a mark of a prudent
man.” To which many such like aphorisms might be added.
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s e c t i on cc i i i
Words, by which we seriously assert that we are speaking truth, and not
falsly, are called asseverations. An asseveration made by invoking God as
our judge, is called an oath. Words by which we wish good things to a
person, or pray to God for his prosperity, are called benedictions. Words
by which we, in the heat of our wrath, wish ill to our neighbour, are
commonly called malediction or cursing. When we imprecate calamities
upon our own heads, it is called execration. <144>
s e c t i on cc i v
From the definition of an asseveration (§203), it is plain that no good
man will use it rashly or unnecessarily, but then only, when a person,
without any cause, calls what he says into doubt, and he cannototherwise
convince him of the truth whose interest it is to believe it; whence we
may conclude, that he acts greatly against duty, who employs assevera-
tions to hurt and deceive any one.*
s e c t i on ccv
Since we desire happiness no less to those we love, and in whose felicity
we delight, than to ourselves, it cannot be evil to wish well to another,
and pray for all blessings upon him, provided it be done seriously and
from love, and not customarily and in mere compliment.† But all mal-
* For since to circumvent and deceive a person, is itself base and unjust (§199),
what can be more abominable or unjust, than to deceive by asseverations? And hence
that form used among the Romans, “As among good men there ought to be fair
dealing,” “That I may not be taken in and deceived by putting trust in you, and on
your account.” Cicero, de off. l. 3. 16. For it is base to cheat and defraud any one; and
it is much more base to cheat and defraud by means of one’s credit with another. See
Franc. Car. Conradi de pacto fiduc. exerc. 2. §4. [[Conradi, De pacto fiduciae. ]]
† And therefore many congratulatory acclamations, which on various occasions
are addressed to illustrious persons and men in power, degenerate into flatteries: nay,
sometimes they are poison covered over with honey, because at the very time these
fair speeches are made, the person’s ruin is desired, if snares be not actually laid for
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edictions breathe hatred, and are therefore unjust, unless when one with
commiseration only represents to wicked persons the curses God hath
already threatened against their practices. Finally, execrations, being
contrary to the love we owe to ourselves, and the effects of immoderate
anger and despair, are never excusable; but here, while we are examining
matters by reason, certain heroic examples do not come into the con-
sideration, they belong to another chair. <145>
s e c t i on ccv i
As to an oath, which is an asseveration by which God is invoked as a
witness or avenger (§203), since we ought not to use a simple asseveration
rashly or unnecessarily (§204); much less certainly ought we to have re-
course rashly or unnecessarily to an oath; but then only when it is re-
quired by a superior as judge; or by a private person, in a case where love
obliges us to satisfy one fully of the truth, and to remove all suspicion
and fear of deception and falsity. And this takes place with regard to
every oath, and therefore there is no need of so many divisions of oaths
into promissory and affirmatory, and the latter into an oath for bearing
witness, and an oath decisive of a controversy: for the same rules and
conditions obtain with respect to them all.* <146>
him. Since all this proceeds not from love but hatred, who can doubt of their being
repugnant to the law of nature, which is the law of love?
* Besides, if we carefully examine the matter, we shall find that every oath is prom-
issory. For whoever swears, whether the oath be imposed by a judge, or by an adver-
sary, he promises to speak the truth sincerely and honestly. And the distinctions be-
tween oaths about contracts past or future, the former of which is called an oath of
confirmation, and the other a promissory oath; an oath about the deed of another, and
an oath about our own deed, the former of which is called an oath of testimony, the
other a decisory oath, which again, if it be tendered by the judge is called judicial, if
by the party, without judgment, voluntary: these and other decisions belong rather
to Roman law than to Natural law, as is plain from their not being in use in several
other nations, as the Greeks and Hebrews. See Cod. Talmud. tom. 4. edit. Surenhus.
[[Probably Willem Surenhuys (1666–1729), Mischna sive totius Hebraeorum juris, ri-
tuum, antiquitatum, ac legum systema. ]] Maimonides de jurejurando, edit. Diethmar.
Leiden 1706. [[Maimonides, Constitutiones de jurejurando. ]] Selden de Synedr. Heb.
xi. 11. [[Selden, De synedriis & praefecturis juridicis veterum Ebraeorum. ]] Jac. Lydius
What is the
use of an oath?
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s e c t i on ccv i i
Since by those who swear God is invoked as a witness and avenger (§203),
the consequence is, that atheists must make light of an oath, and that it
is no small crime to tender an oath to such persons; that an oath ought
to be suited to the forms and rites of every one’s religion;* and therefore
asseverations by things not reckoned sacred, cannot be called oaths; that
he is justly punished for perjury, who perjures himself by invoking false
gods; nay, that even an atheist is justly punished for perjury, who con-
cealing or dissembling his atheistical opinions, swears falsly by God, see-
ing he thereby deceives others.
s e c t i on ccv i i i
Moreover, since one ought not to swear rashly, or without being called
to it (§206); hence it follows, that an oath is made for the sake, not of
the swearer, but of him who puts it to the swearer; and therefore it ought
to be understood and explained by his mind and intention, and not ac-
cording to that of the person sworn; for which reason <147> all those
equivocations and mental reservations, as they are called, by which
wicked men endeavour to elude the obligation of an oath, are most ab-
surd. Those interpretations of oaths are likewise absurd, which require
de juramento. [[Lydius, Dissertatio philologico-theologica de juramento. ]] To which
may be added what Petit [[Pierre Petit (1617–87), French physician]] andotherwriters
on antiquities say of the use of an oath among the Greeks.
* Provided the form doth not tend to dishonour the true God, because such ac-
tions are not excusable even by extreme necessity (§160). Hence it is plain, that an
oath tendered to a Jew may be suited to his religion, because such a form contains
nothing which tends to the dishonour of the true God. But I doubt whether it be
lawful for a Christian judge to order a Mahometan to swear before him by Mahomet,
as the greatest prophet of the one God, especially since the nature of the Mahometan
religion is not such, that an oath by the true God, the Creator of heaven and earth,
does not equally bind them to truth, as if they at the same time made mention of
that impostor.
Who and how.
How an oath
ought to be
administred.
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base or unreasonable things of one, who of his own accord had sworn
to another not to refuse him any thing he should ask of him.*
s e c t i on cc i x
Again, an oath being an invocation of God, (§203), it follows that it
ought to be religiously fulfilled; that it cannot be eluded by quibles and
equivocations, but that the obligation of an oath must yield to that of
law: and therefore that it can produce no obligation, if one swears to do
any thing that is base and forbidden by law; tho’ if it be not directly
contrary to law, it be absolutely binding, provided it was neither extorted
by unjust violence, nor obtained by deceit (§107 & 109): whence is man-
ifest what ought to be said of the maxim of the canonists, “That every
oath ought <148> to be performed which can be so without any detri-
ment to our eternal happiness.”†
* Tho’ he be guilty in many respects, who takes such an oath, because he does it
of himself, unnecessarily and without being called to it (§206); and because he thus
swears before hand not to refuse, without knowing what the person may demand,
and so exposes himself either to the danger of perjury, or of a rash oath: yet by such
an oath no person is bound to fulfil what he promised by his oath, if the other, taking
advantage of it, requires any thing of him that is impossible, unjust or base. For since
he swore voluntarily, and of his free accord, his oath ought without doubt to be
interpreted according to his own mind and intention. But no man in his senses can
be supposed to mean, to bind himself to any thing which cannot be done, either
through physical impossibility, or on account of legal prohibition. Herod therefore
sinned, Mat. xiv. in promising to his daughter by a rash oath to grant her whatever
she should demand of him; but he was yet more guilty in yielding to her when she
desired John the Baptist’s head.
The obligation
and effects of
an oath.
† It comes under the definition of evasion, cavillatio, if one satisfies the words,
but not the mind and intention of the imposer: the impiety of which is evident. He
who thinks of satisfying an oath by evasion or equivocation, deceives another. But
to deceive any person is in itself unjust (§199): it must be therefore much more unjust
to deceive one by invoking God to witness, and as judge and avenger. An oath then
excludes all cavils. Hence it is plain that Hatto archbishop of Mentz was guilty of
perjury, when, having promised to Albertus, that he would bring him back safe to
his castle, pretending hunger, he brought him back to breakfast, thinking that he had
thus satisfied his oath. [[Hatto (ca. 850–913), archbishop of Mainz, who was allegedly
implicated in a treacherous capture of Duke Adalbert of Badenberg.]] Otto Frising.
Chron. 6. 15. [[The work to which Heineccius refers is Otto of Freising’s (1112–58)
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s e c t i on ccx
We have sufficiently proved that it is unlawful to hurt any one by word
or deed, nay even in thought. Now, since whosoever renders another
more unhappy, injures him; but he renders one most unhappy, who,
having injured him, does not repair the damage; the consequence is, that
he who does a person any injury, is obliged to make reparation to him;
and that he who refuses to do it, does a fresh injury, and may be truly
said to hurt him again; and that if many persons have a share <149> in
the injury, the same rule ought to be observed with regard to making
satisfaction and reparation, which we laid down concerning the impu-
tation of an action in which several persons concur (§112 & seq.).*
s e c t i on ccx i
By satisfaction we here understand doing that which the law requires of
one who has done an injury. Now, every perfect law requires two things,
* Aristotle Ethic. ad Nicom. 5. 2. derives the obligation to make reparation from
an involuntary contract: Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 3. 1. 2. deduces
it from this consideration, that the law against doing damage would be in vain, unless
the law-giver be likewise supposed to will that reparation should be made. But we
infer this duty from the very idea of wrong or hurt. For he does not render us more
imperfect or unhappy who robs us of any thing belonging to us, than he who having
robbed us, does not make restitution or satisfaction. If therefore injury be unlawful,
reparation or satisfaction must be duty.
He who does
an injury, is
obliged to
make re-
paration.
What is
satisfaction?
Rerum ab origine mundi ad ipsius usque tempora gestarum libri octo, also known as
Chronica. ]] Marian. Scot. ad ann. 908. [[Marianus Scotus, Chronicorum libri tres. ]]
Ditmarus Merseb. l. 1. [[Dietmar von Merseburg, Chronicon (see Thietmar von
Merseburg, Ottonian Germany )]] at the beginning, wonders at this subtlety of the
archbishop, and he had reason, since even the Romans would not have suffered a
captive to escape without some mark of ignominy who had by such guile deceived
an enemy, Gell. Noct. Att. 7. 18. Of such fraud Cicero says justly in his third book
of offices, cap. 32. “He thought it a sufficient performance of his oath: but certainly
he was mistaken: for cunning is so far from excusing a perjury, that it rather aggravates
it, and makes it the more criminal. This therefore was no more than a foolish piece
of craftiness, impudently pretending to pass for prudence: whereupon the senate
took care to order, that my crafty gentleman should be sent back in fetters again to
Hannibal.”
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1. That the injury be repaired,* because a person is hurt or wronged.
2. That the injurious person should suffer for having transgressed the
law by doing an injury, because the legislator is leased by his disobedience
or transgression. And for this reason satisfaction comprehends both rep-
aration and punishment, (Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 2. 17.
22. & 120.). The one doth not take off the other, because the guilt of
the action for which punishment is inflicted, and the damage that is to
be repaired, are conjunct in every delinquency. But of punishment in
another place. <150>
s e c t i on ccx i i
Damage done, is either of such a nature that every thing may be restored
into its former state, or that this cannot be done. In the former case, the
nature of the thing requires that every thing should be restored into its
first state, and, at the same time, that the loss should be repaired which
the injured person suffered by being deprived of the thing, and by the
expences he was obliged to in order to recover it. In the latter case, the
nature of the thing requires, that the person wronged should be indem-
nified by as equal a valuation of his loss as can be made; in which regard
is to be had not only to the real value, but to the price of fancy or af-
fection. Pufendorff hath illustrated this doctrine by examples in murder,
in maiming, in wounding, in adultery, in rapes, in theft, and other
crimes. Puf. of the law of nature and nations, B. 3. c. 1.
Remarks on This Chapter
We shall have occasion afterwards to consider a little more fully with
our Author, that natural equality of mankind upon which he founds
our natural obligation to mutual love. Let me only observe here, that
* If damage be done by the action of no person, no person is obliged to satisfac-
tion; for what happens solely by divine providence, cannot be imputed to any mortal
(§106). And hence it follows, that when a proprietor suffers any damage in this way,
he is obliged to bear it. For what is imputable to no person we must suffer with
patience.
How it is to
be made.
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it is at least an improper way of speaking among moralists to say, “That
all men are naturally equal in this respect, that antecedently to any deed
or compact amongst them, no one hath power over another, but each
is master of his own actions and abilities; and that none are subjected
to others by nature.” For we ought, as in physicks, so in morals, to
reason from the real state, frame, constitution, or circumstances of
things. And with regard to mankind, abstractly from all consideration
of inequality occasioned by civil society, this is the true state of the
case: 1. “That men are born naturally and necessarily subject to the
power and will of their parents; or dependent upon them for their sus-
tenance and education. The author of nature hath thus subjected us.
2. Men are made to acquire prudence by experience and culture; and
therefore naturally and necessarily those of less experience and less pru-
dence, are subjected to those of greater experience and prudence.There
is naturally this dependence among mankind. Nay, 3. which is more,
the Author of nature (as <151> Mr. Harrington says in his Oceana)hath
diffused a natural aristocracy over mankind, or a natural inequalitywith
respect to the goods of the mind. And superiority in parts will always
produce authority, and create dependence, or hanging by the lips,1 as
the same author calls it. Such superiority and inferiority always diduni-
versally prevail over the world; and the dependence or subjectionwhich
this superiority and inferiority in parts or virtues creates, is natural. 4.
Industry, to which, as the same excellent author says, nature or God sells
every thing, acquires property; and every consequence of propertymade
by industry is natural, or the intention of nature. But superiority in
1. See Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), in The Political Works
of James Harrington, 172–73: “Twenty men, if they be not all idiots—perhaps if they
be—can never come together, but there will be such difference in them that about a
third will be wiser, or at least less foolish, than all the rest. These upon acquaintance,
though it be but small, will be discovered, and (as stags that have the largest heads)
lead the herd; for while the six, discoursing and arguing one with another, show the
eminence of their parts, the fourteen discover things that they had never thought on,
or are cleared in divers truths which had formerly perplexed them; wherefore in mat-
ters of common concernment, difficulty or danger, they hang upon their lips as chil-
dren upon their fathers, and the influence thus acquired by the six, the eminence of
whose parts is found to be a stay and comfort to the fourteen, is auctoritas partum,
the authority of the fathers.” Harrington distinguishes authority from power, which
is based on material dependence (“hanging by the teeth”: see note 9, p. 202).
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property purchased by industry, will make dependence,hanging, as that
author calls it, by the teeth. Here is therefore another dependence or
subjection amongst mankind, which is the natural and necessary result
of our being left by nature each to his own industry.” All these in-
equalities, or superiorities and dependencies, are natural to mankind,
in consequence of our frame and condition of life. Now the only ques-
tion with regard to these superiorities, and the right or power they give,
must be either, 1. “Was it right, was it just and good to create mankind
in such circumstances, that such inequalities must necessarily happen
among them?” To which question, because it does not belong imme-
diately to our present point, it is sufficient to answer, “That we cannot
conceive mankind made for society, and the exercise of the social vir-
tues without mutual dependence; and mutual dependence necessarily
involves in its very idea inequalities, or superiorities and inferiorities:
and that as we cannot conceive a better general law, than that the goods
of the mind, as well as of the body, should be the purchase of appli-
cation and industry; so the advantages arising from superiority in the
goods of the mind, or from superiority in external purchases by inge-
nuity and industry, i.e. the authority the one gives, and the power the
other gives, are natural and proper rewards of superior prudence, virtue
and industry.” 2. Or the question must mean, “Does it appear from our
constitution, to be the intention of our Author, that man should ex-
ercise his natural or acquired parts and goods for the benefit of his kind,
in a benevolent manner, or contrariwise?” To which I answer, “That as
it plainly appears from our constitution to be the intention of our Au-
thor, that we should exercise our natural abilities to the best purpose,
for our own advancement in the goods of the mind and of the body;
and that we should improve in both, and reap many advantages by
improvement in both, the chief of which is superiority over those who
have not made equal advances either in internal or external goods: so
it as plainly appears from our constitution, to be the will and intention
of our Author, that we should love one another, act benevolently to-
wards one another, and never exercise our power to do hurt, but on the
contrary, always exercise it or increase it, in order to do good.” If this
appears to be the will of our Maker, from the consideration of <152>
our constitution and condition of life, then to act and behave so is right;
and to act or behave otherwise is wrong, in every sense of these words,
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i.e. it is contrary to the end of our make; and consequently repugnant
to the will and intention of our Maker. Now, that we are made for
benevolence; and are under obligation by the will of our Maker, to
promote the good of others to the utmost of our power, will be fully
proved, if it can be made out, that we are under obligation by the will
of our Maker, appearing from our make and constitution, to forgive
injuries, to do good even to our enemies, and in one word, to overcome
evil by good. If the greater can be proved, the lesser involved in it, is
certainly proved. And therefore, if it can be made appear, that by the
law of nature, (in the sense we have defined these words) we are obliged
to benevolence, even towards our enemies, all that our Author hath
said about not injuring one by word or deed, or even by thought; and
about the caution and tenderness that ought to be used in necessary
self-defence, will be indisputable. Now, that it appears to be the will of
our Author, from our make, that we should be benevolent even to the
injurious and ungrateful, must be owned by any one who considers,
that resentment in us is indignation against injustice or injury; is not,
or cannot be otherwise excited in us; and therefore is not in the least a
kin to malice; and that as resentment is natural to us, so likewise is
compassion. For if both these passions be in us, and we have Reason
to guide them, as we plainly have, it is clear, that they must be intended
to operate conjointly in us, or to mix together in their operations. Now
what is resentment against injury, allayed or tempered by compassion,
under the direction of reason, but such resentment as the suppression
of injustice requires, moderated by tenderness to the unjust person.
And what is compassion, allayed, mixed or moderated by resentment
against injustice, but such tenderness towards the injuriouspersonhim-
self, as the preservation of justice, and consequentlyof socialcommerce
and public good, permits? This argument is fully illustrated in my
Christian Philosophy, p. 395, &c. And therefore I shall not here insist
any longer upon it. The same thing may be proved, and hath been fully
proved by moralists from other considerations. But I choose to reason
in this manner, that we may see how reasonings about duties may pro-
ceed in the same manner as physical reasonings about the uses of parts
in any bodily frame, or the final cause of any particular bodily whole.
For if it be good reasoning to say, any member in a certain bodily or-
ganization is intended for such an end in that composition, it must be
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equally good reasoning to say, a moral constitution, in which there is
a social and benevolent principle, compassion, and many public affec-
tions, and no hatred or aversion or resentment, but against injustice,
together with reason capable of discerning public good, and delighting
in it, is intended by its Author for the exercises of social affections; for
justice; nay, for benevolence, and for commiserating <153> even the
injurious, as far as public good admits that tenderness to take place.
Having mentioned the necessity of reasoning from the frame of
mankind, and our condition, in order to infer the will of our Creator
concerning our conduct, it may not be improper to add, that there is
no difficulty in determining the will of our Creator, even with respect
to our conduct towards inferior animals, if we state the case as it really
is in fact, which is, “That such is the condition of mankind by the will
of our Maker, that our happiness cannot at all be procured without
employing certain inferior animals in labouring for us; nor even the
happiness of the inferior animals themselves, in a great measure.” For
that being the case, tho’ we can never have a right to employ inferior
animals for our service by compact, they being incapable of it, yet we
have a natural right to it, a right arising from the circumstances of
things, as they are constituted by the Author of nature. But the right
which arises from these circumstances, is not a right to torment them
unnecessarily, because not only our happiness does not require that,
but we really are framed by nature even to compassionate suffering
brutes. But we shall have occasion afterwards to shew more fully, that
a right may arise from the nature and circumstances of things, previous
to compact or consent; or where there cannot be any compact or con-
sent. Whoever would see the true meaning of the precept, to love our
neighbours as ourselves, fully and clearly laid open, may consult Dr. But-
ler’s sermon already quoted upon the love of our neighbour. That the
precept, Do as you would be done by, is not peculiar to Christianity, but
is a precept of the law of nature, and was known and inculcated by
Confucius, Zoroaster, Socrates, and almost all ancient moralists, Pu-
fendorff hath shewn, and Mr. Barbeyrac in his history of the moral
science, prefixed to his notes on Pufendorff ’s system: so likewise our
Author in the following chapter.
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Concerning our imperfect duties
towards others.
s e c t i on ccx i i i
We think our obligation not to hurt any person, and the nature of injury
have been sufficiently cleared and demonstrated. The next thing would
be to explain with equal care our obligation to render to every one his
own, and the nature of that duty (§175); were not the nature of our
hypothetical duties such, that they couldnot be explained<154>without
having first considered the nature of our imperfect absolute duties. But
this being the case, it is proper to begin with them; and this premonition
is sufficient to skreen us against being charged with the crime reckoned
so capital among the critics of this age (ne u¤steron pro´teron) trans-
gressing order designedly, and with evil intention.
s e c t i on ccx i v
The source of all these duties is love of humanity or beneficence (§84), by
which we cheerfully render himwhomwe love, notmerely what we owe
him by strict and perfect right, but whatever we think may conduce to
his happiness. But because humanity commands us to be as good to oth-
ers as we can be without detriment to ourselves; and beneficence com-
mands us to do good to others even with detriment to ourselves (§83);
therefore our imperfect duties are of two kinds, and may be divided into
those of humanity, or unhurt utility, and those of beneficence or gener-
The order and
connexion.
The foundation
and division
of imperfect
duties.
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osity. Both are, for many reasons, or on the account of many wants, so
necessary, that it is impossible for men to live agreeably or conveniently
without them.
s e c t i on ccxv
Since there can be no other measure with respect to these duties but the
love of ourselves, and therefore we are obliged to love others as ourselves,
(§93); the consequence is, that whatever we would have others to do to
us, we ought to do the same to them (§88); whence above, in premising
a certain principle to which all our duties to others might be reduced,
we laid down this rule, Man is obliged to love man no less than himself,
and not to do to any other what he would think inexcusable if done to him-
self, (from which principle we have deduced our perfect duties); but, on
the contrary, to do to others what he would desire others to do to him (§93).
Now <155> hence we shall see that all our imperfect dutiesmay be clearly
inferred.
s e c t i on ccxv i
First of all, none would have those things denied to himby otherswhich
they can render to himwithout hurting themselves; wherefore every one
is obliged liberally to render such good offices to another; and conse-
quently it is justly reckoned most inhuman for one, when it is in his
power, not to assist another by his prudence, his counsel and aid; or not
to do all in his power to save his neighbour’s goods; not to direct a wan-
derer into the right road; to refuse running water to the thirsty; fire to
the cold; shade to those who languish with excessive heat; or to exact
any thing from another to his detriment, which can more easily, either
without hurting ourselves or any other, be procured some other way.
This kind of benignity is so small and trivial, that either by law or cus-
tom, the duties of this class have passed almost every where into duties
of perfect obligation.*
* Thus, among the Athenians, it was reckoned a most attrocious crime not to
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s e c t i on ccxv i i
It belongs to the same class of unhurt utility to communicate such things
to others as we can, <156> (such is our abundance), spare themwithout
any loss or hurt to ourselves; and to dispense among others thingswhich
would otherwise be lost and perish with us; insomuch, that they are very
inhuman who suffer things to corrupt and spoil, who destroy in the fire,
throw into the sea, or bury under ground things onpurpose thatnoother
may be the better for them.*
direct one who wandered, into his right road. Hence that saying of Diphilus, “Don’t
you know that it is amongst the most execrable things, not to shew one his way.” So
by the Roman laws, one could by an action compel another, who was neither bound
to him by any compact, nor by delinquency, to exhibit a thing. Latona in Ovid.
Metamorp. 6. v. 349. appeals to custom,
Quid prohibetis aquas? usus communis aquorum est.
[[Ovid, Metamorphoses, bk. 6, l. 349: “Why do you deny me water? The en-
joyment of water is a common right.” (trans. Miller)]]
And Seneca, Controv. 1. says, “It is barbarous not to stretch out our arms to one who
is falling, this is the common right of mankind,” (commune jus ) that is, a common
right or duty by the consent of all nations. [[“Iniquum est conlapsis manum non
porrigere: commune hoc ius generis humani est.” Seneca (the Elder), Controversiae
1.1.14, in Declamations.]]
* This is also a very common sort of humanity, or another very low degree of it.
As therefore, they are very cruel and inhuman, who refuse such good offices to others,
so they are very unequal prizers of their actions, who expect very great thanks on
account of any such good deeds. Terent. And. 2. 1. v. 31. says well, “It is not a mark
of a liberal cast of mind, to desire thanks when one hath merited none.” [[Terence,
The Woman of Andros, lines 330–31, in vol. 1 of Terence. ]] But who thinks the Cal-
abrian did any considerable favour to his guest? to which Horace alludes. Ep. 1. 7.
v. 14.
Non quo more piris vesci Calaber jubet hospes.
Tu mefecisti locupletem. Vescere sodes.
Jam satis est. At tu quantumvis toile. Benigne:
Non invisa feres pueris munuscula parvis.
Tam teneor dono, quam si dimittor onustus.
Ut libet: haec porcis hodie comedenda relinques.
Prodigus & stultus donat, quae spernit & odit.
[[Horace, Epistles 1.7.14–19, in Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica: “ ’Twas not
in the way a Calabrian host invites you to eat his pears that you have made
It extends to
those things
with which
we abound.
162 the laws of nature and nations
s e c t i on ccxv i i i
But since we are bound to render such good offices to others from the
love we are obliged to entertain towards others by the law of an infinitely
good and merciful God (§215), and yet none is obliged to love another
more than himself (§93); the consequence is, that we may deny these
good offices to others, if we foresee the doing them may be detrimental
to ourselves or our friends; which, since <157> it may easily happen in
a state of nature, where there is no common magistracy to protect and
secure us, if we readily render these good offices even to our manifest
enemies; there is therefore a plain reason why the good offices, even of
harmless use, may be refused to an enemy in that state, as being ill dis-
posed towards us; whereas in a civil state to deny them rashly to others
under that pretext, would be very blameable.*
me rich. ‘Eat some, pray.’ ‘I’ve had enough.’ ‘Well, take all you please.’ ‘No
thanks.’ ‘Your tiny tots will love the little gifts you take them.’ ‘I’m as much
obliged for your offer as if you sent me away loaded down.’ ‘As you please;
you’ll be leaving them for the swine to gobble up today.’ The foolishprodigal
gives away what he despises and dislikes.”]]
He is inhuman who can deny such things to those who stand in need of them: and
he ismore than inhuman,whowhenhe gives them, appears to himself sowonderfully
beneficent, that he would have a person think himself under perpetual andunpayable
obligation to him on that account.
* Thus in war we deny our enemies the benefit of watering, and have even a right
to corrupt provisions, that they may be of no advantage to our invaders. But all these
things we have only a right to do as they are enemies. For otherwise,when they cannot
hurt us, it is humanity that deserves praise to assist enemies, e.g. when they are in
captivity or in sickness. And seeing in a civil state, an enemy cannot easily hurt us,
whom at least the magistrate cannot reduce into order, he is most inhuman who
refuses to an enemy, to a scelerate, the offices of innocent profit or unhurt utility,
since he is an object of commiseration: “If not the manners, yet the man, or if not the
man, at least humanity,” according to that excellent saying of Aristotle in Diogenes
Laert. v. 21. For which reason, the inhumanity of the Athenians is scarcely excusable,
“who had such an aversion to the accusers of Socrates, that they would neither lend
them fire, nor so much as answer them when they spoke, nor bath in the same water
which they had used, but would order their servant to pour it away as polluted and
defiled, till impatient of such amiserable state of reproach, thewretches became their
own executioners.” Plutarch. de invid. & odio. p. 538. [[Plutarch, De invidia et odio
(“On Envy and Hate”), in Moralia: in Fifteen Volumes, vol. 7, p. 107.]]
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s e c t i on ccx i x
Yea rather, since the love which is the source of all these duties, is due,
not for the merits of others, but on account of the equality of nature
(§88), it is very evident, that even to enemies those things in which we
abound, and which we can give them without any hurt to ourselves,
ought to be given. And this humanity is so much the more splendid
<158> and noble, the less hope there is of our ever returning into great
friendship with the enemy to whom such services are rendered.*
s e c t i on ccx x
But because this love of humanity, from which these duties flow as their
fountain or source, ought to have prudence for its director, which is that
faculty by which things conducive to our own happiness and that of
others is discerned; hence it is conspicuous, that regard ought to be had
not only to persons, but to the necessities they labour under; and there-
fore in like circumstances, if it be not in our power to satisfy all, greater
humanity is due to a good man than to a scelerate; more is owing to a
friend than to an enemy; more to a kinsman and relative than to a stran-
ger; and more to him who is in greater, than to him who is in less in-
* We know this is inculcated upon Christians, Mat. v. 45. Luke vi. 35; and before
their eyes the example of our heavenly Father is set, “Who maketh the sun to arise,
and his rain to fall upon the just and the unjust.” But that right reason, from the
consideration of the equality of human nature, may discover this truth, is plain from
hence, that Socrates set himself expressly to refute this vulgar maxim, “That we are
to do good to our friends, and hurt to our enemies.” So Themistius tells us, Orat. ad
Valent. de bello victis. [[A speech addressed by Themistius to the emperor Valens (in
Themistius, Orationes quae supersunt ).]] And what could have been wrote by one
unacquainted with the sacred books, more excellent than this passage of Hierocles
on the golden verses of Pythagoras, p. 69. “Whence it is justly said, that a goodman
hates no person, but is all love and benignity. For he loves the good, and does not
regard the evil as his enemies. If he seeks out for a virtuous man, in order to associate
with him, and loves an honest man above all things, yet in his love and goodness he
imitatesGodhimself, whohates no person, tho’ he delights in the good, andembraces
them with a peculiar affection.” [[Hierocles of Alexandria (fl. a.d. 430), author of
Commentary on the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans. ]]
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digence of our assistance; and therefore so far the illustrious Leibnitz
defines very justly, justice to be the love of a wise man. * <159>
s e c t i on ccx x i
That degree of love, which we called above love of beneficence (§214), is
of a sublimer kind, because it excites us to exert ourselves to the utmost,
and even with detriment to ourselves, to promote the good of others.
Now, since what we would desire to be done to us by others we are
obliged to do to them (§88), and many cases happen in which we our-
selves would be very unhappy unless others should liberally bestowupon
us what we want, and there is none who does not desire that others
should so treat him; the consequence is, thatwe areobliged, in suchcases,
to supply others liberallywithwhat they stand inneedof, evenwith some
detriment to ourselves.† <160>
* Hence it is that Pythagoras has distinguished certain degrees of love inhisgolden
verses, v. 4. &c. which are excellently interpreted by Hierocles, p. 46.
Inde parentis honos sequitor: tum sanguinis ordo:
Post alii sunto, virtus ut maxima, amici, &c.
[[Hierocles, interpreting Pythagoras, Elements of Ethics (Fragmenta philoso-
phorum Graecorum 1.408): “Then the honour of the father follows, then the
blood-line; after, let there be other friends, as their virtue is the greatest.”]]
† We are said to give liberally, not what we lend, or give for hire, but what we
bestow on others, without hope of restitution or retribution. If I give that I may
receive, such an action is a kind of contract. But if I give without any desire of, or
eye to retribution or restitution, this is bounty or liberality. Seneca of benefits, c. 14.
says, “I will entirely pass those whose good services are mercenary, which, when one
does, he does not consider to whom, but for how much he is to do them, and which
therefore terminate wholly in self. If one sells me corn when I cannot live without
buying, I do not owe my life to him, Because I bought it. I do not consider so much
the necessity of the thing to my life, as the gratuity of the deed, and in such a case I
would not have got, had I not bought; and the merchant did not think of the service
it would do me, but of his own profit: what I buy I do not owe.” [[Seneca, “On
Benefits,” 6. 14, in vol. 3 of Seneca,Moral Essays.]] But tho’ benefits ought not to be
done with selfish views, yet none does good to another, without desiring to bind the
person he obliges to him by mutual love; and therefore the receiver by receiving tac-
itely obliges himself to mutual love.
Our obligation
to beneficence.
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s e c t i on ccx x i i
A benefit is a service rendered to one without hope of restitution or ret-
ribution; and therefore readiness to render such services we call benefi-
cence; as readiness to do good offices, to lay on obligation of restoring
or compensating by services to one’s self is called officiousness by Sidon.
Apollin. 23. v. 478.1But tho’ such services be not properly called benefits;
yet they ought to be highly valued, and gratefully received, if they are
greater than to admit of payment, or are rendered to us by one whom
the nature of the good office did not oblige to do it.*
s e c t i on ccx x i i i
Since therefore beneficence is readiness to render such offices to others
as we have reason to think will be serviceable to them (§222), every one
must <161> see that they have no title to the praise of beneficence, who,
as the servant in Terence, Hecyr. 5. 4. v. 39. “do more good ignorantly
and imprudently, than ever they did knowingly, and with design (§48),”
or who do good with an intention to hurt; or who do good only, because
they think the benefit will turnmore to their own advantage than to that
of the receiver. From all which it is manifest, that in judging of benefits
* This likewise is observed by Seneca, c. 15. “According to this way, one may say
he owes nothing to his physician but his petty fee: nor to his preceptor, because he
gave him money. But among us, both these are greatly reverenced and loved. To this
it is answered, some things are of greater value than what is paid for them. Do you
buy from your physician life and health, which are above all price; or from your
instructor in useful arts and sciences, wisdom, and awell cultivatedmind.Wherefore,
to them is paid not the value of the thing, but of their labour and their attendance
on us; they receive the reward, not of their merit, but of their profession.”Afterwards
he gives another reason why we owe gratitude to those who render us such good
offices, cap. 16. “What then? why do I still owe something to my physician and pre-
ceptor, after I have given them a fee; why have I not then fully acquitted my self ?
because from being my physician and preceptor, they become my friend: and they
oblige us not by their art, which they sell, but by their generous and friendly dispo-
sition.” [[Seneca, “On Benefits,” 6. 15–16, in vol. 3 of Seneca, Moral Essays.]]
1. Apollinaris Sidonius, Poems and Letters, vol. 1, p. 314.
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themind and intention of the benefactor aremore to be considered than
the act or effect itself.*
s e c t i on ccx x i v
Since benefits flow from love, which is always joined with prudence
(§83), it is plain that whatever is not agreeable to reason is profusion, and
any thing rather than liberality: nor are those offices deserving of the
name of benefits, which proceed from ambition and vain-glory, more
than from love, and are bestowed upon the more opulent, and not the
indi-<162>gent;† upon unworthy persons preferably to men of merit;
* To illustrate these conclusions by examples; none will say, that a person is ben-
efited by one, who not knowing any thing of the matter, delivers him letters with
agreeable news; or by one who praises him merely to get him out of his place, that
he may be lord of the hall; or by one who planted trees for his own pleasure, when
he enjoys the shade of them, without or contrary to his intention. To such cases
belongs the elegant fable in Phaedrus, 1. 22. of the weasel, who being catched by a
man, when it urged him to spare its life, because it had cleared his house from trou-
blesome mice, had this answer:
Faceres, si caussa mei:
Gratum esset, & dedissem veniam supplici:
Nunc quia laboras, ut fruaris reliquiis,
Quae sint rosuri, simul & ipsos devores,
Noli imputare vanum beneficium mihi.
[[Phaedrus, Fabulae 1.22 (“The Man and the Weasel”): “If you were doing
this for my sake, it would be something to thank you for, and I should have
granted you the pardon for which you ask. But as it is, since you do the job
to profit by the scraps that the mice would have nibbled, as well as to feed
on the mice themselves, don’t set me down as your debtor for imaginary
services.”]]
For this fable, according to the interpretation of Phaedrus himself, ought to be ap-
plied to themwho serve their own ends, and thenmake a vain boast to theunthinking
of their merit.
† For besides, that such benefits are snatched from the indigent, they are likewise
not unfrequently baits to catch; and for that reason likewise they do not merit to be
called benefits, Mat. v. 46, 47. Luke vi. 32. Besides, as to the more opulent, whatever
benefit is rendered to them is neither grateful, nor has it the nature of a benefit. Thus
we knowAlexander theGreatmocked at the pretended favour, when theCorinthians
offered him the right of citizenship, tho’ they boasted of having never made the
Benefits ought
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or, in fine, which are done contrary to that natural order founded in
natural kindred and relation, of which above (§220).
s e c t i on ccx x v
Besides, because benefits ought to be advantageous to persons (§222), it
is evident from hence, that benefits ought to be suited to every one’s
condition and necessities; and therefore that those are not benefitswhich
do no good to a person; much less such as do him great hurt, or at least
are attended with considerable inconvenience to him.* <163>
s e c t i on ccx x v i
Since that love of humanity and beneficencewhich binds to render good
offices, extends even to enemies (§219), it is clear that those have amuch
better title to our love, who have done us all the kindnesses they had in
their power; and that they are the worst of men, nay, more hard-hearted
than the most savage brutes, who are not won to love by favours: they
are so much the more unjust that it cannot be denied, that by accepting
favours, we bind ourselves to mutual love (§221).
compliment to any but Hercules and Alexander. Seneca of benefits, 1. 13. But the
memory of benefits formerly received fromone yea: the customs of the state inwhich
we live, and other reasons, may excuse such benefits: and therefore, at Rome none
could blame this liberality of clients, because the right of patronage there established,
required such liberality from the clients to their patrons, Dionys. Halic. 2. p. 84.
Plutarch. Romul. p. 24. [[Dionysius Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities; Plutarch,
“Romulus” in his Lives, vol. 1, 90–187]] Polyb. Hist. 6. p. 459. Nor were the Persians
blameable for bringing gifts to their king, since there was a law, “That every one
should make presents to the king of Persia according to his ability.” Aelian. var. hist.
1. 31.
* He is not beneficent who gives a hungry person a jewel, to a thirsty person a fine
garment, to a sick person a feast.Bessus did not surely deserve to be called abenefactor,
who put chains of gold upon Darius, Curt. l. 5. cap. 12. Finally, that Roman, who
being saved from proscription was carried about for a shew in a ludicrous manner,
had reason thus to reproach his benefactor, and to say, “He owed him no obligation
for saving him, to make game and a show of him.” Seneca of benefits, 2. 11.
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s e c t i on ccx x v i i
Love to benefactors is called a grateful mind or gratitude; wherefore, see-
ing one is obliged to love him from whom he hath received favours, the
consequence is, that every one is obliged to shewgratude in every respect:
yet this duty is imperfect, and therefore one cannot be compelled to
perform it; an ungrateful person cannot be sued for his ingratitude in
human courts, unless the laws of the state have expressly allowed such
an action. Some such thing we have an example of in Xenophon’s in-
stitution of Cyrus, 1. 2. 7. p. 9. Edit. Oxon.*2 <164>
s e c t i on ccx x v i i i
Seeing gratitude is love to a benefactor (§227), it follows, that one is
obliged to delight in the perfection and happiness of his benefactor; to
commend and extol his beneficence by words, and to make suitable re-
turns to his benefits; not always indeed the same, or equal, but to the
utmost of his power; but if the ability be wanting, a grateful disposition
is highly laudable.
s e c t i on ccx x i x
In fine, since we are obliged, even to our own detriment, and without
any hope of restitution or retribution, to do good to others (§221), the
* Ingratitude is commonly distinguished into simple, of which he is guilty who
does not do good to his benefactor to his utmost power: and pregnant, of which he
is guilty who injures his benefactor. The former, Pufendorff of the law of nature and
nations, 3. 3. 17, says, a man cannot be sued for at the civil bar; but mixed ingratitude
he thinks not unworthy of civil punishment. But if we may say the truth, in this case
the ungrateful person is not animadverted upon as such, but as having done an injury;
and he is liable to punishment who does an injury even to a person from whom he
never received any favours. However, we readily grant, that an injury is much more
attrocious, when it is joined with that basest of vices, ingratitude. And therefore they
are justly reckoned more wicked who are injurious to parents, instructors, patrons,
than those who only wrong strangers, to whom they are under no special ties.
2. The edition used here presumably is Xenophon,De Cyri institutione libri octo,
ed. Hutchinson.
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consequence is, that we ought much less to refuse favours to any one
which he desires with the promise of restitution or retribution; and
therefore every one is obliged to render to another what we called above
officiousness (§222), provided this readiness to help others be not mani-
festly detrimental to ourselves (§93).
Remarks on This Chapter
It is not improper to subjoin the few following observations upon our
Author’s reasoning in this chapter.
1. When duty is defined to be something enjoined by the divinewill
under a sanction, duties cannot be distinguished into perfect and im-
perfect in any other sense but this: “That some precepts of God give a
right to all mankind to exact certain offices or duties from every one.
But other precepts do not give any such right.” Thus the precept of
God not to hurt any one, but to render to every one his due, gives every
one a right to exact his due, and to repel injuries. But the precept to be
generous and bountiful, gives noman a right to exact acts of generosity
and bounty, tho’ it lays every man under an obligation to be generous
and bountiful, to the utmost of his power. So that he who sins against
the former is more criminal, or is guilty of <165> a higher crime than
he who does not act conformably to the other. This is the only sense
in which duties can be called, some perfect, and others imperfect, when
duty is considered, with our Author, as an obligation arising from the
divine will commanding or forbidding. For all such obligation is
equally perfect, equally full. The distinction takes its rise from the con-
sideration of what crimes do, and what crimes do not admit of a civil
action, consistently with the good order of society; and it is brought
from the civil law into the law of nature. But it would, in my opinion,
be liable to less ambiguity in treating of the law of nature, instead of
dividing duties into those of perfect and those of imperfect obligation,
to divide them into greater or lesser duties, i.e. duties, the transgression
of which is a greater crime, and duties the omission of which is a lesser
crime: or, in other words, duties the performance of which may be
lawfully exacted, nay compelled; and duties the performance of which
cannot be compelled or even exacted. But our Author’s termsmean the
same thing, and cannot, if his definitions be attended to, create any
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ambiguity. However, wemay see from his reasoning in this chapter, the
necessity (as we observed in our preceeding remarks) of havingrecourse
to internal obligation (as our Author calls it) or the intrinsic goodness
and pravity of actions, in deducing and demonstrating human duties.
2. Since our Author’s reasoning wholly turns upon the reasonable-
ness of this maxim, “Do as you would be done by; and do not to an-
other what you would not have done by any one to you in like circum-
stances.” Perhaps somemay have expected from him demonstrationof
the reasonableness of this maxim. Now this truth, which is indeed as
self-evident as any axiom in any science, as for instance, “That two
things equal to some common third thing, are equal to one another”:
and which therefore, it is as hard to reason about as it is to demonstrate
any axiom, for the very same reason, viz. that it does not in the nature
of the thing require or stand in need of any reasoning to prove it: This
truth may however be illustrated several ways, in order to make one
feel its evidence and reasonableness. As with Pufendorff, law of nature,
&c. B. 3. cap. 2. §4.3 thus: “It as much implies a contradiction to de-
termine differently in my own case and another’s, when they are pre-
cisely parallel, as tomake contrary judgments on things really the same.
Since then every man is well acquainted with his own nature, and as
well, at least, as to general inclinations, with the nature of other men,
it follows, that he who concludes one way as to his own right, and
another way as to the same right of his neighbour, is guilty of a con-
tradiction in the plainest matter: an argument of a mind unsound in
no ordinary degree. For no good reason canbe given,whywhat I esteem
just for myself, I should reckon unjust for another in the same circum-
stances. Those therefore are most properly sociable creatureswho grant
the same privilege to others which they desire should be allowed them-
selves; <166> and those, on the other hand, are most unfit for society,
who imagining themselves a degree above vulgar mortals, would have
a particular commission to do whatever they please.” He observes in
another place, B. 2. c. 3. §13. “For the easy knowledge of what the law
of nature dictates,Hobbes himself commends the use of this rule (De civ.
3. The translations here are those of Basil Kennet (see Pufendorf, Of the Law of
Nature and Nations ).
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c. 3. §26.)4 when a man doubts whether what he is going to do to another
be agreeable to the law of nature, let him suppose himself in the other’s
room. For by this means, when self-love, and the other passions which
weighed down one scale, are taken thence and put into the contrary
scale, ’tis easy to guess which way the balance will turn.”He afterwards
shews us it was a precept of Confucius, and of Ynca Manco Capace,
the founder of the Peruvian empire, as well as of our Saviour. And in
answer to Dr. Sharrock, who is of opinion (De off. ch. 2. n. 2.)5 “That
this rule is not universal, because if so, a judge must needs absolve the
criminals left to his sentence, in as much as he would certainly spare
his own life, were he in their place; and I must needs give a poor pe-
titioner what sum soever he desires, because I should wish to be thus
dealt with, if I was in his condition, &c.” He replies, “The rule will
still remain unshaken, if we observe, that not one scale only, but both
are to be observed; or that I am not only to weigh and consider what
is agreeable to me, but likewise what obligation or necessity lies on the
other person, and what I can demand of him without injuring either
of our duties.” Thus Pufendorff reasons about this principle. But both
he and our Author seem to consider it not as a fundamental or primary
principle of the law of nature, but rather as a Corollary of that law,
which obliges us, To hold all men equal with ourselves. But it cannot be
so properly said to be a Corollary from that principle, as to be the prin-
ciple itself in other words. For what is the meaning of this rule,To hold
all men equal with ourselves, but to hold ourselves obliged to treat all
men as we think they are obliged to treat us? The equality of mankind
means equality of obligation common to all mankind, with regard to
their conduct one towards another. Now, if any one seeks a proof of
the reasonableness of holding all men equal in this sense, that it is rea-
sonable for us to do to others what it is reasonable for them to do, or
for us to expect they should do to us in like circumstances; if any one,
I say, should seek a proof of thismaxim, he really seeks a proof to shew,
that like judgments ought to be given of like cases, i.e. that like cases
4. See Hobbes, On the Citizen (De cive ), 3.26: “All these natural precepts are de-
rived from just one dictate of reason, that presses on us our own preservation and
security. . . . This rule is not only easy; it has long been famous in the words:Do not
do to another what you would not have done to you.”
5. Sharrock, ÿUpo´jesic e◊jikh´ de officiis secundum naturae jus.
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are like cases;—and if, owning the truth of the proposition, he asks
why it ought to be a rule of action, does he not ask a reason why a
reasonable rule should be admitted as a reasonable rule; or why reason
is reason, as we had occasion to observe in another remark?
3. But in the third place, that we are made for benevolence because
we have benevolent affections, and our principal happiness consists in
the exercise of the social affections, or the social <167> virtues; and our
greatest and best security for all outward enjoyments, and for having
and possessing the love of others, is by being benevolent;—that upon
these and many other accounts, we are made and intended for benev-
olence, is as evident as that a clock is made to measure time, and in
consequence of the same way of reasoning, viz. the way we reason
about any constitution, or any final cause. We see what sad shifts they
are reduced to, who would explain away into certain selfish subtle re-
flexions, all that has the appearance of social, kindly and generous in
our frame; and the perplexity and subtlety of such philosophy is the
same argument against it, which is reckoned a very good one against
complicated, perplexing hypotheses in natural philosophy, compared
with more simple ones. (See some excellent observations on Hobbes’s
account of pity in Dr. Butler’s excellent sermon on compassion, in a
marginal note.)6 Who feels not that we are naturally disposed to be-
nevolence, and what is the way in which our natural benevolence op-
erates, and so points us to the proper exercises of it, while Cicero thus
describes it: “There is nothing,” says he, “so natural, and at the same
time so illustrious, and of so great compass, as the conjunction and
society of men, including a mutual communication of conveniencies,
and general love for mankind. This dearness begins immediately upon
one’s birth, when the child ismost affectionately beloved by the parent;
from the family, it by degrees steals abroad into affinities, friendships,
neighbourhoods; then amongst members of the same state; and
amongst states themselves, united in interests and confederacies; and
at length stretcheth itself to the whole human race. In the exercise of
all these duties, we are farther disposed to observe what everyman hath
most need of, and what with our help he may, what without our help
he cannot attain; so that in some cases the tye of relation must yield to
6. Butler, Fifteen Sermons, p. 81.
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the point of time; and some offices there are which we would rather
pay to one relation than to another. Thus you ought sooner to help a
neighbour with his harvest, than either brother or a familiar acquain-
tance; but, on the other side, in a suit at law, you ought to defend your
brother or your friend before your neighbour, &c.” Cicero de fin. l. 5.
c. 23. Who feels not that this is the language of nature; that thus our
affections work; that thus nature moves, prompts and points us to
work? And who can consider this natural tendency or course of our
affections without perceiving by his reason, the advantage, the useful-
ness of this their natural tendency, with regard to ourselves and others
equally; and consequently the fitness of our taking care that they should
always continue to operate according to this rule, according to this their
natural tendency? Or who does not feel that indeed this is the true
account of human happiness, the happiness nature intended for us, our
best and noblest happiness? <168>
Happier as kinder! in whate’er degree,
And heighth of bliss but heighth of charity.
Essay on Man, Ep. 4.7
But if nature points out this course, this regular course of our affec-
tions; if it is felt to be the state of mind that alone affords true hap-
piness; and if the general happiness of mankind plainly requires this
direction and course of our affections: If, in one word, nature dictates
it, and reason must approve of it in every view we can take of it, in
what sense can it be denied to be our natural duty and the will of our
Creator? And is it any wonder, that this rule of conduct hath been
known to thinking men in all ages (as we cannot look into ancient
authors without clearly seeing it hath been) since every heart dictates
it to itself? This rule, “Do as you would be done by,”8 is a rule of easy
application, and it is universal, or it gives an easy, ready and clear so-
lution in all cases. This appears from our Author’s preceding and fol-
lowing applications of it to cases: for it is from it alone he reasons
7. Pope, Essay on Man, epistle 4, l. 360–61.
8. This is the so-called “golden rule” to which Turnbull referred above in the quo-
tation fromPufendorf citingHobbes. For the golden rule seeMatthew 7:12 andLuke
6:31, as well as Kant’s criticism in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in I.
Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Gregor, 80f.
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throughout all his deductions of duties. And that it is an equal, just,
or reasonable rule, cannot be denied without asserting this absurdity,
That what is true and just in one case, is not always and universally true
and just in all similar cases. Again, that we are made to love mankind,
and to live in the exercise of love and benevolence, is plain from our
make and frame, and the intention of our Maker thereby discovered
to us, according to all the received rules of reasoning about final causes.
And therefore the principles uponwhichourAuthor builds, are inevery
view of them beyond all dispute. He now proceeds to enquiries of a
more complex nature; but he still continues to argue from the same
self-evident truths.
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Concerning our hypothetical duties towards
others, and the original acquisition of
dominion or property.
s e c t i on ccx x x
What hath hitherto been explained, belongs partly to the love of justice,
and partly to that which we call the love of humanity and beneficence
(§84). From the latter we have deduced our imperfect duties in the pre-
ceding chapter; from the former our perfect ones are clearly deducible,
which we said, consist in not injuring any person (and <169> this we
call an absolute duty ), and in rendering to every one his due (which we
call an hypothetical duty ). Now, having treated of absolute duty in the
seventh chapter, we are now to consider our hypothetical duties with the
same care and accuracy.
s e c t i on ccx x x i
That is properly called one’s own which is in his dominion. By dominion
we mean the right or faculty of excluding all others from the use of a
thing.* The actual detension of a thing, by which we exclude others from
the use of it, is called possession. Again, we claim a right to ourselveseither
of excluding all others from the use of a thing, or of excluding all others,
* That dominion consists solely in the faculty of excluding others from the use
of a thing, is obvious. For all the other effects of dominion, which are usually enu-
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a few only excepted. In the former case, the thing is said to be in property;
in the other case, it is said to be in positive communion, which is either
equal, when all have an equal right to the common thing; or unequal,
when one has more, or a greater right than another to that thing. And
it again is either perfect, when every one has a perfect right to the com-
mon thing, or imperfect, when none hath a perfect right to it, as in the
case of the soldiers of an army, to whom a certain reward in money is
appointed by the prince. But if neither one, nor many have right or
design to exclude from a thing not yet taken possession of, that thing is
said to be in negative communion; and this communion alone is opposite
to dominion, because in that case the thing is yet under the dominion
of no person. <170>
s e c t i on ccx x x i i
Now since reason plainly discovers that men were created by God (127),
it is manifest that our Creator must will that we exist. But he who wills
the end, must be judged to will the means likewise. And therefore God
merated in the definition of it, may be separated from it, and yet one may remain
master or owner of it, or have it in his dominion. Thus, e.g. we may observe, that
the right or faculty of receiving all the profits of a thing by usufruct, is separated from
propriety, while the dominion remains entire: and it is known, that the faculty of
disposing of a thing does not belong to minors, whom none however will deny to
have dominion. Whence Seneca of benefits, 7. 12. says, “It is not a proof that a thing
is not yours, that you cannot sell it, waste it, &c. For even that is yours, which is
yours under certain limitations and conditions.” In fine, we find the faculty taken
away in certain countries from the owner, of vindicating to himself from a third
possessor, a thing lent or deposited, where the law takes place, Hand muss hand wah-
ren. Since therefore that only ought to enter into the definition of a thing, which so
belongs to its essence that it cannot be absent, but the faculty of excluding others
from the use of a thing being taken away, one immediately ceases to have any do-
minion, it cannot be doubted but this alone completes the definition of dominion.
And this I take to be Arrian’s definition, when he says, one who hath dominion is,
“to`n tw˜n uÿp◊ a⁄llwn spoudazome´nwn h⁄ e◊kklinome´nwn e⁄xonta e◊qousi´an, He who hath
those things which others desire or fly from in his power.” [[See Epictetus, The Dis-
courses as Reported by Arrian, vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 2, p. 231.]]
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must have willed that men should enjoy all things necessary to the pres-
ervation of their being which this earth produces. Further, God having
given evident signs of his particular love to man, by having made him
a most excellent creature, it cannot be doubted that he desires and de-
lights in our perfection and happiness (§80). And by consequence he
must will that we should enjoy even all things which can conduce to
render our life more perfect, more satisfactory, more happy, provided we
do not abuse them (§90).* <171>
* It hath been called into question by some, whether man hath a right to the use
of the brutes for the preservation of his life, which cannot be killed without their
feeling pain? nay some have denied it, because they thought it an injury to the brutes,
and not use but abuse of them, to kill them in order to feed upon them, especially
since men may sustain their lives without such bloody revelling. Others add, that
eating flesh is not wholsome, and renders men cruel and savage. This argument was
first urged, we know, by Pythagoras, and afterwards by Porphyry in his books peri`
a◊poxh˜c. See Scheffer de Philosoph. Italica, cap. 14. [[Porphyrios (234–ca. 305), scholar
and philosopher. The work Peri` a◊poxh˜c (“On abstinence”) is a treatise on vegetar-
ianism. See Scheffer, De natura et constitutione philosophiae italica. ]] But in the first
place, this whole hypothesis about injury done to brutes, is founded on another er-
roneous opinion of the transmigration of souls, or of their having souls in common
with us, and therefore a common right with us (koin dikai yuxh˜c) as it is calledw˜Ÿ w˜Ÿ
by Pythagoras in Diogenes Laertius, 8. 13. in explaining which Empidocles says in the
same author,
Nam, memini, fueram quondam puer, atque puella,
Plantaque, & ignitus piscis, pernixque volucris.
[[Diogenes Laertius 8.12, “Empedocles” (Lives of Eminent Philosophers ):
“For, I remember, I was a boy once, and a girl, and a plant, and a fiery fish,
and a swift bird.”]]
Add. Iamblichus’s life of Pythagoras, 24. 108. and Porphyry’s life of Pythagoras,
p. 188. But it is false that there is any communion of right between us and the brutes
(§90). And hence it is false, that an injury is done to the brutes. We are not therefore
to abstain from things because we can be without them; for God not only wills that
we exist, but that we live agreeably; and that use is not abuse, which is not contrary
to the will of God. In fine, that unwholesomeness which they alledge, is not suffi-
ciently proved, and most probably, it arises not from the moderate eating of flesh,
but gluttony, and the abuse of created things, which we also condemn.
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s e c t i on ccx x x i i i
Since God then hath given to man for his use and enjoyment all things
conducive to render his life agreeable (§232), he undoubtedly wills that
none should be excluded from any use of these things; and therefore,
according to the intention of God in the beginning of things, all things
were in a state of negative communion, and so were in the dominion of
none (§231).* <172>
s e c t i on ccx x x i v
Whatever God willed, he willed for the most wise reasons, and therefore
it ought not to be altered by men but in case of great necessity. But since
all the divine affirmative laws, such as this is, “That all things should be
in common for the common use of all mankind,” admit of exception
in case of necessity (§159); and by necessity here is to be understood not
only extreme necessity, but even such as makes it impossible to live con-
veniently and agreeably (§158 & 232); the consequence is, that men
might, necessity so urging them, lawfully depart from that negativecom-
munion, and introduce dominion, which is opposite (§231) to negative
communion.
* And thus not only the sacred records, Genesis 1. 28, 29. but even the ancient
poets describe the primaeval state of mankind, which they have celebrated under the
name of the golden age; for then, as Virgil says, Georg. 1. v. 125.
Nulli subigebant arva coloni,
Nec signare quidem, aut partiri limite campum
Fas erat: in medium quaerebant: ipsaque tellus
Omnia liberius, nullo poscente, ferebat.
[[Virgil, Georgics 1.125–28, in vol. 1 of Virgil: “[N]o tiller subdued the land.
Even to mark the field or divide it with bounds was unlawful. Men made
gain for the common store, and Earth yielded all, of herself, more freely,
when none begged for her gifts.”]]
They deny then, that there was at that time any divisions of land into different prop-
erties marked by boundaries, but assert that all things were in common, and so left
to the use of all mankind, that none could be excluded from the use of them.
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s e c t i on ccx x x v
Now it is very evident, that if mankind had been confined to a small
number, there would have been no need of any change with regard to
the primeval negative community of things, because the fertility of na-
ture would have sufficed to render the lives of all, if not agreeable, at
least commodious or tolerable. But so soon as mankind was spread over
the whole earth, and dispersed into innumerable families, some things
began not to be sufficient to the uses of all, whereas other things <173>
continuing to be, because of their vast plenty, sufficient for all; necessity
itself obliged men to introduce dominion with regard to the things
which were not sufficient for the uses of all (§234), leaving those things
only in their original negative community which are of inexhaustible
use, or which are not requisite to the preservation and agreeableness of
life.*
s e c t i on ccx x x v i
Dominion therefore was introduced, and negative community was abol-
ished by necessity itself. But that this institution of mankind is injurious
to none is manifest, because in negative communion none has a right to
exclude another from the use of things (§231); and therefore it must be
* And hence the lawyers have pronounced such things common by the law of
nature, §1. Inst. de rerum divis. and that not, “as those public things which are the
patrimony of a whole people, but as for those things which are originally a present
of nature, and have never passed into the dominion of any person,” as Neratius says,
l. 14. pr. D. de adqu. rerum dom. [[Lucius Neratius Priscus was an eminent Roman
jurist in the late first and early second centuries.]] The best and most beautiful of
things, on account of their abundance, have always remained in the primevalnegative
communion. Hence Petronius Satyr. c. 6. says, “What is common, that is in its nature
most excellent? The sun shines to all; the moon, attended with numberless stars, even
guides the wild beasts to their food. What is more beautiful than water? and it is for
common use.” [[Petronius Arbiter, Satyricon, trans. Heseltine, in Petronius and the
Apocolocyntosis of Seneca. The poet Petronius (d. 66) was held in high esteem by Nero.
See Sullivan, The Satyricon of Petronius. ]] Neither does any one affect dominion
over flies, mice, worms, and other things, which are either hurtful, or of no benefit
to mankind.
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lawful to any one so to appropriate to himself any thing belonging to
none, that he could not afterwards be forced by any person to yield him
the use of it, but might detain it to himself, and set it aside for his own
use.* <174>
s e c t i on ccx x x v i i
When men, obliged by necessity to it, have introduced dominion (§235),
this must consist either in positive communion, or in property (§231).
Wherefore, from the moment men depart from negative communion,
all things are either positively common to many, or they begin to be
proper to particulars; and community arises from the resolutionof many
to possess the same thing undivided in common, and to exclude all oth-
ers from the use of it.† But property takes its rise either from immediate
occupancy and possession at first of a thing belonging to none, or from
an after-deed, in consequence of a division or cession of thingspositively
common. <175>
* For what none hath a right or intention to exclude me from the use of, that
belongs to none. But a thing ceases to be none’s, so soon as I apply it to my uses, and
I have resolved to make use of my right granted to me by God (§232); because since
he hurts and injures me, who endeavours to render me more imperfect or unhappy,
(§178), he certainly injures me, who endeavours to deprive me of what I have taken
to myself for the sake of my preservation, and living agreeably. The same happens
in this case, that Arrian. dissert. Epict. 2. 4. says of the theatre, tho’ it be positively
common. “Is not the theatre common to all the citizens? But if one takes a place in
it, turn him out of it if you can.” And Seneca of benefits, 7. 12. “I have truly a place
among the Equestrian order; but when I come into the theatre, if these places be full,
I have a right to a place there, because I may sit there; and I have no right to a place
there, because all the places are possessed by those with whom I have my right in
common.”
† This, no doubt, was done at first immediately, when families and tribes began
to separate and disperse into different parts of the world. For then each family took
possession of some region for itself in common, and without division for a while, till
necessity urging, they divided the common possession, or by compact gave the liberty
to each particular of occupying as much as he wanted. The antients mention several
nations which in the beginning possessed whole provinces in common without di-
vision, as the Aborigenes in Justin, 43. the Scythians and Getar. in Horace, Carm. 3.
4. the Germans in Tacitus, c. 26. the inhabitants of the island Lipara, the Panchaeans
and Vaccaeans, Diodorus Siculus, Biblioth. v. 9 & 45.
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Truly, if such were the happiness of mankind, that all were equally vir-
tuous, we would neither stand in need of dominion, nor of any com-
pacts, because even those who had nothing in possession, would want
nothing necessary to their comfortable subsistence. For in that case every
man would love another as himself, and would cheerfully render to every
one whatever he could reasonably desire to be done by others to him.
And what use would there be for dominion among such friends having
all in common? But since, in the present state of mankind, it cannot be
expected that any multitude of men should be all such lovers of virtue,
as to study the happiness of others as much as their own; hence it is
evident, that positive communion is not suitable to the condition of
mankind, as they now are, and therefore that they had very good and
justifiable reasons for departing from it likewise.* <176>
* Whoever mentions the being of such a communion any where among mankind,
represents at the same time these men as extremely virtuous. This there is reason to
say of the church of Jerusalem, Acts iv. 32. Nor did the poets think what they say of
the community among mankind in the golden age could have been credited, if they
had not also represented them as most studious of virtue; who, as Ovid says, Metam.
l. v. 90.
vindice nullo,
Sponte sua, sine lege, fidem rectumque colebant.
[[Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.90: “[The Golden Age] with no one to compel,
without a law, of its own will, kept faith and did the right.”]]
The Scythians beyond the Maeotis, among whom Scymnus Chius [[ancient Greek
author of a description of the earth]] tells us this community obtained, are said by
him to have been touc sfo´dra, e◊usebesta´touc, a most pious race. Iamblichus in his
life of Pythagoras, §167, tells us, that Pythagoras derived his community of things
from justice as its source: But virtue, justice and piety becoming rare and languid
amongst men, that this communion could not take place or subsist, is manifest.
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s e c t i on ccx x x i x
And hence also it is conspicuous how property was introduced, and what
are the ways of acquiring property in a thing. For a thing is either still
without dominion, or it is in the dominion of some person or persons.
Now, in the former case we call the original ways of acquiring property
with Grotius, those by which we acquire either the very substance of a
thing yet belonging to none, or the accretions which may any how be
added or accede to it. The first of which is called occupancy; the latter
accession.
s e c t i on ccx l
But if a thing be already in any one’s dominion, then it is either in the
property of many, or of a particular (§231). In the first case, things in
common are appropriated by division or cession; in the latterby tradition.
Nor is there any other derivative way of acquiring dominion, which may
not be most conveniently reduced to one or other of these sorts.
s e c t i on ccx l i
Occupancy is taking possession of a thing belonging to none. A thing is
said to belong to none, which none ever had a right to exclude others
from the use of, or when the right of none to exclude others from it, is
evidently certain, or when the right of excluding others from the use of
it is abdicated by the possessor himself freely; in which last case, a thing
is held for derelinquished. But seeing none has a right to exclude others
from the use of things which belong to none (§231), the consequence is,
that things belonging to none, fall <177> to the share and right of the
first occupants. Nor can this be understood to extend to things that are
lost, carried off by fraud or force, cast over board in imminent danger
of shipwreck, or taken away by brute animals; for in no sense are such
things belonging to none, since they had owners, and these owners never
abdicated their right and dominion.*
* Therefore the fisher Gripus philosophizes very soundly in Plautus, Rud. 4. 3.
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s e c t i on ccx l i i
Occupancy being taking possession of a thing belonging to none (§241),
and possession being detention of a thing, from the use of which we
have determined to exclude others (§231), it is plain that occupancy is
made by mind and body at once, and that intention alone is not suffi-
cient to occupancy, if another has a mind to use his right; nor mere
taking possession of a thing, without intention to exclude others from
the use of it; but by the tacite consent of mankind the declaration of
<178> intention to appropriate a thing to one’s self, joined with certain
sensible signs, is held for occupancy.*
v. 32. concerning the fish he himself had caught in the sea, when he pleads they were
his own, because none could justly exclude him from the use of them:
Ecquem esse dices mari piscem meum?
Quos quum capio, siquidem cepi, mei sunt: habeo pro meis:
Nec manu adseruntur, neque illic partem quisquam postulat.
In foro palam omnes vendo pro meis venalibus.
[[Plautus, The Rope, lines 971–74, in vol. 4 of Plautus: “Gripus: Would you
call any fish mine while it’s still in the sea? When I catch them, supposing I
do, then they are mine; I have them for my own, and no one lays claim to
them or expects any part of them. And I sell them all in the public market
as my wares.”]]
But he gives a very bad reason, when he claims to himself a purse, which being lost
by shipwreck, he had brought out of the sea in his net:
In manu non est mea,
Ubi demisi rete atque hamum, quidquid haesit, extraho.
Meum, quod rete atque hami nacti sunt, meum potissimum est.
[[Ibid., lines 983–85: “It’s a thing I can’t control. When I let down my net
and hook, I pull up whatever’s stuck to ’em. Anything my net and hook gets
hold of is mine, yes, sir, mine.”]]
For to this Trachalio answers very right, v. 42.
Quid ais, impudens,
Ausus etiam, comparare vidulum cum piscibus?
Eadem tandem res videtur?
[[Ibid., lines 981–83: “How’s that, you cheeky rascal? So you’ve got the cheek
to compare trunks with fish, eh? Really now, does it seem the same to you?”]]
* Thus one is reckoned to have taken possession of a field, tho’ he hath not walked
round every spot of it, l. 3. §1. l. 48. D. & l. 2. C. de adqu. vel amitt. possess. if he
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s e c t i on ccx l i i i
Moreover, since every thing may be occupied which is none’s possession
(§241), it will therefore be the same thing whether whole tracts of land
unpossessed be occupied by many in lump, or whether particular parts
be occupied by particular persons. The former, Grotius of the rights of
war and peace, calls occupying per universitatem, by the whole; and the
latter, occupying by parcels, (per fundos ). But because he who takes pos-
session of the whole, is judged to take possession of every part, hence it
follows, that when any number of men, as a people in an united body,
seize on some desolate tract of land by the whole, nothing becomes
proper to any particular person, but all contained in that region, if par-
ticular parts be not <179> taken possession of by particulars, belongs to
the whole body, or to their sovereign.*
hath testified by some sign, such as cutting a branch from the tree, &c. to those
present, his intention of appropriating that field to himself. But since these signs have
their effect by tacite convention, they are not arbitrary; and therefore, he who threw
his spear into a city deserted by its inhabitants, seems no more to be the occupant of
that city than a hunter is of a wild beast, which, having flung his spear at it, he neither
kills nor wounds. And hence may be decided the famous controversy between the
people of Andros and Chalcis, about their right of occupancy with respect to the city
of Acanthos, the former pleading that their spy seeing himself outrun by the Chal-
chidian spy, threw the spear which he had in his hand at the city gate, which stuck
there; the other denying that cities could be occupied in this manner by throwing
spears, and asserting their right to the city, because their spy had first entred into it.
The story is related by Plutarch, Quaest. Graec. 30. [[See Plutarch, The Greek Ques-
tions of Plutarch, 139.]]
* Hence, in a tract of land, particulars may appropriate each to himself aparticular
part, and yet the whole territory may belong to the people, or the united body. Dio
Chrysostom in Rhodiaca 31. “The territory is the state’s, yet every possessor is master
of his own portion.” [[Dio Chrysostom (ca. a.d. 40/50–after 110), Greek orator and
popular philosopher. See “The Thirty-first Discourse: To the People of Rhodes,” in
Dio Chrysostom, vol. 3, p. 51.]]
And either in
the lump, or
by parts.
book i , chapter ix 185
s e c t i on ccx l i v
None therefore can deny that hunting, fishing, fowling, are species of
occupancy, not only in desart places unpossessed, but likewise in terri-
tories already occupied, since such is the abundance of wild beasts, fish,
and winged creatures, that there is enough of them for all men (§235);
yet, if there be any good or just reason* for it, a people may, without
injury, claim to themselves all such animals as are not under dominion
(§243) or assign them to their sovereign as his special right; and that being
done, it becomes contrary to the law of justice for any one rashly to
arrogate to himself the right of hunting already acquired by another.
s e c t i on ccx l v
But wherever the right of hunting is promiscuous, reason plainly teaches
that this right does not extend to tame animals, because they are in domi-
<180>nion, nor to creatures tamed by the care of men, while one pos-
sesses them, or pursues them with an intention to recover them, or hath
not by clear signs manifested his design to relinquish them:† nay, that it
* Many such reasons, tho’ not very proper ones, are accumulated by Pufendorff,
of the law of nature, &c. 4. 6. 6. The one of greatest moment is, that wild beasts,
fish and fowls, are not every where in such exhaustless abundance that the destruction
of the whole species may not be feared, if the right of hunting be promiscuously
given to all (§235), whence we may see why men are nowhere forbid to hunt and kill
savage beasts, which are hurtful to mankind; nay, in some countries, rewards are
offered to those who can, by bringing their heads, skins, or talons to the magistrate,
prove he hath cleared the province from such pests.
† Thus he will hardly be excusable, by a pretended right of hunting, who seizes
a stag with bells about his neck, tho’ wandering, if his owner be known: Nor is he to
be defended, who keeps the master of a bee-hive, who is pursuing his bees, out of
his court, that he may take possession of them himself; tho’ that seemed not unjust
to the Roman lawyers, §14. Inst. de rerum divisione. For tho’ a master have the right
to exclude others from the use of his own, yet he who enters our house to recover
his own, does not use ours, but reclaims his own. And how can it be more just to
keep a person out of our court who is pursuing his bees, than to drive a neighbour
away from our house who comes to reclaim his hens which had flown into our court?
Wherefore that law of Plato was much more equal, de legibus, l. 8. “If any person
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does not extend to wild beasts inclosed in a park, to a fish-pond, a warren,
a bee-hive, &c. but to those which, as Caius elegantly expresses it, l. 1.
§1. de adqu. dom. Terra, mari, caelo capiuntur, are caught in the sea, air,
or land.
s e c t i on ccx l v i
Moreover, since besides the intention of excluding others from the use
of a thing, corporal possession is required to occupancy (§242); the con-
sequence is, that it is not enough to wound a wild beast, much less is it
sufficient to have a mind to seize one that shall fall by its wound; but it
is requisite either that it be taken alive or dead by the hunters dogs, nets,
or other instruments; for if neither of these be done, any one has a right
to seize and kill a creature, tho’ wounded by another, because it is not
yet made property.* <181>
s e c t i on ccx l v i i
Another species of occupancy is called occupancy by war, by which it is
asserted, that persons, as well as things, taken in lawful war, become the
taker’s by the law of nations, l. 1. §1. D. de adqu. vel amitt. poss. But
because occupancy can only take place in things possessed by none
(§241), and things belonging to an enemy can only be by fiction,† and
follows his bees, and another by moving the air invites them into his ground, let him
repair the damage.” [[Plato, The Laws of Plato, 843e.]]
* But there hath always been a great diversity of opinions about this matter; and
hence it is, that the laws of countries are so different about it. See the different judg-
ments of Trebatius and other Roman lawyers on this head, l. 5. D. de adqu. rerum
dom. The Salic law, tit. 35. §4. does not permit a wild beast that was so much as but
raised by another’s dogs to be intercepted by any one. The Langobard law, l. 1. tit.
22. §4. & 6. adjudges to the seizer the shoulder with seven ribs, and the rest to the
wounder. These, and other such like laws among the ancients are collected by Pu-
fendorff of the law, &c. 4. 6. 10.
† Pufendorff, of the law of nature, &c. 4. 6. 14. thus explains this fiction: “By a
state of war, as all other peaceful rights are interrupted, so dominion thus far loses
its effect with regard to the adverse party, as that we are no longer under obligation
to abstain from their possessions, than the rules of humanity and mercy advise us.
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free persons cannot so much as by fiction be deemed to belong to none;
it follows, that occupancy by war does not belong neither to the original
ways of acquiring, nor to occupancy, but must be derived from another
source, even from the right of war itself. <182>
s e c t i on ccx l v i i i
To occupancy finding is properly referred, since it consists in taking hold
of a thing belonging to none; and there is no doubt that a thing not yet
possessed, or left by its possessor, falls to the finder, who first seizes it
with an intention of making it his own; wherefore the law of the Sta-
giritae, Biblienses and Athenians, is contrary to the law of nature: “a› mv`
e⁄sjou, mh` a◊ne´lh.” “What you did not place, do not take up,” unless it
be only understood of things lost; Aelian. Hist. Var. 3. 45. 4. 1. Diog.
Laert. 1. 57. Nor do they less err, who adjudge a thing found in common
to the finder, and him who saw it taken up.* But this right ought not to
be extended to things which a people possess themselves of by the right
In war, therefore, the goods of one party, in respect of the other, are rendered, as it
were, void of dominion. Not that men do by the right of war cease to be proprietors
of what was before their own; but because their propriety is no bar against theenemy’s
claim, who may seize and carry away all for his own use.” But when things are rendered
void of dominion, none has a right to exclude others from the use of them (§231);
now, an enemy always preserves his right of excluding an enemy from the use of his
things; nor does he any injury to any one, while he fights for his own with all his
might. Who then will call such things, things void of dominion? which if it be so,
an enemy does not lose the things taken by his adverse party, because he has not the
right of excluding an enemy, but for want of sufficient force to repel his enemy.
* It was an ancient custom to demand in common what was found, and it was
done by a formula called, in commune, or among the Greeks koino`c ÿErmh˜c, or koino`n
t ÿErmv˜, of which formula see Erasmus in adagiis [[Desiderius Erasmus (1469–w˜Ÿ
1536), famous humanist scholar. Heineccius refers to Erasmus’s Proverbs, or Adages
II. i. 85 (Erasmus, Adages, vol. 33 of Collected Works ).]]: Many things are noted with
relation to it by the learned upon Phaedrus Fab. 5. 6. v. 3. See likewise PlautusRudent.
4. 3. v. 72. But since things in the possession of none fall to the most early occupant
(§241), and none has a right to exclude another from the use of such things (§231);
and he, in fine, who only seized a thing with his eyes, but does not take hold of it,
cannot be said to occupy (§242), it is evident that such a one has no right to demand
any share of what is found, unless the civil laws of a country or custom permits it.
Of finding.
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of occupancy made by an united body in whole, or hath ceded to their
sovereign as a special privilege, which may be lawfully done, as we have
already observed (§243). <183>
s e c t i on ccx l i x
Nor is it less manifest that things belong to the finder which are aban-
doned by one of a sound mind, and master of his actions, with intention
to abdicate them; and therefore scattered gifts, nay, even treasures,whose
former owners cannot be certainly known, which are found by accident,
unless the people or their sovereign claim them to themselves (§243).
About which matter various laws of nations are quoted by Grotius of
the rights of war and peace, 2. 8. 7. Pufendorff 6. 13.1 and Hertius in his
notes upon these sections; Ev. Otto upon the institutes, §29. inst. de rer.
divis.2 Yet regard ought to be had to the proprietor of the ground, as
having a right to all the profits of it of every sort.* And therefore the
emperor Hadrian, justly, and conformably to the laws of natural equity,
adjudged one half of a thing found to the finder, and the other to the
proprietor of the ground where it was found. Spartian in Hadriano,3 c.
18. §39. inst. de rerum divisione.
* This is so true, that some nations thought the finder was to be preferred, as the
Hebrews, Mat. xiii. 44. Selden de jure nat. & gent. See Hebr. vi. 4. the Syrians, the
Greeks, and not a few among the Romans. (See Philostrat. vita Apoll. Tyan. 2. 39.
de vita Sophist. 2. 2. Plautus Trinum. 1. 2. v. 141. l. 67. [[Philostratus,Philostratorum
quae supersunt omnia; Plautus, Three Bob Day, lines 172–80, in vol. 5 of Plautus. ]]
Dig. de rei vind. Where a part is granted to the finder, there seems to be no distinction
between one hired to dig our ground, and one not hired. For tho’ hired workers
acquire to us by their hired labour, yet that does not seem a just reason for a distinc-
tion, if one hires himself not to search for treasures, but to dig a pit, or for any other
like work. See Corn. van Bynkersh. observ. 2. 4. [[Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673–
1743), Dutch jurist. Heineccius refers to Bynkershoek’s Observationum iuris Romani,
which first appeared in 1710.]]
1. Pufendorf, Acht Bu¨cher vom Natur- und Vo¨lkerrecht.
2. Otto, Ad fl. Iustiniani PP. aug. Institutionum commentarius.
3. Presumably a reference to Boxhorn’s Historiae Augustae scriptores sex.
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s e c t i on cc l
Another original way of acquiring dominion is accession, by which is
understood the right of claiming to ourselves whatever additions are
made to a <184> substance belonging to us. Now, since substances be-
longing to us may be augmented either by natural growth, by our own
industry, or by both conjointly;Accession is divided by the more accurate
doctors of the law into natural, industrious, and mixed. *
s e c t i on cc l i
As to natural accession, what belongs to us either receives an addition
we cannot certainly discover the origine and former owner of, or an ad-
dition by something known to belong to another. In the first case, since
a thing, whose master cannot be certainly known, belongs to none
(§241), there is no reason why such an increment may not go with the
thing to which it hath acceded, and so be acquired to us. But in the other
case, the thing hath an owner, who can by right exclude others from the
use of it (§231); and therefore I have no more reason to think such a
thing, however it be added to my goods, is acquired to me, than when
a strong wind blows the linen of Titius, that were hung out in his garden,
into my court.† <185>
* Thus to nature we owe the breed of animals, increments by rivers, a new cast
up island, a forsaken channel: To our own industry, a new form, any thing added to
what belongs to us, mixed or interwoven with it, joined or fastened to it, by lead or
iron, or any other way; writing upon our paper, painting upon our cloath or board,
&c. And partly to nature, and partly to industry, the fruits of harvest, these being
owing conjointly to the goodness of the soil, and the clemency and favourableness
of the weather, and to our own skill and labour. And therefore the first sort are called
natural increments, the second industrious acquirements, and the third mixed. For
what others add under the title of fortuitous, is more properly referred to the occu-
pancy of things belonging to none.
† No reason can be imagined why an owner, who is well known to be such, should
lose the property of any thing belonging to him while it subsists, if he hath neither
abdicated his property, nor transferred it to another by any deed: And it would be
cruel to take advantage of one’s misfortune or calamity to deprive him of his right.
If then one continues proprietor or master of a thing, which is added by whatsoever
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s e c t i on cc l i i
From the foregoing most evident principles, (§251), we may also con-
clude, that offspring, or a birth, the origine of which is not evident,
(which often happens with regard to animals, and likewise to persons
born out of lawful marriage) follows the dam or mother as an accessory
increment, and that Ulpian, l. 24. D. de statu hominum, not without
reason ascribes this effect to the law of nature. But this does not appear
equal if both parents be certainly known,* unless the male be kept at
common expence for procreation, as a bull often is in common to many,
or when the owner lets his bull or stallion to his neighbours for a certain
hire.
s e c t i on cc l i i i
Nor is it less difficult to determine to whom a new island, that starts up
in the sea, or in a river, belongs. For since it is impossible to discover
with certainty to whom the different particles of earth belonged which
have coalited into an island (§251), it follows, that an island must be
adjudged an acces-<186>sion to the sea or river;† and therefore, if the
chance to our goods, he hath still the right of excluding any other from the use of
that thing (§231); and therefore the dominion of it cannot be acquired against his will.
* Hence with regard to slaves, a division of children commonly takes place; so
that the first belongs to the mother’s owner, and the next to the father’s, and thus the
offspring is shared by turns between the two masters. Of this I have discoursed in
my Element. jur. Germ. 1. 1. 30. [[Heineccius, Elementa juris Germanici tum veteris
tum hodierni ]] where I have quoted examples of it among the Wisigoths and others,
&c. From Goldast. rerum Alam. Tom. 2. charta 2. [[Goldast and Senckenberg,Rerum
Alamannicarum scriptores aliquot vetusti ]] & Aventin. Annal. Boic. l. 7. 14, 23. p. 708.
[[Annales ducum Boiariae (Annals of the Dukes of Bavaria) by Johannes Turmair,
also known as Aventinus. See Turmair, Johannes Turmair’s genanntAventinusSa¨mmt-
liche Werke. ]]
† There is therefore no reason why a new island should accede to the neighbouring
fields upon each side, if it is formed in the middle, or to the one of them to which it
is nearest; which however several lawyers have asserted, §22. Inst. de rer. div. l. 7. §3.
l. 29. l. 30. §1. D. de adqu. rer. dom. For the particles of earth forming the island
come from grounds in a way that it cannot be certainly determined from what pos-
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sea or river belong to no person, the island likewise is without an owner,
and must fall to the first occupant. But if, as often happens, either the
sea or river belongs to a people or their sovereign (§243), that people or
sovereign will have a just title to the island. In fine, since a thing which
appertains to a known master, cannot be acquired by any person by ac-
cession (§251), an owner cannot lose his ground which is washed by a
river or channel into a new island, as the Roman lawyers have acknowl-
edged, l. 7. §4. 1. 30. §2. D. de adqu. rer. dom.
s e c t i on cc l i v
The same is to be determined of alluvion, and ground separated by the
force of a river. For as to the former, as nothing certain can be known
concerning the origine of particles gradually annexed to our ground
(§251), there is no doubt but what is added to our ground in that manner
is accession <187> to us; and what is thus added to a public way, or any
public ground, accedes to the public.* On the other hand, when the
sessors they were carried off, and it is more probable that they were washed from more
remote than from nearer fields. Besides, the river itself sometimes sweeps along with
it, particles washed from the bottom, which at last collecting, form an island, ac-
cording to Seneca, nat. quaest. 4. 9. This however was the opinion of Cassius Lon-
ginus, which his followers afterwards defended as by league and compact. Aggen Ur-
bic. de limit. agr. p. 57. [[Aggenus Urbicus, De limitibus agrorum libro duo. ]] But the
Proculiani, whose leader was Labeo, have exploded it in their way, Labeo apud Paul-
lum, l. 65. §4. D. de adqu. dom. “Si id quod in publico innatum aut aedificatum est,
publicum est: insula quoque, quae in flumine publico nata est, publica esse debet.”
[[Marcus Antistius Labeo (jurist at the time of Augustus) in Justinian’s Digest (1.65,
4 D. de adqu. Dom.): “If that which is natural or built in public, is public, an island
also, which is born in a public river, ought to be public.”]]
* And upon this foundation is built the distinction of lawyers and measurers of
ground between arcifinious grounds, which are not bounded by any other but their
natural limits, and such as are encompassed with artificial bounds, and parcelled out
by a certain measure, as by the number of acres, l. 16. D. de adqu. Dom. l. 1. §6. D.
de flumin. of which difference between lands, see Isidor. orig. 11. 13. [[Isidore, Isidori
Hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum. ]] Auctores de limitib. p. 203. edit.
Guil. Goesii. [[The “auctores de limitibus” (that is, authors on the questionof bound-
aries) are presumably those in Goes and Rigault,Rei agrariae auctores legesquevariae. ]]
Jo. Fr. Gron. ad Grotium de jure belli & pacis, 2. 3. 16. 1. [[Grotius, De jure belli ac
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master of the ground carried off is known (§251), no change can be made
in this case as to dominion, unless the master abdicates and leaves what
is thus taken away from his possession; which in governments is com-
monly inferred from the not claiming it during a certain time fixed by
law, §2. Inst. de rerum divis. l. 7. §2. D. de adqu. rerum dom.
s e c t i on cc l v
In fine, as to a river’s changing its channel, if the channel it deserts, as
far as can be known, was in the dominion of no person, it cannot accede
to those who possess the adjoining lands in proportion to their grounds,
as the Roman lawyers thought, l. 7. §5. D. de adqu. rer. dom. But because
the property of the river of which the channel is a part, is certainly
known (§251), it will, as a part of the river, be his to whom the river
belonged; as, for the same reason, the new channel, if again deserted,
without doubt belongs no less to the first masters, than an overflown
ground, after the water retires from it.* <188>
s e c t i on cc l v i
Let us now consider industrious and mixed accession, concerning which
some lawyers have treated with so much subtlety. And we think, if the
things be joined by mutual consent, it cannot be doubted but each is
pacis. ]] For what lies between artificially limited grounds and a river, it is eitherpublic,
or the propriety of some private person. But in neither of these cases, does any thing
accede to limited ground.
* It is otherwise, if the inundation be perpetual, so that it becomes now sea where
Troy stood, according to the saying; for then the ground is as it were extinct, and can
be of no utility to any one. But of a non-entity, or what can be of no advantage to
any person, there can be no dominion, no propriety (§235). Whence it follows, that
their case is extremely hard, who are still obliged to pay tributes or taxes for lands
long ago swallowed up by an inundation, unless, perhaps, they may have deserved it
by their negligence in restoring the dikes, tho’ even a penalty in that case seems un-
reasonable and cruel: For why ought things to be burdened with taxes, or imposts to
be exacted, when the propriety, the usufruct, the possession or passage are lost? l. 23.
de quibus modis ususfr. amit. l. 3. §17. l. 30. §3. D. de adqu. possess. l. 1. §9. D. de
itin. actuque priv.
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master according to his proportion, and in this case there is a positive
community introduced (§231). But we are here speaking of an accession
made without the other’s consent. Now, seeing a master has a right to
exclude all from the use of what is his (§231), he has a right certainly to
hinder any thing from being joined to what is his against his will. Where-
fore, since what is added to any thing of ours, either renders it useless,
or at least worse, or renders it more valuable and better, because he who
renders our goods worse hurts us (§178); the consequence is, that he who
has rendered our goods either useless or worse by any industrial acces-
sion, is obliged, taking the spoilt goods, to repair our damage; and if he
did it by deceit, and with evil intention, he is likewise liable to punish-
ment (§211). <189>
s e c t i on cc l v i i
But if our goods are rendered better and more valuable by any artificial
accession, then there is a great difference when the two things can be
separated without any considerable loss, and when they cannot. In the
former case, since the master of each part hath a right to exclude all
others from the use of what belongs to him (§231); but that cannot now
be done otherwise than by separating the two things; the consequence
is, that in this case the things are to be immediately separated, and to
each is to be restored his own part. But, in the other case, the joined
things ought to be adjudged to one or other of the two, the other being
condemned to pay the value of what is not his to the owner who is thus
deprived of it;* and if there be any knavery in the matter, punishment
is deserved (§211).
* For whosoever intercepts any thing from another, he stands in need of for his
sustenance or agreeable living, injures him (§190); but he who injures one is bound
to satisfaction (§210), which, when what is done cannot be undone, consists in mak-
ing a just estimation of the thing, and paying it (§212); wherefore, he who desires to
intercept any thing belonging to another person, and to appropriate it to himself, is
obliged to pay its just value. Whence this law appears to be very equitable, “That
none ought to become richer at the expence or detriment of another.”
Second and
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s e c t i on cc l v i i i
But since in the last case, the joined things are to be adjudged to some
one of the two, there (§257) ought to be some good reason why one
should be preferred (§177): because therefore, there can be no other be-
sides the superior excellence of one of the two things, which is oftner
measured by rarity and affection than by utility; hence we infer, that the
rule which adjudges the accessory to its principal, is not always equal. Jus-
tinian him-<190>self, and before him Caius, acknowledged the absurd-
ity of it in the case of a picture, §34. In. de rer. divis. l. 9. §2. D. de adqu.
dom. And therefore the joined things ought to be assigned to him whose
part is of the greatest price,* either on account of its rarity, or of his
affection, labour, care and keeping; and he ought to be condemned to
make an equivalent to the other for what was his, if he insists upon it,
and does not rather choose to make a present of it to him.
s e c t i on cc l i x
Hence we may plainly see what ought to be determined in the case of
specification, by which a new form is given to materials belonging to
another. For since very frequently all the affection or value is put upon
the form on account of the workmanship or art, and none at all is set
upon the substance (§258), a new species will rightly be adjudged to him
who formed it;† but so as that he shall be obliged to make a just equiv-
* The ancient lawyers did not found in this matter upon any certain natural rea-
son, and therefore divided into different opinions, as is observed by Jo. Barbeyrac
upon Pufendorff, of the duties of a man and a citizen. The first who attempted to
reduce this affair into order, and to distinguish things that had been confounded
together, was Christi. Thomasius dissertat. singulari, de pretio adfectionis in res fun-
gibiles non cadente, Hal. 1701, where he has by the same principles most accurately
examined the doctrines of the Roman lawyers concerning accession by industry.
[[Thomasius (praeses ) and Hecht (respondens ), Dissertatio inauguralis juridica de pre-
tio affectionis in res fungibiles non cadente. ]]
† There is no solidity in the distinction by which Justinian proposed to clear this
intricate question, §25. Inst. de rer. divis. whether the new form could be reduced
without hurting the substance, or not? For there is no good reason why, in the former
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alent for the price or value of the materials, and shall be liable to pun-
ishment, if there be any fraud or knavery in the case (§256). So Tho-
masius, in the differtation above quoted, §43. & seq. Yet for the same
reason above mentioned, the owner of the substance ought to be pre-
ferred, if it be rarer and of greater value than the form added to it by
another’s labour and art: e.g. if one shall make a statue or vase of Co-
<191>rinthian brass, amber, or any precious matter belonging toanother,
the owner of the materials shall have it, but he shall be obliged to pay
for the workmanship, provided the fashioner actedbonafide, i.e. without
any fraudulent design.
s e c t i on cc l x
Again, adjunction is no inconsiderable species of industrious accession,
when something belonging to another is added to our goods by inclu-
sion, by soldering with lead, by nailing or iron-work, by writing, paint-
ing, &c. Now since inclosing is often of such a kind, that the things
joined may be severed without any great loss, in such cases the things
may be separated, and every one’s own restored to him, and this is equal
(§257): There is certainly no reason why the gold may not be restored to
whom it belongs, when another’s precious stone is set in it, and the gem
to its owner. And the same holds with regard to soldering, fastening,
inter-<192>weaving, and other such like cases, when the things can be
separated without any considerable loss: Otherwise the joiner ought to
case, the owner of the materials, and in the latter the fashioner should be preferred,
especially, seeing the matter without the fashion is frequently of very little value. (See
Pufend. of the law of nature and nations, 4. 7. 10.) Yea sometimes the fashion, is of
a hundred times more value than the materials. Now who will say in this case, that
the form belongs to the owner of the substance, because the fashion may bedestroyed,
and the substance reduced to its first state? But since the value of the planks can be
more easily paid than the value of the ship made of them, who therefore will adjudge
the ship to the owner of the planks, because the ship can be taken down. If an old
ship be repaired with another’s timber, Julian follows our principle in this case, l. 61.
D. de rei vind. and yet without doubt the materials can also be reduced to their former
state, even when a new ship is built with planks belonging to another, l. 26. pr. D.
de adqu. rer. dom.
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be preferred, because the substance rarely admits of any price of affec-
tion (§258).*
s e c t i on cc l x i
If any one builds upon his own ground with the materials of another
person, when there was no knavery in the design, and the building is of
timber, there is no reason why, if the mistake be very soon discovered,
the building may not be taken down, and the timber be restored to its
proprietor† (§257). But if the building be of stone, or if the timberwould
afterwards be useless to its owner, it will then be most equal to say, that
the builder should have the property of the building, but be obliged to
make a just satisfaction, for the materials, and be moreover liable to pun-
ishment, if there is any knavery in the case (257 and 258). If one build
with his own materials upon another’s ground, if the building can be
taken down without any considerable loss, it ought to be done (§257);
or what admits of a price of affection ought to be adjudged to the pro-
prietor of the ground (§258), unless the building be plainly of no use to
the lord of the ground, in which case <193> the builder retaining the
* Besides, it would not seldom be an inconvenience to the owner of the materials,
if he were obliged to retain them with the accession, and to pay the price of the thing
adjoined, especially if it be what he cannot use on account of his condition, age, or
other circumstances, e.g. if one should add to the vestment of a plebeian a laticlave,
or much gold lace, the materials are in such a case, as to use, rendered truly worse to
him, or quite useless. But whoever renders our materials worse or useless to us, is
obliged to take the spoilt goods, and to repair our damage; and if there be any fraud
or knavery in the case, he is also liable to punishment (§256).
† The reason why the Decemviri forbid timber edifices to be pulled down was,
that cities might not be molested with ruins, l. 6. D. ad exhib. l. 7. §10. de adqu.
rerum dom. l. 1. D. de tigno juncto, and is merely civil, and has nothing in natural
reason to support it. Hence many nations, where the houses were not built of stone
but of timber, not only allowed but commanded by their laws buildings in this and
like cases to be pulled down. See jus. prov. Sax. 2. 53. and what I have observed on
this subject in my Elements juris. Germ. 2. 3. 66. To which I now add the Lombard
Constitution, 1. 27. 1. [[ Jus provinciale Saxonicum (Saxon provincial law): this refers
to the Saxon Mirror, which had been codified by the Saxon jurist Eike von Repgow
in the early thirteenth century; see Repgow, SaxonMirror, pp. 108–9. The “Lombard
constitution” presumably refers to Langobard feudal law, which was often used to
supplement classical Roman law.]]
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building to himself, is bound to pay the worth of the ground, and if
there be any bad intention, he is moreover liable to punishment.
s e c t i on cc l x i i
There is less difficulty as to writing and painting. For since those things
upon which another sets no value, are to be left to him who puts a value
upon them (§258), and the value for the most part falls upon the writing
and painting, and never upon the cloth or paper, the paper ought to yield
to the writing, and the board or cloth to the painting, if the writer and
painter will make satisfaction for them.* And if the painting and writing
have no value, as if one should scrible a little upon my paper, or dawb
my board with fooleries, even in this case, the writer and painter ought
to take the thing, and pay the value of the paper or board by the first
axiom (§256). <194>
s e c t i on cc l x i i i
Further, as to the mingling of liquids, or the commixture of dry sub-
stances, tho’ the Roman lawyers have treated of a difference with much
subtlety, l. 23. §5. D. de rei vind. yet there is none. For if things be mixed
or confounded by the mutual consent of parties, the mixed substance is
* It is strange that the Roman Lawyers, some of whom agreed to this principle,
in the case of painting, should not admit it in the case of writing. As if it were more
tolerable that the writing of a learned man should become an accession to a trifle of
paper, than that the painting of Appelles or Parrhasius should become an accession
to a contemptible piece of board. [[Apelles (fl. 4th/3rd century b.c.) and Parrhasius
(fl. 5th century b.c.) were Greek painters.]] Besides, when the Roman lawyers com-
pare writing with building upon one’s ground, §23. Inst. de rerum divis. l. 9. D. de
adqu. dom. may it not very reasonably be asked, why there should not be room for
the same comparison with regard to painting? And what likeness can there be imag-
ined between the ground upon which one builds, and the paper upon which one
writes? The one we seldom or never can want without suffering very great loss: The
other we do not value, provided we receive satisfaction for it, or as much paper of
the same goodness. This is a poetical resemblance taken from the action of writing,
upon which account the Latin writers used the phrase exarare literas for scribere. But
such a similitude of things is not sufficient to found the same decision about them
in law and equity.
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common, and ought to be divided between them proportionably to the
quantity and quality of the ingredients (§256). If it be done against the
will of one of them, then the substance, which is of no use, ought to be
adjudged to the mixer, and he ought to make satisfaction, and toundergo
a penalty if he had any bad or fraudulent intention (§256); but yet, if
one would rather have a part of the substance than the price of his ma-
terials, there is no doubt that he now approves the mixture which he at
first opposed, and therefore a proportionable part of the commonmatter
cannot be refused to him.* <195>
s e c t i on cc l x i v
To conclude; by the same principles may we determine concerning sow-
ing and planting, which were above referred to the class of mixed acces-
sions, (§250). For trees and plants, before they have taken root, may be
severed from the soil without any great loss, and so be restored to their
owners (§257); but when they have taken root, as likewise seed sown,
seeing they cannot easily be separated from the soil, and yet do not admit
of a price of fancy or affection, they are acquired to the proprietor of
the soil, he making satisfaction for the value of the trees or seed, and the
expences of culture (§258), unless, in this last case, the proprietor of the
soil is willing to leave the crop to the sower for a reasonable considera-
tion.†
* For subsequent approbation is consent, tho’ it be less imputable than command
and previous consent (§112): Wherefore, if by an accidental confusion of our metals,
a matter of great value should be produced, like the Corinthian brass by the burning
of Corinth; there can be no reason why we may not claim each a share of the common
matter: for since it would have been common if it had been made by our consent
(§256), and approbation is adjudged consent (§112), there is no reason why it should
not become common by approbation, and every one have his proportionable share.
† For which the lord of the soil may have just and proper reasons: As for instance,
if the ground was ill-dressed or ill-sown, so that he has no ground to expect a good
crop: Then the crop would be of little use to him, and the first axiom is in his favour
(§256).
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s e c t i on cc l x v
As to a tree in our neighbourhood, he who plants it, consents that a part
of its branches should hang over into the court of his neighbour; and
the neighbour, who has a right to exclude others from his court, by not
doing it, also consents to it; wherefore the accession being made with
the mutual consent of both parties, the tree is common, (§256); and for
this reason, while it stands in the confines, it is common in whole, and
when it is pulled up, it is to be divided in common: so that in the former
case the leaves and fruits are in com-<196>mon; and in the latter case
the timber is to be divided between the two neighbours in proportion.*
Remarks on This Chapter
The questions in this chapter, however intricate they may appear at first
sight, or as they are commonly treated by the doctors of law, are in
themselves very simple and easy. Nothing more is necessary than to
state them clearly, or in the simplest terms, in order to discover on
which side the least hurt lies. Our Author’s divisions and definitions
are exceeding distinct: And all his determinations turn upon this simple
principle he had in the preceeding chapters fully cleared, “That no in-
jury ought to be done; and injuries that are done ought to be repaired.”
He sets out in this chapter, as good order and method require, by in-
quiring into the nature and origine of dominion and property. And
tho’ I think he hath handled this curious question, which hath been so
sadly perplexed by many moralists, better than most others, yet some-
thing seems to me still wanting to compleat his way of reasoning about
it. Our Locke, in his treatise on Government, book 2. c. 4.4 as Mr.
Barbeyrac hath observed in his notes on Pufendorff of the law of na-
ture and nations, b. 4. c. 4. hath treated this question with much more
perspicuity and accuracy than either Grotius or Pufendorff. The book
* This simplicity is preferred by our ancestors to the subtleties of the Roman law,
concerning the nourishment attracted by the roots of trees, which gradually changes
their substance, l. 26. §2. D. de adqu. dom. For the nations of a German extraction
considered the branches of trees more than their roots, as we have shewn in our Elem.
of the German law, 2. 3. 69.
4. John Locke (1632–1704),TwoTreatises of Government, ed. by P. Laslett, 265–428.
About the
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being in every one’s hands, I shall not so much as attempt to abridge
what he says on the head. The substance of it is contained in this short
sentence of Quintilian, Declam. 13. “Quod omnibus nascitur, indus-
triae praemium est.” “What is common to all by nature, is the purchase,
the reward of industry, and is justly appropriated by it.”5 Let us hear
how our Harrington expresses himself upon this subject (the original
of property) in his art of law-giving, chapter 1. at the beginning in his
works, p. 387 “The heavens, says David, even the heaven of heavens
are the Lords, but the earth has he given to the children of men: yet
says God to the father of these children, in the sweat of thy face shalt
thou eat thy bread, Dii laborantibus sua munera vendunt. This do-
nation of the earth to man, comes to a kind of selling it for industry,
a treasure which seems to purchase of God himself. From the different
kinds and successes of this industry, whether in arms, or in other ex-
ercises of the mind or body, derives the natural equity of dominion or
property; and from the legal <197> establishment or distribution of
this property (be it more or less approaching towards the natural equity
of the same) proceeds all government.”6 Now, allow me to make some
very important observations upon this principle, which, as simple as it
appears, involves in it many truths of the last importance, in philos-
ophy, morality and politics. 1. That man is made to purchase every thing
by industry, and industry only, every good, internal or external, of the
body or mind, is a fact too evident to be called into question. This hath
been long ago observed. When Mr. Harrington says, “Nature or God
sells all his gifts to industry,” he literally translates an ancient Greek
proverb: Jeoi` ta a◊gaja` toi´c ponoi´c polou˜ntai,7 (see Erasmi adagia) as
did the Latins in their many proverbial sentences to the same purpose,
“Labor omnia vincit”: “Omnia industriae cedunt,” &c. See Virg.
Georg. 1. v. 121, &c. 2.8 But as ancient and evident as this observation
is, yet none of the ancient philosophers ever had recourse to it in the
5. Quintilian, The Major Declamations, 13.8, pp. 169–70.
6. Harrington, Political Works, p. 604.
7. “Jeoi` ta a◊gaja` toi´c ponoi´c polou˜ntai”: “The gods sell their goods for hard
work” (see note 3, p. 571, of Turnbull’s “Discourse”).
8. “Labor omnia vincit”: “Toil conquered the world”; see Virgil, Georgics 1, line
145, in vol. 1 of Virgil. “Omnia industriae cedunt”: “Everything yields to industry”;
this is from a different, unidentified source.
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celebrated question, “Unde bonis mala, &c.” i.e. about the promis-
cuous distribution of the goods of fortune (as they are commonly
called) in this life; tho’ this fact contains a solid refutation of that ob-
jection against providence, and from it alone can a true answer be
brought to it. Mr. Pope in his Essay onMan, ep. 4. v. 141, &c. (as I have
taken notice in my Principles of Moral Philosophy, part 1. chap. 1. and
chap. 9. and part 2. chap. 3.) is the first who hath given the true reso-
lution of this seeming difficulty from this principle, that according to
our constitution, and the frame of things, the distribution of goods
internal or external, is not promiscuous; but every purchase is the re-
ward of industry. If we own a blind fortuitous dispensation of goods,
and much more, if we own a malignant dispensation of them, or a
dispensation of them more in favour of vice than of virtue, we deny a
providence, or assert bad administration. There is no possibility of rec-
onciling bad government with wisdom and goodness; or irregularity
and disorder with wisdom and good intelligent design, by any future
reparation. But the alledgeance is false; for in fact, the universe is
governed by excellent general laws, among which this is one, “That
industry shall be the purchaser of goods, and shall be generally suc-
cessful.” And that being the fact, the objection which supposes pro-
miscuous, fortuitous, or bad government, is founded upon a falsity in
fact. In fine, there is no way of proving providence, but by proving
good government by good general laws; and where all is brought about
according to good general laws, nothing is fortuitous, promiscuous or
bad. And not to mention any of the other general laws in the govern-
ment of the world, constituting the order according to which effects
are brought about; and consequently the means for obtaining ends to
intelligent active creatures; what better general law can we conceive
with regard to intelligent active beings, than the general law of indus-
try; or can we indeed conceive intelligent agency and dominion with-
out such a law? Are not the two <198> inseparable, or rather involved
in one another? But where that law obtains, there is no dispensation or
distribution properly speaking; for industry is the sole general pur-
chaser, in consequence of means uniformly operative towardsends.But
having elsewhere fully insisted upon this law of industry, in order to
vindicate the ways of God to man; let me observe, 3. in the third place,
Mr. Harrington is the first who hath taken notice, or at least fully
202 the laws of nature and nations
cleared up the consequences of this general law of industry with respect
to politics, that is, with respect to the natural procreation of govern-
ment, and the natural source of changes in government. Every thing
hangs beautifully and usefully together in nature. There must be mani-
fold mutual dependencies among beings made for society, and for the
exercise of benevolence, love and friendship; that is, there must be vari-
ous superiorities and inferiorities; for all is giving and receiving. But
dependence, which supposes in its notion superiority and inferiority,
must either be dependence in respect of internal, or in respect of ex-
ternal goods; the former of which Mr. Harrington calls hanging on the
lips, and the other hanging on the teeth. Now the law of industry ob-
taining amongst men placed in various circumstances (and all cannot
be placed in the same) will naturally produce these dependencies. A
greater share of wisdom and virtue will naturally procreate authority,
and the dependence on the lips. [This perhaps is the meaning of that
ancient saying of Democritus mentioned by Stobaeus, serm. 27. “fu`sei
to` a⁄rxein o◊ikh´ion tw kreissoni,” “Authority falls naturally to the share
of the better, more excellent or superior.”] And a greater share of ex-
ternal goods, or of property, naturally begets power, and the other de-
pendence on the teeth. And hence it will and must always hold as a
general law, That dominion will follow property, or that changes in
property will beget certain proportional changes in government: and
this consequently is the natural seed, principle or cause of procreation
and vicissitude in government, as Mr. Harrington has demonstrated
fully and accurately.9 I only mention these things here, because we shall
9. Harrington’s argument that “a greater share of external goods, or of property,
naturally begets power” was a response to Thomas Hobbes. Harringtonwas interested
in solving the same problem as Hobbes, the threat of anarchy resulting from con-
stitutional collapse. However, Harrington believed that the fault in Hobbes’s argu-
ment was exposed by the dissolution of the Rump Parliament in 1653, the Rump
being an example of a Hobbesian sovereign, whose rule was based on conquest. Ac-
cording to Harrington, Hobbes had not taken into account that the sovereign’spower
depended on the military, so that the question of actual control over the army was
critical to the sovereign’s ability to maintain himself in power. The Rump Parliament
did not control the army and therefore could be dissolved by it. The answer to control
of the army lay in men’s dependence on riches, especially land. The more land a
person owned, the greater his empire. Political power thus followed landownership
(see Fukuda, Sovereignty and the Sword ).
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have occasion to have recourse to them afterwards, when our Author
comes to treat of government. The conclusion that more properly be-
longs to our present purpose is, 4. in the fourth place, Itmustnecessarily
have happened soon after the world was peopled that all was, must have
been appropriated by possession and industry: and therefore, at pres-
ent, our business is to determine how, things being divided and appro-
priated, the duties of mankind stand. But it is clear, 1. in the first place,
that suppose the world just beginning to be peopled, or suppose a con-
siderable number of men just cast ashore upon a desart country (setting
aside all compacts and regulations previously agreed upon) every one
will have a right to the purchase of his industry; to the fruits of his
labour; to improve his mind, and to all the natural benefits and rewards
of that culture; and to the fruits of his skill, ingenuity and labour, to
get <199> riches, with all the natural benefits and rewards of them; but
yet every one will be obliged, in consequence of what hath been already
said of the law of love and benevolence, to exercise his abilities, and to
use his purchases in a benevolent way, or with tender regard to others.
This must be the case with regard to our right and obligation, previous
to all compacts, conventions or regulations. 2. And where lands are
already appropriated, and civil government settled, this is a true prin-
ciple still, that one has a right to all the purchases of his industry, with
respect either to external or internal riches, (if I may so speak) consis-
tent with the law of benevolence, or the law of not injuring any one,
but of doing all the good to every one in our power; and hence it is,
that every one in formed society hath a right to his purchases by the
arts of manufacture and commerce, &c. Tho’ a state, to fix the balance
of dominion or of government, may fix the balance of property in land,
and likewise make regulations about money, (as in the Common-
wealths of Israel, Lacedemon, Athens, Rome, Venice, &c. in different
manners) in consequence of the natural connexion between the bal-
ance of property and the balance of dominion: Tho’ this may be done
in forming or mending government by consent, yet even where an
Agrarian law obtains, this principle must hold true and be untouched,
that every one has a right to the purchases of his industry, in the sense
above limited: For otherwise, there would be no encouragement to in-
dustry, nay, all must run into endless disorder and confusion. 3. And
therefore universally, whether in a state of nature, or in constitutedcivil
governments, this must be a just, a necessary principle, that industry
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gives a right to its purchases, and all the benefits and rewards attending
them. 4. And therefore, fourthly, it can never be true, that a person may
not, as far as is consistent with benevolence, endeavour to have both
power and authority. If we consider what would be the consequences
of denying this principle, that is, of setting any other bounds to the
purchases of industry but what the law of benevolence sets, we will
soon see that this must be universally true. And if we attend to our
frame, and reason from it to final causes, as we do in other cases, it is
plain, that there is in our constitution naturally, together with a prin-
ciple of benevolence, and a sense of public good, a love of power (of
principatus, as Cicero calls it in the beginning of his first book of of-
fices) without which our benevolence could not produce magnanimity
and greatness of mind, as that desire of power would, without benev-
olence and a sense of public good, produce a tyrannical, overbearing
and arrogant temper. Some moralists do not seem to attend to this no-
ble principle in our nature, the source of all the great virtues, while
others ascribe too much to it (as Hobbes), and consider it as the only
principle in our nature, without taking our benevolence and sense of
public good, which are as natural to us, into the account. (See what I
have said on this head in my Principles of Moral <200> Philosophy. )10
But both principles belong to our constitution; and therefore our virtue
consists in benevolent desire of, and endeavour to have authority and
power in order to do good. 5. It is in consequence of this principle, that
it is lawful to have dependents or servants, and that it is lawful to en-
deavour to raise ourselves, or to exert ourselves to encrease our power
and authority. The great, sweet, the natural reward of superiority in
parts and of riches, and consequently the great spur to industry, is the
dependence upon us it procreates and spreads. And why should this
noble ambition acknowledge any other bounds but what benevolence
sets to it: Any other limits but what the Author of nature intended
should be set to it, or rather actually sets to it, by making the exercises
of benevolence so agreeable to us, as that no other enjoyments are equal
to them in the pleasure they afford, whether in immediate exercise, or
10. See Turnbull, Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy, especially vol. 1,
pt. 1, chap. vi, p. 208.
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upon after reflection; and in making mankind so dependent every one
upon another, that without the aid and assistance of others, and con-
sequently without doing what he can to gain the love and friendship
of mankind, none can be happy, however superior in parts or in prop-
erty he may be to all about him. Every man stands in need of man; in
that sense all men are equal; all men are dependent one upon another;
or every man is subjected to every man. This observation is so much
the more necessary, that while some moral writers assert, that man has
a right to all things and persons to which his power of subjecting them
to his use can extend or be extended; others speak of our natural equal-
ity in such a manner as if nature had not designed any superiorities
among mankind, and as if all desire of, or endeavours after power or
authority were unlawful; which last must result in asserting, that all
culture of the mind, and all industry are unlawful, because the natural
consequence of the one is superiority in parts, and the natural effect
of the other is superiority in property; while the other terminates in
affirming there is no distinction between power and right, or between
power rightly and power unreasonably applied, i.e. no distinction be-
tween moral good and ill, i.e. no distinction between reasonable and
unreasonable; which difference must remain, while there is such a thing
as public good or benevolence, or such a thing as reason, as hath been
already fully proved. 6. If the preceeding principles be true, due atten-
tion to them will lead us through most of our Author’s succeeding
questions about derivative acquisitions and succession. Because the ef-
fect of property, which makes it the great reward of industry, is a right
to dispose of our own in our life, or at our death, which admits no
limitations but what benevolence sets to it; in consequence of which
right and duty, succession to him who dies without making a dispo-
sition of his estate, ought to take place in the way a wise man, directed
by benevolence, must be presumed to have intended to dispose of his
own at his death, i.e. according to the natural course in which benevo-
<201>lence ought to operate and exert itself, already taken notice of.
For when the will of a person is not declared, his will ought to be in-
ferred from his duty. We shall therefore for some time have but little
occasion to explain or add to our Author.
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u ch a p t e r x u
Of derivative acquisitions of dominion or
property made during the life of the first
proprietor.
s e c t i on cc l x v i
Dominion being acquired, a change sometimes happens, so that one
acquires either property or dominion in a thing, neither of which he
before had; and such acquisitions we called above, (§240), derivative.
Now, seeing the thing in which we acquire property was before that com-
mon: the thing in which we for the first time acquire dominion, was
before that the property of some person: as often as we receive our own
proper share of a common thing, there is division; as often as we acquire
the whole thing in property, there is cession; * and as often as another’s
property passes by his will into our dominion, there is, as we called it
above (§240), tradition, or transferring.
* The term cession, is sometimes taken in a larger acceptation, so as to signify all
transferring of rights or actions from one to another. But since in that sense it may
be comprehended under tradition, we use it here in a more limited signification, and
mean by it, the transferrence of right and dominion common to many, to one of the
associates made by the consent of the rest. Thus, e.g. if co-heirs transfer their whole title
of inheritance to one of the co-heirs, they are said to have ceded their title or right
to him.
Transition to
derivative
acquisitions.
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s e c t i on cc l x v i i
In all these cases, what was ours ceases to be ours any longer in whole or
in part, and passes into the dominion or property of another person;
and <202> this we call alienation, which, when it proceeds from a prior
right in the acquirer, is termed necessary; when from a new right, with
the consent of both parties, it is called voluntary. * But the effect of either
is, that one person comes into the place of another, and therefore suc-
ceeds both to his right in a certain thing, and to all the burdens with
which it is incumbered. Alienation is called pure, when no circumstance
suspends or delays the transferrence of the dominion; and when the
transferrence is suspended, it is called conditional alienation.
s e c t i on cc l x v i i i
Voluntary alienation cannot be understood or take place otherwise than
by the consent of both parties: but there may be consent either for a
present alienation, so that the dominion may be transferred from us to
another in our own life, or for a future alienation, so that another shall
obtain the possession of what is ours after our demise: and this consent
to a future alienation, is either actual, or it is inferred from the design
and intention of the person.† Now by the first of these is what is called
* Thus the alienation of a thing common to many, which is made when one of
the associates demands a division, is necessary, because he who insists upon a division
has already a right in the thing. In like manner, the alienation of a thing pledged to
one is necessary, because it is done by virtue of the right the creditor had already
acquired in that thing. On the other hand, the alienation of houses, which, one who
is to change his habitation, sells, is voluntary, no person having a right in them. Thus
is the division in the Roman law to be explained, l. 1. D. de fund. dot. l. 2. §1. D. de
rebus eorum qui sub tut. l. 13. l. 14. D. fam. ercisc. and elsewhere frequently.
† We therefore refer to future alienation, that possession of our goods which de-
volves upon a person after our death. If this be done by ourselves truly willing it, such
a will is called a testament, and succession by virtue of such a will is called testamentary
succession. But if it be inferred from the design and intention of the defunct, that he
willed his inheritance to pass to certain persons, preferably to all others, this is suc-
cession to an intestate. Now, against both these ways of succession it may be objected,
that no person can will any thing at a time when he cannot will at all; and that alien-
By them is
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tion necessary,
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testamentary succession; and by the latter is what is termed succession to
one who dies intestate. We shall now treat of present alienation, and in
the succeeding chapter we shall consider future alienation. <203>
s e c t i on cc l x i x
The transition from community to property is made by division (§266),
which is an assignation to any of the associates of his competent part of
the whole in positive community. Now seeing any associate or sharer can
exclude all but his fellow associates or sharers from the use of the thing
common to them (§231); the consequence is, that any of the associates
may demand the use of the thing according to the share belonging to
him, and therefore <204> may demand a division; and the others, if
they should oppose a division, are so much the less to be heard, that
positive community doth very ill suit the present state of mankind
(§238).*
ation cannot be made in this manner by a person while he lives, because he does not
transfer neither right nor dominion to heirs while he lives; nor by a dead person,
because, what he himself does not possess, he cannot transfer. And for these reasons,
many very learned men deny that wills are of the law of nature, as Merill. obs. 6. 25.
[[Me´rille, Observationum libri VIII. ]] Thomas. not. ad tit. inst. de test. ord. p. 173.
[[Thomasius, Notae ad singulos institutionum et pandectarum titulos varias juris Ro-
mani antiquitates imprimis usum eorum hodiernum in foris Germaniae ostendentes. ]]
Gothofr. de Coccei. diss. de testam. princ. part. 1. §22. & seq. [[H. von Cocceji
(praeses ) and J. G. Cocceji (respondens ), Disputatio juridica inauguralis de testamentis
principum. ]] If these arguments conclude against the foundation of wills made by
the dying person’s real declaration of his will, i.e. testaments, in the law of nature,
they conclude more strongly against succession to intestates; and therefore all this
doctrine we have now been inculcating concerning future alienation is a chimera. But
as we easily allow that these arguments prove wills, as defined in the Roman law, not
to proceed from the law of nature (see my dissertation de testam. jure Germ. arct.
limitibus circumscripta, §3.) [[Heineccius (praeses ) and Gunther (respondens ), De tes-
tamentifactione iure Germanico arctis limitibus passim circumscripta ]] so we think they
do not conclude against all sorts of future alienation and succession. And what the
law of nature establishes concerning them, shall be enquired in the followingchapter.
* For since such a communion can only subsist among men endowed with great
virtue, and it must become inconvenient in proportion as justice and benevolence
wax cold and languid (§238), how can it hold long in our times? Which of two as-
sociates does not envy the other? Who is so careful about a common thing as his own?
What division
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s e c t i on cc l x x
A subject is either easily divisible into parts, or it is indivisible; either
because in the nature of the thing, or by laws and customs, it cannot be
divided into parts. If therefore an associate demand a division of a thing
in its own nature divisible, nothing is more equal than to divide it into
as many parts as there are associates, and to commit the matter to the
decision of lot. But if the thing be indivisible, it is either to be left to
one of the associates, who can pay, and bids most for it, or to whom age
or chance gives a preference, who, a valuation being made, is to satisfy
the rest; or it is to be sold to the best advantage, and the price is to be
divided proportionably among the sharers; or they are to have the use
of it alternately, each in his turn.* <205>
How apt is one to hinder another when he would medle with a common thing? Who
does not endeavour to intercept a part of his associate’s profits? Hence a thousand
animosities and contentions, as Aristotle has demonstrated, in opposition to the Pla-
tonic communion, Polit. 2. 2. [[Aristotle,Politics, bk. 2, chap. 2.]] So that the Romans
had reason to pronounce partnership and communion the mother of discord, and
to give power to any associate to demand a division, l. 77. §2. D. de legat. 2.
* Thus we know the land of Palestine was divided among the Hebrews by lot, it
having been separated in parts according to the number of their tribes. On the other
hand, it often happens among co-heirs, that one of them, either with the consent of
the rest, or by the decision of lot, buys at a certain price the whole indivisible inher-
itance, and gives every one of the rest his share of the price. It likewise sometimes
happens, that none of the co-heirs being rich enough to be able to satisfy the rest,
the inheritance is sold to a stranger upon the best terms, and the co-heirs divide the
price. Finally, Diether, in contin. thesauri Besold. voceMutschirung, p. 417. [[Dieth-
err, Orbis novus literatorum praeprimis jurisconsultorum detectus, sive continuatio the-
sauri practici Besoldiani, i.e., a continuation of Christoph Besold, Thesaurus practi-
cus. ]] Wehner observ. pract. ibidem, p. 370 [[probably Wehner, Practicarum iuris
observationum selectarum liber singularis ]], have observed, that the alternate use of a
common thing hath sometimes been agreed to by illustrious brothers, which is in
some places called Die Mutschirung. We have an instance of it in the family of
Saxony in Muller. in Saechs. annal. p. 203. [[Mu¨ller, Des chur- und fu¨rstlichenHauses
Sachsen . . . Annales. ]]
How it may be
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s e c t i on cc l x x i
Moreover, because with regard to a common thing all may have equal
right, or some one may have more right than others (§231); it is evident
that division is either equal or unequal. In the first case, all are called to
equal shares, and in the second, to unequal shares. Now, since thenatural
equality of mankind obliges every one not to arrogate any prerogative
to himself above any other without a just reason, in things belonging to
many by perfect right (§177); it is manifest that division ought to be
equal, and that none ought to claim any preference, unless his right to
it can be clearly proved.* <206>
s e c t i on cc l x x i i
These rules belong to perfect community. But there is likewise an im-
perfect community, as often as none of the partners hath a perfect right
to the thing (§231). Now, when by the bounty of another any thing be-
comes thus common to many persons, it is at his option to give equal
shares, or to give more or less according to merit.† And in this case it
would be most unjust for any one to complain that a person of less merit
* Such a pre-eminence may be due to one by law, by compact, and by the last-
will of the former possessor, but not on account of greater strength or power, which
Hobbes however seems to admit of, as giving a just prerogative above others in di-
vision, (de cive, c. 3. 15). For if such a reason be allowed to be just, the division of
the lion in the fable is most fair and equal, Phaed. fab. 1. 5. who being to divide the
prey with his fellow hunters, reasoned in this manner; “I take the first share as called
lion; the second as being stronger you will give me; the third shall follow me because
I am superior to you all, and woe be to him who dares to touch the fourth. Thus did
his injustice carry off the whole booty.” Whoever can call this a fair and just division,
and he only, will grant what Hobbes asserts concerning a natural lot (sortem natur-
alem) as he calls superior power.
† And this is that distributive (dianemhtikh´) justice which ought to attend all those
virtues which pursue the interest of others; as liberality, compassion, and rectoreal
prudence, (the prudence of magistrates in conferring dignities, &c.) Grotius of the
rights of war and peace, 1. 18. who justly remarks, that this justice does not always
observe that comparative proportion, called geometrical proportion; and that therefore
Aristotle’s doctrine on this head, is one of those things that often not always takes
place, Grotius ibidem, n. 2. Nor is this opinion of Grotius overturned by Pufendorff
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is put upon an equal footing with him (Mat. xx. 12, 15), or to take upon
him to judge rashly of his own merit; or to think benefits conferredupon
this or the other person, may be pled as precedents. <207>
s e c t i on cc l x x i i i
When a thing in common to many is resigned by the rest to one of the
sharers, this is called cession. Wherefore, since in this case one succeeds
into the place of all the others, the consequence is, that he succeeds into
all their rights to that thing, and also into all the inconveniencies and
burdens attending it (§267). And hence the Roman lawyers justly in-
ferred that the same exceptions have force against the person ceded to,
which would have had force against the ceder, l. 5. c. de her. vel act. vend.
s e c t i on cc l x x i v
Since, whether the thing in common be divided, or whether it be ceded
to one of the sharers, this seems to be the nature of the deed, that those
who get the thing by division or by cession, acquire the rightof excluding
all others from the use of that thing; (§231) it is manifest that in both
cases the associates oblige themselves, that he to whom the thing is trans-
ferred, shall not be hindered from taking possession of it; and therefore
oblige themselves to warranty, and to repair all his loss, if it be evicted
by another with right, and without the possessor’s fault; since they have
of the law, &c. 1. 7. 9. because he speaks of the distribution of things owing to many
of good desert by perfect right, as by promise or pacts. Then what Arrian says is
absolutely true, ep. 3. 17. “Such is the law of nature, that he who excels another is in
a better condition in respect of what he excels in, than one who is worse or inferior.”
[[Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, vol. 2, “Discourses,” bk. 3, chap.
17.]] But in matters proceeding from mere good-will, this law of nature can hardly
be pled; nor could these veterans justly complain of the emperor Hadrian, whom he
ordered to rub one another in the bath, tho’ some days before he had made a present
of servants and money to one of their companions, whom he saw rubbing himself
against the marble, Spartian Had. c. 17. because benefits are not to be wrested into
examples. [[See Boxhorn, Historiae Augustae.]]
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their shares safe and entire, while the other hath got a thing with an
encumbered or burdened title.* <208>
s e c t i on cc l x x v
We proceed now to tradition, by which an owner who has the right and
will to alienate, transfers dominion to another, accepting it for a just
cause. I say dominion. For tho’ the Roman law orders the thing itself
and its possession to be transferred, and does scarcely allow any right in
a thing to arise previously to delivery: l. 20. C. de pact. yet such subtlety
cannot be of the law of nature,† as is justly observed by Grotius of the
rights of war and peace, 2. 6. 1. 2. 2. 8. 25. and Pufendorff of the law of
nature and nations, 4. 9. 6: and the Roman lawyers themselves acknowl-
edge, “That nothing can be more agreeable to natural equity, than that
the will of an owner willing to transfer his goods to another, should take
place and be confirmed.” §40. Inst. de rer. divis. l. 9. D. de adqu. rer.
dom. Whence we conclude, that the will of an owner concerning trans-
ferring his dominion to another, whether expressly declared, or deduc-
ible from certain signs, is sufficient to transfer his dominion to another
without delivery. <209>
* Thus the doctrine of eviction, which hath found place likewise in tradition or
transferring, flows from natural equity, tho’ many things be added to it by the civil
law for clearing it, with respect to the form and effect of it, e.g. as when it requires
that one should transfer to another in his own name; that the possessor should inform
the transferrer of the suit in time; that the thing be evicted for a cause preceeding the
contract; and not by violence, but by right, &c. For every one may discern at first
sight, that all these conditions proceed from natural equity.
† Nor did the Romans themselves anciently require that in every case. Delivery
was only necessary with respect to things (nec mancipi) of which one had not the
full possession, as of provincial farms, Simplic. inter rei agrar. script. p. 76. [[Sim-
plicius, in Goes and Rigault (eds.), Rei agrariae auctores legesque variae. ]] Things
(mancipi) of which one had the property and full possession, were alienated (per aes
& librain), so that the conveyance and title being made, the dominion was imme-
diately acquired. Varro de lingua lat. 4. [[Varro, On the Latin Language (De lingua
Latina ).]] Therefore, from the time that Justinian took away the distinction between
res mancipi and nec mancipi, and the dominium Quiritarum and bonitarium. l. un.
C. de nudo jure Quirit. toll. & l. un. C. de usucap. transform, this law againprevailed,
that dominion should be transferred without delivery or putting in possession.
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s e c t i on cc l x x v i
Since therefore the will of the owner to transfer his dominion to another,
is equivalent to delivery, and is a valid transferrence of his dominion to
another (§275), it follows, that it must be equal, whether one absent, by
intervening letters or words, or present, by giving the thing from hand
to hand, or by inducting him into it, whether by long or short hand, or
by certain symbols, according to the usage of the province (§242), or in
whatever way he delivers it; so that nothing hinders but that a right may
be conveyed or transferred to another without delivery, or by a quasi-
delivery. *
s e c t i on cc l x x v i i
But since he only who hath dominion can transfer it or alienate (§275),
it is plain that tradition can have no effect, if it be made by one, who
either by law, convention, or any other cause, hath no right to alienate;
much less, if it be made by one who is not himself master of the thing;
for none can convey a right to another which he himself has not.† But,
* That symbolical delivery was not unknown to the Romans, appears from l. 1.
§ pen. D. de adqu. poss. l. 9. §6. D. de adqu. dom. l. 74. D. de contr. empt. And the
nations of German origine have been more acute in this matter: For they, indelivering
conveyances and investitures, made use of almost any thing, a stalk of a tree, a rod,
a turf, a branch, a straw of corn, a shrub, a glove, and other such things. See my Elem.
juris Germ. 2. 3. 74. & seq. to which belongs the Scotatio Danica, c. 2. 10. de consuet.
of which Strauchius Amoenit. jur. can. ecl. 5. [[Strauchius, Amoenitatum juris can-
onici semestria duo ]] and also Gundlingliana part. 7. diss. 4. [[Nicolaus Hieronimus
Gundling (1671–1729), most important follower of Thomasius and from 1705 pro-
fessor of philosophy at the University of Halle. Heineccius refers to Gundling’sessays
Gundlingiana. ]]
† Yet such a tradition, if made to one without his knowledge that it is so, con-
stitutes an honest possessor till the true owner claims his own. Grotius of the rights
of war and peace, 2. 10. and Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 4. 13. 6. &
seq. endeavour to shew what such a possessor is obliged to do in point of restitution,
what profits he may retain, and what he ought to restore, by a multitude of rules.
We shall treat of this matter afterwards in its own place expresly (§312), and shall
there shew, that the whole affair is reducible into two rules, 1. An honest possessor,
during the time that the true owner doth not appear, is in his place, and therefore
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on the other hand, it is the same in effect, whether the master himself
transfers his right immediately by his own will, or by his order and ap-
probation. <210>
s e c t i on cc l x x v i i i
Because alienation ought to be made for a just cause (§275); but it is
evident, from the nature of the thing, that by a just cause must be un-
derstood one sufficient for transferring dominion; therefore dominion
cannot pass to another if a thing be delivered to one in loan, in trust, or
letting; much less, if it be delivered to him on request and conditionally,
or upon any terms revocable at the pleasure of the deliverer; yea, that
no cause is sufficient, if he, to whom a thing is delivered, does not fulfil
his bargain.* <211>
s e c t i on cc l x x i x
Besides, we said, in order to transfer, one must deliver with the design
and intention of transferring dominion (§275). From which it is plain,
that tradition cannot be made by infants, by madmen, by persons dis-
ordered in their senses, and other such persons, who are presumed not
has the same rights that the owner would have, were he in possession. 2. When the
true owner appears, he, if the thing subsists, is obliged to restore it with its existing
profits; and if the thing does not subsist, he is only obliged to make restitution, so
far as he hath been made richer by enjoying it.
* For when alienation is made to a person upon condition that he shall do some-
thing, it is conditional. But because the condition suspends the transferrence of do-
minion, the consequence is, that if the other does not perform what he promised, the
dominion is not transferred, and the tradition becomes of no effect. Hence the Romans
pronounced things bought and delivered not to be acquired to the buyer till the price
was paid, or other satisfaction was made to the seller, §41. Inst. de rerum divis. Hence
Varro says, de re rustica, 2. 2. “A herd sold does not change its master till the money
be paid.” [[Varro, On Farming, 2.2.6.]] So Quintilian, Declam. 336. “By what right can
you claim the thing which you have not paid the price of?” [[Quintilian, Lesser Dec-
lamations, vol. 2, p. 199.]] So Tertullian de poenitentia. “It is unreasonable to lay your
hands on the goods, and not to pay the price.” [[Tertullian (ca. 160–ca. 220), probably
the most important Christian theologian before St. Augustine. His treatise De poeni-
tentia is on ecclesiastical penance (Tertullian, Treatises on Penance ).]]
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to know what is transacted: nor is it valid, if the owner gives a thing to
one with the intention of lending, depositing, pawning it; or with any
such like design; as likewise, that any one may reserve or except whatever
right he pleases in transferring a thing; and that in this case, so much
only is transferred as the alienator intended to transfer.
s e c t i on cc l x x x
Whence it is easy to conceive the origine of imperfect or less full domin-
ion. For since by that is understood nothing else but dominion, the ef-
fects of which are inequally shared between two persons; it is highly
probable that its origine is owing to transferrence, with exception, or
with reservation of a part of the dominion; which being done, there are
two masters, one of whom acquires the right of excluding all others from
reaping and using the fruits and profits of the thing, and of taking them
to himself; the other has the right either of concurrence with respect to
the disposal of it, or of exacting something, by which the acknowledg-
ment of his dominion may be evidenced.* <212>
s e c t i on cc l x x x i
Since the nature of the (dominium utile) or dominion with respect to
the use, is such, that the superior owner reserves to himself the right of
concurrence with regard to the disposal of the thing, or the right of
exacting something in acknowledgment of his superior dominion
(§280); the consequence is, that tho’ there may be various kinds of less
full dominion, yet the whole matter in these cases depends on the agree-
* The last kind of less full dominion, the lawyers of the middle ages called direc-
tum, the former they called prius utile; not so elegantly indeed, but by terms received
at the bar and in the schools, and which therefore it is not now time to discard. But
the one may be called the superior (dominus superior vel major ) the other the inferior
master (dominus minor ), after the example of the Romans, who called the patrem-
familias, herum majorem, and the filiosfamilias, heros minores, Plaut. Capt. 3. 5. v. 50.
Trinum 2. 2. 53. Asinar. 2. 66. [[Plautus, Plautus, trans. Nixon, vols. 1 and 5.]]
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ment of the parties. However, if one stipulates with the possessor of the
thing delivered to him for homage and services, and that the thing be
not alienated without his consent; hence arise (feudum ) the right of fief
or fealty; if he stipulates that an annual tribute shall be paid in acknowl-
edgment of his superiority; hence arises ( jus emphyteuticum ) the right
of holding in fee. Finally, if he stipulates for a ground-rent, hence arises
( jus superficiei ) the right of ground-rent; * and these are the principal
kinds of dominion with regard to use in any nations. <213>
s e c t i on cc l x x x i i
If not the thing itself, and the dominion of it, but a certain use only be
conveyed, he who receives it, acquires a servitude upon a thing belonging
to another; and if the use be restricted to the person and life of him who
is to have the use, it is personal; and if it be annexed to the estate itself,
the use of which is conveyed, it is real. Since therefore in all these cases
just so much right is transfered as the transferrer willed to transfer (§279),
it follows, that in these cases likewise the matter comes to be intirely an
affair of an agreement between parties; and therefore, almost all the sub-
tleties to be found in the doctors about services are of positive law.†
* Of holding in fee we have an example, Gen. xlvii. 26. according to Josephus,
Antiq. 2. 7. Tho’ Hertius thinks the lands of Egypt were rather made censual, or paid
a land-tax, ad Puffend. jus nat. &c. 4. 8. 3. But if he place the difference between
holding in fee and censual, in this, that in the former the possessor has only the do-
minion of use, and in the latter full dominion, it may be clearly proved, that the
Pharaoh’s of Egypt had a part of the dominion. For the Words of the Patriarch
Joseph are, Gen. xlvii. 23. “This day I have bought you and your lands to Pharaoh.”
Of the ( jus superficiarium ) or the right of ground-plots, there is a remarkable instance
in Justin. Hist. 18. 5. Concerning the origine of fiefs the learned are much divided,
tho’ they be common throughout all Europe. That there are many other sorts of less
full dominion among the nations of German extract, I have shewn in my element.
juris Germ. 2. 2. 23. & seq.
† Hence the known tenets, that service consists not in doing, but in suffering or
not doing; that it is indivisible, that its cause ought to be perpetual, that because the
thing is to be used and enjoyed without hurting its substance, usufruct does not take
place, where there is nothing to be used or enjoyed: That there is a great difference
between usufruct, use, habitation, and the labour of servants; that some of these
rights are lost by change of state, and some not: All these are of such a nature that
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If a thing is delivered by the owner to his creditor, so that the deliverer
continues to have the dominion, but the creditor has the possession for
his security, then the thing is said to be in pawn. If it be delivered in
these terms, that the creditor shall likewise have the fruits of it by way
of interest, <214> it is called jus antichreticum. Finally, if the right of
pawn be conveyed to a creditor without delivering the pawn, we call it
hypotheca, mortgage. As therefore in the former cases the creditor has a
right, the debt not paid, not only to retain the thing pawned, but also
to dispose of it, and deduct from the price what is due to him; so, in the
latter case, the creditor may prosecute his right of possession of what is
pledged to him for his security, i.e. attach it; and then detain it until his
debt be paid, or even dispose of it for his payment.*
s e c t i on cc l x x x i v
To conclude; we said, that by transferring, dominion passes to him who
accepts of the transferrence (§275). But we truly accept, when we testify
by words or deeds our consent that a thing transferred should become
ours, and we are presumed to accept, whenever, from the nature of the
thing, it cannot but be judged that we would not refuse or despise the
thing one would transfer to us. In like manner, a thing may be transferred
by the will of the transferrer, either expresly declared, or presumable
right reason neither precisely commands them, nor opposes them, but they may be
variously fixed and altered by pacts and conventions.
* (’Tis not improper to take notice here, that this sort of mortgage called Anti-
chresis in the Roman law, is nearly the same with that which is termed vivum vadium
in the English law; which is, when a man borrows a sum of money of another, and
maketh over an estate of lands unto him, until he hath received the said sum of the
issues and profits of the lands, so as in this case neither money nor land dieth, or is
lost. And therefore it is called vivum vadium, to distinguish it from the other sort of
mortgage called mortuum vadium, Coke 1. Instit. fol. 205. Domat’s civil law, &c. by
Dr. Strahan, T. 1. p. 356.) [[Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of En-
gland, bk. 3, sect. 332. Jean Domat (1625–96), French jurist; see Domat, Les loix civiles
dans leur ordre naturel, and The Civil Law in Its Natural Order, trans. Strahan.]]
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from certain signs (§275). The most certain sign is gathered from his end
and intention who hath acquired a thing, and hath bestowed care in
keeping and preserving it.* <215>
s e c t i on cc l x x x v
Since therefore every one has a right to transfer his goods to others, and
that alienation may be made upon any conditions (§267); the conse-
quence is, that it may be made upon this condition, that another may
obtain, after the alienator’s death, the dominion and possession of a
thing. Now, since this will may be truly declared, or can be certainly
inferred from the intention of the acquirer; and since, in neither of these
cases, the real and express acceptance of the other person to whom the
transferrence is made, is necessary (§284); the former comes under the
name of succession to a last-will or testament; and the latter is the genuine
foundation of succession to a person who dies intestate.
* But the end and intention of men in acquiring and managing with great care,
is always, not only that they may not want themselves, but that it may be well with
theirs when they are dead and stand in need of nothing. Hence Euripides in Medea,
v. 1098.
Sed quibus in aedibus est liberorum
Dulce germen, eos video curis
Confici omni tempore,
Primum quidem, quo pacto bene ipsos educent.
Et unde victum relinquant liberis.
[[Euripides, Medea, l. 1098: “But as for those in whose houses sweet children
are born, I see them worn out all the time by cares, first, as to how they can
bring them up well and then from what source they can leave a livelihood to
their children.”]]
And in Iphigenia in Aulide. v. 917.
Res est vehemens parere, & adfert ingens desiderium:
Communeque omnibus est, ut laborent pro liberis.
[[Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis, l. 917: “To give birth is a terrible thing and it
brings a huge desire: it is common to all, to labour on behalf of children.”]]
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s e c t i on cc l x x x v i
A Testament, in the notion of Civilians, is a solemn declaration of one’s
will concerning the transition of his inheritance and all his rights to
<216> another after his demise. And therefore, while the testator is alive,
no right passes to his heirs; nay, not so much as any certain hopes of
which they may not be frustrated; but the testator, while he lives, may
alter his intention, and tearing or destroying his former will, make a new
disposition, or die without a will.*
s e c t i on cc l x x x v i i
But that such a testament is not known to the law of nature is evident.
For tho’ right reason easily admits that solemnities should be added to
so serious an action, which is obnoxious to so many frauds; yet it implies
a contradiction, to suppose a person to will when he cannot will, and to
* Hence these known maxims of law, That the will of a testator is ambulatory till
his death: That the last will alone is valid, being confirmed by death; or as Quintilian,
Declam. 37. expresses it, “That testament alone is valid after which there can be no
other,” and several other such; yea, so far does this liberty with regard to testaments
extend, that it is said none can deprive himself of the liberty of changing by any
clause of renunciation, nor even by confirming his former testaments with an oath,
l. ult. D. leg. 2. Grotius de jure belli & pacis, 2. 13. 19. Leyser. medit. ad Pand. spec.
43. n. 6. & 7. [[Augustin Leyser (1683–1752), Meditationes ad Pandectas. ]]
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desire his dominion to pass to another, then, when he himself has no
longer any dominion. This is so absurd, that the Romans owned the
contradiction could not be removed but by mere fictions.* <217>
s e c t i on cc l x x x v i i i
Add to this, that no reason can be imagined why the survivers should
hold the will of the defunct for a law, especially when it very little con-
cerns one, whatever his condition be, after death, whether Dion or
Thion enjoys his goods:† yea, the last judgments of dying persons often
proceed rather from hatred and envy than from true benevolence; and
* For since a testator neither transacts any affair with his heir when he disposes of
his effects, nor the heir with the testator, when he acquires; and therefore, in neither
case does any right pass from the one to the other; many things were feigned by
lawyers, always very ingenious in this respect, to reconcile these inconsistencies.
Hence they feigned the moment of testament-making to be the same with the very
instant of dying, and the instant of death to be the same with the moment of entering
upon a succession, bringing it back by fiction to the instant of death, l. 1. C. de 55.
eccl. l. 54. D. de adqu. vel amitt. hered. l. 193. D. de reg. jur. Besides, they feigned
the inheritance not entered upon to be no person’s, but to represent the person of
the deceased, §2. Inst. de hered. inst. l. 31. § ult. D. eod. l. 34. D. de adqu. rer. dom.
Ant. Dadin. Alteserra de Fict. jur. tract. 4. 2. p. 143. [[Hauteserre, De fictionibus juris
tractatus quinque ]] Jo. Gottfr. a Coccei. de testam. princip. part. 1. §24.
† Hence Seneca of Benefits, 4. 11. says very elegantly “There is nothing we settle
with such religious solemn care as that which nowise concerns us.” As this very grave
author denies that these last judgments belong to men; so in the same sense Quintilian
Declam. 308, calls them a will beyond death. [[Quintilian, Lesser Declamations,
vol. 1.]] Since therefore the Civilians do not allow even a living person to stipulate,
unless it be the interest of the person stipulating, §4. Instit. de inut. stip. how, pray,
can the same Roman lawyers before the validity of the wills of deceased persons,when
it is not for their interest? We readily grant that the souls of men are immortal, (which
we find urged by the celebrated Leibnitz, nov. method. jurisp. p. 56. [[Leibniz,Nova
methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae ]]) but hence it does not follow, that
souls delivered from the chains of the body retain the dominion of things formerly
belonging to them, much less that they should be affected with any concernabout them.
Id cinerem & Manes credis curare sepultos?
Virg. Aen. 4. v. 92.
[[Virgil, Aeneid 4.34 (not 92), in vol. 1 of Virgil: “Thinkest thou that dust or
buried shades give heed to that?”]]
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in such cases, it seems rather to be the interest of the deceased that his
will should not take effect, than that his survivers should religiously fulfil
it. See our dissertation de testam. jure Germ. arct. limit. circumscript.
§5. <218>
s e c t i on cc l x x x i x
Since therefore the law of nature scarcely approvesof testament-making,
as described by the Roman laws, i.e. as Ulpian elegantly defines it, tit.
20. “A declaration of our mind solemnly made to this end, that it may
take place validly after our decease,” (§286); the consequence is, 1. That
it no more approves like customs of other nations; and therefore, 2. That
testaments of the same kind among Greeks or Barbarians, are no more
of the law of nature and nations than those* of the Romans; and for
the same reason, 3. No nation hath accommodated their manners in this
respect more to the simplicity of the law of nature than the Germans
where there was no testament; (heredes successoresque sui cuique liberi, &
nullum testamentum; Tacitus de mor. Germ. c. 20).1 <219>
* We find, from the time of Solon among the Athenians, a similar kind of tes-
tament, consisting in will on one side, with regard to what ought to be done after
death, Plutarch. in Solone, p. 90. and among the Lacedemonians from the times of
the Ephor Epitadeus. Plut. in Aegid. & Cleom. p. 797 [[Plutarch, Plutarch’s Lives,
vols. 1 (“Solon”) and 10 (“Agis and Cleomenes”)]], and among other Greeks, who all
agreed, in this matter, in the same practice, as Isocrates tells us, in Aeginet. p. 778.
[[Isocrates, “Aegineticus,” in Isocrates, vol. 3, 298–353.]] There are likewise examples
of such testaments among the Egyptians, as of Ptolomy in Caesar de bello civil. 3.
20. [[Caesar, The Civil War ]] Hirt. de bello Alex. cap. 5. [[Hirtius, Caii Iulii Caesaris
de bellis gallico et civili Pompeiano nec non A. Hirtii aliorumque de bellis alexandrino,
africano, et hispaniensi commentarii ]] Attalus King of Pergamos, in Florus, Hist. 2.
20. [[Florus,Epitome of RomanHistory ]] Hiero of Sicily, of whom Livy, 24. 4. [[Livy,
History of Rome ]] and finally among the Hebrews themselves, of whose way of mak-
ing wills, see Selden de success. ad leg. Heb. cap. 24. [[Selden, Uxor Ebraica.]] But
that it was not of ancient usage among them, and that it owed its rise to the inter-
pretations of their doctors, may be proved, amongst other arguments, by this con-
sideration, that there is not a word in their language for a testament, and therefore
they gave it a Greek name. See our Dissertation de testamentif. jure Germ. arct. limit.
circumscript. §6.
1. Tacitus, Germania 20.5: “Yet each man has his own children as heirs, and suc-
cessors and wills are unknown.”
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s e c t i on ccxc
This being the case, Grotius gave a new definition of a testament, (of
the rights of war and peace, 2. 6. § ult.) he defines it thus; “Alienation
to take place at the event of death, before that revocable, with retention
of the right of use and possession.” But as this definition does not quad-
rate with what we commonly call testament, and is faulty in several re-
spects; (Ziegler. ad Grotium, 2. 6. Pufend. de jure nat. & gent. 4. 10. 2.
and the illustrious Jo. Gottfr. de Coccei. ibid. §4. & seq.) so it does not
follow that testament-making is of the law of nature, because that law
does not disallow of alienation at the event of death, revocable before
that event, with retention of the right of possessing and using.
s e c t i on ccxc i
But tho’ the arguments above-mentioned plainly shew, that testament-
making, according to the Roman law, is not of the law of nature, yet
they are by no means repugnant to all dispositions with respect to future
succession (§268).* Let us therefore enquire what these are which are
approved by the law of nature. And I answer, they are nothing else but
pacts, by which dying persons transfer a possession itself, with the do-
minion to others; or men in good health give others the right of suc-
ceeding to them at the event of their death. For since we can dispose of
our own, not only for the present, but for the future (§268), we may
* And in the earliest ages of the world men disposed of their goods in no other
way than this. So Abraham, having no children, had destined his possessions to his
steward Eleasar, Gen. xv. 3. no doubt, by some successory, pact, or donation to take
place at his death. The same Abraham, his wife Sarah being dead, having children by
Kethura, distributed, while he was in health, part of his goods by donation, and gave
the residue to Isaac, Gen. xxv. 5, 6. Thus Cyrus also at his death, in the presence of
Cambyses, gave his eldest Son the kingdom, and to the younger the lordships of the
Medes, the Armenians and Cadusians, Xenoph. Cyrop. 8. 7. 3. [[Xenophon, Cyro-
paedia, vol. 2, 8.7.2.]] Mention is made of a division and donation made by parents
amongst their children upon the approach of death, Gen. xlviii. 22. Deut. xxi. 16, 17.
1 Kings, i. 35. Syrac. xxxiii. 24. and examples of it among the Francs are quoted by
Marculf. Form. 1. 12. 2. 7. [[Marculfi Monachi, “Formularum Libri Duo,” bk. I.12,
cols. 381–82, in Capitularia Regum Francorum, vol. 2.]]
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certainly make a pact for transferring to another what belongs to us,
either to take place at present, or at our death.* <220>
s e c t i on ccxc i i
Since every one therefore hath a right to transfer his goods for the present
or for the future, at the event of his death (§291); the consequence is,
that there is no reason why pacts about succession may not be pro-
nounced agreeable to the law of nature.† But, on the contrary, theyought
to be deemed valid by the best right, whether they be reciprocal, oroblig-
atory on one side only; and whether they be acquisitive, preservative, or
remunerative; for as to dispositive pacts, that they bind the contracters,
but not him whose heritage is disposed of, is evident, because he hath
made no pact about his own. <221>
s e c t i on ccxc i i i
Besides, since such is the nature of all transfers of property, that any one
may except or secure to himself any part of, or any right in his own he
pleases, in which case, so much only is transmitted as the owner willed
to transmit (§279); it is evident, that it is at the option of the owner to
transfer the possession to his heir by pact at once; or the right only of
succeeding to his estate after his death; to transfer either revocably or
* [[See note on previous page.]]
† The Roman law does not approve of them, but pronounces them contrary to
good manners, and liable to very fatal consequences, l. ult. c. de pact. But the objec-
tions taken from the desire of one’s death, that may thus be occasioned, do not lie
stronger against such compacts than against donations in view of death, which are
valid by the Roman law. Nor are those sad effects which Rome once suffered by
legacy-hunters, an argument of any repugnancy between such pacts relative to suc-
cession after death and honesty, because neither testament nor any other human in-
stitution, is proof against the abuse of wicked men.
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irrevocably;* with or without any condition; in whole or in part; so that
there is no natural opposition between testate and intestate, as Pom-
ponius seems to have imagined, l. 7. D. de reg. juris.
s e c t i on ccxc i v
But because a thing may be accepted, not only actually but presump-
tively, when from the nature of the thing it cannot but be concluded,
that one will not refuse what another designs to transfer to him (§284);
it must therefore be the same in effect by the law of nature, whether one
be present and declares his consent, or being absent, so that he cannot
accept verbally, there is no ground to apprehend that the liberality of
another will be disagreeable to him;† especially, if the inheritance de-
signed for him be very profitable. There is however this difference be-
tween these cases, that in the former the heir acquires a valid and irrev-
ocable <222> right, unless the owner hath expresly reserved to himself
the faculty of revoking; whereas in the latter, there is liberty to revoke
till acceptation be made: And whereas an heir having declared his con-
sent, cannot renounce the heritage he hath accepted, he whose consent
* Thus Abraham transferred an irrevocable right to his Sons by Kethura. And
Telemachus in Homer’s Odyss. B. 17. v. 77. transferred a revocable one to Piraeus,
We know not yet the full event of all:
Stabb’d in his palace, if your prince must fall,
Us, and our house, if treason must o’erthrow,
Better a friend possess them than a foe:
Till then retain the gifts.
[[Lines 90 (not 77) to 96, bk. 17, in Pope’s translation of the Odyssey. ]]
† This whole matter is admirably illustrated by the chancellor of our college, my
beloved collegue Jo. Petrus a Ludewig, in a dissertation wrote with great judgment
and erudition, de differentiis juris Romani & Germanici in donationibus, & barbari
adnexus, acceptatione. Hal. 1721 [[Ludewig (praeses ) and Krimpff (respondens ), De
differentiis iuris Romani & Germanici ]], where he hath shewn by impregnable ex-
amples and arguments, that neither the nature of donation, nor the Justinian, nor
the Canon, nor the German law, requires acceptation made by words or other signs,
and hath solidly refuted all objections.
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is presumed, may enter upon or refuse the heritage transferred to him,
as he thinks proper.
s e c t i on ccxcv
But if an owner can really and truly will that his goods may be transferred
to one after his death (§291), there is no reason why as much should not
be attributed to one’s will, presumed from his end and intention, as to
one’s will expressed by words or signs (§268). Now we have already
shewn, that it is not the end and intention of those who acquire any
thing, and take care of their acquisitions, that they should after their
death be held for things relinquished to the first occupant; but that they
should be advantageous to those whom they love and wish well to (§284).
But hence we may justly conclude the succession to belong to them,
preferably to all others, for whose sake chiefly the defunct acquired and
took care of his acquisitions with so much concern and sollicitude.*
<223>
s e c t i on ccxcv i
But because this is not a duty of perfect obligation, but rather a species
of humanity, which pays regard to persons and ties or connexions, and
therefore prefers relatives to strangers (§220); hence we have reason to
* This is so true, that nothing ordinarily is so vexatious and tormenting to men
as the thoughts of their estate’s falling to men they hate, after their death, and when,
as the Poet has it,
Stet domo capta cupidus superstes,
Imminens lethi spoliis, & ipsum
Computet ignem.
[[“Let the greedy man stand, a survivor when the house is captured, hanging
over the spoils of death and calculating the very fire” (Statius, Silvae 4.7.38–
40).]]
Nothing is more certain than what Pindar says in a passage quoted by Pufendorff on
this subject (of the law of nature and nations, 4. 11. 1.) “Riches which are to fall into
the hands of a stranger, are odious to the dying person.”
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infer, that relatives exclude all strangers from succession, and that among
relatives those of the nearer degrees are preferable; and that many of the
same line and degree have equal rights to succession.* <224>
s e c t i on ccxcv i i
Since of relatives the more remote are excluded by the nearer (§296),
but none can be reckoned nearer to one than children are to theirparents;
therefore they are justly preferred in succession to their parents before
all others, and that without distinction of sex or age:† For as to the pref-
erence given in some countries to males, and to the first-born, that, be-
cause it is making an unequal division among equals, proceeds from civil
* For tho’ it be not always true, that kindred are dearer to one than strangers: yea,
so far is it from it, that love amongst brothers is very rare: yet since, if the defunct
had been of that opinion, nothing hindered him to have disposed of his estate as he
pleased, and to have left it to whom he liked best (§291); and he chose rather to die
without making such a disposition; he cannot but be judged not to have envied the
inheritance of his goods to his relatives, whom natural affection itself seems of choice
to call to the succession. But one is nearer, not only in respect of degree, but likewise
in respect of line. For Aristotle hath justly observed, that natural affection falls by
nature upon the descending line, and failing that upon the ascending line, and failing
both these upon the collateral, Nicomach. 8. 12. Hence Grandchildren, tho’ in the
second degree, are nearer than a parent, and a great grandfather, tho’ in the fourth
degree, is nearer than a brother, &.
† But if the thing be indivisible, there is no doubt it may (ceteris paribus) be left
to the first-born, on condition that he make satisfaction to the rest (§270). The first-
born are wont to have a special prerogative, if the heritage be indivisible; especially
if it be a crown or sovereignty. Cyrus in Xenophon says elegantly, “This also I must
now declare to you, even to whom I leave my kingdom, lest that being left doubtful,
should occasion disquiets. I love you, my sons, both with equal affection: But I order
that the eldest should govern by his prudence, and do the duty of a general, when
there shall be use or occasion for it, and that he should have, in a certain suitable
proportion, the larger and superior use of my demesnes.” [[Xenophon, Cyropaedia
8.7.8.]] Tho’ the affections of kings be equal towards all their children; yet the nature
of government itself seems to require, that sons should be preferred in succession to
sovereignty to daughters, and amongst them the eldest to the younger, insomuch
that it is become, as Herodotus says, a received law in all nations, l. 7. p. 242. [[He-
rodotus, Histories, Selincourt translation, bk. 7, p. 372]] and what is done against this
rule, is, according to the ancients, against the law of nations. See Justin. Hist. 12. 2.
24. 3. Liv. 40. 9.
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law, pact, or some other disposition; and so it is not of the law of nature
(§271).
s e c t i on ccxcv i i i
But if in succession to parents children be justly preferable to all others
(§297), and this may be concluded from the presumed will of parents,
(§295); the consequence is, that it ought to be <225> certainly known
who is the child. But because that cannot be ascertained except in the
case of lawful marriage; hence we infer, that legitimate children only,
even posthumous ones, and not illegitimate ones, or bastards, succeed
to a father; but that all children succeed promiscuously to a mother; tho’
none will deny that a father may take care of his illegitimate children in
his disposition.
s e c t i on ccxc i x
Besides, it may be inferred from the same will of parents (§295), that the
succession of descendents extends not only to children of the nearest,
but of the more remote degrees; and therefore that grandsons and gran-
daughters are admitted to inherit, as well as sons and daughters; and that
not only if there be no children of the first degree, but if they concur
with them; so that the right of representation, by which children of the
remoter degrees succeed into the room of their parents, and receive their
portion, is most agreeable to the law of nature.* <226>
* And this is the foundation of the succession of children of the first degree, in
capita, by heads, and those of remoter degrees, in stirpes, by descent. That this is
consonant to the law of nature appears even from hence, that if contrariwise, all
should succeed in capita, the condition of the surviving children would be rendered
worse by the death of a brother or sister, and the condition of grandchildren would
be bettered by the death of their parents, and so there would be no equality among
them. For if the father were worth a hundred pieces, and had four children, each
would get twenty five pieces. Now suppose one of the four, contrary to the course
of nature, to have died before the father, leaving seven grandchildren to him: in that
case, if all succeeded in capita, each would get ten pieces; and thus by the brother’s
death, the three children of the first degree would have lost forty five pieces, and the
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s e c t i on ccc
From the same rule, that the nearest of many relatives are to be preferred
(§296), it follows, that grandchildren are to be preferred both to the par-
ents of the grandfather, tho’ nearer in degree, and to his brothers and
sisters, tho’ equal in degree. For one is to be judged nearer, not only in
respect of degree, but chiefly in regard to line (§296).* But whether nat-
ural equity in this case calls grandchildren to succession by heads, or by
descent, may be easily understood from what hath been said in the pre-
ceding scholium.
s e c t i on ccc i
Since, failing the line of descendents the nearest is the ascendent (§296),
hence it is plain, that the mournful succession to their children is due to
the progenitors,† and in such a manner, that <227> the nearer in degree
seven grandchildren would have gained as much by the untimely death of their father.
But since no reason can be assigned why the death of a brother should diminish the
patrimony of the surviving brothers or sisters, and add to that of the grandchildren;
no reason can be given why both should be admitted to succession equally in capita.
* For no reason can be brought, why the condition of one issue should be bettered
and another worsted by the untimely death of parents; which must however be the
case, if the grandchildren surviving their parent should be admitted by heads: Be-
cause, suppose a man worth a hundred pieces to have four sons, and to have by the
first, one, by the second, two, by the third, three, and by the fourth, four grandchil-
dren alive; if the sons had survived they would have received each twenty five pieces,
and have consequently transmitted each to his children as much. But if they dying,
the grandchildren be admitted to succession by heads, each would get ten pieces, and
thus the one grandchild by the first son would lose fifteen pieces, the two by the second
five, and the three by the third would gain five, and the four by the fourth would
gain fifteen. But if this be unreasonable, it must be unreasonable to admit grand-
children in this case to succession by heads.
† This is so agreeable to right reason, that whereas the divine law established this
order of inheritance, that the sons should stand first, the daughters next, then the
brothers, and in the fourth place the uncles by the father’s side, Num. xxvii. 8. & seq.
Philo [[Philo of Alexandria, a philosopher, writer, and political figure in the first
century a.d., a leading exponent of Jewish Alexandrian culture in that period. His
writings on the Old Testament were strongly informed by Platonism.]] remarks, that
something ought here to be supplied by right reason. “For it would be foolish (says
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excludes the more remote, and those of the same degree come in equally.
Nor does the law of nature in this case suggest any reason why the in-
heritance of children should be divided among many of the same degree
according to lines; so that these, and like cases, must rather be left to the
determination of civil laws.
s e c t i on ccc i i
It follows from the same principle (§296), that failing both the ascending
and descending line, the succession to intestates devolves on the collat-
eral kindred, according to the degree of nearness in which they stand;
nor is there any reason why the right of representation should take place
among collaterals;* much less is there any reason why duplicity of ties,
or the origine of the goods should <228> make any difference. In this
case, many of the same degree equally divide the inheritance: nor is there
any difference how far they may be removed from the defunct, seeing it
he) to imagine, that the uncle should be allowed to succeed his brother’s son, as a
near kinsman to the father, and yet the father himself be abridged of that privilege.
But in as much as the law of nature appoints (where by the law of nature Philo un-
doubtedly understands the order of nature ) that children should be heirs to their par-
ents, and not parents to their children, Moses passed this case over in silence as om-
inous and unlucky, and contrary to all pious wishes and desires, lest the father and
mother should seem to be gainers by the immature death of their children, whoought
to be affected with most inexpressible grief: Yet by allowing the right of inheritance
to the uncles, he obliquely admits the claim of the parents, both for the preservation
of decency and order, and for the continuing the estate in the same family.” Nor do
the Talmudists reason otherwise about succession in the ascendent line. See Selden
de success. in bona def. ad leges Hebr. cap. 12. where this matter is fully and accurately
handled.
* For since succession belongs preferably to those for whom the defunct chiefly
acquired and managed with care (§295), and experience shews us, that affection is
commonly no less ardent towards the remoter than the nearer descendents: Hence it
is justly concluded, that grandfathers had no inclination to take from their grand-
children what was due to their parents; and on account of this presumed inclination
or will, they ought to succeed to the rights of their parents. On the other hand, the
same experience teaches us, that with respect to collaterals, affection diminishes every
remove, and therefore it does not follow that a brother’s son, e.g. should come into
the same place with the uncle as his brother. Hence there is no reason why a brother’s
son should concur with brothers in succession.
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was in his power to appoint another heir, if he had no mind they should
be made happy by his estate.
s e c t i on ccc i i i
So far does right reason acknowledge the right of succession in kindred.
But because it is obvious to every one, that all these things belong rather
to the permissive than to the preceptive part of the law of nature, much
must here be left to civil legislature, to fix and determine by their laws,
as the end and interest of their states may require (§18). And hence it is
easy to give a good reason why legislators have thought the surviving
wife should be taken care of; and why there is no branch of law almost
in which civil laws and statutes so much differ, as with regard to suc-
cession to intestates.
s e c t i on ccc i v
Seeing this whole right of succession proceeds from presumed will
(§285); but he, whose consent is presumed, may enter upon an inheri-
tance, <229> or renounce it as he pleases (§294), it must be evident to
every one, that necessary heirs are unknown to the law of nature.* And
therefore that no person is heir to an intestate by unalterable right, but
becomes such by his consent, declared by words or deeds.
* That reason is quite a stranger to heirs necessary, voluntary and extraneous, is
plain, because it knows nothing of the reason lawyers had in their view in making
such distinctions. First of all, this quality and difference of heirs belongs chiefly to
testamentary heirs, to which, as we have already observed, the law of nature is a stran-
ger (§287), because to one who dies intestate, no servant succeeds as necessary heir.
Again, a testament among the Romans was a sort of private law. And they thought
a testator could indeed give law to his servants and children, whose duty and glory it
was to obey their will, but not to strangers not subject to their power. Hence they
called those necessary and these voluntary heirs, (Elem. sec. ord. Inst. §95). [[Heinec-
cius, Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem Pandectarum. ]] But since the law of
nature knows nothing of all this, it cannot possibly know any thing of this difference
with respect to heirs.
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s e c t i on cccv
Now, when one determines to succeed to another, nothing is more equal,
than that he should be adjudged to succeed to all his rights and burdens
(§267); whence it follows, that an heir, whether by the real disposition
of the deceased, or by his presumed will, acquires all his rights, which
are not extinguished by his death; and that he has no reason to complain,
if he be bound to satisfy all his obligations, as far as the inheritance is
sufficient.* <230>
* Not therefore, in solidum, in whole. For since there is no other reason why an
heir is obliged to fulfil what the defunct was bound to do by buying or hiring, and
to pay his debts, but because he hath acquired his goods, no reason can be imagined
why he should be bound farther than the inheritance is sufficient to answer. Besides
that rigour of the Roman law, by which an heir succeeded to all the obligations of
the defunct, turns upon a fiction, that the heir and the defunct are the same person,
l. 22. D. de usucap. l. 14. C. de usufr. Novell. 48. praef. Ant. Dadin. Alteserra de
fiction. jur. tractat. 1. cap. 20. p. 48. [[Antoine Dadin de Hauteserre, De fictionibus
juris.]] Now since the law of nature knows no such fiction, it cannot know that which
follows from it alone.
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Concerning the rights and duties which
arise from property or dominion.
s e c t i on cccv i
Dominion is the right of excluding all others from the use of something
(§231). But when we exclude others from the use of a thing, we pretend
to have the sole right of using it. Hence the first effect of dominion is
the free disposal of a thing; i.e. the right or faculty of granting any one
the use of it; nay, of abusing it, and of alienating it at his pleasure. Again,
from what we can justly exclude others, that we retain to ourselves with
that intention, and therefore possession is amongst the effects of domin-
ion. Finally, we also exclude others from the use of a thing, when, being
in another’s possession, we reclaim it. But to reclaim a thing in another’s
possession, being to endeavour to recover it, it follows, that one of the
noblest effects of dominion is the right of recovering our own from
whomsoever possessing it.* <231>
* All these effects of dominion are acknowledged by the Roman law. For what is
said by Caius, l. 2. D. si a par. quis man. “That it is unjust for men not to have the
liberty of alienating their goods,” it is to be understood of free disposal. In like man-
ner Paullus infers, from the right of possession belonging to the lord or master only,
l. 3. §5. D. de adqu. vel amitt. possess. “That many cannot possess the same thing in
whole; and that it is contrary to nature that you should possess what I possess. That
two can no more possess the same thing, than you should occupy the same place in
which I am.” All belonging to the reclaiming of a thing, which is the principal action
arising from dominion, is well known. Hence it is among the paradoxical themes of
dispute, “That the lord of timber cannot recover it, if it be joined,” §29. Inst. de rer.
divis.
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s e c t i on cccv i i
Since therefore the owner has a right to apply his own to any use what-
soever (§306), the consequence is, that he has a right to enjoy all the
profits arising from the thing itself, and from its accessions and incre-
ments, as far as these can be acquired by the proprietor (§250); and there-
fore to reap all the fruits, and either to consume or share them with
others, or to transfer them to others upon whatsoever account. Nay, be-
cause the yearly fruits and profits of things may be increased by art and
careful management, nothing hinders a master from altering the thing,
and so rendering it more profitable, provided he do not by so doing
deprive another of his right.*
s e c t i on cccv i i i
Since he hath likewise the right of abusing (§256), i.e. of consuming, or
of destroying the thing and its fruits, Donat. ad Terent. Andr. <232>
prolog. v. 5.1 the consequence is, that the master may destroy the thing
which is his own, provided he do it not with that intention that another
may thereby receive detriment.† For tho’ such a spoiling of our own
goods, which may be beneficial to others, be repugnant to the love of
* This right belongs to the master only, as is plain when we consider the right of
usufruct, of use, of loan, of hire, all which, because they are exerced about a thing
belonging to another, do not include the right of changing a thing at pleasure, tho’
all of them include the right of reaping the fruits. Therefore the right of taking the
profits may be common to the master with others, but the faculty of changing the
thing, i.e. the principal or substance, is proper to the master only, nor can he who
has the right of use, usufruct, loan or hire, claim it without his permission.
† For if any corrupts his own with an intention to hurt another, he does it with
a design to injure another, and by doing hurt to him, really injures another. But it
being the first and chief principle of natural law, not to hurt any one (§178), the
consequence is, that he acts contrary to the law of nature who spoils his own goods
with such an intention. And to this class belongs the wickedness of those who poison
their flowers to destroy their neighbour’s bees, Quinct. Declam. 13. [[Quintilian,The
Major Declamations.]]
1. Aelius Donatus (fl. 4th century a.d.) was the author of a commentary on the
works of Terence.
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humanity (§217); yet he does not violate expletive justice, who, in con-
sequence of his having dominion, abuses his own, and without any ne-
cessity urging him so to do, corrupts it.
s e c t i on ccc i x
Because the free power or right of a master to dispose of his own com-
prehends likewise the right of alienation (§306), it may easily be under-
stood, that an owner can abdicate his dominion, and transfer it to an-
other, either now, or for a time to come, and grant any other advantage
by it, or right in it, to any person; and therefore give it in use, usufruct,
mortgage, pledge, as he will, provided no law, no pact, no other more
valid disposition stand in his way.
s e c t i on cccx
Since possession also is one of the effects of dominion (§306), it is plain
that the owner can take possession of what belongs to him, and defend
his possession against every one, even by force; and that it makes no
difference whether one possesses by himself or by another; yea, that pos-
session once <233> acquired, may be retained by an absent person, and
by will merely, while another hath not seized it.*
s e c t i on cccx i
Finally, the right of recovering a thing being among the effects of do-
minion (§306), it cannot but be that we may use our right against any
possessor of what is ours; nor does it make any difference as to the res-
titution, whether one detain what is ours from us honestly or fraudu-
* For possession is the retention of a thing, from the use of which we have de-
termined to exclude others (231). As long therefore as we have determined to exclude
others from the use of a thing, so long we have not relinquished it (§241): Wherefore,
such a thing is not without a master, and none has a right to seize it. But what none
hath a right to seize, I certainly retain the possession of, even tho’ at distance, by my
will merely.
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lently; nor whether he be known to us or a stranger; because we do not
reclaim the thing on account of any deed of his; but because we have a
right to it. Besides, since to reclaim and recover a thing is not the same as
to redeem it; it is manifest, that when an owner recovers his own, he is
not bound to restore the price; tho’ equity doth not permit thatoneshould
be inriched at another’s expence (§257), or that he should refuse the nec-
essary and useful expences laid out upon a thing by the possessor.* <234>
s e c t i on cccx i i
Since the owner can claim to himself all the accessions and fruits of his
own goods (§307), it may be enquired, whether an honest possessor be
obliged to restore to the owner reclaiming his own, all the accessions,
and all the fruits, nay, all the gain he hath received from another’s goods?
We conceive thus of the matter in a few words. He who honestly, and
with a just title, possesses a thing, as long as the true owner is not known,
has the right of excluding all persons from the use of what he possesses.
But he who has this right is in the room of the owner (§231), and there-
fore enjoys all the same rights as the owner; yet, because he is not the
true master who possesses a thing honestly, there is no reason why he
should desire to be inriched to the loss of the true owner; as there is
none, on the other hand, why the master should claim to himself the
fruits not existing, which were not owing to his care and industry.† <235>
* To which case, without all doubt, belong the expences, without which themaster
himself could not have recovered his own from robbers, especially if the possessor
redeemed it with intention to have it restored to its owner, Pufend. law of nature,
&c. 4. 12. 13. at which paragraph Hertius in his notes has brought an excellent example
from Famian. Strada’s Decades de bello belgico, l. 7. ad annum 1572. “When the
merchants of Antwerp had redeemed merchandize of above a hundred thousand
pieces in value, from a Spanish soldier, who had plundered the city of Mechlin, for
twenty thousand, the owners got them back, upon restoring that sum, because they
could not have recovered the goods with less expence.” [[Strada, De bello belgico decas
prima. See also Pufendorf, Acht Bu¨cher.]]
† For a natural accession to a thing, the master of which is not known (§241),
belongs to none, and so goes to the first occupant. Since therefore the honestpossessor
has seized the fruits which he produced by his own care and industry, there is no
reason why they should be taken from him. And therefore the Justinian law not ab-
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s e c t i on cccx i i i
Because neither ought to be inriched at the other’s loss (§312), the con-
sequence is, that even the accessions ought to be restored to the master
reclaiming his own thing, and therefore he hath a right to demand the
existing and hanging fruits,* the expences laid out upon them being de-
ducted; because the master would be inriched to the detriment of the
honest possessor, if he should take to himself the fruits upon which he
had bestowed no care.
s e c t i on cccx i v
But since a natural accession to a thing, the owner of which is not
known, goes to the first occupant as a thing belonging to no body, the
same is to be said of the civil fruits (§212); consequently, the fruits gath-
ered ought to be left to an honest possessor, who bestowed his labour
and care about them, unless he be made richer by them (§212).† <236>
surdly says, “That it is agreeable to natural equity and reason, that the fruits which
an honest possessor hath gathered, should be his for his care and labour.” Nor is the
case different with regard to civil fruits. For they, in like manner, when they are re-
ceived having no certain master, and the true master of the substance producing
them, having had no trouble about, belong also to an honest possessor, so long as the
true master does not appear.
* This Grotius grants (of the right of war and peace, 2. 8. 23. and 2. 10. 4.) but
only with respect to natural fruits. But since even the industrial fruits are accessions
to the principal of an owner, who is now known, no reason can be imagined why an
honest possessor should claim them to himself. But the master can by no means refuse
to repay expences, because he would otherwise demand fruits which he did not pro-
duce by his care and industry (§312). Whence the Hebrews thus proverbiallydescribed
a hard austere man, “One who reaps where he did not sow, and gathers where he did
not straw,” Mat. xxv. 24. Luke xix. 21.
† The Civilians follow this principle in demanding an inheritance, l. 25. §11. &
§15. l. 36. §4. l. 40. §1. D. de hered. petit. But in reclaiming a thing, they adjudge
indiscriminately the reaped fruits to an honest possessor, and make no account of
the matter, whether he be enriched by them or not, l. 4. §2. D. fin. regund. l. 48. pr.
D. de adqu. rer. dom. But the reason of this difference is merely civil, andnot founded
in natural law. For in suing for heritage, as being an universal action, the price is
deemed to succeed into the room of the thing, not in singular actions. But the law
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From the same rules, that an honest possessor is in the room of the
owner, but yet cannot inrich himself at the detriment of another (§312);
we infer, that he is no more obliged to make restitution to the owner, if
he infraudulently consumed the thing, than if it had perished in his
possession by chance; but that he is obliged, if he sell the thing he ac-
quired without paying any price, or a small price, for a greater price,
because he would be richer at another’s cost, if he kept the profit to
himself. On the other hand, this obligation ceases, if the owner hath
already received the value of his thing from another; partly because in
this case an honest possessor is indeed made richer, but not at the cost
of the owner; and partly because the owner has a right not to sue for
gain, but only for loss.
s e c t i on cccxv i
Because all this belongs to honest possessors only; and, on the other
hand, because fraudulent possessors are neither in the room of the
owner, nor have they the right of use, on this score, that the owner is
not known to them; and therefore none of these reasons, why one may
enjoy any advantage by a thing, or its fruits, takes place; hence it is plain,
that they are strictly bound not only to restore what is existing, but to
refund the value of things consumed or alienated; and much more,
<237> of all the fruits they have, or might have reaped from them, and
likewise to run all risks.*
of nature does not make these distinctions; and therefore it is most equal that those
received fruits should be indiscriminately restored to the true owner, by which one
is made richer. And that this is now the practice observed in courts, is observed by
Stryk. Us. hod. Digest. 6. 1. 12.
* For tho’ accidents be regularly imputable to no person (§106), yet this rule does
not take place if it was the agent’s fault that any accident happened (§ ibidem), be-
cause then there is default as well as accident. Now, a fraudulent possessor could and
ought to have restored the thing to its true owner, and if he had done it, he would
have prevented its perishing in his hands. He is therefore obliged to answer for all
accidents; whence the Roman lawyers have rightly determined, that a thief androbber
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s e c t i on cccxv i i
Now these are the rights which arise plainly from dominion; but since
it belongs to civil law to adjust indifferent actions to the interest of each
people or state (§18); and it is frequently the interest of a state, that no
member should make a bad use of his goods (Instit. §2. de his qui sui
vel alieni juris sunt,) it is no wonder that dominion is sometimes con-
fined within narrower limits by governors of states, and that sometimes
the liberty of disposal, sometimes the right of taking possession, and
sometimes the right of recovering, is either wholly taken away fromown-
ers, or not allowed to them but under certain restrictions.* <238>
s e c t i on cccxv i i i
And because an owner has the liberty of disposing of his goods in his
life, or in the prospect of death (§268), and then just as much is trans-
ferred to another, as he who alienates willed to transfer, (§279), it is plain
the effects of dominion may be restricted by the pact and disposition of
the former owner,† and in this case the possessor can arrogate no more
are answerable for all chances, because they are always the cause why a thing is not
in the possession of its owner, (quia semper in mora sint ) l. 8. §1. D. de condict furt.
* Thus we find the civil law taking the free disposal of their goods from pupils,
mad persons, prodigals, minors. The same law does not allow a legatee, tho’ owner
of the thing left to him in legacy, to take possession, and gives the heir a prohibition
against him, if he goes to seize at his own hand. (Interdictum quod legatorum) tot.
tit. D. quod legat. Again, it is known that he, whose timber another hath joined, tho’
he be the owner of the materials, and doth not lose his dominion, yet he cannot
recover the timber when joined, by the laws of the twelve tables, §29. Inst. de rerum
divis. l. 7. D. de adqu. rerum dom. So that there is almost no effect of dominion
which the civil laws suffer to remain always and wholly safe and entire, if the public
good of the common-wealth require it should not: For this magistrates justly account
the supreme law in all those matters, which belong to the permissive part of the law
of nature. Because, since any one by the law of nature may renounce his permissive
rights (§13), a people may also renounce them, and hath actually renounced them by
submitting themselves to the laws enacted by the supreme power under whose au-
thority they have put themselves.
† Thus sometimes the right of reaping all advantage from a thing is circumscribed
within narrower limits by the disposition of the former owner, as, e.g. if he hath
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to himself than he received from the former owner, unless he in whose
favour the restriction was made, voluntarily quit his right, cease to exist,
or lose his right by a just cause. <239>
s e c t i on cccx i x
Hitherto we have only treated of rights arising from dominion or prop-
erty. Now since right and obligation are correlates, and therefore a right
being constituted an obligation is constituted (§7); the consequence is,
that as many rights as dominion gives to an owner, just so many obli-
gations does it lay others under with regard to the owner. Because there-
fore an owner hath the liberty of disposing (§306), they injure him who
hinder him in disposing or enjoying the fruits of his own:* They also
do him damage who corrupt or spoil the fruits and accessions of his
property. And in general, since he who intercepts or corrupts any thing
that tends to the perfection or happiness of another certainly wrongs
him (§82), but none ought to be wronged (§178); hence we may justly
conclude, that none ought to have his free disposition of his own dis-
turbed or hindered; that none ought to have his goods damaged; and
therefore, if any thing of that kind be done, the author of the injury is
bound to make reparation, and is moreover liable to punishment.
given another the usufruct, any right of service, or hath pawned it (§282). Sometimes
the liberty of disposing, destroying, and alienating is taken from the master, as when
the dominion or right of use merely is given him (§279); or when the thing is bur-
dened with some fiduciary bequest, &c. An usufruct being constituted, even the right
of possession, which could not otherwise be refused to the owner, is restricted; as
when the right of use is given to one, the direct or superior lord has neither the right
of possessing the thing, nor of claiming what appertains to the right of use.
* For the Roman lawyers define an injury to be not only any wrong done to a
person by words or deeds, but any action by which one is hindered from the use either
of public things, or of what is his own, or by which one arrogates to himself any
degree of liberty in disposing of what belongs to another. Thus by the leg. Cornel.
he is guilty of injury who enters another’s house forcibly, l. 5. pr. D. de injur. he who
hinders one to fish in the sea, or to draw a drag-net, to bath in public baths, to sit on
a public theatre, or to act, sit, or converse in any other place, or who does not permit
us to have the use of what is our own, l. 13. §7. D. eod.
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s e c t i on cccx x
Seeing possession belongs to the rights of property (§306), the conse-
quence is, that it is our duty to <240> suffer every one to possess his
own quietly and unmolested, and not to deprive any one of his posses-
sion against his will directly or indirectly. And that if any one can be
proved to have done any such thing, he is bound as an injurious person,
to repair all the damage he has done, and is moreover liable to condign
punishment.
s e c t i on cccx x i
One carries off another’s possession directly, either by open force, or by
taking it away clandestinely. The latter is called theft. The former, if the
thing be moveable, is called rapine; and if it be immoveable it is called
force, or violent ejection. Theft is therefore taking away another’s goods
in a clandestine manner, without the knowledge and against the will of
the owner, to make profit of them.* Rapine or robbery is bearing off a
* If a thing be carried away to affront one, or by way of contumely, it is called an
injury; if it be carried away in order to spoil it, it is called damage. Thus in Homer,
Iliad. A. v. 214. Minerva says that Chryseis was taken from Achilles u¤brioc ei¤neka, to
rub an affront upon him. It was therefore an injury, and not theft or robbery. And
he is more properly said to have damaged than to have stollen, who, as Horace says,
Serm. 1. 3. v. 116.
Teneros caules alieni infregerit horti.
[[Horace, Satires I 3.116: “has cut some young cabbages from another’s
garden.”]]
But without doubt Cacus was guilty of theft properly so called,
Quatuor a stabulis praestanti corpore tauros
Avertit, totidem forma superante juvencas,
Atque hos, ne qua forent pedibus vestigia rectis,
Cauda in speluncam tractos, versisque viarum
Indiciis, raptos saxo occultabat opaco.
Virg. Aeneid, 8. v. 207.
[[Virgil, Aeneid 8.205ff., in vol. 2 of Virgil: “But Cacus, his wits wild with
frenzy, that naught of crime or craft might prove to be left undared or unes-
Nor directly
nor indirectly
intercept or
hinder his
possession.
It is done
directly by
theft, rapine
and violent
ejection.
book i , chapter x i i 241
moveable thing by violence, against the owner’s will, to make profit of
it: And force is ejecting one violently out of his possession of an im-
moveable thing. <241>
s e c t i on cccx x i i
One is said to take away another’s possession indirectly, who by fraud-
ulent words or deeds is the cause of his losing it; and this we call de-
fraudation. Now since one is likewise hurt in this manner, but none
ought to do to another what he would not have done to himself (§177);
it is self-evident, that they are no less guilty than thiefs and robbers, who,
by insidious words, cheat one out of his goods;* or by moving bound-
aries, using false weights and measures, and other such knavish practices,
adventure to take off any thing from one’s estate.
sayed, drove from their stalls four bulls of surpassing form, and as many
heifers of peerless beauty. And these, that there might be no tracks pointing
forward, he dragged by the tail into his cavern, and, with the signs of their
course thus turned backwards, he hid them in the rocky darkness.”]]
Tho’ the ancients thought theft might be said of immoveables (l. 38. D. de usurp. &
usucap. Gell. Noct. Attic. 11. 18. Plin. Hist. nat. 2. 68. [[Pliny the Elder, Natural
History, vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 68]] Gronov. observ. 1. 4. p. 42. [[Gronovius, Observa-
tionum libri III ]]) yet this application of the word is inconvenient, and therefore we
do not use it in that sense.
* For all these crimes agree in one common end, this being the design of the thief,
the robber and the defrauder, to bereave others of their goods. They agree also with
regard to the motive or impelling cause, viz. knavery. They agree likewise in theeffect,
which is making one poorer. Nay the defrauder is sometimes worse than the thief or
robber in this respect, that he circumvents one under the mask of friendship, and
therefore cannot be so easily guarded against as a thief or robber. They are therefore,
with good reason, joined together by that excellent teacher of morals, Euripides in
Helena, v. 909. who there says, “God hates force, and commands every one to possess
the purchase of his own industry, and not to live by plunder. Base and unjust riches
are to be renounced with contempt.” [[Euripides, Helen, lines 903–5, in Euripides,
vol. 5: Helen, Phoenician Women, Orestes. ]] To which unjust and base riches belongs
more especially, as every one will readily acknowledge, whatever one knavishly cheats
others of.
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s e c t i on cccx x i i i
The last right which belongs to the lord of a thing, viz. the right of re-
covering it, must found <242> an obligation to restore what belongs to
another to its owner. But hence we conclude, that every one, into whose
hands any thing belonging to another comes without his fault, is obliged
to take care that it be restored to its owner;* and therefore, that it ought
not to be hid or concealed, but that public notice ought to be given of
it, that the owner may have it again, upon making his right to it appear,
Deut. xxii. 1. l. 43. §4. D. de furt. and that the possessor ought to be
much more ready to restore it, if the author claim it, or publickly ad-
vertise his having lost it. But in both cases equity requires partly that the
restitution should not be made at the expence of an honest possessor,
and partly that he may not be made richer at another’s cost (§312). <243>
* But even this obligation to restitution does not always take place, because some-
times right reason dissuades from restitution, sometimes the civil laws free the pos-
sessor from all obligation to restitution. An example of the first case is a madman
claiming his sword deposited by himself; of which Seneca of benefits, 4, 10. Cicero
de offic. 1. 10. 3. 25. And like examples are adduced by Ambros. de offic. 1. ult. [[Am-
brose, De officiis. ]] To the last exception belong usucapion and prescription. For that
these are unknown to the law of nature, seems most certain and evident; because
time, which is a mere relation, can, of its own nature, neither give nor take away
dominion. And, as we observed above, our dominion cannot otherwise pass to an-
other than by tradition or transferring. Whence it is plain, that one can neitheracquire
dominion without some deed of the proprietor, nor can the proprietor lose it without
some deed of his own. Wherefore usucapion and prescription owe their origine to civil
laws, which introduced both for the public good, l. 1. D. de usurp. & usucap. partly
to put a period to the trouble and danger of contests, Cicero pro Caecin. c. 26. [[Cic-
ero, “Pro Caecina,” in Pro lege Manilia, Pro Caecina ]] partly to excite men who are
indolent and neglectful, to reclaim their goods in due time, by giving them to see the
advantages of vigilance above negligence; so that the observation of Isocrates is very
just in Archidam. p. 234. “All are persuaded that possessions, whether private or pub-
lic, are confirmed by long prescription, and justly held as patrimonial estate.” [[Isoc-
rates, Isocrates, vol. 1, “Archidamus,” 26 (p. 361).]] But it does not follow, that what-
ever many are persuaded of is therefore a precept of the law of nature. And this it
was proper to mention, that none may be surprized that we have taken no notice of
usucapion and prescription in treating of property or dominion.
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But if the true owner do not appear to claim a thing, it is understood
to be no body’s, and therefore it justly falls to the honest possessor*
(§241). And tho’ those who have assumed to themselves the direction of
consciences, commonly exhort to give things to the poor when theowner
of them does not appear; yet he cannot be called unjust, who, making
use of his right, takes to himself a thing morally free from dominion.
See Nic. Burgund. ad consu. Flandr. l. 2. n. 1.2
Remarks on This Chapter
We have not had occasion for some time to add to our Author, or to
make any remarks on his reasonings. And indeed the reason why I
choose to translate this Author into our language, is because there is
seldom any occasion to add to what he says, and almost never any
ground of disputing against him, so orderly, clear, just and full, is his
method of proceeding in this most useful of all sciences. But because
usucapion and prescription are usually treated of at greater length by
writers on the laws of nature and nations than our Author does; and
because this is a proper occasion to explain a little upon the distinctions
that are commonly made <244> by moralists about the dictates of the
law of nature and right reason, or conformity to them, let me subjoin
the following observations.
1. First of all, it is proper to observe the difference which the Roman
law makes between prescription in general, and that kind of it which
they distinguished by the name of usucapio. By usucapio they meant
* Besides, the master of a thing alone has the right of excluding others from the
use of it. Since therefore the master does not appear, none has this right; and, for this
reason, nothing hinders why an honest possessor may not retain it to himself. But
because in many countries things free from dominion of any value may be claimed
by the people or prince (§242), it is plain, that in such countries, where that custom
or law prevails, an honest occupant ought to offer things, the master of which is not
known, to the magistrates, and may expect from them mh`nutron, the reward of telling
(Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 2. 10. 11).
2. Bourgogne, Ad consuetudines Flandriae aliarumque gentium tractatus contro-
versiarum.
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the manner of acquiring the property of things by the effect of time.
And prescription had also the same meaning; but it signified moreover
the manner of acquiring and losing all sorts of rights and actions, by
the same effect of the time regulated by law. See l. un. C. de usucap.
transf. & Inst. de usucap. and Domat’s civil law, in their natural order,
T. 1. p. 485. But writers on the law of nature have now very seldom
occasion to make use of the word usucapio; that of prescription being
now common by usage, both to the manner of acquiring the property
of things, and to that of acquiring and losing all sorts of rights by the
effect of time. 2. The chief reasons assigned by the Roman law for
the first introducing of property by prescription, are, as Pufendorff of
the law of nature and nations hath observed, book 4. cap. 12. §5. “That
in order to the avoiding of confusion, and cutting off disputes and
quarrels, it is of great consequence to the public welfare, that the pro-
prieties of things should be fixed and certain amongst the subjects,
which would be impossible, should perpetual indulgence be allowed to
the negligence of former owners, and should the new possessors be left
in continual fear of losing what they held. (Ne scilicet quarundam re-
rum diu & fere semper incerta dominia essent, l. 1. ff. de usurp. &
usucap.) Again, trade and commerce could not otherwise subsist in the
world. For who would ever contract with another? who would ever
make a purchase, if he could never be secured in the quiet possession
of any thing conveyed to him? Nor would it be a sufficient remedy in
this case, that if the thing should be thus challenged by a third party,
the person from whom we receive it should be obliged to make it good;
for after so long a course of time, thousands of accidents might render
him incapable of giving us this satisfaction. And what grievous com-
motions must shake the commonwealth, if at so vast a distanceof years,
so many contracts were to be disannulled, so many successions were to
be declared void, and so many possessors to be ejected? It was therefore
judged sufficient to allow such a time, as large as in reason could be
desired, during which the lawful proprietors might recover their own.
But if through sloth and neglect they suffered it to slip, the Praetor
might fairly reject their too late importunity. And tho’ it might so hap-
pen, that now and then a particular person lost his advantage of re-
covering his goods, utterly against his will and without his fault, only
because he was unable to find out the possessor, yet the damage and
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inconvenience arising from that general statute to some few private
men, is compensated by the benefit it affords to the public.” It was a
judicious reflexion of Aratus of <245> Sicyon in Tully’s offices, l. 2. c.
23. “He did not think that possessions of fifty years shouldbe disturbed,
because in so long time many things in inheritances, purchases and
portions, might be held without an injury to any.” 3. Now from the
nature of property acquired by prescription, i.e. by the effect of time
regulated by law, and the reasons upon which the utility, or rather ne-
cessity of it is founded, it is plain on the one hand, that whatever is not
subject of commerce, cannot be the object of prescription, such as lib-
erty; so prime, so essential a blessing; a blessing so much dearer than
life, that none can ever be presumed so much as tacitely to have con-
sented to be a slave! Liberty, a blessing, a right in the nature of things
unalienable; or to renounce which is contrary to nature, and the will
of the author of nature, who made all men free! Public places, goods
belonging to the public, &c. So, on the other hand, whatever is the object
of commerce may be the object of prescription, i.e. property in it may
be acquired by the effect of time. As every man who is otherwisecapable
of acquiring dominion, is likewise capable of prescribing; so by this
right of prescription we may acquire dominion over both sorts of
things, moveable and immoveable, unless they are particularlyexcepted
by the laws. But moveable things may pass into prescription sooner
than immoveable, for this reason, that immoveables are judged a much
greater loss than moveables; that they are not so frequently made the
subject of commerce between man and man; that it is not so easy to
acquire the possession of them, without knowing whether the party
that conveys them be the true proprietor or the false; and consequently,
that they are likely to occasion fewer controversies and suits. Plato’s
rules for the prescription of moveables are these: “If a thing of this
kind be used openly in the city, let it pass into prescription in one year;
if in the country in five years: if it be used privately in the city, the
prescription shall not be compleated in less than three years. If it be
thus held with privacy in the country, the person that lost it shall have
ten years allowed him to put in his claim, de leg. l. 12.”3 As for the
prescription of immoveables, the constitution of Plato’s common-
3. Plato, The Laws 954d.
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wealth was not acquainted with it. It is proper to observe here, that by
the civil law prescription has not only respect to property; but it de-
stroys other rights and actions when men are not careful to maintain
them, and preserve the use of them during the time limited by the law.
Thus a creditor loses his debt for having omitted to demand it within
the time limited for prescription, and the debtor is discharged from it
by the long silence of his creditor. Thus other rights are acquired by a
long enjoyment, and are lost for want of exercising them. See Domat’s
civil law, &c. T. 1. book. 3. t. 7. §4. 1. and the Roman laws there quoted.
And all the long reasonings in Thomasius de perpetuitate debitorum pe-
cuniariorum, and in Titius’s observations on Lauterbach, obs. 1033, and
elsewhere, quoted by the very learned Barbeyrac on Pufendorff, of the
law of nature <246> and nations, book 4. cap. 12. 1.4 to shew how far
prescription is of natural right, and what civil law adds to it, do not
prove, that the law of nature does not permit, nay require, that a time
should be limited, even for claiming rights, upon the elapsing of which,
rights and actions, and what the lawyers call incorporeal things, are
prescribed. No one ever pretended, that the law of nature fixed a time
which gave a title by prescription with regard to things corporeal or
incorporeal. But if security of property and commerce require, that
such a time should be fixed, where there is property and commerce,
then the law of nature or right reason requires that a time prescribing
be fixed so far as security of property and commerce, and quiet pos-
session by honest industry require it, whether with respect to corporeal
or incorporeal things. Let me just add upon this head, that whereas it
was said above, that things out of commerce cannot be prescribed, yet
by the civil law one may acquire or lose by prescription, certain things
which are not of commerce; but it is when they are connected with
others, of which one may have the property. They are acquired by their
connection with such other things. See Domat ibidem. Now, if here
also it be said, that the law of nature knows no such distinction: the
answer is, that the law of nature or right reason acknowledges every
distinction which the public utility of a state requires, in order to pre-
4. Thomasius (praeses ) and Hofmann (respondens ), Dissertatio juridica de per-
petuitate. For Titius’s observations, see Schu¨tz and Lanterbach, Thesaurus juris
civilis.
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vent confusion and quarrels, and to render honest industry secure in
the enjoyment of its just acquisitions. For, 4. whatever distinctions
moral writers have made about belonging or being reducible into the
law of nature, directly or indirectly, immediately, remotely, or abu-
sively; this is plain, that in order to determine what the law of nature
or right reason says about a case, the circumstances of the case must be
put. For in the science of the law of nature, as well as other sciences,
however general the rules or canons may be, yet in this sense they are
particular, that they only extend to such or such cases, such or such
circumstances. Now, if we apply this general position to the present
question, it will appear that prescription is of the law of nature, in the
same sense that testamentary succession, or succession to intestates is
of the law of nature, viz. That right reason is able to determine with
regard to prescription, in like manner as with regard to the others, some
general rules which equity and public, common security require to be
settled about them, where any number of men live in commerce, and
property is established, that industry may have due liberty and security.
Testamentary succession, and succession to intestates, as we have found
them to be regulated by right reason, may be detrimental in some cases
to the public, because in some cases, it may be more the interest of the
public that any other should succeed to an estate than the heirs ac-
cording to these general rules with regard to succession, by or without
testament. But notwithstanding such detriment that may in some cases
happen to the public, general rules about succession are necessary; and
none are fitter to be such than those which most encourage in-
<247>dustry, by best securing the possessor in his right of disposing
of his own, the great motive to industry; and those which determine
succession in the way it is properest for the general good, that men’s
affections should operate towards others. In like manner, whatever det-
riment may arise in certain cases from the general rule, that time should
give a title by prescription; yet the general rule ought to obtain, because
it is the best general rule that can be conceived, the least inconvenient,
or rather the best for the security of commerce and property, being the
best encouragement to honest industry, by giving the securest posses-
sion of its honest acquisitions. In fine, if we ask what the law of nature
says about succession, or prescription, or any thing else, we must put
a case or enumerate the circumstances; and therefore, we must either
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ask what it requires about them where men are in a state of nature, or
where men are under civil government. If we confine the questions of
the law of nature to the former case (tho’ there be distinctions to be
made even in that case, as will appear afterwards) yet we limit the sci-
ence too much, and render it almost useless: But if we extend it to what
right reason requires under civil government, we must, in order to pro-
ceed distinctly, define the principal end of the civil constitution, and
its nature, before we can answer the question; which will then be two-
fold. Either, 1. What that particular constitution requires, in consis-
tency with its end and frame, with regard to prescription, for instance,
or any other thing? Or, 2. Whether the end and frame of that consti-
tution requiring such and such rules about prescription for instance,
or succession, or any other thing, be a good end, and a good frame, i.e.
whether all the parts of it, considered as making a particular consti-
tution, do make one consonant to the great general end of all govern-
ment, public happiness? Thus, if we attend to the necessity of thus stat-
ing the meaning of what is called determination by natural law, we will
easily see that what is urged from the laws in the Jewish commonwealth
against prescription, does not prove that right reason does not require
that every state should make some regulation with regard to the effect
of time, as to security in possession. For tho’ the divine law, which
prohibited perpetual alienations for several reasons, abolished by that
means prescription, yet the letter of this law being no longer in force,
where alienations which transfer the property for ever are allowed, the
use of prescription is wholly natural in such a state and condition, and
so necessary, that without this remedy every purchaser and every pos-
sessor being liable to be troubled to all eternity, there would never be
any perfect assurance of a sure and peaceable possession. And even
those who should chance to have the oldest possession, would have
most reason to be afraid, if together with their possession they had not
preserved their titles. See Domat’s civil laws, &c. T. 1. p. 483. God, for
reasons arising from the constitution of the Jewish republic, forbad the
perpetual alienation of their immoveable estates (and not of their
goods in general, as some objectors against prescription urge) but all
their <248> laws concerning usury, conveyances, and other things,were
necessarily connected together, and with their Agrarian law, (as we shall
see afterwards). And therefore there is nothing in the law of Moses that
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condemns prescription as an unjust establishment; and we can no more
infer it from hence to be such (as Barbeyrac well observes, ibidem)5
than we may conclude that the perpetual alienation of lands is odious,
and not conformable to natural right. But not to insist longer on this
head, it is not only evident that the law of nature for the security of
property and the encouragement of industry requires, that a time
should be regulated for the effect of possession as to prescribing, in all
states which admit of alienations and commerce; but that it requires
that this time should be the most equal that can be fixed upon, all the
circumstances of a particular state being considered, with regard to the
non-disturbance of honest industry, i.e. the properest to preventunjust
dispossession on either side, i.e. either with respect to the first or the
last possessor. And therefore, 5. There is no difficulty with regard to the
following general maxims about it. 1. That prescription may affectually
proceed, ’tis requisite that the party receiving the thing at the hands of
a false proprietor, do obtain this possession by a just title; and conse-
quently, that he act in this matter bona fide, with fair and honest in-
tention. For this is necessary to just possession. “A man doth not be-
come a just possessor of a thing barely by taking it to himself, but by
holding it innocently.” Detaining is otherwise, as Tacitus expresses it,
diutina licentia, a long continued injustice. Upon this head Pufendorff
observes, that according to the civil law, ’tis enough if a man had this
uprightness of intention at his first entring on the possession, though
he happens afterwards to discover, that the person who conveyed it to
him was not the just proprietor. But the canon law requires the same
integrity throughout the whole term of years, on which the prescrip-
tion is built. But Barbeyrac justly takes notice in his notes, “That the
maxim in the civil law is better grounded than that of the canon law.
And the artifice of the clergy consists not so much in this, that the
determinations of the Popes require a perpetual good intention in him
that prescribes, as in this, that they will have the goods of the church
look’d upon as not capable of being alienated, either absolutely, or un-
der such conditions as will make all prescriptions void.”6 2. Another
5. See note 1 by Jean Barbeyrac in bk. 1, xii.7, of Pufendorf ’s Law of Nature and
Nations.
6. See note 5 by Jean Barbeyrac in bk. 4, xii. 3 of Pufendorf ’s Of the Law of Nature
and Nations.
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necessary condition is, that it be founded on constant possession, such
as hath not been interrupted, either naturally, as if the thing hath re-
turned in the mean while to the former owner, or hath at any time lain
abandoned or forsaken: or civilly, as if the owner had been actually
engaged at law with the possessor for the recovery of what he lost; or
at least by solemn protestations hath put in a salvo to his right. 3. That
the space of time during which the prime possessor holds the thing,
shall be reckoned to the benefit of him that succeeds in the possession,
provided that both the former and the latter first entered upon it <249>
with honest minds, and upon a just title. For otherwise the prime pos-
sessor shall not be allowed to make over his time to the next holder,
and consequently, if the former come to the possession by dishonest
means, the time he passed in it shall not be computed towards the pre-
scription of the latter, tho’ he, for his own part, obtained the possession
fairly and justly. See Pufendorff, ibidem. 4. Prescription does not run
against minors. And if one that is major happens to have a right un-
divided with a minor, the prescription which could not run against the
minor, will have no effect against the major. And the same reason for
which prescription does not run against minors, hinders it likewise
from running against those whom a long absence disables from pur-
suing their rights; which is to be understood not only of absence on
account of public business, but also of other absences occasioned by
accidents, such as captivity. See Domat’s civil law, ibidem. And for the
same reasons, it is highly agreeable to reason, that the timeduringwhich
a country hath been the seat of war, shall not avail towardsprescription.
But with regard to minority, it is remarked by Pufendorff ibidem, that
there may be a case in which the favour of possession shall overbalance
the favour of majority. As for instance, suppose it should so happen,
that when I want only a month or two of compleating my prescription,
and it is morally certain that the ancient proprietor will not within that
space give me any trouble about the title, and if he should then decease
leaving an infant heir, it would be unreasonably hard, if after five and
twenty years possession, I should be thrust out of my hold for want of
those two months, especially if it be now impossible for me to recover
damages of him from whom I received what is thus challenged, as I
might have done, had the dispute happened before the goods devolved
on the minor. See this subject more fully discussed than it can be done
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in a short note, by Pufendorff and Grotius. It is sufficient for our pur-
pose to have taken notice of these few things relative to prescription;
and to have observed once for all, that unless the determinations of the
law of nature be confined to signify the determinations of right reason
with regard to a state of nature, (a very limited sense of the law of
nature, in which it is hardly ever taken by any writer) every decision of
right reason concerning equity, justice, and necessity or conduciveness
to the public good of society, or of men having property and carrying
on commerce, is a decision of the law of nature. Whatever reason finds
to be the best general rule in this case is a law of nature; and in this
sense, prescription is of the law of nature, i.e. reason is able to settle
several general rules about it in consequence of what commerce, the
security of property, and the encouragement of industry make neces-
sary. So that where reason is able to make any such decisions, it is an
impropriety to say, that thing is not of the law of nature, because some
forms and modes relative to it must be determined and settled by con-
vention, or by civil constitution; as the parti-<250>cular spacesof time,
for instance, with regard to prescription of moveables and immovea-
bles, &c. must be. For if right reason requires, that time should have
a certain effect with regard to property, then is prescription of the law
of nature, which by its definition is the acquisition or addition of a
property, by means of long possession. But indeed we may safely say,
that the law of nature is an absolute stranger to the debates among
lawyers, whether prescription should be defined with Modestinus ad-
jectio, or adeptio with Ulpianus; for all such disputes are mere verbal
wranglings, grievossly cumbersome to right reason and true science.
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Concerning things belonging to commerce.
s e c t i on cccx x v
After men had departed from the negative communion of things, and
dominion was introduced, they began to appropriate useful things to
themselves in such a manner, that they could not be forced to allow any
one the use of them, but might set them aside wholly for themselves,
and their own use (§236). But hence it followed of necessity, that all men
had not the same stock, but that some abounded in things of one kind,
which others wanted; and therefore one was obliged to supply what was
wanting to himself either by the labour of another, or out of his pro-
vision. Yea, because every soil does not produce every thing,* necessity
* To this purpose belongs that elegant observation in Virgil, georg. 1. v. 54.
This ground with Bacchus, that with Ceres suits,
That other loads the trees with happy fruits.
A fourth with grass, unbidden decks the ground,
Thus Tmolus is with yellow saffron crown’d.
India black ebon and white ivory bears,
And soft Iduma weeps her od’rous tears.
Thus Pontus sends her beaver stores from far,
And naked Spaniards temper steel for war.
Epirus for the Elian chariot breeds,
(In hopes of palms ) a race of running steeds.
Thus is th’ original contract; these the laws
Impos’d by nature, and by nature’s cause.
To the same effect does this poet sing at greater length, georg. 2. v. 199. & seq. Com-
pare with these passages, Varro de re rustica, 1. 23. Ovid. de arte amandi, 4. v. 578.
How men
began to want
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forced men to give to others a share of the things in which they
abounded, and which they had procured by their own art and industry,
and to acquire to themselves what they wanted in exchange; which when
they began to do, they are said to have instituted commerce. <251>
s e c t i on cccx x v i
Indeed if all men were virtuous, none would have reason to fear any
want. For every one would then liberally give to those who wanted of
what he had in abundance (§221). But since the love of mankind hath
waxed cold, and we live in times when virtue is praised, and starves, there
was a necessity of devising that kind of commerce, by which another
might be obliged, not merely by humanity and beneficence, but by per-
fect obligation, to transfer to us the dominion of things necessary or
useful to us, and to assist us by their work and labour.
s e c t i on cccx x v i i
By commerce therefore we understand the exchange of useful things and
labour, arising not from mere benevolence, but founded on perfect ob-
ligation. But since by commerce either work is performed, or dominion
and possession is transferred, which obligation ought to be extorted from
none <252> without his knowledge, and against his will (§320); the
consequence is, that commerce requires the consent of both parties.
Now, that consent of two persons concerning the exchange of necessary
work, or things which is not of mere humanity and beneficence, but of
perfect obligation, is commonly called a contract; and therefore it is ob-
vious, that commerce cannot be carried on without the intervention of
contracts.*
and above all, Seneca, ep. 87. who having quoted the passage of Virgil above cited,
adds, “These things are thus separated into different provinces, that commerce
amongst men might be necessary, and every one might want and seek from another.”
[[Ovid, Amores; Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, vol. 2, letter 87, p. 335.]] Ar-
istotle urges the same origine and necessity of commerce, Nicomach. 5. 8. Polit. 1. 6.
* This is observed by Isocrates, except. adv. Callimach. p. 742. “There is such a
The necessity
of commerce.
That could not
be done but
by contracts.
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s e c t i on cccx x v i i i
From the nature of commerce, as it hath been defined (§327), it is evi-
dent, that it will rarely happen that one will communicate his goods or
labour with another gratuitously; but every one will desire something to
be returned to him, which he thinks equivalent to the goods or labour
he communicates. Wherefore, those who would commute things or la-
bour one with another, must compare things together; which compar-
ison cannot otherwise be made, than by affixing a value to things, by
means of which an equality can be obtained and preserved. But a quan-
tity, moment, or value affixed to goods and labour, by means of which
they may be compared, is called price. And therefore most contracts can-
not take place without affixing or settling price. * <253>
s e c t i on cccx x i x
This comparison is instituted either between goods and work by them-
selves, or a common measure is applied, by which all other things are
valued. In the first case, vulgar or proper price takes place, or the value
force in pacts, that many affairs among the Barbarians, as well as Greeks, are trans-
acted by them. Upon the faith of them we bargain, and carry on commerce. By them
we make contracts with one another; by them we put an end to private feuds or public
war. This one thing all men continue to use as a common good.” [[Isocrates, Isocrates,
vol. 3, “Against Callimachus,’’ secs. 27–28, p. 271.]]
* Hence by the Greeks not only pacts and contracts, but all kinds of commerce
are called sumbola´c, su´mbola, sumbo´laia, sumbo´laia koinwnika´, from the verb
sumba´llein, which signifies to bring together and compare. For those who are to
interchange goods or labour, compare them together, every one assigns a certain value
to his goods or work, and so demands a proportional return. Thus, e.g. if we fix the
proportion of gold to silver to be as eleven to one, we affix to each metal a moral
quantity or price; which being done, nothing is more easy than to exchange these
metals, and keep equality. But we say most contracts suppose the price of things
determined, not all. For some are gratuitous, and therefore contracts are rightly di-
vided into onerous, when the burden on both sides is equal; beneficent, when one
obliges himself to do any thing to another gratuitously; and contracts of chance, in
which fortune so reigns, that one may receive what is done by another sometimes
with, and sometimes without any onerous title.
Most of them
suppose the
price of labour
and things
fixed.
Price is either
vulgar or
eminent.
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we put upon goods and labour compared amongst themselves. In the
latter case, there is a common measure by which we estimate all things
that enter into commerce, which is called eminent price; * such as is
money amongst us. But in both cases equality is required. <254>
* Hence Aristotle justly defines money; “A common measure to which all things
are referred, and by which all things are estimated,” Nicomach. 9. 1. And hence all
things which enter into commerce are said to be purchasable by money. This alone
is reprehensible, that men should estimate things by money, which do not enter into
commerce; such as, justice, chastity, and conscience itself. And against this venality
the antient poets have severely inveighed. Horat. serm. 2. 3. v. 94.
Omnis enim res,
Virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque, pulchris
Divitiis parent: quas qui construxerit, ille
Clarus erit, fortis, justus, sapiensne etiam, & rex,
Et quidquid volet.
[[Horace, Satires II, 3.94: “For everything, virtue, reputation, glory, the hu-
man and divine, obeys beautiful riches: as for the man who piles them up,
he will be famous, brave, just, even wise, and a king, and whatever he may
want.”]]
So Propertius, 3. 10.
Aurea nunc vere sunt saecula, plurimus auro
Venit honos, auro conciliatur amor.
Auro pulsa fides, auro venalia jura,
Aurum lex sequitur, mox sine lege pudor.
[[This passage is not from Propertius, Elegies 3.10, but from Ovid, Ars ama-
toria 2.277: “These truly are the golden ages, the highest honour comes to
gold, love is won by gold, faith is broken by gold, oaths are on sale for gold,
the law follows gold, soon shame without a law.”]]
Many such like passages are to be found among the antients, as in Petronius’s satyr-
icon, c. 137. and in Menander, of whom we have this elegant saying concerning a
rich man preserved;
Opta modo, quidquid volueris: omnia evenient:
Ager, domus, medici, supellex argentea,
Amici, judices, testes: dederis mado.
Quin & deos ipsos ministros facile habebis.
[[“Only choose whatever you want: everything will turn out: land, houses,
doctors, silver supplicating, friends, judges, witnesses: now you will have
given them. In fact you will easily have the gods themselves too as your ser-
vants” (translation by the editors). Menander (342–292 b.c.), Athenian au-
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s e c t i on cccx x x
That in the earlier times of the world men knew nothing but the proper
price of things, is plain, because eminent price could not have been in-
stituted without the consent of many; but every one imposed vulgar
price upon his own work and goods at his pleasure. But since that is
done with intention, and in order to purchase by them what one wants
from another (§325); it is plain, that regard ought to be had in fixing the
price of goods and labour to others from whom we want certain things;
and therefore they ought to be estimated at such a rate, as it is probable
others will be willing to purchase them.* <255>
s e c t i on cccx x x i
Now, since work or things ought to be valued at such a price as it is
probable others from whom we want any thing will purchase them; it is
obvious, that sometimes the necessity and indigence of others will raise
the price of things;† and sometimes the scarcity of the thing will raise
thor of comedies, the greatest part of which have only survived in fragmen-
tary form. It is not evident from which play this particular quotation hasbeen
translated.]]
* For if we suppose the Arabians to estimate their incense and spiceries at such a
price, that they would not give above one dram of them for six hundred bushels of
corn, they would never get corn at that price, because none would exchange it upon
so unequal terms, nor would others get their spices; and thus there would be a stop
to commerce, for the sake of which price is devised. Since therefore the means ought
to be as the end, the consequence is, that price ought to be fixed so that commerce
can be carried on; and for this reason, in settling it regard ought to be had to others
from whom we would purchase any thing.
† It is true indeed, that the most necessary things have not always the highestprice,
kind providence having so ordered it, that the things which we can least dispensewith
the want of are abundant every where; and those things only are rare and difficult to
be found, which are not necessary, and which nature itself does not crave, as Vitruvius
justly philosophizes, Architect. 8. praef. [[Vitruvius, Ten Books on Architecture.]] But
if necessity be joined with scarcity, e.g. if there is every where a dearth of corn, the
price of it rises very high, as experience tells us. And then happens, as Quintilian says,
declam. 12. “In magna inopia, quidquid emi potest, vile est.” “In great scarcity, what
can be bought is cheap.” [[Quintilian, The Major Declamations Ascribed toQuintilian,
How vulgar
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it; and that regard ought likewise to be had to workmanship, the intrinsic
excellence of the thing, the labour and expence bestowed upon it, the
danger undergone for it; and, in fine, to the paucity or multitude of those
who want the goods or labour, and various other such circumstances.
s e c t i on cccx x x i i
It may be objected, that men are accustomed to put an immense value
upon their own goods, a much greater certainly than any one will pur-
chase them at, whether it be that the author renders them precious, or
their rarity, or some remarkable event which they recal to our memory.
But since we are now treating of the duties which ought to be observed
in commerce, and that kind of price is not commonly considered in
commerce, but on-<256>ly in repairing damages (§212),* it is evident
that this price does not destroy our rule.
“XII: The Case of the People Who Ate Corpses,” 159.]] The seven years famine in
Egypt was an instance of this, Gen. xlvii. 14. & seq.
* Fancy or affection is of such a nature, that it cannot pass from one to another;
and therefore it will be no motive to one to purchase a thing from me at a greater
price, because it is agreeable to me on account of its serving to recal something to my
memory that gives me pleasure. But this however is but generally true: for sometimes
in commerce even this price is considered; as when, 1. The affection to a thing is
common on account of the author or artist, or of its singular beauty and rarity.Hence
the statues of Phidias, and the more finished pictures of Apelles or Parrhasius, sold
at a higher than the vulgar or proper price, because they deserved the common esteem
of all mankind. 2. If the purchaser has a greater affection to a thing than the possessor;
e.g. if my possession would greatly better another’s, and he therefore desire, like him
in Horace, who thus speaks, serm. 2. 6.
O si angulus ille
Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellunt!
[[Horace, Satires II, 6.8–9: “Oh, if that nearest little corner could be added,
which now disfigures the shape of my little farm!”]]
What is called
price of
affection.
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s e c t i on cccx x x i i i
But since commerce was instituted among men that one might supply
his wants out of another’s stock or labour (§326), and price was devised
for no other reason but that equality might be obtained in the exchange
of goods or labour (§328); it could not but happen very often, that one
might not have a very great abundance of what another might want,
that one might despise what another would desire to exchange, and that
the value of things which persons might desire to commute, might be
so uncertain and variable, that some of the parties must run a risk of
loss; and that the things to be exchanged might be of such a bulk, that
they could not be commodiously transported to distant places, or could
not be taken proper care of in the journey.—All which inconveniencies
not being otherwise avoidable, necessity itself at last devised some em-
inent <257> price that all would receive, and the proportion of which
to goods could easily be determined.*
s e c t i on cccx x x i v
The end of money, or eminent price, requires that the matter chosen for
that purpose be neither too rare, nor too common, nor useless, and in
itself of no price;† that it be easily divisible into small parts, and yet not
* This is observed by Paullus JC. l. 1. D. de contra empt. who describes the origine
of buying and selling as above. Aristotle likewise gives much the same account of the
matter, ad Nicomach. §8. and Polybius 1. 6. upon which passages Perizonius hath
commented with much erudition, de aere gravi §2. p. 6. & seq. [[Perizonius, Disser-
tatio de aere gravi ]] as has Duaren. upon that of Paullus animad. 1. 6. [[Franciscus
Duarenus (Franc¸ois Douaren) (1509–59), French humanist jurist.]]
† Wherefore Aristotle justly calls Money, Nicomach. 5. 8. “a surety, which if one
carries along with him he may purchase any thing.” Whence Pufendorff of the law
of nature and nations, v. 1. 13. justly reasons thus: “As we accept a man of known
credit and value, and not every common fellow for a surety, so no man would part
with his goods, which perhaps he had acquired with great labour and industry, for
what he might meet with any where, as a handful of dust and sand; it was necessary
therefore, that money should consist of such a matter, as might be convenient for
keeping, and by reason of its scarcity, should have the value of many things crowded
and united with it.”
Why eminent
price was
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too brittle; that it may be easily kept and laid up, and easily transported
to any distance; because, if it was too scarce, there would not be a suf-
ficient quantity of it to serve the uses of mankind; and if it was too
common, it would be of no price or value, in which case, it would not
be received by all; if it could not be easily divided into any portions,
equality in commerce could not be obtained by it; and yet, if it was too
brittle, it would easily wear out by use, and thus its possessors would be
impoverished. In fine, if it could neither be conveniently kept, nor easily
transported, the same inconvenience which rendered commercedifficult
before the invention of it, would still remain (§333). <258>
s e c t i on cccx x x v
But because these properties belong to no other matter but the more
precious kinds of metals, as gold, silver and brass; these metals are there-
fore applied to this use, and hence coined money of various weights and
sizes hath seemed to most civilized nations the properest substance to
answer the ends of commerce. If any people hath thought fit to give an
eminent price to any other matter,* it hath been done out of necessity,
and for want of money, and with this intention, that the scarcity or dif-
ficulty being over, every one might receive solid money for the symbol-
* Thus the Carthaginians used instead of money something I know not what,
fastened to a bit of skin, and marked with some public stamp, Aeschin. dialog. de
divit. c. 24. p. 78. edit. Petri Horrei. [[Aischines, Aeschinis Socratici dialogi III. ]] The
Lacedemonians an useless lump of iron, idem ibid. p. 80. Plutarch. Lycurg. p. 51.
[[Plutarch, “Lycurgus,” in Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 1]] other nations used shells, Leo Afr.
l. 7. [[Leo Africanus, Africae descriptio IX libris absoluta ]] others grainsof corn,kernels
of fruit, berries, lumps of salt, Pufendorff. §1. 13. [[Pufendorf, Law of Nature, bk. 5,
chap. 1.]] Examples of paper, leather, lead, and other things made use of for money
in besieged towns, are to be found (not to mention instances from more modern
history) in Polyaenus Strategem. 3. 10. [[Polyaenus, Stratagems of war ]] and there
Masuic. p. 274. Seneca de beneficiis, 5. 14. But all such money used in barbarous
nations, is capable of carrying on but a very small trade among themselves. And sym-
bolical money used in public calamities, is really to be considered as tickets or bills,
which the supreme magistrate obliges himself to give ready money for, when the
distress is over. Thus Timotheus is said by Polyaenus to have persuaded merchants
to take his seal for money, to be received upon returning it.
Why the
nobler metals
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ical; or such money hath only been used by a nation within itself, and
was not proper for carrying on commerce with foreign nations. <259>
s e c t i on cccx x x v i
Tho’ it belong to the supreme power in a state to fix the value of money
(as we shall shew afterwards in the proper place); yet, as with respect to
vulgar or proper price, regard ought to be had to others from whom we
would have any thing in exchange (§330); so it is evident, that a value
ought to be put upon money, at which it is probable other nations, with
whom we are in commerce, will not refuse it; and therefore the value of
it ought to be regulated according to that proportion of one metal to
another, which is approved by neighbouring civilized nations, unless we
would fright other nations from having any commerce with us, or be
ourselves considerable losers.*<260>
* For if we put too high a value on our money, foreign nations will either not care
to have commerce with us, or they will raise the price of their commodities in pro-
portion to the intrinsic value of our money. But if we put a less value on our money
than neighbouring nations, nothing is more certain, than that our good money will
remove to our neighbours, and their bad money will come to us in its room, so that
none will know what he is worth. Hence it follows, in the more civilized nations, the
proportion of gold to silver varying according to times, and being sometimes as
twelve, sometimes as eleven, sometimes as ten to one, the price of gold must be some-
times higher and sometimes lower. (See our dissertat. de reduct. monet. ad just. pret.
§24.) [[Heineccius and Egelgraser, De reductione monetae.]] Wherefore the Arabians
could not but be great losers, who, according to Diodorus Siculus, Bibliothec. 3. 45.
received for brass and iron an equal weight of gold; or, as Strabo, Geogr. 16. p. 1124.
[[Strabo, Geography ]] paid for brass three times the weight of gold, for iron twice the
weight, and for silver ten times the weight, partly through their ignorance of arts,
and partly through their indigence of those things which they bartered for it, that
were more necessary to them. See what is related of the Peruvians by Garcillass. de
la Vega dans l’histoire des Yncas, 5. 4. p. 425. [[Garcilaso de la Vega (1539–1616), au-
thor of the Commentarios reales que tratan del origen de los Incas of 1609 (Royal Com-
mentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru ).]]
What price
is to be put
on money.
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s e c t i on cccx x x v i i
That we may now come to the contracts, by means of which commerce
is carried on (§327), it is obvious to every one, that one kind of contracts
took place while the proper price of things only was known, and money
or eminent price was not yet in use (§330), and that after money was
invented another kind took place, and that some were known both after
and before money was in use. Among those which took place before
money was in use, the first and principal is bartering. For in the first ages
of the world commerce was only carried on by exchanging or bartering
commodities and labour; and therefore bartering is the most antient of
contracts; and it continued still to be in use in many nations, aftermoney
was in use, as well as where no price was yet put upon gold, silver, and
brass.*
s e c t i on cccx x x v i i i
Bartering is giving something of our own for something belonging to
another; which, because it may be done two ways, i.e. either with, or
without estimating and putting a certain price upon the <261> things
exchanged, it therefore follows, that when no estimation is made, it is
called simple bartering; and when an estimation is made, and price fixed,
it is called estimatory bartering. The former is somewhat like mutual do-
nation, and the latter somewhat like buying and selling, l. 1. C. de per-
* So it was among our ancestors the ancient Germans, Tacitus de moribus Germ.
c. 5. who observes, that in his time the Germans who lay nearest to the Roman prov-
inces, had conceived some desire of money. Justin, hist. 2. 2. relates the like of the
Scythians. Pomponius Mela of the Satarchi, a People in the European Scythia, de
situ orbis, 2. 1. [[Pomponius Mela (fl. 40 a.d.), Latin geographer. His De situ orbis
was published in various editions in the first half of the eighteenth century.]] Strabo
of the Spaniards, Geogr. 3. p. 233. The same is yet practised by several nations in Asia,
Africa and America: And it is the less to be wondered at with respect to barbarous
countries, since the Greeks and Romans, long after the invention of money, carried
on commerce in no other way but by barter. We have a noted example of it among
the Greeks in Homer, Iliad 7. v. 482. and among the Romans in Plin. nat. hist. 18.
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mut. l. 1. §1. D. de contr. emt. For tho’ Pufendorff of the duties of a
man and a citizen, 1. 15. 8. asserts that mutual donation is quite a different
business from bartering, because it is not necessary that equality should
be observed in it, yet there is no difference in this respect; for neither is
equality observed in simple bartering. *
s e c t i on cccx x x i x
Because simple barter is somewhat like mutual donation, and it is not
necessary that equality should be observed in it (§338), it is plain neither
of the contracting parties can have any reason to complain of being
wronged, unless the other use force or guile (§322. and 321.) nor is such
a contract null on account of injury, except when he who exchanges a
more precious thing for a thing of no value, has not <262> the free dis-
posal of his goods (§317); and more especially, if the thing thrown away
in such a manner, be of such a kind that it cannot be alienated without
doing something base, unless the accepter himself be perchance guilty
of equal baseness.†
* For in it, each of the contracting parties estimates not his own but the other’s;
and not at the just price others would put upon it, but according to his fancy; and
so there is in such a contract no equality of goods, but of affection or fancy only.
Because as often as the affection of the acquirer is greater than that of the possessor,
regard is had in commerce, as we have already said (§332), to price of affection. The
commerce between Glaucus and Diomedes in Homer, exchanging their arms, fur-
nishes us with an example, Iliad 2. v. 236.
Aurea aereis, centena novenariis, &c.
[[“[G]olden for brass, the worth of an hundred oxen for the value of nine.”
(Homer, The Iliad, vol. 1, 6.236)]]
Of which barter Maximus Tyrius, Dissert. Platon. 23. very elegantly observes, “Nei-
ther did he who received the gold get more than he who got the brass. But both acted
nobly, the inequality of the metals being compensated by the design of theexchange.”
[[Maximus of Tyre, The Philosophical Orations, Oration 35.3, p. 277.]]
† Hence it may be doubted, whether the exchange made by Jacob and Esau, the
latter of whom shamefully sold his birth-right for pottage, Gen. xxv. 29. would have
been valid in foro humano. For tho’ Esau was very blame-worthy in setting so small
a value upon the prerogative God had favoured him with, and he be on that account
very justly called by the apostle, Heb. xii. 6. a profane person; yet Jacob acted no less
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s e c t i on cccx l
In estimatory permutation or barter, since here a price is put upon the
things to be exchanged, (§338), equality ought certainly to be observed,
and neither ought to wrong the other; nor is the barter valid if either be
circumvened, unless the injury be of so little moment that it be not
worth minding.* <263>
s e c t i on cccx l i
But men not only barter commodities, but likewise work for work, or
work for other considerations; whence these contracts, I give that you
may do; I do that you may give, and I do that you may do; which being of
the same kind and nature with barter, or reducible to barter, simple or
estimatory (§338), the same rules already laid down concerning them
(§338) must, it is evident, be observed in those contracts. For either one’s
work is estimated with respect to another’s work or goods, (which kind
of negotiation is called, not unelegantly, by Ammian. Marcell. hist. 16.
10.1 pactum reddendae vicissitudinis ) or work for goods is done without
basely in taking advantage of his brother’s hunger, to defraud him of so great a privi-
lege (§322). For what Esau could not sell without a crime, that his brother could not
buy without a crime; and it was his duty to dissuade his brother from such folly, and
not to abuse his weakness. But many things of this sort are admirable in their typical
sense, which are scarcely defensible by the rules of right reason.
* For the vulgar or proper price of things is either legal or conventional; the former
of which is fixed by law, or the will of superiors, the latter by the consent of the
contracting parties. Now, seeing the former is fixed, and consists, as it were in a point,
but the latter is uncertain, or admits of some latitude; in the former case one is justly
thought to be wronged who does not receive the full price; in the latter case, the
damage ought to be of some consideration to invalidate the contract in foro humano.
“For,” as Seneca says of benefits, 6. 15. “what’s the matter what be the value of a
thing, if the price be agreed upon between the buyer and the seller? The price of
every thing is temporary. When you have highly praised things, they are just of so
much value and no more than what they may be sold for.” Hence in formed govern-
ments, we may observe that a contract is only annulled when the injury is enormous,
as by the Roman law, when one of the parties was wronged above half the price, l.
2. C. de rescind. vendit.
1. Marcellinus, Ammianus Marcellinus, 16.12 (not 10) .26.
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any estimation.* And in the former case equality ought to be observed,
and damage of any considerable moment ought to be repaired; but in
the latter all complaints about wrong or hurt are to no purpose. <264>
s e c t i on cccx l i i
There are other contracts by which commerce was carried on before the
invention of money, viz. all gratuitous ones, by which, what before was
only owing to one by imperfect right, or by mere love and benevolence,
became due to him by perfect right, such as a contract of loan. For since
we are obliged to what was called (§228) officiousness, we are likewise
bound to accord to one who may want it, the use of any commodity
belonging to us not consumable, with his obligation to restore it; i.e. to
lend, or give in loan.† But the love of mankind becoming cold, it could
* Such was the promise of Agamemnon in Homer, Iliad. 10. v. 135.
If gifts immense his mighty soul can bow,
Hear all ye Greeks, and witness what I vow:
Ten weighty talents of the purest gold,
And twice ten vases of refulgent mold;
Seven sacred tripods, whose unsully’d frame,
Yet knows no office, nor has felt the flame;
Twelve steeds unmatch’d in fleetness and in force,
And still victorious in the dusty course, &c.
[[Homer, The Iliad of Homer, vol. 3, 10.155 (not 135)–162]]
All this to pacify Achilles.—Whence it is plain, that it was a practice for one to stip-
ulate with one for inestimable services, and to promise him for them whatever he
thought would be most agreeable, without any regard to equality.
† Loan therefore is a perfect obligation to allow another the use of something
belonging to us, on condition of his restoring it to us in specie, gratis. And hence it
is plain, that in natural law a loan scarcely differs from (precarium) what is granted
to one upon his asking it, between which there is however some difference in civil
law. Hence also may this question easily be decided, “Whether a contract of loan
derives its essential obligation from the consent of the contracting parties, or from
the delivery of the thing?” For tho’ by the law of nature, consent alone to the use of
a thing obliges (§327); yet it is not a loan till the thing be delivered; because he to
whom the promise of a loan is made, before he hath received the thing thus promised,
is not obliged to restore it in specie: it is only a pact or agreement about a loan. But
that there is a difference between these two is plain from hence, that the borrower,
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hardly be hoped that one would do this service to another spontaneously
(§326), and therefore necessity forced men to invent a kind of contract,
by which men might be obliged by perfect right thus to grant the use
one to another of their not consumable goods. <265>
s e c t i on cccx l i i i
Now, because the use of a thing is granted by loan, on condition of the
borrower’s restoring it in species (§342),* the former is obliged not only
not to apply the thing borrowed to other uses than those for which it
was given, but likewise to apply it to these uses with the greatest care and
concern; and therefore, when the use is over, or when the proprietor re-
demands it, to restore it to him in species, and if it hath suffered any
damage by his fault, to repair it; but he is not bound to make up for-
tuitous damages, unless he had voluntarily so charged himself (§106);*
nor can he demand for any expences he may have laid out upon it, unless
they exceed the hire to be paid for the letting of such a thing.
s e c t i on cccx l i v
Again, the love of humanity obliges every one to promote the good of
others to the utmost of his power (§216); but since we have only an
imperfect right to demand such good offices, it is often our interest to
by loan, is obliged to restore the thing, but by a compact about lending, he who
promises to lend is obliged to give the thing in loan: so that different obligations arise
from these two negotiations.
* Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 2. 12. 13. was the first who distinguished
here, whether a thing would have perished in like manner in the hands of its pro-
prietor or not; in the latter of which cases, at least, he thinks the loss should fall upon
the borrower: And Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 5. 4. 6. is of the same
opinion; So likewise Mornac, ad l. 1. C. commod. [[Mornac, Observationes in 24
priores libros digestorum. ]] But since accidental or fortuitous events, arising merely
from providence, are imputable to no person (§106), they certainly cannot be im-
puted even to a borrower. Nor is the divine law repugnant to this sentence, Exod.
xxii. 14. For it cannot be understood otherwise than when the borrower is in fault.
See Jo. Clerici Comment. in Exod. p. 110. [[le Clerc, Mosis prophetae libri quatuor. ]]
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stipulate with others, in order to their <266> being obliged by a perfect
right to take the custody of our things deposited with them; and this is
the intention of the contract of deposite or charge, by which we under-
stand a perfect obligation upon another to keep gratis our things in-
trusted to his faith, and to restore them to us upon demand in species.*
s e c t i on cccx l v
It is plain from the definition of a charge, (§344), that the trustee is
obliged to the most watchful custody of his charge, not so much as to
untie it, or take it out of its cover, much less apply it to his use, without
the master’s consent; in which case, the contract becomes not a charge,
but contract of loan or use. And that the trustee is obliged to restore the
thing intrusted to his keeping to its owner whenever he calls for it, unless
right reason dissuade from so doing (§323); and consequently he is not
only bound to make satisfaction, but is likewise worthy of severe pun-
ishment, if knowingly and guilefully he refuses to restore it, more es-
pecially, if it was lodged in his trust in a case of distress.† <267>
* Nothing was more sacred among the ancients than this contract, because the
deponent reposes the greatest trust and confidence in the trustee; and nothing can
be more base than to deceive a friend under the mask of friendship (§322). Hence
the religious veneration paid to such trusts, not only among the Hebrews, of which
see Exod. xxii. 7. and Josephus’s antiquities of the Jews, 4. 8. 38; but among the Greeks
likewise, and several other Pagan nations, as we may learn from the story of Glaucus
in Herodot. 6. 87. and from Juvenal, Sat. 13. v. 15. who there calls it depositum sacrum.
Hence it is not to be wondered, that the ancients pronounced such terrible curses
against those who dared to refuse to give back their charge; and looked upon them
as no less infamous, and equally to be punished with thieves. See what is said on this
subject by Gundlingius in Gundlingianis, part. 2. diss. 8.
† For because regard is had to all circumstances in imputation (§113), therefore
such a crime is so much the more vile and odious, in proportion as he is more in-
human, who not only cheats under the cloak of friendship (§322), but cruelly adds
affliction to the afflicted. This is warmly urged by Hecuba against Polymnestor, who,
when Troy was destroyed, killed Polydorus, son to Priam, that he might have the
gold entrusted with him to himself, Hecub. v. 1210, & seq. Euripides. [[Euripides,
“Hecuba,” in Euripides, trans. Way, vol. 1.]]
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s e c t i on cccx l v i
Again, the love of humanity ought to excite every one to assist another
as readily as himself (§216); but because one cannot be sure of that from
another, there is need of a contract, by which we may oblige one to
manage our business which we have committed to him diligently, with-
out any reward.* Now this contract we call commission, as when one
without his knowledge, undertakes another’s business, or orders and
manages it for him voluntarily gratis, he is said negotia gerere, to take
another’s business upon him of his own accord. <268>
s e c t i on cccx l v i i
Wherefore, since a proxy undertakes another’s business committed to his
care (§346), but it depends upon the master’s pleasure what, and how
* It is a true and solid remark of Noodt, in his probabilia, 1. 12. [[Gerard Noodt
(1647–86), Dutch jurist, professor at Leiden. See his Opera omnia ab ipso recognita. ]]
that a mandate or commission in ancient times, had not perfect obligation, but that
the proxy or person commissioned, was only bound by the laws of humanity and
friendship, to the diligent and honest execution of his commission: and that the sym-
bol used was giving the hand; whence it is not unlikely that this contract was called
Mandatum, Isidor. orig. 4. 4. You may see examples of thus giving hand to proxies
in Plautus Capt. 2. 3. 82. where the youth says,
Haec per dextram tuam, te dextera retinens manu,
Obsecro, infidelior mihi ne fuas, quam ego sum tibi.
[[Plautus, The Captives, lines 441–42, in vol. 1 of Plautus: “This I beseech
you by this hand, this hand I hold in mine: don’t be less true to me than I
am to you.”]]
And in Terence Heaut. 3. 1. v. 84.
Cedo dexteram: porro te idem oro, ut facias, Chreme.
[[Terence, The Self-Tormentor, line 493, in vol. 1 of Terence: “Give me your
hand. I beg you to continue that way, Chremes.”]]
Anciently therefore, this whole business depended upon integrity, and not laws, till
benevolence becoming very cool among mankind, necessity obliged them to make it
a contract, that thus the proxy might be laid under a perfect obligation of executing
his commission diligently. And the case is the same with regard to all the other gra-
tuitous contracts.
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far to commit; it is plain, that the person giving the commission, either
gives him full power to do all as he shall judge proper, or circumscribes
the person commissioned within certain limits; or at least, by way of
counsel, suggests to him what he would have him do. In the second case
therefore, the proxy cannot exceed the bounds of his commission. In
the first, he is only obliged to answer for knavery. In the third, that he
may expede his commission by doing something equivalent. But, in all
these cases, the procurator or proxy is obliged to render account of his
management, in consequence of the very nature of a commission.*
s e c t i on cccx l v i i i
He also who takes another’s business upon him without commission,
without being called to do it, <269> of his own accord, and gratis (§346),
by so doing binds himself to manage it to the best advantage, and to
bestow all possible care about it, and therefore to render account, and
to stand to all the losses that may happen by his fault.†
* To this belongs that noted passage of Cicero, pro Q. Rosc. c. 38. “Why did you
receive a commission, if you was either resolved to neglect it, or to make your own
advantage of it? Why do you offer your service to me, and yet oppose my interest?
Get away: I will transact the affair by another. You undertake the burden of an office
to which you think yourself equal: an office which does not appear heavy to those
who have any degree of weight or sufficiency in themselves. Here there is a base
violation of two most sacred things, faith and friendship. For one does not commis-
sion another unless he have confidence in him, nor does one trust a person except he
have a good opinion of his integrity. None therefore but the most abandoned villain
would both violate friendship, and deceive one who could not have been hurt had
he not trusted to him.” [[Cicero, Pro Quinto Roscio Comoedo, in Cicero, Pro Publio
Quinctio.]]
† To the cause or author of a deed are it and all its effects imputable (§105). Since
therefore, he who takes upon him another’s business is the author of the adminis-
tration (§346), to him are all the consequences of the administration justly imputable.
But the consequences of administration are giving account and repairing damages
incurred by the fault of the administrator. And therefore he who takes upon him the
administration of another’s business is obliged to give account, and to make repa-
rations for damages proceeding from any fault in him. So that there is no need of
deriving this obligation, with the lawyers, from feigned or presumed consent, since
such an administrator as hath been described, by his own deed in undertaking an-
other’s business, tacitely indeed, but truly obliges himself to all that hath been said.
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These then are the contracts which took place, money or eminent price
not being yet found out: and with regard to them all, we have one thing
yet to observe, which is, that because in the three last, one obligeshimself
to give and do something gratuitously, but not to suffer any hurt on
another’s account, in them therefore no one ought to suffer by his good
offices, and consequently he who lends is obliged to restore to the bor-
rower expences that are not immoderate (§343), and the deponent is
obliged to restore to the trustee all necessary charges; and the person
giving a commission, or the person whose affair is undertaken and man-
aged without his commission, is obliged to restore necessary or useful
charges; and they are all of them bound to repair all the damages that
may have been incurred for their sake, or on account of managing their
af-<270>fairs by the borrower, the trustee, the proxy, or the voluntary
undertaker, without their fault.*
s e c t i on ccc l
We now go on to another kind of contracts which began to take place
when money was invented, the chief of which are buying and selling,
renting and hiring. The first is a contract for delivering a certain thing
for a certain price. The second is a contract for granting the use of a
certain thing or labour at a certain rate or hire. But as the price in buying
* We say those damages ought to be repaired which a proxy hath suffered by man-
aging another’s affairs. For it is not enough that he hath incurred any accidental dam-
age on occasion of his having undertaken another’s business: because none being
obliged to answer for accidents, a person giving commission to another is not. Where-
fore, if a proxy, while he is expeding his commission, is robbed by highwaymen, or
falls into a dangerous sickness, the loss he may thus providentially suffer is not to be
imputed to his constituent. “For such accidents,” says Paullus, l. 26. §6. D. mandati,
“are imputable to fortune, not to commission.” See Grotius of the rights of war and
peace, 2. 14. 13. But it is otherwise with respect to one commissioned by a prince to
do some public business in a foreign country. For he to whom the glory of obeying
is the chief reward, ought to be indemnified by the public. See Hubert. Eunom. ad
l. 26. D. mandati. Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 5. 4. and Hert. de
lytro, 2. 10. [[Hertius (praeses ) and Viselius (respondens ), De Lytro von Rantzion. ]]
The duties
of a lender, a
deponent, a
person giving
a proxy, and
of one whose
business is
managed by
another with-
out com-
mission.
The contracts
which took
place after the
invention of
money, buy-
ing, selling,
renting, hiring.
270 the laws of nature and nations
is the value of the thing itself in money, so hire is the value of the use
of a thing, or of labour in money; and therefore, from the very defini-
tions, it is plain that buying and selling, renting and hiring, now-a-days,
require payment in money, and in that are different from bartering, and
the other contracts defined above; “I give that you may give; I give that
you may do; I do that you may give, and I do that you may do.” * Yet they
all agree in the chief points, and have almost all the same common prop-
erties or effects. <271>
s e c t i on ccc l i
Since therefore this is the nature of the contract buying and selling (§351),
that a thing is delivered at a certain price; the consequence is, that the
buyer and seller ought equally to know the thing; and therefore the seller
ought not only to point out to the buyer all its qualities, all its imper-
fections, faults or incumbrances, which do not strike the eyes and other
senses;† but he is likewise bound to suffer him to examine it with his
* For tho’ estimatory barter bears some affinity to buying and selling (§338), yet
it really differs from it in this respect, that in selling, money intervenes, but in esti-
matory barter, an estimated thing is given for another thing. Whence it is very man-
ifest, what ought to be determined concerning the ancient controversy between the
Sabiniani and the Procullani, whether price in buying and selling could only consist
in money, or might consist in other things. Upon which see, besides the learned
commentators upon §2. de empt. vend. instit. V. C. Gottf. Mascou. de sect. Sabin.
& Procul. 9. 10. 1. & seq. [[Mascovius, Exercitatio inauguralis de sectis Sabinianorum
et Proculianorum in jure civili. ]]
† There are faults and imperfections which are so glaring, that it would be needless
to point them out; so that if one is deceived with respect to such faults, he deservedly
suffers by his own blindness and heedlessness; to which case belongs the contest be-
tween Marius Gratidianus and C. Sergius Orata in Cicero, off. l. 3. 16. But the Roman
laws, that men might be more firmly bound to do this good office one to another,
ordained that all the faults should be told in selling which were known to the seller,
and appointed a punishment for those who hid any, or did not discover them. “For
tho’ the twelve tables,” says Cicero, “ordered no more than this, that the seller should
be bound to make good those faults, which were expresly mentioned by word of
mouth in the bargain, and which whoever denied was to pay double damages, the
lawyers have appointed a punishment for those, who themselves do not discover the
faults of what they sell: For they have so decreed, ‘That if the seller of an estate, when
he made the bargain, did not tell all the truth in particular, that he knew of it, he
should afterwards be bound to make them good to the purchaser,’ ” de off. 3. 16. The
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eyes, and by all other means; so that of things belonging to the taste, the
sale is not perfect till they are tasted; and of others which stand in need
of other trials, the sale is not perfect till the trial hath been made: And
therefore, if what Euripides says be true with respect to any contract, it
certainly holds with regard to this chargeable one, “Light is necessary to
contractors.” Cyclop. v. 137.2 <272>
s e c t i on ccc l i i
Hence it is also plain, that equality between the thing sold and the price
paid, ought to be observed (§329); and therefore every injury ought to
be repaired, whether it be done by guile or force, or be occasioned by a
justifiable mistake.* Yet here we ought to call to mind what was before
observed, that the wrong ought to be of some considerable moment,
because here price does not consist as it were in a point, but admits of
some latitude, and it would justly be reckoned being too sharp, and
opening a door to endless suits and contentions, to rescind a contract
for every small loss (§340). <273>
s e c t i on ccc l i i i
It is disputed to whom the loss and gain belongs while the thing sold is
not delivered; whether it immediately passes to the buyer so soon as the
price is agreed upon, or whether it still belongs to the seller while the
same author, c. 12. disputes, “Whether an honest merchant bringing, when corn was
scarce at Rhodes, a large quantity thither from Alexandria, and withal knowing, that
a great many ships, well laden with corn, were in the way thither from the same city,
was bound to tell the news to the people of Rhodes, or might lawfully say nothing
of it, but sell his own corn at the best rates he could?” of which question see Grotius
of the rights of war and peace, 2. 12. Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations,
5. 3. 4.
* If it should be invincible, involuntary and inculpable (§107): For otherwise, if
one buys any thing at a certain price, which he hath not seen nor sufficiently exam-
ined, his error ought to fall on himself, if the seller used no guile to deceive him,
(which we know Laban did to Jacob in buying his wife, Genesis xxix. 23.) because he
suffers justly for his mistake, who might not have mistaken, had he not been supinely
negligent.
2. Euripides, Cyclops, in Euripides, vol. 1.
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thing is undelivered? What the Roman law has determined in this case
is well known; nor will any one expect that we should insist long upon
the reasons of that decision. To us, who are now only enquiring into the
determination of the law of nature, it seems incontrovertible, that the
owner or master is to stand all chances (§211); nor does it appear less
certain to us, that what proceeds from delay or fault, is not mere chance;
and therefore he, who by any deed damages another, is obliged to repair
that damage (§211). Whence it follows, that because the buyer may, by
the law of nature, be master of the thing bought without delivery (§275),
the risk, after the sale is compleated, immediately falls upon the buyer,
unless the seller be guilty of any delay in delivering it, or some other
fault.* <274>
s e c t i on ccc l i v
Now, because the buyer immediately becomes master or proprietor even
before delivery, and therefore ought to stand to all chances (§353); the
consequence is, that the doctrine of the Roman lawyers concerning the
risk of a thing sold is true, but is not so consistent with their own prin-
ciple, which denies that the dominion passes to the buyer without de-
livery; that since the proprietor hath the right of all the fruits, accessions,
and other advantages of what is his own (§307), he hath also a right to
all the gains of a thing sold to him; but so, that this rule shall then only
* Pufendorff ’s opinion (of the law of nature, &c. 5. 5. 3.) is much the same, but
more obscurely told, where he distinguishes whether a certain day was fixed for the
delivery or not, and if fixed, whether it be elapsed or not. For he thinks it most equal
that the seller should run the risk till the term is elapsed; but that, the term being
elapsed, if the thing perishes, it perishes to the buyer. But since the buyer is master,
by the law of nature, without delivery, and the term being elapsed, it may not be
always the seller that is in delay, but that may often be the fault of the buyer; we think
in general the risk belongs to the buyer, in whose power it was to have received the
thing immediately, upon paying down the price. But if he hath fulfilled the condi-
tions of the contract on his side, or if he is ready to fulfil them, the seller who delays
the delivery, deservedly runs the risk, whether a certain term for delivery was agreed
upon or not.
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take place, if the buyer hath any way satisfied the seller for the price;*
because otherwise he would, at the same time, have the thing and the
price, and thus he would be made richer at another’s detriment (§257).
s e c t i on ccc l v
But since a thing justly perishes to the loss of the seller when he is guilty
of delay in delivery, or of any other fault (353), it is manifest that the
buyer is exempt from all risk, if the seller, when he offers him the price,
refuses to give him full possession of the thing sold, or cannot do it; and
likewise, if it can be proved to have been owing <275> to the seller’s fault
or negligence, that the thing sold perished either in whole or in part.
s e c t i on ccc l v i
Buying and selling is done on purpose that a thing may be delivered for
a certain price (§278). But since he who transfers dominion to another
for an onerous cause, as, for a certain price, is obliged to warranty (§274),
the seller must be obliged to warrant the buyer, if the thing be evicted
from him upon account of any cause antecedent to the contract; but
not, if, after the sale, something shall then happen, on account of which
one is deprived of his property, or if it be taken from him by accident,
or by superior force.†
* But not only he seems to have given satisfaction as to the price, who hath paid
the money, but he also to whom the seller trusts, having, e.g. stipulated to himself
an annual interest. For tho’ this is the most simple kind of contract, in which the
price being paid down, the thing is immediately delivered, i.e. if men merchandize
Graeca fide, which was the only kind of commerce Plato allowed in his common-
wealth de legibus, l. 11. yet that cannot always be done, and experience shews us, that
commerce consists more in credit than in ready money.
† Truly, what happens by superior force happens by accident; wherefore, since
when the contract of buying and selling is perfected (§353), the owner must stand all
chances, even when a thing sold is carried off from the buyer by chance or superior
force, he cannot seek warranty or reparation from any person. Moreover, there is no
doubt, but, as other pacts added to this contract ought to be valid; so the buyer and
seller may agree that there be no warranty, but that the thing may be entirely at the
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s e c t i on ccc l v i i
Moreover, because buying and selling is a contract, (§350); but a contract
requires the consent of both parties (§327), it is manifest, that in buying
and selling all turns upon agreement; and therefore any other pacts may
be added to it by consent, provided they be not absurd, unjust, or fraud-
ulent; as for instance, addictio in diem,—lex commissoria,—pactum de
retrovendendo,—pactum protomiseos,—pactum de evictione non praes-
tanda,—pactum <276> de poena in casum poenitentiae praestanda, and
such others.*
buyer’s risk. Such a pact was added to the selling of the girl by Sagaristio in Plautus,
in Persa, 4. 4. v. 40.
Prius dico: hanc Mancupio nemo tibi dabit, jam scis?
Do. Scio.
[[Plautus, The Persian, line 589, in vol. 3 of Plautus: “I tell you this first:
nobody will give you a warrant with her. You understand now?” “I under-
stand.”]]
* The definitions of these pacts are known from the civil law. Addictio in diem,
is a pact which gives the seller leave to accept of any better bargain that shall offer
itself by such a day, which may be done two ways. First, when the bargain is com-
pleated, but upon condition that it shall be null, if better terms offer themselves: Or,
secondly, if it be only agreed, de futuro, that it shall be a bargain, if better offers are
not made. Lex commissoria, makes void the bargain, if the price be not paid by such
a day. We have an example of it in Cornelius Nepos in the life of Atticus, c. 8. Pactum
de retrovendendo, is an agreement, that upon tender of the price at any time, or by
such a certain day, the buyer shall be obliged to restore the goods to the seller or his
heirs. Such is that sale in Livy, 31. 13. and that in Julius Capitolin. in Marco c. 17.
[[See Boxhorn, Historiae Augustae scriptores latini minores. Vol. 2 includes writings
by Julius Capitolinus.]] Pactum protomiseos, is the privilege of the first refusal, that
is, if the buyer be hereafter disposed to part with the commodity, he must let the
seller, or his heirs, have the first refusal, at the same rate he would sell it to another.
The nature of the rest is obvious from the terms by which they are expressed. [Eviction
is the loss which the buyer suffers, either of the whole thing that is sold, or of a part
of it, because of the right which a third person has to it; so that pactum de evictione
non praestanda, is an agreement between the seller and the buyer, that the former
shall not be obliged to warrant the buyer against all danger of being evicted or trou-
bled in his possession of the thing sold. Warranty being a consequence of the contract
of sale, there is a first kind of natural warranty, which is called warranty in law,
because the seller is obliged to it by law, altho’ the sale make no mention of it. And
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From the same principle we infer that a seller may except something for
himself in the sale, and <277> that either party may add to the bargain
any condition not repugnant to honesty and good manners, as likewise
appoint a day, before which the thing is to be delivered, and the price
paid.* Nay, that they may also agree, that the price not being paid, the
property shall remain for some time with the seller, or that the buyer,
retaining some part of the price in his hands, for which he is to pay
interest, may be thus secured against eviction; that accessions shall go
with the principal, that some fixed things may be carried off, that the
thing sold shall be let at a certain rate to the seller, &c.
s e c t i on ccc l i x
Besides, we conclude from the same principle, that tho’ buying and sell-
ing requires equality, (§352); yet, by the consent of both parties, a sale
may be agreed upon which shall not be null on the account of any in-
equality whatsoever. Such are auction, when the price is not fixed by the
seller, but by the highest of contending bidders: emptio sub hasta, which
is nothing else but a more solemn auction, instituted by public authority:
emptio per aversionem, when things of different value are not rated sep-
arately, but sold together: and emptio spei, when the purchase is no cer-
tain thing, but hope and expectation only, on which, by agreement of
the parties, a price is laid. In all which contracts, since equality is not
required, by consequence neither of the parties can complain of injury
it being in our power to augment or diminish our natural engagements by covenants,
there is a second kind of warranty, which is a warranty by deed or covenant, such as
the seller and buyer are pleased to regulate among themselves. Pactum de poena in-
casum poenitentiae praestanda, is an agreement to pay a fine, in case of repenting and
not standing to the bargain.]
* Nay the sale may be so agreed upon, as that a certain term of years agreed upon
being run out, the thing sold shall then return to the seller or his heirs, and yet the
buyer shall not redemand the price paid. Estates are often sold in this manner. See
Pufendorff, law of nature, &c. 5. 5. 4.
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in these cases, unless there be some knavery on either side, or the thing
produced by the event was not thought of by the contracters.* <278>
s e c t i on ccc l x
The other contract which took place after the invention of money, is
letting and hiring (§350): For tho’, according to the Roman law, in letting
farms a part of the fruits was paid for the rent, which was called quanta,†
1. 21. 6. loc. conduct. and thus this contract could take place before
money was in use; yet there is no reason why it may not be referred to
the contract, “I give that you may give ”; because in this case the use of
the thing is not compared with money or eminent price, but with the
* And hence we may decide the famous suit between the fishers and the Milesian
youth, who had bought the cast of a net from them, occasioned by the fortune of
the cast, the fishermen having drawn out a golden tripod in their net, each party
contended this unexpected treasure was theirs, and the oracle very absurdly adjudged
it to the wisest.
De tripode ex Phoebo quaeris, Milesia pubes?
Huic tripodem addico, cui sit sapientia prima.
Laert. 1. 28. Val. Max. 4. 1. [[Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia (Memo-
rable Doings and Sayings ) 4.1, ext. 7. Also cited in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent
Philosophers, 1.28: “Are you enquiring about the tripod from Phoebus, Milesian
youth? I assign the tripod to him who is of the greatest wisdom.”]] But it is plain that
the tripod belonged to the fishermen, if its owner was not known (§324), notwith-
standing the contract, the Milesian youth having only had regard in the contract to
what fish should be caught, and not to golden tripods, of which neither of the parties
could have any thoughts. See l. 8. §1. D. de contr. empt. l. 11. §ult. & l. 12. D. de act.
empt.
† For if the lord of the mannor stipulate to himself a certain portion for his rent,
that bargain hath the nature of partnership, as will appear from the definition of
these contracts, when we come to treat of them. Moreover, letting a fruitful farm for
a certain share of the fruits, is not a contract of renting and hiring, as is plain from
this consideration, that the latter is an onerous contract, in which equality is required
(§324); but in the former it cannot obtain. For if one should stipulate to pay for the
use of a farm for six years, every year so many measures of grain, it may happen that
in one year of great plenty, when corn is very abundant and cheap, the rent shall be
moderate, and proportioned to the use of the farm, but another year of scarcity it
shall be immoderate on the account of scarcity and dearness. And therefore, we have
already said, that renting and hiring requires that the price be paid in money (§350).
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proper or vulgar price of the fruits; and therefore the value of fruits not
being always the same, but higher or lower according to the plenty or
scarcity of the season, one year the proprietor might be a loser, and an-
other year the tenant. <279>
s e c t i on ccc l x i
Because renting and hiring is a contract for the use of a thing, or labour
at a certain rate or hire; the consequence is, that he who lets ought to
grant the use of a thing, or the labour contracted for, to the person who
hires it; and therefore, if, by his fault, or by accident, it happens that he
who hires cannot have the use of the thing hired, or cannot perform the
labour promised, the stipulated hire justly diminishes in proportion.*
Yea, sometimes the lessor may be sued to the value; and the same holds,
if the landlord should expel, without a just cause, the tenant before his
lease is out. <280>
s e c t i on ccc l x i i
In like manner it is the tenant’s duty to pay in due time the stipulated
rent, to use what he hath the use of as another’s, to be returned in specie,
like an honest man, to make up damages owing to his fault; and not to
desert the farm while his lease is yet unexpired, unless he be forced to it
by just causes, as the incursion of an enemy, the fear of a plague, and
other such dangers. For since the landlord is obliged to deliver him the
thing safe and sound, to indemnify him, and not to turn him out before
* This equity was acknowledged by all the ancients, as by Sesostris king of Egypt,
who, if any part of the land was washed away by the force of the river, ordered the
rent to be proportionably diminished, Herodot. 1. 2. p. 81. edit. Steph. [[Herodotus,
Herodoti Halicarnassei historiae libri IX. ]] Nor did the Romans observe less equity in
this affair, according to Polybius, hist. 6. 15. and among them Caesar, by Sueton’s
relation, cap. 20. But it is manifest, that here likewise ought to be understood a con-
siderable loss, and not a very small one, seeing the barrenness of one year is often
compensated, especially in farms, by the plenty of a succeeding year; and it is un-
reasonable that the tenant should have all the advantages, and yet refuse to bear the
smallest share of loss.
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his time is expired (§361); it is most equal, that what he would not have
another do to him, he should not do to another; and, vice versa, what
he would have another do to him, that he should do to another (§88);
especially since in this chargeable contract equality ought in justice to
be observed (§329).
s e c t i on ccc l x i i i
But this contract also depends wholly upon consent (§327); and therefore
it is plain that several pacts may be annexed to it, provided they be con-
sistent with good morals;* and therefore that it may be with, or without
conditions, and for a certain time. And since tacite consent is held for
real consent; hence we may infer, that tacite re-hiring is valid, if the first
lease being elapsed, neither party renounces the contract; and that in this
case it is just that the same terms should take place as in the former
engagement. <281>
s e c t i on ccc l x i v
Now those are the contracts which began to take place after money was
in use; we are therefore, in the next place, to consider those contracts
which could have place either before or after money was found out. The
chief of which is the contract of loan, mutuum; by which we understand
granting the use of consumable things, on condition that as much shall
* Hence it is, that estates are often let out on such conditions that in renting and
hiring very little remains of the nature of such a contract. Hence perpetual leases,
hence irregular ones, by which at once the dominion, and all hazards, are devolved
upon the lessee; of which we have an instance quoted from Alfenus Varus [[Alfenus
Varus was a lawyer and consul in 39 b.c.]] by Corn. van Bynkershoek, observ. 8. 1.
& seq. ad legem 31. D. locati. There is such a contract among the Germans, of
which I have treated Element. juris Germ. 2. 14. §105, after Tabor, who has given
us a dissertation on this subject. [[Possibly the De servitutibus realibus: Dissertatio
juridica by the German jurist Johann Otto Tabor (praeses ) and HermannHopfener
(respondens ).]]
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be restored in kind.* For since not only money, but every consumable
commodity may be credited in this manner, it is plain that this contract
had place before men had acknowledged money for a common measure
of things, and it is now most frequent.
s e c t i on ccc l x v
It is plain, from the definition of this contract, (§364), that the debitor
has the power of abusing the thing credited to him; and therefore the
credi-<282>tor has abdicated his right of excluding the debtor from the
use of it; and thus he hath, only upon condition of receiving as much
from the debtor, transferred to him all his right; but to transfer the right
of excluding others from the use of a thing, is to transfer dominion
(§231); wherefore this contract is an alienation, by which the dominion
of the things credited passes intirely to the debtor.†
* We call those consumeable things which we can number, measure or weigh.
And this is the nature of them, 1. That they cannot be used without being abused or
consumed. 2. That they may be returned either in kind or in species, 1. 2. §1. D. de
rebus cred. i.e. if I owe a hundred guineas, my creditor will own himself satisfied
whether I return him the same guineas I received from him, or others of the same
kind. And hence it is plain what is meant by the same kind: it means the same in
quantity and quality. But thence follows another property of consumeable com-
modities. 3. viz. That with respect to them as much is the same, Nor, 4. do they (as
Thomasius has observed de pretio adfect. in res fung. non cad.) admit of a price of
fancy, unless they be very scarce, so that as much in kind cannot easily be found.
Thus, tho’ at Rome Falernian wine was a consumeable commodity, yet a price of
fancy fell upon Trimalchion’s Opimian wine of a hundred years old, Petronius Arbit.
Satyric. cap. 34.
† It is well known what a bustle Alexius a Massalia, i.e. Claudius Salmasius, has
made about this affair, endeavouring to turn the defenders of this Thesis intoridicule.
But all his weapons borrowed from the civil law, and much stronger ones, have been
turned against him by Wissenbachius, Fabrottus, and other learned men, insomuch
that the subject is now exhausted. [[A reference to a debate between the jurists Charles
Annibal Fabrot (1580–1659), Claude Saumaise (1588–1653), and Johann Jakob Wis-
senbach (1607–65). Wissenbach’s and Fabrot’s positions were published in one vol-
ume with Saumaise’s Disquisitio de mutuo. ]] But the principles here laid down shew,
that right reason is not against the Civilians in this matter, and does not favour Sal-
masius. It is true that the creditor does not alienate the quantity, but preserves it safe
to himself, by obliging the debtor to return him the same in kind: But the dominion
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s e c t i on ccc l x v i
From the same definition we infer, that the debtor is obliged to return
as much, not only in quantity, but in quality; and therefore, if it be
money that is lent to him, and its intrinsic value should afterwards be
augmented or diminished, regard is to be had to the time when the con-
tract was made; and accordingly so much ought to be diminished as the
money has rose, or so much ought to be added as the money has fallen.
Moreover, the debtor ought not to delay paying; nor is he delivered from
his obligation by the perishing of the consumeable commodity he re-
ceived from his creditor, nor by any accidental event.* <283>
s e c t i on ccc l x v i i
But tho’ this contract be in its nature gratuitous, (as well as commoda-
tum, of which above, i.e. loan of not consumeable things); yet the love
of mankind waxing cold, it hath become customary for creditors to stip-
ulate a reward to themselves for what they lend to their debtors; which,
if it consist in paying monthly or yearly a certain proportion of the sum
lent, as 3, 4, or 5 per cent. it is called interest or usury, tho’ that last term
is often taken in a bad sense for exorbitant interest, by which creditors
reduce their debtors to the last dregs. Concerning usury, it is a celebrated
question, that has been severely agitated by learned men, whether it be
of the species credited, and all the risks, pass undoubtedly to the debtor, as Salmasius
himself, being pushed to the utmost extremity, is forced by his adversaries to own.
* For since the dominion of a consumeable commodity is transferred to thedebtor
(§365), but he who has the dominion must stand chances (§211), the creditor cannot
be freed from his obligation, if, e.g. the wine lent him should turn into vinegar, or
the money lent should be stoln from him, or be lost by any other accident. Much
less then will poverty excuse a debtor from payment, if he has squandered away his
estate, or, like an idle drone, lives at another’s expence, and wantonly consumes on
his pleasures the gains of another’s sweat and labour. For this is a most pestiferous
race, ready to engage in the vilest schemes. And they who have wasted their own
substance must needs covet that of others. See Salust. Catil. cap. 20.
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agreeable to the law of nature for creditors to stipulate with debtors for
it.* <284>
s e c t i on ccc l x v i i i
But since, 1. It is not unjust to communicate our goods with others, not
gratuitously, but for a hire (§328). 2. Since one often makes great gain
by the use of another’s goods, while, in the mean time, the creditor suf-
fers loss or inconvenience by the want of them; but none ought to inrich
himself at the detriment of another (§257). 3. Besides, since he runs a
great risk who lends his goods to another on these terms, that he may
consume or abuse them, it is not unreasonable that the creditor should
exact a hire from the debtor in proportion to the risk (§331).—From all
these considerations, we think it may be justly concluded, that a pact
about interest with one who may make gain of our money, is not con-
trary to the law of nature.† And tho’ interest ought to be proportioned
* We need not insist long upon the history of this controversy, which was revived
in Holland the last century. We are saved this labour by Noodt de foenore & usuris,
1. 4. [[G. Noodt, De foenore et usuris libri tres ]] Martinus Schook exercit. var. p. 430.
[[Martin Schoock (1614–69), Exercitationes variae, de diversis materiis ]] and Thomas.
not. ad Lancellot. 4. 7. not. 275. p. 2024. [[Lancelotti, Institutiones juris canonici, ed.
Thomasius]] the last of whom hath given us a full history of the rise of this dispute,
and of the managers on both sides of the question. It must however be acknowledged,
that most of the learned who have wrote upon this subject have been more taken up
about the divine positive law than the law of nature; so that very little advantage is
to be reaped from them by students of natural law.
† To this doctrine it is in vain objected, as, 1. “That money is a barren thing, and
therefore that usury, as a kind of offspring, ought not to be required for it.” For it is
a barren thing in a physical sense, but not in a civil sense; for in commerce the double,
and very often more, is gained by it, Mat. xxv. 16. 17. Or, 2. “That loan of incon-
sumeable things is gratuitous, and therefore loan of consumeable goods ought to be
so too.” For he who lends an unconsumeable thing suffers less inconvenience, and
runs less risk than a creditor who transfers to his debtor the dominion of a consume-
able thing, with the power and right of abusing it. Or, 3. “That God hath prohibited
such pacts, Exod. xxii. 25. Lev. xxv. 37. Psalm xv. 5. Luke vi. 34.” For God proscribed
such pacts from the Israelitish common-wealth, so far only that an Israelite could not
exact interest from an Israelite; they were permitted with strangers, Deut. xxiii. 19.
20. But the law of nature makes no difference between fellow citizens and strangers.
See Jo. Selden de jure nat. & gent. See Heb. and Jo. Cleric. ad Exod. xxii. 25. p. 112.
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to the gain which the debtor may, in all probability, make of the sum;
yet it is not iniquous that it should be augmented in proportion to the
risk, the scarcity of money, and other circumstances (§331), as the custom
of bottomry shews us, dig. 1. 22. tit. 2. de nautico foenore. <285>
s e c t i on ccc l x i x
Another contract of this kind is pawn or pledge, by which we understand
an obligation to deliver something to a creditor for the security of what
he lends or credits. For if a thing, especially if it be in its nature im-
moveable, be not delivered, but yet the creditor hath a right constituted
to him in it, of taking possession of it, in case the debt be not cancelled,
that transaction between the creditor and debtor is called hypotheca,
mortgage. Again, if it be agreed that a creditor should receive the fruits
of a thing delivered to him for the security of what he hath credited, in
lieu of interest, this invention is termed pactum antichreticum (§283).
s e c t i on ccc l x x
From the definition of a pawn, it is plain that it ought to be the debtor’s
own; and therefore he deserves punishment who pawns any thing be-
longing to another, whether lent to him, deposited with him, or hired
by him. That the creditor ought not to use a pawn, if it may be rendered
worse by use, but to preserve it with as much care as his own goods, and
to return it to the debtor, when the debt is cleared. Finally, since the
owner regularly runs risks (§211),* the consequence is, that the risk of
* By the law of Germany in the middle ages, when a pawn perished by chance,
the debtor was freed from all obligation to pay his debt, jus prov. Sax. 3. 5. Sometimes
it was provided by a special pact, that the risk should belong to the creditor, as in
Pontan. hist. Dan. 1. 9. ad annum 1411. [[Pontanus, Rerum Danicarum historia. ]]But
because that proceeded from this singular principle of the Germans, that the creditor
got the dominion of the pawn, of which see our Elem. jur. Germ. l. 2. 11. §319. the
reasons given in this section do not permit us to attribute these things to the law of
nature.
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the pawn belongs to the debtor, and that perishing by accident, he is
notwithstanding obliged to pay his debt. <286>
s e c t i on ccc l x x i
From the definition of mortgage (§369), we infer, that it can scarcely
consist in moveables, which a debtor may easily alienate and transfer to
a stranger without his creditor’s knowledge; but it consists chiefly in im-
moveables, as houses, lands, cities and territories;* and likewise in larger
stocks of moveable things, which are not easily transported from place
to place, as large libraries; yea, in rights and actions likewise, if great
advantage accrue from them to the possessor. But whatever is thus
pledged to a creditor, his right in it continues, to whomever it may be
transferred; for otherwise his hypotheca would be without effect. <287>
s e c t i on ccc l x x i i
From the definition of the pactum antichreticum, (§369), it is obvious
that it can only take place in pawning things which yield increase; and
since the fruits are in lieu of interest, they ought not greatly to exceed
that measure of interest which we have found to be most agreeable to
* This we add on account of what Pufendorff says of the law of nature, &c. 5.
10. 16. “In the state of nature such mortgages are needless; for if the debtor refuses
payment, the possession of the mortgage assigned in security, must be detained by
force of arms. But in that state, even without such a particular assignment, it is lawful
to seize on any thing that belongs to the debtor.” But examples of such mortgages
are not wanting even among independent nations, as Hertius has shewn in his notes
upon this passage of Pufendorff, p. 738. & seq. who elegantly replies to Pufendorff ’s
argument, that this mortgage may be of great use, if the town thus pledged should
fall into a third person’s hands. Moreover, we readily grant, that independent nations
do not rashly satisfy themselves with such simple mortgages, but do at least stipulate
the right of keeping a garison in these cautionary towns, as Elizabeth queen of En-
gland did in the 1585, when the Hollanders put several towns into her hands, Em.
Meteran. Rer. Belg. l. 13. and the other Belgic annalists for that year. [[Emanuel van
Meteren (1535–1612), author of a history of the Low Countries, frequently repub-
lished with additions after his death (Historien der Nederlanden en haar naburen oor-
logen tot het jaar 1612 ).]]
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equity. The creditor, in this case, is not liable to accidents, unless it be
so agreed; and therefore if the creditor, on account of barrenness, or any
public calamity, does not receive the value of the interest due to him,
the debtor is obliged to make it up.
s e c t i on ccc l x x i i i
This is in common to all these contracts, that being designed for the
security of the creditor, (§369), the creditor, if the debtor be tardy in his
payment, has a right to alienate the pawn or mortgage, and deducting
his principal and interests, is obliged only to refund the overplus to the
debtor, unless there be an accessory pact, lex commissoria; by which it is
stipulated, that the pawn, if not relieved within a certain time, shall be
left to the creditor for his principal and interests. For tho’ the more recent
Roman laws did not allow of such a pact,* l. un. C. Theodos. de com-
missor. rescind. l. ult. C. de pact. pign. and that might have been justly
done on account of the exorbitant avarice of creditors; yet it does not
follow from hence, that the law of nature, which permits every owner
to alienate his own on whatsoever conditions, does not allow of such a
pact (§309), which Hertius hath shewn, by many examples, to have been
in use amongst princes and independent nations, in his notes upon Pu-
fendorff, 5. 10. 14. p. 737. <288>
* The more ancient laws among the Romans adhering more strictly to the sim-
plicity of the law of nature, are not contrary to this commissory pact; yea, while the
republic was yet free, it was looked upon as lawful, as appears from a passage in
Cicero’s epistles, epist. ad famil. 13. 56. quoted by Hertius, and before him by
Jac. Gothofred. ad l. un. Theodos. de commiss. rescind. (Philotes Alabandenses
uÿpojh´kac Cluvio dedit: hae commissae sunt.) [[Cicero, Epistulae ad familiares 13.56:
“Philocles of Alabanda has mortgaged some property to Culvius. The time of the
mortgage has expired.”]] But the terrible severity of creditors, by which debtors were
unmercifully squeezed, being forced to pawn, in this manner, things of much greater
value than the debt, at last obliged the emperors to proscribe this pact, as exceeding
detrimental to debtors.
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s e c t i on ccc l x x i v
The third contract which may take place before and after money is in-
vented, is suretyship; i.e. an obligation a person comes under to pay an-
other’s debt, if he does not. For if one binds himself not merely to pay,
the other failing, but conjointly with him in solidum for the whole debt,
he is debtor, and the obligation of both is equal. Again, he who, with
the consent of the creditor, delivers a debtor from his obligation, and
takes it upon himself, is called expromissor, Bail. All these contracts, as
well as that of pawn or mortgage, are contrived for the security of cred-
itors, and afford an ample proof of the decay of benevolence among
mankind.*
s e c t i on ccc l x x v
Moreover, from the definition of suretiship, (§374), it is plain that there
is no place for suretiship, which is a subsidiary security, unless the <289>
debt be such that it may be as conveniently paid by another as by the
principal debtor; and therefore suretiship for condemned persons, tho’
some ancient nations admitted it, is contrary to right reason.† But yet
* For if benevolence prevailed, as it ought to do, among mankind, a creditor
would not distrust a debtor, nor would a debtor allow one thought of defrauding his
creditor to enter into his mind; and thus there would be no occasion for pawns or
sureties. But now that men are become so suspicious and diffident, that they will not
believe unless they see, this is an argument of the decline of benevolence, and of the
prevalence of perfidy among men. This is allowed by Seneca in a most beautiful
passage (of benefits, 3. 15).
† Pufendorff, 5. 10. 12. hath brought many instances of it among the Greeks; and
Hertius in his notes on Pufendorff, ibidem, p. 735, produces statutes approving of
such sureties. But as for others who pretend to justify this kind of suretiship by ex-
amples in the sacred writings, they are easily refuted, Gen. xlii. 37. For every one may
perceive that obligation of Reuben to have been foolish, especially seeing he did not
pledge his own head, but the lives of his innocent children; and besides, it was not
for a condemned person, but for his brother Benjamin’s return out of Egypt. Whence
it is not probable that the pious and prudent Jacob accepted of the offered security,
Gen. xliii. 9. Juda offers security, but not for a condemned criminal, nor does he
pledge his life. Finally, 1 Kings, xx. 39. there no person pawns his life for a guilty
Of suretyship.
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there is no reason, when the crime may be expiated by a mulct, why
another person may not interpose in behalf of the criminal, and oblige
himself to pay the mulct, if the criminal fail.
s e c t i on ccc l x x v i
As to the obligation of sureties, it is plain, from the definition (§374),
that they oblige themselves to the same which the creditor has a right to
exact from his debtor, and therefore it is unjust for a creditor to stipulate
more to himself from a surety than from the debtor; that the obligation
of a surety is subsidiary, and therefore that by the law of nature a surety
does not stand in need of the singulari beneficio ordinis vel excussionis,3
as it is called in the civil law; but may then be sued, when it clearly appears
that the principal debtor has not <290> wherewith to pay.* Many sur-
eties engaged for the same persons and debts, are only bound propor-
tionably, unless they have voluntarily and expresly bound themselves for
the whole; and therefore the benefit of division is due to them by the
law of nature, as being proportionably bound, unless one’s fellow sur-
eties be insolvent, and one could not but know they were so.
criminal, but the custody of a captive is demanded under the peril of death. So that
there is nothing in the sacred writings to justify this custom among the ancients.
* A contrary opinion hath prevailed in many nations, who thought that recourse
might be had to the surety before the principal debtor. Concerning the Hebrews, see
Prov. xx. 16. xvii. 18. As for the Greeks, that saying of Thales is well known, “Be
surety, and ruin is at your heels.” The ancient Germans had likewise such a proverb.
See Schilt. Exercit. 48. 21. [[ Johann Schilter (1632–1705), Exercitationes theoretico-
practicae ad L libros Pandectarum. ]] The same rigour was also observed by the Ro-
mans, till Justinian introduced the beneficium ordinis vel excussionis, novella 4. But
since a surety only accedes as a subsidiary security on failure of the principal, if he
might be immediately sued, there would be no difference between the Surety, the
Expromissor or Bail, and the Principal debtor. It is therefore agreeable to right reason,
that he who is bound as a subsidiary security, should not be sued before the discussion
of the principal debtor. So Cicero Epist. ad Attic. 16. 15. “Sponsores adpellare,videtur
habere quamdam duswpi´an.” [[Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 16.15: “To call upon
sureties seems to have a certain shame [attached].”]]
3. “The right of bringing an action in a particular order” (that is, first against the
principal debtor, then against the surety).
The obligation
of sureties.
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s e c t i on ccc l x x v i i
When two or more become debtors of one and the same thing (§374),
it is evident, that every one of them being obliged to the creditor for the
whole debt, the creditor may exact the whole debt from either of the
two he pleases;* and when any one of them pays the debt, the other is
discharged from his obligation to the creditor, but not with respect to
his fellow-surety; for he who paid for him (§346) did his business, and
therefore ought to be indemnified by him (§349). <291>
s e c t i on ccc l x x v i i i
Again, from the definition of an expromissor or bail (374), we infer, that
his obligation is the same with that of the principal debtor, insomuch
that the latter, bail being accepted by the creditor, is free; and therefore
neither can this kind of surety plead the discussion of the principal
debtor before him; nor can the creditor, if he cannot recover his debt
from this surety, any more have recourse to the principal debtor whom
he hath once freed, but he must depend upon this surety alone for it,
upon whose faith he had relieved his debtor.
s e c t i on ccc l x x i x
The next contract which may take place either where money is, or is not
in use, is partnership, as it may plainly do, since it is nothing else but
sharing among many the profit or loss that may arise from joint stock
* There is therefore no place here for the division of an obligation. But because
if both who are bound in solidity be solvent, and both may easily be sued, there is
no just cause why the creditor should press one, and extort the whole sum from him
alone; humanity does not allow one so rigorously to prosecute his right, as to press
any one singly, but commands us to have recourse to both. For surely humanity doth
not permit us to demand any thing from any other which we can obtain otherwise,
without detriment to ourselves or any other (§216).
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or labour:* for commodities and labour may be communicated either
before or after money is in use. <292>
s e c t i on ccc l x x x
Because in universal partnership all things, in general partnership some
things only are common; so that these contracts somewhat depend upon
chance (§379); the consequence is, that amongst such partners the loss
and gain must be common, but the contribution may be very unequal;
and therefore such a partner hath no reason to complain if his fellow-
partner expends more than him, when his necessities require it; yea,
a partner is obliged to pay his proportion of debt contracted by his
fellow-partner; for which reason, it cannot be doubted that it is highly
reasonable that every one of such partners should share of the gain made
by any one of them; and that he who has a right to the gains, ought to
bear his share of the loss, damages, or inconveniencies.
s e c t i on ccc l x x x i
But since in singular or particular partnership equality ought to be ob-
served (§380), which however is not always observed in the contribution;
it follows, that the equality in dividing loss and profit cannot be arith-
metical, but must be geometrical. † And therefore he who hath contrib-
* We are therefore here treating of community in consequence of the consent of
partners. But because consent may be either tacit or express, and both have the same
effect (§275), the consequence is, that partnership may be contracted by tacite con-
sent, i.e. by deed, Hert. diss. de societate facto contr. [[Hertius (praeses ) and Gilfeld
(respondens ), De societate facto contracta. ]] Now, since either all goods and labour, or
a certain share only, or some particular goods and labour, may be joined, partnership
may be either universal, or general, or particular. Grotius of the rights of war and
peace, 2. 12. 24. hath justly remarked, that universal and general partnership have
something of chance in them; but that in particular or singular partnership, equality
ought to be observed.
† Some have said, that arithmetical equality ought to be observed here, as among
brethren; and thus they interpret, l. 6. l. 29. l. 80. D. pro Soc. and other Roman laws,
Connan. Comment. jur. civ. 7. 19. 5. Huber. Praelect. ad tit. Inst. de societate. [[Con-
nan, Commentariorum; U. Huber, Praelectionum juris civilis tomi 3.]] But this fra-
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uted more stock or labour, ought to have a proportionably greater share
of profit and loss than he who contributes less. But seeing any one can
grant to any other whatever advantages he pleases with regard to his own
goods (§309), it is undeniable that partners may agree one with another
in any manner; and may observe, in dividing loss and gain, either arith-
metical equality, or any inequality, unless, by the knavery of one or other
of them, the division degenerates into that of the lion in the fable,
Phaed. Fab. 1. 6. <293>
s e c t i on ccc l x x x i i
In fine, since partnership is formed by consent, and by way of conven-
tion (§379), this rule of the Roman law can hardly be deduced from the
principles of the law of nature, viz. “That any one may quit partnership,
provided he do it not fraudulently, nor at an improper time.”*Thewhole
matter rather turns upon the conditions of the agreement; and therefore,
if the partnership was contracted for perpetuity, it ought to be perpetual;
ternity of partners is a fiction, to which the law of nature is a stranger; and besides,
in this case the profit arises from joint stock and labour; wherefore, nothing can be
more just than that loss and gain should be shared proportionably to stock and labour.
So Aristotle rightly decides the matter, ad Nicom. 8. 16.
* This may be proved from the very reasons brought by ancient lawyers. For some-
times they give this reason, “That community is the mother of discords,” l. 77. §20.
D. de legat. Sometimes they say, “It is a natural vice to neglect what is in common,”
l. 2. C. quando & quibus quarta pars. To which some add another reason, “That
respect is had in the choice of a partner to his abilities and industry; and therefore,
if either partner does not answer his co-partner’s hope and expectation, with regard
to his honesty and diligence, the other hath a right to renounce the partnership.” But
buying and selling, renting and hiring often produce as much discord, in which con-
tracts they allow no place for changing one’s mind, or repenting. And houses let, are
often no less neglected than houses in common to many, and yet it is not allowable
to break such a contract before the time is out. Again, he who hires one to work for
him, hath regard to the skill, honesty and industry of the person he hires, and yet he
cannot break his contract before the time is expired. If therefore this rule takes place
in other contracts, why may it not be allowed to take place likewise in partnership,
l. 5. C. de obl. & art. “As every one is at liberty to contract or not contract, so none
can renounce the obligation he hath once come under, without the consent of his
party.”
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if for a time only, it is but for the time fixed; unless one of the partners
be injurious to the others, and do not fulfil the articles of agreement; in
which case, it is most just that the others should have the right of re-
nouncing the partnership even before the time agreed upon in the con-
tract. <294>
s e c t i on ccc l x x x i i i
Let us add donation, by which we understand a promise to transfer some-
thing of ours to another gratuitously. From which definition, it is plain
that it may be made with or without conditions; and therefore in view
of death. So that donations are justly divided into donations among the
living, and donations in prospect of death. And a donation among the
living obliges to deliver the thing promised, and leaves no room to
the donor to revoke his promise. But from what was said above, it is
evident, that he who receives the donation cannot demand warranty
from the donor, if the thing be evicted (§274), and that he is obliged to
shew gratitude to his benefactor by words and deeds on all occasions
(§222).
s e c t i on ccc l x x x i v
To conclude; with regard to all contracts in general, it is to be observed,
that because they consist in consent (§327), they can only be formed by
those who are not incapable, by nature of by law, of consenting. Again,
because they were devised for the sake of commerce (§327), they must
be about things which may be in commerce honestly, and with the per-
mission of the laws; and therefore contracts about impossible or base
things, or things exeemed by the laws from commerce, are null: <295>
but as many things are exeemed by positive laws from commerce, which
naturally are subjects of it, so positive laws may likewise permit contracts
about several things which are not subjects of commerce, according to
the laws and manners of other nations.*
* For example, with us it is base and to no purpose to pawn dead bodies. But the
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Remarks on This Chapter
It seems necessary to add a little to what our Author hath said in this
chapter concerning usury, to shew at one and the same time, the true
state of the case with regard to the forbidding of usury in the Israelitish
commonwealth, and how civil laws may confine and alter natural
rights, consistently with the law of nature. And here all we have to do
is to copy a little from our excellent politician Mr. Harrington, in his
prerogative of popular government (p. 245).
Mr. Harrington, who hath shewn at great length, that propertymust
have a being before empire or government, or beginning with it must
still be first in order, because the cause must necessarily precede the
effect, reasons thus: “Property comes to have a being before empire two
ways, either by a natural or violent revolution: natural revolution hap-
pens from within, or by commerce, as when a government erectedupon
one balance, that for example, of a nobility or a clergy, through the
decay of their estates, comes to alter to another balance; which alter-
ation in the root of property, leaves all to confusion, or produces a new
branch or government, according to the kind or nature of the root.
Violent revolution happens from without, or by arms, as when upon
a conquest there follows confiscation. Confiscation again is of three
kinds, when the captain taking all to himself, plants his army by way
of military colonies, benefices or Timars, which was the policy of Ma-
homet; or when the captain has some sharers, or a nobility that divides
with him, which was the policy introduced by the Goths and Vandals;
or when <296> the captain divides the inheritance, by lots or otherwise,
to the whole people; which policy was instituted by God or Moses in
the commonwealth of Israel. Now this triple distribution, whether
from natural or violent revolution, returns, as to the generation of em-
pire, to the same thing, that is, to the nature of the balance already
laws of the Egyptians permitted pawning of dead bodies, and denied burial to chil-
dren if they neglected to relieve such pledges by paying their parents debts, Diod.
Sicul. Bibl. 1. 93. On the other hand, it is unnatural and abominable to pawn wives
and children, as was permitted in the kingdom of Pegu, because it must be attended
with most miserable consequences. And therefore the Romans judged him worthy
of banishment, who knowingly accepted in pawn a free-born child from his father,
l. 5. D. quae res pign.
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stated.”4 Mr. Harrington having fully proved these points, or that prop-
erty is the natural cause of government, and that changes in it must
make proportional changes in government, it follows from hence, that
unless the balance of property be fixed, empire or government cannot
be fixed, but will be continually altering as the balance of property
varies; but property in land can only be fixed by an Agrarian law. Now
these principles being laid down, the following truths concerning
money, and the methods of regulating it in governments will be man-
ifest, namely, “That the balance in money,” as Mr. Harringtonexpresses
it, “may be as good or better than that of land in three cases: First,
where there is no property of land yet introduced, as in Greece during
the time of her ancient imbecility; whence, as is noted by Thucydides,
The meaner sort, through a desire of gain, underwent the servitude of the
mighty. Secondly, in cities of small territory and great traffic, asHolland
and Genoa, the land not being able to feed the people, who must live
upon trade, is over-balanced by the means of that traffic, which is
money. Thirdly, in a narrow country, where the lots are at a low scant-
ling, as among the Israelites; if care be not had of money in the regu-
lation of the same, it will eat out the balance of land. For which cause,
tho’ an Israelite might both have money, and put it to usury, (Thou
shalt lend [upon usury] to many nations, Deut. xv. 6. and xxiii. 19.) yet
might he not lend upon usury to a citizen or brother. Whence two
things are manifest. First, that usury in itself is not unlawful: And next,
that usury in Israel was no otherwise forbidden, than as it might come
to overthrow the balance or foundation of the government. For where
a lot, as to the general, amounted not perhaps to four acres, a man that
should have a thousand pounds in his purse, would not have regarded
such a lot in comparison of his money; and he that should have been
half so much in debt, would have been quite eaten out. Usury is of
such a nature, as, not forbidden in the like cases, must devour the gov-
ernment. The Roman people, while their territory was no bigger, and
their lots, which exceeded not two acres a man, were yet scantier, were
flead alive with it; and if they had not helped themselves by their tu-
mults, and the institution of their tribunes, it had totally ruined both
4. Harrington, “The Prerogative of Popular Government,” in The Political Works
of James Harrington, bk. I, chap. III, 405–6.
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them and their government. In a commonwealth whose territory is very
small, the balance of the government being laid upon the land, as in
Lacedemon, it will not be sufficient to forbid usury; but money itself
must be forbidden. Whence Lycurgus allowed of none, or of such only
as being of old or useless iron, was little better, or if you will, littleworse
than none. The prudence of <297> which law appeared in the neglect
of it, as when Lysander, General for the Lacedemonians in the Pelo-
ponnesian war, having taken Athens, and brought home the spoil of
it, occasioned the ruin of that commonwealth in her victory. The land
of Canaan, compared with Spain or England, was at most but a York-
shire, and Laconia was less than Canaan. Now, if we imagine Yorkshire
divided, as was Canaan, into six hundred thousand lots, or as was La-
conia into thirty thousand, a Yorkshireman having one thousand
pounds in his purse, would I believe, have a better estate in money than
in land: Wherefore, in this case, to make the land hold the balance,
there is no way but either that of Israel, by forbidding usury, or that of
Lacedemon, by forbidding money. Where a small sum may come to
over-balance a man’s estate in land; there, I say, usury or money, for
the preservation of the balance in land, must of necessity be forbidden,
or the government will rather rest upon the balance of money, than
upon that of land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a territory of such
extent as Spain or England, the land being not to be overbalanced by
money, there needs no forbidding of money or usury. In Lacedemon
merchandize was forbidden; in Israel and Rome it was not exercised;
wherefore, to these usury must have been the more destructive; but in
countries where merchandize is exercised, it is so far from being de-
structive, that it is necessary; else that which might be of profit to the
commonwealth, would rust unprofitably in private purses, there being
no man that will venture his money but through hope of some gain;
which, if it be so regulated, that the borrower may gain more by it than
the lender, as at four in the hundred, or thereabouts, usury becomes a
mighty profit to the public, and a charity to private men: In which
sense, we may not be persuaded by them, that do not observe these
different causes, that it is against scripture. Had usury to a brother been
permitted in Israel, that government had been overthrown: But that
such a territory as England or Spain cannot be over-balanced by money,
whether it be a scarce or plentiful commodity, whether it be accumu-
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lated by parsimony, as in the purse of Henry VII. or presented by for-
tune, as in the revenue of the Indies. For in general this is certain, that
if the people have clothes and money of their own, these must either
rise (for the bulk) out of property in land, or at least, out of the cul-
tivation of the land, or the revenue of industry; which, if it be depen-
dent, they must give such a part of their clothes and money to preserve
that dependence, out of which the rest arises, to him or them on whom
they depend, as he or they shall think fit; or parting with nothing to
this end, must lose all; that is, if they be tenants, they must pay their
rent, or turn out. So if they have clothes or money dependently, the
balance of land is in the landlord or landlords of the people. But if
they have clothes and money independently, then the balance of land
must be in the people themselves, in <298> which case they neither
would, if there were any such, nor can, because there be no such, give
their money or clothes to such as are wiser, or richer or stronger than
themselves. So it is not a man’s clothes and money or riches, that oblige
him to acknowledge the title of his obedience to him that is wiser or
richer, but a man’s no clothes, or money, or his poverty. Wherefore,
seeing the people cannot be said to have clothes and money of their
own, without the balance in land, and having the balance in land, will
never give their clothes or money or obedience to a single person, or a
nobility, tho’ these should be richer in money, in such a territory as
England or Spain, money can never come to over-balance land. Henry
VII. tho’ he missed of the Indies, in which, for my part, I think him
happy, was the richest in money of English princes. Nevertheless, this
accession of revenue did not at all preponderate on the king’s part, nor
change the balance. But while making farms of a standard he increased
the yeomanry, and cutting off retainers he abased the nobility, began
that breach in the balance of land, which proceeding ruined the no-
bility, and in them that government. The monarchy of Spain, since the
silver of Potosi sailed up the Guadalquiver, which in English is, since
that king had the Indies, stands upon the same balance in the lands of
the nobility on which it always stood.”5 See Mr. Harrington himself.
What hath been now quoted from him is sufficient to shew in what
manner we ought to reason about the regulation of money in a state.
5. Ibid., 406–8.
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There will be occasion afterwards to consider the natural causes of gov-
ernment more fully. But it is plain from what was said in a former re-
mark, 1. That superior wisdom and virtue will naturally create author-
ity. And that, 2. Property alone can give or create power, and will
naturally produce it. And therefore, 3. That empire will follow the bal-
ance of property: And by consequence, 4. There is no natural mean of
fixing government, but by fixing the balance upon which it depends.
Wherefore, 5. That is a proper regulation of money with respect to the
preservation of a government, which is necessary or proper to fix the
balance upon which the nature of that government depends or turns.
But, 6. Men have a natural right to form themselves into any form of
civil government proper to promote their greater happiness; and con-
sequently, to make any regulations necessary or proper to that effect.
Thus the Lacedemonians had a right, for the preservation of their gov-
ernment, to forbid money, and the Israelites to forbid usury. And thus
our government has a right to regulate the interest of money as the
nature and end of our government, i.e. as the greater good in our gov-
ernment requires. If it be asked what the law of nature says about
money in a state of nature, the answer is obvious; it requires that com-
merce be carried on with or without money, in an honest candid way;
so as none may be made richer at the detriment of others; and allows
bartering, buying, letting and hiring, and other contracts, all imag-
inable latitude or liberty <299> within the bounds of honesty, the
general dictates of which, with regard to all contracts, are sufficiently
explained by our Author.
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Concerning pacts.
s e c t i on ccc l x x x v
Tho’, by the law of nature, there be no difference between pacts and
contracts, both deriving their subsistence and force from consent; yet it
may be said, that contracts, according to the antient way of speaking,
related to commerce about goods and labour (§327); and pacts to other
things and deeds, which are not matters of ordinary commerce.* Thus,
e.g. tho’ free persons of either sex are not in commerce, yet among them
agreements are made about marriage, to be celebrated either immedi-
ately, or some time after; and both these agreements, the former of which
is called betrothing, the other full marriage, come under the title of pacts.
<300>
* Pufendorff, law of nature, &c. 5. 2. 4. has acknowledged this difference. And
tho’ the Roman writers, because they use the words in another sense, and make an-
other distinction between contracts and pacts, do not always make use of the word
contrahere in speaking of things in commerce, or the word pacisci in speaking of
things out of commerce; (for they say contrahere nuptias, l. 22. D. de ritu nupt. and
pacisci ab aliquo numos, Val. Max. 9. 4. 2.) yet the word contractus is seldom or never
used by them but to signify an agreement about things in commerce. This is so true,
that the civilians (contra Donell. comm. juris, 13. 18.) [[Hugo Donellus (Hugues Do-
neau, 1527–91), French jurist and commentator on Roman civil law (Commentar-
iorum juris civilis libri viginti octo )]] deny marriage to be a contract, because it relates
to persons and their inseparable union, which are not things in commerce. We may
therefore admit this difference between contracts and pacts.
The difference
between pacts
and contracts.
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s e c t i on ccc l x x x v i
Now, since men cannot live comfortably and agreeably, except they ren-
der one to another those duties of humanity and beneficence which we
have already defined (§214); and yet benevolence is become so cold and
languid amongst men, that we can hardly depend upon one another’s
humanity and beneficence for them (§326); and besides, these are duties
not of perfect, but imperfect obligation, (§122),* and therefore duties
which cannot be extorted from the unwilling: for these reasons, there is
no other security for our obtaining them but another’s obligation to us
by his consent; and therefore we ought thus to secure to ourselves the
performance of those good offices by others to which we would have a
perfect right. Now, this consent of two or more to give, or do any thing
which could not be otherwise exacted from them by perfect right, but
was due merely in consequence of the law of humanity and beneficence,
is called a pact.
s e c t i on ccc l x x x v i i
Nor can it be questioned that such pacts ought to be faithfully fulfilled.
For since he who promises any thing, declares his mind, whether by words
or other signs; and words are so to be used, that the person we speak to
may not be de-<301>ceived (§196); the consequence is, that all fraud, all
lying, all falshood ought to be far removed from those who deliberately
make covenants or pacts; and therefore that nothing ought to be held
more sacred than keeping faith, or more detestable than perfidy.†
* The history of Abraham and Abimelech furnishes us with an example. The law
of humanity and beneficence required, commanded both of them, Abraham espe-
cially, an upright pious man, who had received many favours from Abimelech, to
behave kindly and graciously towards one another: natural reason obliged Abraham
to gratitude: And yet we read, Genesis xxi. 23. that they bargained or covenanted
friendship the one with the other. And thus the ancients obliged one another by
covenants to perform what they were previously obliged to by the law of humanity
and beneficence.
† For as by pacts we in some measure supply our indigence; and we make cove-
nants or pacts with others, that they may be obliged to render us those good offices
Why pacts are
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s e c t i on ccc l x x x v i i i
There is a second reason which every one will own to be of no lessweight.
And it is this, the love of justice is the source of all the duties we owe
to one another (§173), and this love commands us not to do to others
what we would not have done by them to ourselves (§177). But surely
none would desire to be deluded by the promises and pacts of another.
It is therefore our duty not to deceive any one by our pacts or promises;
not to defraud one, by making him trust to our fidelity; but faithfully
and conscientiously to perform what we engage to do.* <302>
s e c t i on ccc l x x x i x
Pacts are either unilateral or bilateral. By the former, one party only is
bound to the other; by the latter, both parties mutually oblige or engage
themselves one to another; and therefore this latter kind of pacts includes
in them a tacite condition, that one is to perform his promise, if the
other likewise fulfils the pact on his side. Both however are either oblig-
atory or liberative. By the former, a new obligation is brought upon one
of humanity and beneficence, which we can hardly expect from them without such
pacts; it is plain that human life, and all the interests of social commerce, depend
upon fidelity in fulfilling them. Therefore Cicero says justly, pro Q. Roscio comoedo,
c. 6. “To break one’s faith is so much the more base and attrocious, that human life
depends upon faith.” Hence unlying lips have always been reckoned a noble quality,
as Euripides expresses it in Iphig. in Taur. v. 1064. [[Euripides, Iphigenia inTauris. ]]
Kalo´n ti glwss◊, o¤tw pi´sic parv˜.
A faithful tongue is a beautiful thing.
* We do not here use this argument, “That civil society could not subsist without
faith and honesty.” For tho’ this argument proves the necessity of pacts, and of faith-
fulness amongst mankind, and Cicero hath elegantly demonstrated this necessity
from this consideration, “That without some share of this justice, without faith and
pacts among themselves, even those who live by villainy and wickedness could not
subsist.” [[Cicero, De officiis (On duties), 2.11.40.]] Yet we have already shewn, that
the origine of moral obligation is not to be derived from this principle of sociality
(§75): And therefore we have rather chosen to give these two reasons in the preceding
sections derived from our first principle of love.
A second
argument.
Pacts of
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or other, or upon both. By the latter, obligations formerly constituted
are taken off. Again, pacts may be of a mixed kind; such are those by
which former obligations are annulled, and new ones are constituted at
the will of the parties covenanting. Of this kind principally, it is evident,
are novations and transactions about doubtful or uncertain affairs. But
there is one rule for them all, which is, that they ought to be faithfully
and religiously kept, especially if one hath not promised with an inten-
tion to lay himself under a strict obligation.* <303>
s e c t i on cccxc
Hence we infer, that by the law of nature there is no difference between
pact and stipulation; and therefore that Franc. Connanus, in his com-
ment. 1. 6. is mistaken, when, to exalt the excellence of the Roman laws,
he denies that by the law of nature obligation arises from promises, as
* This we add, in opposition to those who assert, that there is a perfect and an
imperfect promise; the former of which they define to be a promise, wherein the
promiser not only designs to be obliged, but actually transfers a right to another, to
exact the thing promised from him as a debt: And the latter they define to be a promise
wherein the promiser designs indeed to be obliged, but not in such a manner as that
the thing promised may be exacted from him by the person to whom he promises it.
To which kind they refer this way of promising, “I have purposed to give you such
a thing, and I desire you may credit me.” As likewise, the promises of great or com-
plaisant men, when they promise one a vote or a recommendation, Grotius of the
rights, &c. 2. 2. 2. Pufendorff of the law of nature, &c. 3. 5. 5. But, 1. Such promises
are often not pacts, but words or asseverations only, which Grotius and Pufendorff
themselves distinguish from pacts: Yea, sometimes, they are but preparations to pacts,
or what is called treaties. 2. It is a contradiction to say, one wills to promise, and yet
does not will to give a right to exact from him. It is a fiction, by which, if it be
admitted, I know not what pacts and promises may not be basely eluded, after the
example of the Milanese, who being reproached with perjury, answered, “We swore
indeed, but we did not promise to keep our oath.” Upon which answer, when Rad-
evicus de gestis Friderici I. l. 2. c. 25. relates it, he justly says, “A suitable answer indeed,
that their discourse might be of a piece with their profligate manners; and that they
who lived perfidiously and infamously, might speak as wickedly as they lived, and
their discourse might be as impure and villainous as their actions.” [[Radevicus, De
rebus gestis Friderici I. Romanorum Imperatoris.]] 3. Finally, tho’ the promises of great
men should sometimes be imperfect with respect to exaction, it does not follow from
hence, that they are imperfect in respect of obligation.
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long as they are simple agreements, and are not converted into contracts.
His arguments have been sufficiently refuted by Grotius of the rights of
war and peace, 2. 2. 1. and Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations,
3. 5. 9. We shall only add, that Connanus speaks not in so high a strain
of the natural obligation of bare pacts as the Romans themselves did,
who never denied their perfect obligation, tho’ they did not grant an
action upon them for particular reasons.* <304>
s e c t i on cccxc i
A pact being the mutual consent of two or more in the same will or
desire (§386); i.e. an agreement of two or more about the same thing,
the same circumstances; the consequence is, that this internal consent
must be indicated by some external sign. But such signs are words either
spoken or written, and deeds; the former of which make express, the
latter tacite consent (§284); and therefore it is the same, whether persons
make a pact by express, or by tacite consent, provided the deed be such
as is held to be significative of consent by the opinion of all mankind,
or of the particular nation;† nay, consent is sometimes justly inferred,
* According to the Romans, one was perfectly obliged by a bare pact; and they
looked upon him who broke his word with no less contempt than other nations.
Besides, they did not think the obligation imperfect which arose from such bare
promises as were not confirmed by stipulation, when there was place for compensatio,
1. 6. D. de compens. constituto, l. 1. § pen. D. de pecun. const. novatio, l. 1. fin. D.
de novat. fideijussoribus & pignoribus, l. 5. D. de pign. exceptio. l. 7. §5. l. 45. D. de
pact. l. 10. l. 21. l. 28. C. eodem: Whence even what a promiser paid by mistake, could
not be recovered condictione indebiti, l. 19. D. de cond. indeb. most of which cases
are of such a nature that they can hardly be brought under the notion of imperfect
obligation. The Romans only refused to grant an action upon bare pacts, because
they had contrived a certain civil method which they ordered to be used inagreements
or pacts, viz. stipulation. Wherefore, as in several countries the laws do not grant an
action upon the pawning of immoveable things, unless the pawn be registered in the
public acts, and yet these laws do not detract from the perfect obligation of pawn,
which exerts itself in other ways; so neither did the Romans think that pacts did not
produce a perfect obligation, because they did not grant an action upon bare pacts.
† Hence by the Roman law, a nod was reckoned consent, l. 52. § ult. D. de obl.
& act. Quintilian. declam. 247. Nay, submission and silence were reckoned consent,
l. 51. pr. D. locat. l. 11. §4. 7. D. de interr. in jure fac. and elsewhere, which we likewise
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from the very nature of the business, if it be of such a kind, that a person
cannot be imagined to dissent (§284). <305>
s e c t i on cccxc i i
It is plain from the definition of a pact as requiring consent (§391), that
they cannot covenant who are destitute of reason, and therefore that the
pacts of mad persons are null, unless they were made in an evidently
lucid interval from their madness; as likewise the pacts of infants, and
of all whose age cannot be supposed capable of understanding thenature
of the thing; or of such persons, whose minds are disturbed by their
indisposition; or of persons in liquor, even tho’ their drunkenness be
voluntary;* or finally, of those who promised any thing to another, or
stipulated any thing from another to themselves in jest. <306>
s e c t i on cccxc i i i
From the same principle it follows, that pacts made thro’ ignorance or
mistake are unvalid, if this fault of the understanding was culpable, vin-
cible and voluntary (§107); but not, if it be of such a nature, that the
most prudent person is liable to it; (§108), as, if the covenanting persons
admit to be true, unless there be some probable reason why one might, tho’ he did
not assent, rather choose to be silent, than to testify his dissent by words or deeds,
e.g. if a son, afraid of a cruel father, being asked by him, whether he would marry
Mavia whom he hated, should be silent, he cannot be thought to have consented.
For what if a son, when such a father bids him go hang himself, should say nothing,
would he therefore be deemed to have consented?
* For tho’ in other cases, an action done in drunkenness be imputed to one whose
drunkenness was voluntary (§50), yet here another sentence must be pronounced,
and the degrees of drunkenness must be distinguished. For either the promiser was
quite drunk, or only a little in liquor. Now, if he was quite drunk, that could not but
be perceived by the party bargaining with him; and therefore, the latter either acted
knavishly, or at least he is blameable for covenanting with such a person; so that there
is no reason why, when the person has recovered from his drunkenness, such a con-
tracter should have any right to demand the fulfilment of such a promise. But if the
person be not quite drunk, his promise must be obligatory, because he was not quite
incapable of judging what and to whom he promised.
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had different persons and objects in their view; or if either of them was
mistaken about the person, or object, or any circumstances of it which
could not easily be known, and which, had he known, he would not
have made the pact.*
s e c t i on cccxc i v
Much less still is a pact valid if one be led into it by the fraud or knavery
of the other; or in which one is involved, and by which one is wronged
by another’s cunning and deceitfulness; because he cannot be deemed
to have consented, who was so blinded or deluded by another’s artful
misrepresentations, that he had quite a different opinion of the person
or object when he covenanted, than he afterwards <307> found to be
the case.† On the other hand, there is no reason why a pact should be
null when a third person induces one to make it without the other’s
knowledge, tho’ in this case it be indisputable, that the person by whose
fraudulence the pact was made, is obliged to repair the damages of the
persons whom he hath thus injured.
* By these rules may all the cases be resolved that are usually put upon this head.
Thus, for instance, the pact will not be valid, if one promised to espouse a virgin,
who is afterwards found to be pregnant, because the most prudent person might have
mistaken in this case: Nor is the contract of marriage valid, if Afrania be betrothed
to one in mistake, instead of Tullia whom he had in view, but did not know her
name; because not having the same person in view, they did not consent to the same
thing: In fine, if Tullia after betrothment is found to be Epileptical, or liable to any
other hideous disease, the betrother shall not be bound in such a case, because he was
ignorant of, or in an error about a circumstance which he could not easily discover,
and which, if he had known, it is not probable he would have desired the marriage.
† Hence none will say, that Jacob’s marriage with Lea was valid by the law of
nature, since it was brought about by the fraudulence of Laban, Gen. xxix. 22. Nor
was the custom of the country, by which Laban pretended to exculpate himself, suf-
ficient to excuse him, or to oblige Jacob to submit, and suffer himself to be so ma-
liciously deceived by his father-in-law. For that custom was not obligatory; and if it
really had been received as a law, Jacob ought to have been pre-admonished of it,
and Laban ought not to have promised Rachel to Jacob, but to have acquainted him,
who was a stranger, that by the customs in Syria, the younger sister could not be
betrothed before her elder sister. This transaction was therefore full of knavery, nor
could it have been valid, had it not seemed better to Jacob, who was a stranger, to
put up the injury, than to involve himself in an ambiguous suit.
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s e c t i on cccxcv
And since nothing can be more repugnant to consent than force and
fear; nor can an action be imputed to one, if he was forced to it by one
who had no right to force him (§109); hence it is clear, that one is not
bound by his promise to a robber, or to any one who unjustly uses vi-
olence against him. But a pact is not invalid, if it be made with one who
had a right to use violence; and much less is a pact null, if not he to
whom the promise is made, but a third person, without his knowledge,
used violence, or was the cause of the pact.* Nor is a pact invalid, if the
person forced to it, afterwards freely consents and confirms his promise,
because he then becomes obliged, not by his first <308> promiseextorted
from his by force and fear, but by his after voluntary consent (§109).
s e c t i on cccxcv i
Moreover, since a pact consists in the consent of two or more to the
same thing (§386), it is very plain that this rule must hold not only in
bilateral, but likewise in unilateral pacts; and therefore a promiser is not
bound, unless the other signify that the promise is agreeable to him. But
this may be justly presumed, either from the condition of the person to
whom the promise is made; or from the nature of the thing promised;
or from antecedent request, provided, in this last case, the same thing
that the other had demanded be promised.
* For since imputability ceases, if one be neither the cause nor doer of a thing
(§105), but in this case, he to whom a promise is made, is neither the author nor cause
of the violence by which the other was forced to promise, the violence cannot be
imputed to him. Thus, e.g. if any person in imminent danger from robbers or pirates,
should hire a convoy at a high price, it would be in vain for him to pretend to his
convoy, when the hire is demanded, that he promised it in fear of robbers. So Seneca
decides the matter, Controv. 4. 27. [[Seneca, Controversiae, in Seneca (the Elder),
Declamations.]]
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s e c t i on cccxcv i i
Again, because pacts are made about something to be performed (§386),
but impossible things cannot be performed, and therefore the omission
of them is imputable to none (§115); the consequence is, that pacts about
things absolutely impracticable are null: no obligation arises from them,
unless the thing, at the time the pact was made, was in the power of the
promiser, and he shall afterwards destroy, by his own fault, his power to
fulfil his promise; or unless one fraudulently promised a thing not ab-
solutely impossible, but which he knew to be impracticable with regard
to him (§115). <309>
s e c t i on cccxcv i i i
And since those things are justly reckoned among impossibles, which,
tho’ not impossible in the nature of things, yet cannot be done agreeably
to the laws and to good manners (§115); hence it is evident, that pacts
and promises contrary to the laws of justice and humanity, or even to
decency, modesty and honour, (and which, for that reason, we ought to
be judged not to be capable of doing, as Papinianus most justly and
philosophically speaks, l. 15. D. de condit. instit.) are not valid. A person
is not obliged to fulfil a promise by which he engaged to commit any
crime; nor is he who promised to pay one a reward for perpetrating any
crime bound by such a promise; and therefore all pacts about base and
dishonest things, whether unilateral or bilateral, are of no effect.*
* For it is manifestly contradictory, that the law of nature should confirm pacts
contrary to itself; that it should at the same time prohibit a pact, and command it to
be fulfilled; or that a pact should be at one and the same time null, and yet obligatory.
And therefore, a pact is departed from without perfidy, which could not be fulfilled
without committing a crime. Nor does he deserve the character of faithful, who per-
forms what he cannot do without incurring guilt. And for this reason the nurse gives
an excellent answer to Dejanira, when she would have her to promise silence.
Praestare, fateor, posse me tacitam fidem,
Si scelere careat, interim scelus est fides.
Seneca in Herc. Oeteo. Act. 2. v. 480.
[[Seneca, Hercules Oetaeus 2.480, in Seneca (the Younger), Tragoediae incer-
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s e c t i on cccxc i x
Hence again we infer, that one is not obliged to perform promises, the
fulfilment of which would manifestly be detrimental to the other, tho’
this other should urge the fulfilment of the promise to his own ruin. For
since we are forbid to injure any person by the law of nature (§178), and
none <310> can make pacts contrary to the law of nature, (§398), no
pact by which another is hurt can be valid; and he who keeps such a
promise, even to one who insists upon the fulfilment of it, is no less
deserving of punishment, than he who hurts one against his will, and
by force.*
s e c t i on cccc
Besides, because we make pacts about those things which we desire to
have a perfect right to exact from others (§386); but those things can
neither be done, nor given, which are not at our disposal, but subject to
the dominion of another person; we have therefore reason to deny that
one can make a valid pact about things belonging to others, without
commission from the owner, or even about his own things, to which any
other hath already acquired some right by a prior pact. He indeed who
hath engaged to use all his diligence to make another give or do, is
torum auctorum: “I confess that I can offer silent faith, if it is free from crime,
meanwhile, faith is the crime.”]]
* Nor can the maxim, volenti non fieri injuriam [[“there is no injury done to some-
one who is willing to suffer it”]], be opposed to this doctrine. For we have already
shewn, that this maxim does not take place when it is unlawful to consent. But it is
unlawful to consent to what God hath prohibited by right reason, or by his revealed
will. For this reason, tho’ Saul being wounded, had begged the young man to slay
him, yet he was so far from escaping unpunished for consenting to this request, that
David ordered him to be put to death as guilty of Regicide, 2 Sam. l. 15, &c.
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obliged to fulfil that promise.* Yea, he is obliged to answer for the value
of it, if he hath engaged himself to get another to give, or do a thing to
any one; but he to whom a third person hath made such a promise, hath
no right to exact the thing or deed, thus promised to him, from the
person to whom it belongs to dispose of it. See Hertius de oblig. alium
datur. facturumve.1 <311>
s e c t i on cccc i
From the same principle, that promise to give or do consists in the con-
sent of both parties (§386), it manifestly follows, that it depends upon
the parties to make a pactwith, orwithout conditions, and any agreement
with regard to time they please; and that these circumstances ought to
be observed by the persons engaging, provided what regards the con-
dition truly makes the effect of the pact depend upon an uncertainevent;
i.e. provided it be truly a condition. Whence it is plain, that what is prom-
ised under what is called an impossible condition, is not obligatory, since
such an additional clause hardly deserves to be termed a condition: † and
* For since he hath promised no more than his help and diligence, the other hath
no right to exact more from him. And in general, as often as one stipulates something
to himself, which he knew, or might have known not to be in another’s power; so
often is the Promissor discharged from his promise, by using all his diligence. This
is elegantly expressed by Seneca of benefits, 7. 13. “Some things are of such a nature,
that they cannot be effectuated; and in some things it is to do them, to have done all
that one could in order to effectuate them. If a physician did all in his power to cure
one, he hath done his part. Even tho’ a person be condemned, an advocate deserves
the reward of his eloquence, if he exerted all his skill. And praise is due to a General,
tho’ he be vanquished, if he exerted all due prudence, diligence and courage.” [[The
reference to bk. 7, chap. 13 is incorrect.]]
1. Hertius (praeses ) and Ga¨rtner (respondens ), Disquisitio juridica de obligatione
alium daturum facturumve.
† For a condition is a certain circumstance expressed by the stipulating parties,
by which the effect of the pact is suspended, as by an uncertain event. But seeing
impossible does not mean an uncertain event, but an event which it is certain cannot
happen, it is plain that such a circumstance does not suspend the effect of a pact, and
therefore it is not a condition. Miltiades therefore cavilled, when he required the
Lemnians to surrender their city according to their pact, because, coming from home
he had arrived at Lemnos by a north wind, Nepos, Miltiad. c. 1. and 2. For the Lem-
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those who have promised or stipulated what they foresaw could not be
done, must be deemed either to have been in jest, or to have been mad:
in the first of which cases, they must be judged not to have consented;
and in the other of which they must be judged not to have had it in their
power to have consented (§392). <312>
s e c t i on cccc i i
But since base and dishonest things are justly reckoned amongst im-
possibles (§115), and what is promised upon an impossible condition is
null and void, (§401); and since in general it is unlawful to make pacts
about base or dishonest things (§398); hence we may justly infer, that
base and dishonest conditions render a pact null;* and that he who
promised upon such a condition is not bound to fulfil his promise; but
nians meant Athens: nor could Miltiades understand the Lemnians in anyother sense,
since he at that time had no home but at Athens. The condition was impossible, and
therefore rendered the pact null; especially seeing the Lemnians might easily have
been perceived by Miltiades to have spoken in jest and to banter him.
* For a particular reason, the Romans held conditions, whether physically or mor-
ally impossible, in testaments, as not written, not existing, §10. Inst. de her. inst. l.
1. l. 19. D. de condit. Inst. l. 8. & l. 20. D. de condit. & dem. For as it seemed absurd
to indulge jesting and trifling to a testator in so serious an affair; so neither could the
omission of an impossible action be deemed fraud in an heir, since he could never
have consented to it (§115). And hence by the Roman law they would have got their
legacies which were left to them by Eumolpus in Petron. Sat. cap. 91. tho’ they had
not fulfilled the condition. [[Petronius, Satyricon, 141, p. 321.]] “All who have legacies
by my testament, except my children, shall only have them upon condition that they
cut my body into pieces, and eat it up publickly.” But since, in our opinion, the law
of nature knows no other last-wills beside those which are done by way of pact (§291),
all that hath been said of pacts is applicable to last-wills; so that the law of the Thebans
was absurd, which ordered ridiculous conditions to be performed, as that one who
had flattered a woman in order to be her heir, should carry her naked corps besmeared
with oil upon his shoulders.
Scilicet elabi si posset mortua, credo,
Que nimium institerat viventi.
Hor. Serm. 2. 5.
[[Horace, Satires II, 5.87: “Of course, I believe, if she could slip away from
him when she was dead—he had pressed too hard on her while she was
alive.”]]
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that if it be fulfilled, he is justly liable to punishment for having done a
crime; as is the other party likewise, being, by making such a condition,
the moral cause of that crime (§112). <313>
s e c t i on cccc i i i
Moreover, since one may assist another, or promote his advantage by
means of a mandate, or by undertaking his business without a com-
mission (§346), we must conclude, that it is the same whether one prom-
ise and make a pact in person, or another do it for him by his order. But
since he who undertakes another’s business without a commission from
him, is obliged to manage it to his advantage (§348), which he does not
do, who is liberal of another’s goods, and gives any thing of another’s
away without the owner’s consent (§400); the consequence is, that he
who undertakes another’s business without a commission, may stipulate
to that person; (so that this rule in the Roman law is not agreeable to
natural equity, “That none can stipulate to another, unless he be under
subjection to him,” §4. Inst. de inut. stip.) but he cannot promise for
him without his knowledge; and such a promise does not bind the
owner.
s e c t i on cccc i v
Finally, because, as we observed in the beginning of this chapter, there
is no distinction, by the law of nature, between pacts and contracts, both
deriving all their subsistence and force from consent (385), it is evident,
that all the rules which have been laid down in this chapter, do no less
belong to contracts than to pacts; and that one does not proceed in a
wrong method, who deduces the <314> nature of contracts from the
nature of pacts, and so begins by considering the latter.
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By what means obligations arising from
pacts and contracts are dissolved.
s e c t i on ccccv
We have already proved that pacts ought to be religiously fulfilled, and
that nothing is more sacred than one’s pledged faith (§387); but by faith
is meant nothing else but the performance of promises and pacts; (and
therefore Cicero de off. 1. 6. justly, tho’ not exactly according to ety-
mological rules, says, “Fidem appellatam, quia fiat, quod dictum est”).1
Hence thenwe infer, that those who covenant have then attained to their
end, when they have satisfied the terms of their covenant, and what was
agreed upon is done. But the end (which according to the philosophers,
is first in intention, and last in execution) being obtained, or being of
such a nature that it cannot be obtained (§397), the obligation arising
from a promise or pact must cease.* <315>
* The civil law distinguishes between the ways by which obligation is removed
ipso jure, in the nature of the thing, and the ways by which it is taken off by exception.
When the obligation is cancelled by any deed of the parties contracting, as by paying,
compensation, acquittance, &c. then it expires ipso jure by the nature of the thing.
But if it be dissolved on the account of equity, it is said to be removed by an exception.
But tho’ we do not think this distinction quite idle, or without foundation, (upon
which see an excellent dissertation by Hen. Cocceius de eo quod fit ipso jure) [[H.
von Cocceji (praeses ) and Zaunschliffer (respondens ), Discursus juridicus inauguralis
de eo quod fit ipso jure ]] yet it will easily be granted to us, not to be of the law of
nature, by those who are acquainted with the judiciary affairs of the Romans, and
the reason which induced them to make this distinction.
1. Cicero, De officiis (On duties ), 1.7.23: “ ‘Good faith’ is so called because what is
promised is ‘made good.’ ”
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s e c t i on ccccv i
Since an obligation arising from a pact or promise ceases when it is ful-
filled, and that which was agreed upon is done (§405); the consequence
is, that it ceases by payment, which is nothing else but the natural per-
formance of the thing promised or agreed upon. But it is the same thing
to him who is to be paid, by whom he be paid, provided the thing itself
which was owing to him, or, (if it be a consumeable commodity) the
equivalent be paid to him (§364); because thus the obligation to him is
naturally discharged. So, for the same reason, it is evident, that he who
is under an obligation by his pact, is not delivered from that obligation
when another offers to fulfil it for him, if it be of such a nature as not
to admit of being performed by another in his room.*
s e c t i on ccccv i i
From the same principle we infer, that the species is to be restored, if
the use or custody only of an inconsumeable thing was granted; and the
same in kind and quantity, if the use of a consumeable thing was
granted; that one thing cannot be obtruded upon a creditor for another
against his will; <316> andmuch less can he be forced to accept of a part
for the whole; or to take payment later, or in another place than was
agreed upon in the contract;† because, in all these cases, the thing in
* This happens as often as a person’s quality or virtue engaged one to make a pact
with him. And therefore, if Titia be obliged by contract of marriage to marry Sem-
pronius, she is not freed from this obligation, tho’ Sulpicia should be ever so ready
and willing to fulfil the contract in her stead, because Sempronius chose Titia for her
age, her figure, her personal good qualities, and it is not the same to him whom he
espouses. On the contrary, to a lender it is the same, whether he receive the book he
lent from the person who borrowed it, or from another with whom he had nothing
to do: And it is the same to a creditor, whether he receive hismoney and interest from
his debtor, or from a third person unknown to him, because thus the thing in obli-
gation is naturally performed.
† For tho’ necessity may require some indulgence to a debtor, and tho’ the laws
of humanity may often oblige a creditor to remit a little of his rigour, we are here
speaking of right; and by it pacts and contracts ought to be punctually and faithfully
performed. “For,” as Cicero says, Off. 2. 24. “nothing cements or holds together in
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obligation is not naturally performed (§307). Further, it is plain, from
the same principle, that we are to pay to no other but our creditor, pro-
vided the laws allow him to receive payment, or to him to whom he has
ceded his right, or given commission to receive payment; for otherwise,
tho’ the thing in obligation is performed, yet it is not fulfilled to him to
whom one is debtor by the contract (§406).
s e c t i on ccccv i i i
Again, because obligation ceases when a contract is fulfilled, and with
respect to consumeable things as much is held for the same (§364); the
consequence is, that obligation is removed by compensation, which is
nothing else but balancing debt and credit, both of which have a certain
value, one with another.* <317>
s e c t i on cccc i x
From the definition of compensation it is plain, that it can only take
place among thosewho aremutually owing one to another, and therefore
that another’s debt to me cannot be obtruded upon my creditor. Com-
pensation has place with respect to consumeable things, which, since
they do not regularly admit of price of fancy, have always a certain value;
but species cannot be compensated by species, nor a thing of one kind
by a thing of a different kind, nor personal performances by like per-
formances, because all these things admit of a price of affection, and are
of an uncertain value. In fine, compensation, even by unequal quanti-
ties, amounting to the sum, holds good, tho’ it does not appear reason-
union all the parts of a society, as faith and credit, which can never be kept up, unless
men are under a necessity of honestly payingwhat they oweone to another.”[[Cicero,
De officiis 2.24.84.]]
* There is yet another reason: For since he is paid who gets what was owing to
him (§406), and he to whom a consumeable thing was owing, gets it when he gets
as much (§363); it follows, that in such a case, he who any way receives as much as
was owing, is paid; and therefore, compensation is but a short way of paying; and it
is most reasonable that it should have the same effect as payment.
The second
way, Com-
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able to desire to compensate a clear debt by one not so clear or contended
for.*
s e c t i on ccccx
Moreover, since every one can abdicate his own right (§13), an obligation
may likewise be dissolved by acquittance or voluntary remission, by
which we understand a creditor’s voluntary renounc-<318>ing his right
of exacting a debt. And since it is the same whether one manifests his
will by words, or other signs (§195), it is also the same whether one re-
nounces his right to a debt by words or by deeds, as by giving up, tearing
or burning the bond, provided some other intention of the creditor be
not evident, or the bond be not destroyed by the creditor, but by another
without his order, or be not rather accidentally lost, destroyed or effaced,
than by the will of the creditor.†
* Much less does he act justly, who would compensate a clear debt by this con-
sideration, that he hath abstained from injuring his creditor by unjust violence, be-
cause in this case plainly there is no mutual obligation. It was therefore a very odd
way of compensation by which Vitellius satisfied his creditors, Dion. Cass. Hist. l.
65. p. 735. “When he went into Germany he was so embroiled in debt, that his cred-
itors would scarce dismiss his person upon any security; but a little after, when he
was made Emperor, and returned to Rome, they hid themselves. And he ordering
them to be brought before him, told them that he had restored them safety for their
money, and demanded back the bonds and instruments of contract.” [[Dio Cassius,
Dio’s Roman History, vol. 8, bk. LXIV, pp. 229–31.]] As if a robber could reckon it
for credit to a traveller, that when he had it in his power to murder him, he had only
robbed him, without shedding one drop of his blood.
† Thus the Romans might justly say, that their taxes and other fiscal debts were
remitted to them, when Hadrian with that design burnt all their bonds and obliga-
tions, that by such a stupendous liberality he might win the affections of the people,
Spartian. Had. cap. 6. [[Spartianus’ life of the Emperor Hadrian, included in vol. 3
of Boxhorn, Historiae Augustae scriptores Latini minores. ]] But a debtor would most
absurdly conclude so, if his creditor should deliver himhis bond in order that itmight
be drawn up in a new and better form, or if his bond was burnt by accidental fire.
And hence we may see, why it hath always been pronounced most iniquitous in the
Roman people, for one plunged in debt, novas tabulas postulare, i.e., to demand a
remission of his debt from the magistrates or tribunes of a turbulent genius. For thus
the acquittance came not from the creditors, but from magistrates profuse of what
did not belong to them, andwhose office and duty it was to render justice to creditors,
A third way,
Acquittance.
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s e c t i on ccccx i
Moreover, since any one may resign his right, and remit a debt due to
him (§410), it follows, that both parties in a bilateral contract, may by
mutual agreement dissolve their contract, especially, since nothing ismore
natural, than that a thing may be dissolved in the way it was formed, l. 35.
D. de reg. <319> jur. But so, that this manner of dissolving anobligation
cannot have place, if the positive laws ordain a contract to be indissolve-
able: such as matrimony now is amongst Christians, which among the
Romans, might, as is well known, be dissolved by consent.
s e c t i on ccccx i i
But because the obligation of a bilateral contract can only be dissolved
by mutual consent (§411), the will of one of the parties does not dissolve
it; and therefore the treachery of either party does not dissolve the con-
tract, as Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 3. 19. 14. and Pufendorff
of the law of nature and nations, 5. 11. 9. seem to think. For even he
who does not fulfil his part, remains obliged to do it, because he cannot
liberate himself by his own single will from an obligation, which can
only, as hath been said, be dissolved by mutual consent, and the other
has a right to compel him to fulfil his pact; tho’ if the latter will not use
his right,* then the obligation ceases on both sides, because it is now
removed by the consent of both (§411).
instead of liberating debtors against the will of creditors. This practice, of most per-
nicious example,was first put in use by Sylla, Liv. Ep. l. 88. And thatCatalineexpected
the same, and that the people expected the same from Caesar is manifest, tho’ men
of that turbulent spirit were then disappointed, Salust. Catil. cap. 21. Caesar de bello
civili, 3. 1. Sueton. Jul. cap. 42. Plutarch. Solon. p. 86.
* But either can do that, if the other will not fulfil the pact. For in every bilateral
contract, this condition is supposed, that the one is obliged to performwhat he prom-
ised, if the other performs his part (§379). If one therefore does not satisfy his prom-
ise, the condition fails upon which the obligation depended (§401), and therefore the
obligation of both ceases.
A fourth way.
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s e c t i on ccccx i i i
But seeing any circumstance may be added to a pact, and these circum-
stances must be observed (§401), it is evident that an obligation being
conceived ex die, i.e. so that what is promised cannot be demanded till
a certain day, it cannot be demanded before that time fixed: But if it be
conceived in diem, within the compass of a certain time, <320> then
when that day comes, the obligation is dissolved ipso jure. * And the con-
dition upon which the effect of a pact depended not taking place, ob-
ligation is dissolved for the same reason, unless one being ready to fulfil
his part of the pact, is hindered either by his party or a third person,
without whom the pact could not be fulfilled.
s e c t i on ccccx i v
Besides, there are obligations which are contracted with an eye to a cer-
tain person, and his qualities; but these are of such a nature, that they
cannot be performed by other persons (§406): And therefore it is clear,
that these obligations cannot pass to heirs and successors, and that they
expire with the death of the promiser. Something like this we observed
with respect to the obligation of a betrother, and of one who accepteth
of a commission or trust. But this way of obligation’s being dissolved,
does not belong to other obligations, which can be fulfilled out of the
goods of the person obliged; because these, as admitting of performance
in the room of the person obliged, are justly transmitted to heirs, as we
have shewn in its proper place (§305).
s e c t i on ccccxv
The case is the same, if we are bound to perform any thing as being in
a certain state. For it is the same, as if the promise had been made upon
* Therefore, this rule of the Roman lawyers hath too much of subtlety in it, viz.
ex contractu stricti juris non posse ad tempus deberi, &c. §3. Inst. de verb. oblig. l.
4. pr. D. de serv. l. 44. §1. D. de obl. & act.
The fifth and
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condition this state should continue.And therefore theconditionfailing,
the obligation likewise ceases (§413): Thus he who contracted as a man-
ager, his administration being at an end, is no more <321> bound, the
obligation being solely founded upon his state as administrator, l. ult.
D. de Instit. act. l. 26. C. de adm. tut. But this is only true of obligations
arising from pacts or positive law, and not of those which arise from the
law of nature.*
s e c t i on ccccxv i
Moreover, since the obligation ceases if the end be such as cannot be
obtained (§406), hemust be delivered fromhis obligationwhopromised
the species itself, if it be quite lost by accident, unless he promised it for
a certain value, or as it were in part of payment, and the first obligation
be not removed by renovation. Besides, since impossibility is no excuse,
if one be in fault or delay, it is evident that he ought to bear the loss who
is in fault or delay; and therefore, all that was said above concerning the
risks in buying and selling takes place andmight be repeated here (§353).
s e c t i on ccccxv i i
In fine, since one may pay by another (§407), and remit an obligation
to another (§411), and parties may depart from a pact bymutual consent,
and introduce a new obligation, which last kind of agreement we called
above a mixed pact (§389), it follows, that any one may remit to another
his former obligation, and accept a new one from him in its place, which
is called renewal or novation; or if it be about matters subject to con-
tention and dispute, transaction, and that a creditor may remit <322> a
debtor, upon condition that another, whom he approves of, be substi-
* Thus the special duties owing to a city by one as consul, cease so soon as one
ceases to be consul. Thus likewise the duties of a son, as far as they proceed from
positive law, cease, so soon as the son is no longer under paternal power. But the
duties to which the law of nature binds him, such as obedience, reverence, gratitude,
remain after emancipation, nor can they be refused to parents by children no longer
under paternal power.
The ninth.
The tenth,
novation and
delegation.
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tuted in his place, which is called delegation, and that novation ought to
be made in express words, or by the most evident signs, and that dele-
gation must be done with the united consent of all concerned in the
affair; and, in fine, that there is a great difference between delegationand
cession, by which a creditor transfers an action against his debtor to an-
other, without his debtor’s knowledge, and against his will.
Remarks on This Book
Our Author may perhaps be thought by some to have mentioned sev-
eral cases; as for instance, with regard to alluvion, casting up of islands,
&c. which are rather curious than useful. But let me answer to such
objections against our Author, (Grotius, Pufendorff, and other writers
on the law of nature), 1. That of as little use as these questions may
appear to us, they were not so in other countries, such as Egypt, where,
as Strabo observes, Geograph. l. 17. p. 1139. edit. Amst. “They were
obliged to be particularly exact and nice in the division of their lands,
because of the frequent confusion of boundaries, which the Nile, by
its overflowing occasioned, taking from one part, and adding to an-
other, changing the very form and look of places, and entirely con-
cealing those marks that should distinguish one man’s property from
another’s. For which reason, there was a necessity for their often mak-
ing new surveys,&c.” 2 And it is so still in Holland and other countries,
in some measure; nay some such cases may and do happen in every
country, where there are large and impetuous rivers,&c. 2.Buthowever
rarely any such cases may happen, yet as one cannot be an expert, ready
natural philosopher, without having run through many possible cases,
and determined how gravity, elasticity, or any other physical powers,
would operate in these circumstances according to their laws of work-
ing; and therefore, such exercise is by no means useless, but highly use-
ful: So for the same reason, one cannot be ready and expert in themoral
science, so as to be able readily to determine himself, or advise others
how to act upon every emergency, without having practised himself in
2. The edition used here is presumably Strabo, Rerum geographicarum libri XVII
(Amsterdam, 1707).
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resolving all, or very many possible cases, i.e. in determining what is
requisite in such and such cases, in order to do the least harm, and
render every one his due. Thus, it is evident, must one prepare himself
for being able to judge readily what ought to be the general rules of
justice in states with regard to different cases. Thus alone can one pre-
pare himself for judging of cases in enacting, abrogating or mending
laws. And indeed the proper way of studying the laws of any particular
country, is by comparing <323> them all along with the dictates or the
laws of nature concerning the same cases, in an orderlyway, proceeding
from simple to more and more complex cases gradually. Whence it is
evident, that one well versed in the knowledge of natural law, cannever
be at a loss to find out what ought to be the general positive law in
certain cases, and how positive law ought to be interpreted in cases,
which, tho’ not expresly excepted in a law, which must be general, yet
are in the nature of things excepted. 3. The same thing holds with re-
spect to the duties of societies, one towards another, for the laws by
which particular persons ought to regulate their conduct in all pacts,
covenants, bargains or contracts, under whatsoever denominations
they are brought by the doctors of laws, are the very rules by which
societies ought likewise to regulate their conduct one towards another;
societies being, as we shall find our author himself observing after-
wards, moral persons. Whence it follows, that the former rules or laws
being determined, it cannot be difficult to fix or determine the latter.
And indeed our Author having fixed the former in such a manner, that
there was almost no occasion to differ from him, and but very little
occasion to add to him; in following him while he deduces and fixes
the other in the succeeding book, there will be very little need of our
adding any remarks, except in the affair of government, that nothaving
been distinctly enough handled by any writer of a system of the law
of nature and nations, for this reason that, as we have already had oc-
casion to observe, none of them has ever considered government in its
natural procreation, or its natural causes. Nor do I know any author
by whom that hath been done but our Harrington, tho’, as he himself
shews, the principles uponwhich he reasonswere not unknownneither
to ancient historians, nor to ancient writers on morals and politics. It
will not therefore be a disadvantage to young readers, for whom this
translation, with the remarks, is chiefly intended, in order to initiate
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them into this useful science, if we, upon proper occasions, in the fol-
lowing book concerning the laws of nations, add a few things to set
the more important questions about government in a clear light. On
this subject, we of this nation, and we only, dare write freely. For our
happy constitution is the blessed effect of thinking freely on this mat-
ter: and it must last uncorrupted, unimpaired, while we continue to
exercise the right to which we owe it: A right without the exercise of
whichmen are not indeedmen. For who will say that slaves, who know
not the price of liberty, or who know not that they are slaves, deserve
to be called men!
The end of the first book.
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Concerning the natural and social
state of man.
s e c t i on i
Hitherto we have considered the law of nature, by which the actions of
particulars ought to be regulated. Now, the next thing to be done in this
undertaking, is to deduce the laws of nations from their principles, and
to give a compendious view of them. This we promised (l. 1. §23). But
since the law of nations is the law of nature, applied to social life, the
affairs of societies, and of independent political bodies (l. 1. §21), we
cannot treat of it distinctly, without first giving a clear notion of what
we call states and societies.
The con-
nection.
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s e c t i on i i
State in general means the quality which constitutes a particular thing,
or makes it what it is; and thus the qualities constituting man are rightly
said to make his state. Now, we may either consider man merely as con-
sisting of certain faculties of body and mind with which he is endowed
by his Creator, or we may consider him as subjected <2> to laws for the
regulation of his free actions. The first way of considering man is called
considering him in his physical state. * The second is considering him as a
moral being, or in his moral state. But in treating of the law of nations,
the objects of which are mens free actions, it is evident, that it is not
merely man’s physical, but more directly his moral state, which then falls
under consideration.
s e c t i on i i i
This moral state, by which men are so greatly distinguished, is either
cogenial to them, or it depends upon some deed of ours. The first is
called natural; the other adventitious. Wherefore the natural state of man
is that quality or condition imposed upon man by nature, without any
deed of his, by which our free actions are subjected to, and limited by
a natural law, suitable to the nature of that state. The adventitious state
of man, on the other hand, is a quality or condition which man brings
* Thus it is by regulations arising from the will of the Creator, that men are male
and female, that some have well formed, and others distorted bodies; that some have
a strong and robust, others a weakly and feeble constitution; that some are beautiful,
and others deformed; and which is more, that some have a very quick and vigorous
apprehension, an universal penetrating genius, while others are exceeding slow and
dull, and have no capacity almost for any thing. All these differences, it is plain,belong
to the physical or natural state of man, as it is called by the civilians. On the other
hand, the free actions of man are differently limited, if he be a husband, from what
they are, if he live in celibacy; differently according to the different personages or
characters one bears, as of a parent, or a child, a master or a servant, &c. For which
reason, all these differences are referred to the moral state of man, which is called by
civilians his civil state. But let it be observed, that the moral state of man extends a
little farther than what they call the civil state, to which they only refer the state of
liberty, citizenship, and a family state.
Of man’s
physical and
moral state.
What is meant
by a natural,
and what by
an adventi-
tious state.
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him-<3>self into by his own deed, in consequence of which his free
actions are subjected to, and limited by a natural law, suitably to the
nature and exigencies of that state.*
s e c t i on i v
We do not then oppose a natural state to the state of brutes, for the
difference between our nature and that of the brutes belongs rather to
our physical than our moral state (§2); nor to what the Civilians call a
contra-natural state, such as they have feigned the state of slaves to be,
§2. Inst. de jure pers. but to a social and a civil state; both of which being
imposed upon men by themselves, are equally adventitious. But what
this state is, shall be more accurately considered, and thereby it will ap-
pear, why so great a number of men, forsaking their natural state, have
put themselves into other states, attended with many and various un-
easinesses.† <4>
* And in consequence of these limitations, both states give men certain rights, and
oblige them to certain duties: Thus certain duties belong to those who live in a state
of nature, and other duties belong to husbands and wives, others to parents and
children, others to masters and servants, and others to citizens. And therefore our
definition of a state comes to the same with that of Pufendorff, of the duties of a
man and a citizen, 2. 1. 1. where he defines that state to be in general, “a condition in
which men are understood to be placed in order to a certain course of action, and
which is accompanied with certain rights.”
† From this state of mankind, by which their Creator hath so far exalted them
above the brute creation, Pufendorff deduces certain duties of mankind, ibidem, §3.
“As that man ought to acknowledge his Creator and worship him, contemplate and
admire his works, and live in quite a different manner from the brutes.” Simplicius
ad Epictet. c. 79. seems to have entertained much the same sentiments, when he prays
to God, “to keep him in mind of the dignity given to human nature, by his distin-
guishing favour.” [[Simplicius, On Epictetus’ Handbook, “Epilogue,” vol. 2, p. 127.]]
But we are obliged to all these duties, not because we have received endowments
superior to those bestowed on the brutes, but by the will of God, the sole source of
all moral obligation (l. 1. §62), and consequently, we have deduced all these duties
from that principle (l. 1. §126. §149).
Natural state is
not opposed to
the state of
brutes, nor to
a state con-
trary to nature.
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s e c t i on v
We have already observed (l. 1. §88), that all men, tho’ one may be more
perfect than another, are however equal by nature. And who can call this
into question, since all men consist of the same essential parts, body and
mind? But hence it follows, that a state of nature is a state of equality;
and consequently, among those who live in it, there is no superior or
inferior; and therefore in it empire and subjection, and distinction of
dignities, have no place; so that Ulpianus justly says, “That by the law
of nature all men are equal,” l. 32. D. de reg. jur. l. 4. D. de just. & jure,
l. 12. §3. D. de accusat. l. 64. D. de condict. indeb.*
s e c t i on v i
But there being, in a state of nature, no place for empire and subjection
(§5), it must be a state of liberty;† nor can either political subjection, or
* Merillius observ. 1. 15. observes, that all this is taken from the Stoics. And indeed
many such sayings are to be found in their writings. See Arrian. ad Epict. 1. 13. Seneca,
ep. 47. and of benefits, 3. 22. which passages are quoted by Merillius. But this prin-
ciple was rather common to all philosophers and poets, because none could choose
but admit it, who had considered human nature with any attention. To this purpose
is that of Euripides in Hecuba, v. 291.
Lex enim vobis & liberis aequa
Et de servili sanguine natis lata est.
[[“Lo the same law is stablished among you for free and bond as touching
blood-shedding”: Euripides, Hecuba, ll. 291–92 (see Euripides, Euripides,
vol. 2, trans. Way).]]
And that fragment of Varro apud Nonium Marcell. 2. 98. “Natura in humanis omnia
sunt paria.” [[Marcellus, Nonii Marcelli nova editio, chap. 2, “De honestis at nove
veterum dictis, per literas,” p. 81.]] Not to mention many other testimoniesof ancient
authors to the same purport.
† Liberty is the faculty of acting according to our own will and pleasure, and for
our own advantage. And it is either political or civil, when one acknowledges no
superior, according to whose will, and for whose interest he is obliged to regulate his
actions: Or of the law of nations, which they enjoy who are under the power of no
master, to whose will they are bound to conform, and for whose interest they are
obliged to act. To the first, which we called political liberty, subjection is opposite. To
the other, which we called, of the law of nations, servitude is opposite. Thomasius has
It is a state
of equality.
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of liberty.
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<5> that servitude which is introduced by the law of nations, have place
in it; so that in it there can be no positive laws, no magistrates, nopositive
punishments, nor none of those things which suppose a certain prerog-
ative in some above the rest.
s e c t i on v i i
Yet because magistracy, and positive laws and punishments, have no
place in this state merely on account of the natural equality of mankind
(§6), which reason does not at all affect that eternal law which is con-
stituted by God himself; it is plain that the actions of men, even in a
state of nature, are subject to the law of nature; and those who live in
that state, are no less bound than we who have put ourselves into ad-
ventitious states, to love and obey God, to love, preserve, and perfect
ourselves, and to love other men as ourselves; to do no injury to any one,
but to render to every one his own, and to all the duties of humanity
and beneficence.* <6>
added a third species of liberty, viz. natural, which is defined, §2. Instit. de jure
person. [[Thomasius, Notae ad singulos institutionum et pandectarum titulosvarias juris
Romani antiquitates imprimis usum eorum hodiernum in foris Germaniae ostendentes. ]]
But we shall not here take any notice of it, since it belongs rather to the physical than
the moral state of mankind.
* And this is the chief argument by which we above exploded that first principle
of sociality, laid down by Pufendorff (l. 1. §75). This learned author derives the law
of nature from our obligation to sociality, to which men are compelled by necessity
itself. But man would be under obligation to perform duties to God and to himself,
tho’ he were not united by any ties with other men, and every man lived apart and
independently. With what shew of reason then can one set about to derive duties
from our obligation to sociality, the greater part of which would have place, tho’
there were no social state?
But the law of
nature must
have place, and
be of full force
in it.
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s e c t i on v i i i
Whence it is evident, how absurdly Hobbes 1 derives all right from com-
pact, and therefore attributes to every man, in a state of nature, a right
to all, and over all; and thus prescribes the law of nature from this state
(l. 1. §73) nor do those writers speak less unreasonably, who represent a
state of nature, as a state in which men would differ very little from
brutes, as being bound or cemented together by no ties, no obligations.*
s e c t i on i x
Now, since where magistracy, and positive laws, and punishments, do
not take place, as we have <7> said, they do not in a state of nature (§6);
there the oppressed can have no recourse, have no defence but in them-
* Thus a natural state is described by Cicero, pro Sext. Roscio, cap. 42. So Horace,
Serm. 1. v. 99.
Quum processissent primis animalia terris
Mutum & turpe pecus: glandem atque cubilia propter
Unguibus & pugnis, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quae post fabricaverat usus.
Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenere, dehinc absistere bello,
Oppida coeperunt munire, & condere leges,
Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.
[[Horace, Satires I, 99–106: “When animals crawled forth on the first earth,
a dumb and base creation, they used to fight for their acorns and places to
sleep with claws and fists, then with clubs and so step by step with the weap-
ons which need had later forged, until they found words, with which they
could signify their cries and feelings, and names: from this time on theybegan
to refrain from war and to fortify cities and to lay down laws that no-one
should be a thief, nor a robber nor an adulterer.”]]
Many such passages are to be found among the ancients, which are collected by Pu-
fendorff of the law of nature, &c. 2. 2. 2. But all this is fiction, and highly improbable.
For tho’ we should grant, that in a state of nature men would be very brutal; and tho’
we find that in former times, and even now, several nations are not very far removed
from the brutes; (such an account is given of the Hunni by Ammian. Marcell. 31. 2.)
[[Marcellinus, Ammianus Marcellinus, vol. 3, bk. 31, chap. 2, 381–87]] yet it does not
follow from hence, that in a state of nature, the law of nature cannot at all be known,
nor does at all oblige.
1. See Hobbes, On the Citizen, 1.10.
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selves; the consequence is, that in a state of nature every one has a perfect
right to repel violence and injury by force, and to extort from others by
violence whatever they owe him by perfect obligation; but not to extort
from any one the offices of humanity and beneficence (l. 1. §84.) unless
he hath voluntarily bound himself by pact to do them (l. 1. §386), or
extreme necessity forces one to seize something belonging to another,
and to convert it to his own use (l. 1. §170); especially if the good offices
be of such a kind, that one might perform them without any detriment
to himself, were he not quite devoid of all humanity (l. 1. §216).*
s e c t i on x
But seeing, in a state of nature, none can be compelled to the goodoffices
of humanity and beneficence, and therefore he who would be sure of
them, must secure the performance of them to himself by pacts (§9), it
follows, that all we have said about pacts, and the duties of those who
make compacts or contracts, as likewise of the rights of commerce, hath
place, or at least may have place in a state of nature; nay, that men <8>
ought, in this state, frequently to stipulate to themselves even the per-
formance of what is due to them by perfect right, by intervening pacts;
and therefore that there is no stronger tie to hold men together in this
state than the religious regard to pacts, which failing, or being con-
temned, all friendship and correspondence must cease.
* Wherefore, the violence with which David menaced Nabal upon his refusing
him certain offices of beneficence, would not have been excusable, even in a state of
nature, 1 Sam. xxv. 21, 22. For Nabal was only obliged by the law of gratitude to
supply David. But to such offices none can be forced, unless the ingratitude be preg-
nant, and attended with injustice (l. 1. §227). Extreme necessity would have excused
force, but not such revenge as David threatened, while Nabal had not yet resisted
him, but had only denied his request, which it is plain he had a right to do, especially,
as he was not yet convinced of the justice of the cause.
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s e c t i on x i
Now, these things being premised, it is obvious, that tho’ this state be
represented as most miserable by Hobbes, and even by Pufendorff, yet
many things which seem to them to be wanting in it, and of which they
seem so much afraid, ought not to be attributed to this state itself, so
much as to the wickedness of mankind; and that some things for which
they reproach this state, as solitude, poverty, weakness, barbarity, and
perpetual strife, might be avoided in a state of nature, as well as in a civil
state, if men would follow right reason,* and are equally unavoidable in
a civil state as in a natural one, if men will not act conformably to right
reason, Titius obs. ad Pufend. de offic. hom. & civ. 2. 1. 9.2 <9>
s e c t i on x i i
Therefore it was not the extreme misery of a state of nature (§11), but
partly the hopes of greater convenience and security, and partly the mal-
ice of men that made them form themselves into societies, as shall be
* For solitude can only be conceived amongst a few, and for a short space of time.
Indigence, hunger and cold could not oppress men more in a state of nature, than
they may do in a civil state, since nothing hinders men to possess themselves of nec-
essaries, and carry on commerce in a state of nature as well as in civil states, that
inequality of dignities which begot luxury, the mother of poverty, being unknown.
Barbarity and ignorance are cured by the culture of reason. But why might not men
have improved reason, as well in a state of nature as in a civil state? Nay, are not
simplicity and candour often misrepresented as rudeness; and on the other hand, is
not an affectation of elegancy too often set forth as politeness? Besides, since even in
civil states the only remedy for the weakness of particulars, is by pacts and covenants,
why may not the same be done in a state of nature? In fine, if strife and war be
reckoned amongst the evils of a state of nature, a civil state will not be found to have
much preeminence above it in this respect, since in consequence of the latter, whereas
in ancient times, particulars tried their strength one with another to the hazard of a
few, now whole nations wage war to the destruction of myriads. Let any one therefore
pronounce a state of nature worse than a civil state if he can, when it is evident that
the latter is liable to all the same inconveniencies as the former; and that is not subject
to some to which this is obnoxious.
2. Titius, Observationes in Samuelis L. B. Pufendorfii De officio hominis et civis juxta
legem naturalem.
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shewn afterwards. But since there is no stronger tie or bond for holding
men together than pacts and conventions, the consequence is, that so-
cieties were constituted by pacts and conventions; and because a few
more easily consent in the same end than many, it is probable that men
first formed more simple, and then more complex societies.* <10>
s e c t i on x i i i
Here we understand by society the consent of two or more persons in
the same end, and the same means requisite to obtain that end; where-
fore, while such consent lasts, there is society. And so soon as they who
had formerly consented in the same end and means, begin to propose
and pursue each his own end, that society is broke and dissolved, and
each begins to have his own to himself.† Whence a state in which men
live in society is called a social state.
* Sacred history sufficiently confirms this. For first, we find Adam and Eve in the
matrimonial state, the most simple of all societies, Gen. ii. 22, 23. Then children are
born to them, and thus a new society was produced, Gen. iv. 1, 2. somewhat more
complex, between parents and children. None could then be born slaves, unless you
say that our first parents reduced their children and grandchildren into slaves. Nay,
since Noah was saved by the ark with his wife, his sons and his sons wives only, it is
probable that pious men then had no slaves in their families, Gen. vi. 18. Tho’, on
the other hand, it is evident, from what is said of the posterity of Cain, Gen. vi. 4
that some men then oppressed others, and reduced them into servitude. Again, we
have an instance of the most complex sort of society, Gen. iv. 17. So that it appears
very certain, that the progress was gradually from more simple to more complex so-
cieties, and from these to the most compounded of all, which is commonly a civil
state or republic.
† I would not be understood to mean, that the pact by which society is formed
becomes null by the dissent of any one of the parties. This opinion I have already
confuted (§382): But that such a one can no longer be considered by the rest as an
associate, who does not concur with them in the same end and means, and shews that
disposition by incontestible signs and evidences. For in that case, the others continue
to have a right by the convention to force him to fulfil his pact, and all the terms and
articles of his agreement; or if that can’t be done, to repair their damage, and to make
them satisfaction. But such a person can no longer be said to be an associate, because
the definition of an associate no longer agrees to him from the moment he perfidi-
ously breaks the bond of union and society.
What society
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s e c t i on x i v
But since every society proposes or tends to a certain end (§13), but the
ends may be very different; hence it follows, that if the end be just and
lawful, the society formed for that end is likewise just and lawful (l. 1.
§398). Wherefore societies of pyrates, robbers, and such like societies,
are most base and flagitious. Societies must be judged of by their ends;*
and hence means must be judged of by their ends, and the laws, rights
and duties of <11> persons united in a society, must be inferred from
the end of that society.
s e c t i on xv
But since society cannot be understood without consent (§13), which is
either voluntary or extorted by force, which we call forced consent, and
which may become valid by ratification (l. 1. §345); hence it follows, that
some societies are voluntary and cordial, and others are forced; but that
the latter ought not to be pronounced unjust, because they had a vitious
or faulty origine, if those who were at first forced to enter into society
do afterwards expresly or tacitly ratify their consent (l. 1. §381).† <12>
* This we have already seen with respect to the contract of partnership, the end
of which is common gain (l. 1. §379). But matrimonial society has another end; a
society of masters and servants has another end; and in fine, that most complex of
all societies, which we call a republic, has yet another end. Therefore, as many dif-
ferent ends as there are, so many different kinds of society there are, and so many
societies so many different ends must there be. Aristotle begins his political work with
a remarkable observation to this purpose. “Because we see all communion or society
is constituted for the sake of some good (for all things are done with a view to some-
thing that appears good to the agent) it is evident that all societies have some good
as their proposed end.” (Politic. 1. 1.)
† Thus was matrimony ratified between the Romans and the Sabines; andbetween
the Benjamites and the daughters of Shiloh, Judg. xxi. 21. tho’ its origine in both
cases was unjust, being violent; because the ravished afterwards confirmed the deed
by their consent, and adhered to their marriages, tho’ they had been forced, Dion.
Hal. antiq. Rom. l. 2. p. 110. [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, vol.
1, bk. II, chap. 30, p. 401.]] In like manner, the society between masters and their
slaves taken in war, is originally forced: And yet sometimes, the mildness and hu-
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s e c t i on xv i
Besides, consent being either express or tacite, which is inferred from
some deed, of which kind is even patience (l. 1. §391), it follows, that
societies may be formed either by express or tacite consent: and it is the
same as if persons had consented, when they afterwards live with others
in society, and pursue the same end with them by the same means; nay,
seeing sometimes we judge one to have consented from the very nature
of the thing, (l. 1. §391), it is plain that society may arise from presumed
consent.*
s e c t i on xv i i
Sometimes it happens, that not only individuals, but also whole societies
intend the same end, and agree upon the same means for obtaining it.
But such consent or agreement being society (§13), the consequence is,
that not only individuals, but that whole societies may coalite into so-
ciety; and therefore societies are either simple, such as are those formed
by individuals; or they are more complex, such as those entred into by
manity of masters has engaged the slaves to serve with good will, and to say seriously,
what in Plautus, Capt. 2. 2. v. 21, one says with great grief,
Quamquam non fuit multum molesta servitus:
Nec mi secus erat, quam si essem familiaris filius.
[[Plautus, The Captives, lines 272–73, in Plautus, vol. 1: “[B]ut being a slave
hasn’t bothered me much, though: I wasn’t treated any differently than if
I’d been a son of the house.”]]
See Exod. xxi. 5.
* Such is the consent between parents and children. For so far are children from
consenting directly to that society at the time they enter into it, that they are then
absolutely incapable of consenting. And tho’ coming afterwards to understand the
nature of the thing, they might consent if they would; yet so far are all of them then
from testifying this consent by words and deeds, that many more dissent and rebel.
But this society is not therefore dissolved, because the education of children requires
this society, and it is presumed that children cannot but consent to live with their
parents in such society, without which they can neither be conveniently preserved
nor educated.
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simple socie-<13>ties, which are then considered as associates. In the
same manner, it is evident that complex societies may become larger and
more compounded; so that some societies may consist not only of many
thousands, but of myriads.*
s e c t i on xv i i i
In fine, those who consent in the same end and means, are either equal
or not equal. The former, as equals, by common consent consult about,
and find out the means necessary to a common end, and thus equal
society is formed. In the latter, the business of finding out the end and
means is intrusted <14> or committed to one or more, and then society
* Experience confirms and illustrates all this. The most simple societies are those
of persons joined in marriage, of parents and children, masters and servants. Of these
societies coalited among themselves, is formed a larger society, which we call a family.
Of many families are formed hamlets, villages, towns. Of many villages, &c. are
formed whole states or republics; of many republics are formed systems of republics,
such as were the Greek republics. See Cicero’s offices, 1. 17. that is, if lesser and more
simple societies are not sufficient to obtain a certain end, it is necessary to form greater
and more complex societies by the consociation of many little ones. Hence Justin,
hist. 1. 1. observes, that in the beginning kingdoms were confined within the narrow
bounds of particular counties. [[The reference is to Turnbull’s own translation of
Marcus Junianus Justinus, Justini Historiae Philipicae, which appeared in 1742 and
in a second edition in the same year as his Heineccius translation, 1746, under the
title Justin’s History of the World, Translated into English (bk. I, chap. 1, p. 4).]] And
this is plain from the examples of the Canaanites, the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the
Gauls, the Germans, the Britons, whose provinces were originally split into several
different states, kingdoms, or governments, Gen. xiv. 1. Jos. xii. 7. Judg. i. 7. Strabo,
Geograph. 16. p. 519. and other writers. [[Strabo, Geography, vol. 8, bk. 16, chap. 2.14
(p. 257) and chap. 4.3 (p. 311). It is not clear who the “other writers” are.]] But by
degrees, several states being oppressed by violence, coalesced with others into a larger
state; and many states being in danger from their neighbours, formed a still larger
system or confederacy of republics. Thus the Amphyctionian confederacy shook the
power of the Medes; and the Greeks, tho’ otherwise very inconsiderable, became
strong merely by their union and consociation. See Jo. Henr. Boecler. de concilio
Amphictyonum. [[Boecler, Synedrion Amphyktyonikon. ]]
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is unequal, and this society is likewise called Rectoreal. Now, it is plain,
from the nature of the thing, and from human temper and disposition,
that the larger a society is, the less practicable is it, that so great a mul-
titude of associates should find out necessary or proper means by com-
mon consent and suffrage; and therefore the larger the society is, the
more necessary it becomes that it be rectoreal and unequal.*
s e c t i on x i x
But of whatever kind society be, it is plain, from the description of it,
that it is designed in order to obtain an end by certain means (§13). But
since to consent in this manner is to will the same thing, the consequence
is, that the understanding and will of every society are to be considered
as one will and one understanding (l. 1. §32), and therefore every society
constitutes one person, which, in contradistinction to a physical person,
is called a moral one. † <15>
* Hence experience teaches us, that the more extensive empires are, the less liberty
they have; and empire daily extending itself and enlarging its dominions, necessity
often obliges men, otherwise great lovers of liberty, to bear subjection with patience.
For in a large but free and equal society, because the greater number will overpower
the better part, bad councils must often take place and be pursued; and liberty de-
generating into licentiousness, must create disorders, and rend the state into factions.
In which cases, there is often no other remedy but subjection to one head, as it hap-
pened in the Roman republic, when Augustus usurped the sovereign power, accord-
ing to the opinion of the most prudent among them. (Tacitus. annal. 1. 9.)
† Cicero de off. 1. 17. observes, “that by every kind of union and friendship, many
persons become one, and that because all think and will the same thing.” [[SeeCicero,
De officiis 1.17.59.]] Add. Catilin. 4. 7. So Apuleius de habit. doctrin. Platon, l. 2.
p. 25. “A state,” says he, “is a conjunction of many persons, in which some govern,
and others are governed, formed by concord for mutual assistance; and who being
ruled by the same good laws, and having thus the same manners, constitute one body,
every member of which hath the same will.” [[Apuleius, “On the Philosophy of
Plato,” bk. 2, chap. 24, p. 288, in Apuleius, Apuleius’ Golden Ass or The Metamorphosis,
and Other Philosophical Writings. ]] We may learn the nature of a moral person from
Seneca likewise, Ep. 102. as also from l. 30. D. de usurp. & usucap.
Every society
is one moral
person.
336 the laws of nature and nations
s e c t i on xx
Now, if every society be, as it were, one person (§19), it must, by con-
sequence, be subject to the same laws as individuals or physical persons;*
and therefore all the duties which the law of nature prescribes to par-
ticular persons, ought likewise to be religiously observed by all societies
greater or lesser. In like manner, the same rights which belong to par-
ticular persons, belong also to societies, and associated persons have the
same common things and rights; yea, all the affections or properties of
bodies and persons may justly be attributed to societies; and thus they,
by very elegant metaphors, are said to flourish, or to be sick; nay, to die
and perish. See Koehler. spec. jur. gent. 1. §20. & seq.3 <16>
* And hence appears the truth of what was said above (l. 1. §21.), that the law of
nations is nothing else but the law of nature applied to a social state, and the affairs
of societies and whole political bodies. Wherefore, it is justly called by Koehler, ibi-
dem, “Jus naturale societatum, the natural law of societies.” [[Koehler, Juris socialis
et gentium ad ius naturale revocati specimina VII.]] And hence likewise it is evident
how sadly they reason, who, as it were, absolve empires and states from the obligation
of natural law, and pronounce all things lawful to emperors which are for their private
interest, or that of their empires. It was therefore a most accursed saying of Caesar
(in Cicero de off. 3. 21.)
Si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia
Violandum est, aliis rebus pietatem colas.
[[Cicero, De officiis 3.21.82: “If wrong may e’er be right, for a throne’s sake
were wrong most right—be God in all else feared!” This is a Latin translation
from Euripides’ play Phoenician Women, lines 524–25, in vol. 3 of Euripides. ]]
Hertius has said a great deal to excellent purpose on this execrable doctrine, Polit.
paed. §13. p. 22. & seq. [[It is not certain which work by Johann Nikolaus Hertius
is being referred to here.]]
3. Koehler, Juris socialis et gentium ad ius naturale revocati specimina VII.
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s e c t i on xx i
From the same principle we may justly conclude, that every associate,
or member of a society, is obliged to adjust his actions to the common
end of that society; and therefore that he injures his fellow-associates,
who seeks his own advantage at their detriment, or who does any thing
contrary to the end of the society of which he is a member, or hurts any
one of its members. For which reason, no injustice is done to him, if he
be forced, by what is called punishment, to repair the injuries he hasdone,
and to behave better with regard to his society for the future, (l. 1. §211).
And it is no less evident, that an associate cannot be blamed if he sepa-
rates such a bad associate from himself, or if he leave a society in which
no regard is paid to its common end, nor to the means requisite to that
end.
s e c t i on xx i i
Hence likewise it is perspicuous, that society ought to hurt no person, but
to render to every person his own; but is not obliged to prefer the interest
of any private person, or of any other society to its own. For since every
society constitutes a moral person, (§19), and hath the same rights with
physical persons (§20), and no person is obliged to love another more
than himself (l. 1. §94), or to perform to another the offices of humanity,
which would be hurtful to himself, or to his friends, to whom he is under
special obligations (l. 1. §218); hence it follows, that no society is bound
to render such offices to another society, or to prefer the interest of an-
other society to its own.* <17>
* Therefore the consociates in a mercantile society are not inhuman when they
refuse a share in their monopoly to a private person, or another society. For thatwould
be a detriment to themselves. Nor will any one say the Cimbri, Teutones and Hel-
vetians, who seeking a new habitation to themselves, desired, as by their right, that
the Romans would turn out in their favour, and leave them certain tracts of land they
possessed. For that the Romans could not grant to them without manifest detriment
to their republic. For as Florus says, “Quas enim terras daret populus, agrariis legibus
intra se dimicaturus?” (3. 3). [[Florus, Epitome of Roman History, trans. Forster, bk. I,
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s e c t i on xx i i i
In like manner it is demonstrable, that in more compounded societies,
the interest of the lesser is not repugnant to that of the larger, but ought
to submit to it; because, in this case, the lesser societies are considered
as individuals (§17); but individuals ought to consent to the same end
and means, (§13), and not to prefer their private interest to the common
end of the society (§21); and therefore lesser societies, which have coal-
ited into a larger, or more compounded society, can do nothing which
is manifestly contrary to the interest of that larger society, without in-
justice.* <18>
s e c t i on xx i v
To conclude; since the duties of the members of societies must be in-
ferred from the end of the society (§14), it is plain that this is, as it were,
the sum and substance of all the laws of societies; “That all the members
of a society are bound to do every thing, without which, the end pro-
posed by that society cannot be obtained; and therefore the happiness
of society is justly said to be the supreme law of all its members.”
chap. 38, p. 169: “But what land could the Roman people give them when they were
on the eve of a struggle amongst themselves about agrarian legislation?”]] AndCaesar
gave a very just answer to the Tencteri and Usipetii, who demanded much the same
thing, “That there were no vacant lands in Gaul which could be given, especially to
such a multitude, without doing injustice” (de bello Gallico, 4. 8). [[See Caesar,Gallic
War, bk. IV, chap. 8, p. 189.]]
* Thus, for example, it would be no small advantage to a family to be exempt from
certain imposts and taxes; but because such an exemption would be detrimental to
the republic; none will say its governors act unjustly, when they refuse it to a family
that asks it. On the contrary, magistrates and princes would be justly blamed, if they
should thus cut the nerves of a republic, in order to promote the private interest of
certain families; and therefore, when Nero thought of taking off all the taxes, and
making a glorious present to the people of a total immunity from them, the senate
interposed, pronouncing it a dissolution of the empire to diminish the revenues by
which it was to be supported, Tacit. Annal. 14. 50.
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Remarks on This Chapter
I cannot see how the physical state of man, as it is defined by our Au-
thor, can be said not to belong directly to the moral science. For whence
can a man’s duties or obligations, which constitute his moral state, be
inferred but from his physical state, from his frame, condition, rank
and circumstances; from his make, and the relations he stands in, in
consequence of his make and situation? Properly speaking, man’s
physical state lays him under moral obligations; or binds and obliges
him to a certain behaviour; binds and obliges him to choose to act, in
a certain manner, or according to certain rules: or, in other words,man’s
physical state constitutes the law of his nature, by which he is bound,
whether he consents or not, being bound to consent and choose to act
agreeably to that law. Man cannot be said to be under the law of nature,
or subject to it by his consent in any other sense, but this, that were he
not capable of discerning the law of his nature, of perceiving its rea-
sonableness, its excellence, and of consenting to it, he would not be a
moral creature; but being such by his make, he is by his nature under
natural and immutable obligations to know the law of his nature, and
to regulate his conduct in all instances by it. And all men are equally
under or subject to the law of nature: no man is less or more subject
to it: but all men as men, are equally, universally obliged to observe it
as the law of their nature, the law of reason, the law of God their Cre-
ator. And in this sense all men are equal, or there is an equality of ob-
ligation, and of right belonging to all men. Whence it follows, that all
men are by nature equally subject and equally free; equally subject to
the same universal law, and equally free or exempt from all obligations
but those which arise from the law of nature. All are equally bound by
the law of nature; and for that reason, all are equally free from all ob-
ligations but those which the law of nature lays equally upon all. All
are equally obliged to direct their conduct according to the law of na-
ture; and therefore every one <19> hath a right, an unalienable right,
to make the law of nature his rule of conduct; and none hath a right
so much as to advise, far less to force or compel any one to act contrary
to the law of nature, or to hinder any one from making the law of
nature his rule, and exercing his right to judge of it, and to act according
to it: nay, none hath a right to dispose of, quit or resign this natural
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right and obligation. For that would be a right to throw off his natural
obligations, and to choose or take another rule to himself. Man is free,
or master of his actions, free and master of his consent; but how far?
within the bounds that the law of nature or of reason sets to him. That
is, he is free to consent and to dispose of himself and his actions, in
any way not contrary to the law of nature; but not in any way that is
repugnant to it, or which the law of nature forbids. Now, if this be
carefully attended to, it will not be difficult to determine any of the
questions that are commonly put by moralists about what are called by
our Author adventitious obligations, or obligations imposed upon man
by himself, or some deed of his own. For, from what hath been said,
it is evident that man can bring himself under no obligation contrary
to the law of his nature. Such adventitious impositions upon himself
are ipso jure null, being morally not in his power, as being contrary to
the law of nature, which he cannot abrogate, rescind or dispense with.
This general principle shall afterwards be applied to civil society, and
the impositions or obligations men lay themselves under by a civil con-
tract. Here, we shall only observe, that the natural inequalities which
take place amongst mankind, are not inconsistent with the moralequal-
ity and freedom of mankind that hath been defined. The first distinc-
tion which subjects some persons to others, is that which is made by
birth between parents and children, which distinction makes a first
kind of government in families, where the children owe obedience to
their parents, who are the heads of families. But of this we shall say
nothing here, because our Author treats expresly of it at great length
in a succeeding chapter. It will be better for us to supply here a few
things not touched upon by our Author, which however it is of im-
portance to clear up. 1. Then, there is an evident inequality amongst
mankind, intended by nature in respect of the goods of the mind. And
it might easily be shewn, were this the proper place for it, that, as our
excellent poet most beautifully expresses it,
Order is heav’n’s first law; and this confest,
Some are, and must be greater than the rest,
More rich, more wise; but who infers from hence
That such are happier shocks all common sense.
Heav’n to mankind impartial we confess,
If all are equal in their happiness:
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But mutual wants our happiness increase,
All nature’s difference keeps all nature’s peace.
Essay on Man, Ep. 4.4 <20>
But what we would observe, is in the first place the fact. “God, who
does nothing in vain, (says an excellent author often quoted in our
remarks) hath so differenced or divided men, that twenty men (if they
be not all idiots, perhaps if they be) can never come together, but there
will be such a difference in them, that about a third will be wiser, or at
least less foolish than the rest, these, upon acquaintance, tho’ it be but
small, will be discovered, and (as stags that have the largest heads) will
lead the herd: For while the six discoursing and arguing one with an-
other, shew the eminence of their parts, the fourteen discover things
that they never thought of, or are cleared in divers truths which had
formerly perplexed them. Wherefore, in matter of common concern-
ment, difficulty or danger, they hang upon their lips as children upon
their fathers: And the influence thus acquired by the six, the eminence
of whose parts are found to be a stay and comfort to the fourteen, is
the authority of the fathers. Wherefore, this can be no other than a nat-
ural aristocracy diffus’d by God throughout the whole body of man-
kind, to this end and purpose. And therefore, such as the people have
not only a natural but a positive obligation to make use of as their guide;
as where the people of Israel are commanded to take wise men and un-
derstanding, and known among their tribes, to make them rulers over
them. The six will acquire an authority with, and imprint a reverence
upon the fourteen; which action and passion in the Roman Common-
wealth were called authoritas patrum, and verecundia plebis. Never-
theless, if the few endeavour to extend the authority which they find
thus acquired, to power, that is, to bring the fourteen to terms or con-
ditions of subjection, or such as would be advantageous to the few, but
prejudicial to the many; the fourteen will soon find, that consenting,
they hurt not only themselves, by endamaging their own interests, but
hurt the six also, who by this means come to lose their virtue, and so
spoil their debate, which, while such advantages are procurable to
themselves, will go no farther upon the common good, but theirprivate
4. Pope, Essay on Man, epistle 4.1, lines 49–56.
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benefit. Wherefore, in this case they will not consent, and not con-
senting, they preserve not only their own liberty, but the integrity of
the six also, who perceiving that they cannot impair the common in-
terest, have no other interest left but to improve it. And neither any
conversation, nor any people, how dull soever, and subject by fits to be
deluded, but will soon see thus much, which is enough, because what
is thus proposed by the fourteen, or by the people, is enacted by the
whole, and becomes that law, than which, tho’ mankind be not infal-
lible, there can be nothing less fallible in mankind.” Art, says our Au-
thor, “is the imitation of nature; and by the observation of such lines
as these in the face of nature, a politician limns his commonwealth.”5
This is the fact, God having divided mankind into the natural aristoc-
racy and the natural democracy, hath laid in nature the foundation of
social union and civil government, and thereby delineated the whole
mystery of a commonwealth, which lies only in <21> dividing and
choosing. “Nor has God (if his works in nature be understood) as the
same Author speaks, left so much to mankind to dispute upon, as who
shall divide, and who choose, but distributed them for ever into two
orders, whereof the one hath the natural right of dividing, and the
other of choosing.”6 2. But this natural division of mankind gives no
more than authority to the aristocracy, or the right of counselling, and
not the power of commanding; it gives them ability and right to advise
or counsel right, and lays an obligation upon the many to seek and
follow advice and counsel: But, as it cannot give a right to the few so
much as to counsel, far less to command what is contrary to reason and
the law of nature; so it can lay no obligation upon the many to be led
by the few to what is wrong or contrary to the law of nature. The few
are under obligation to conform to the law of nature in their advices
or counsels; and the many are under obligation not to be influenced
by the few to act contrary to the law of nature, tho’ by the nature of
the thing, and by the law of nature, they be under obligation to ask
and take counsel from the few. Put therefore the case, that a few being
5. The first half of this quotation is from Harrington’s Oceana (see The Political
Works of James Harrington, 172–73); the second (from “The six will acquire an au-
thority . . .”) is from his Prerogative of Popular Government of 1658, bk. I, chap. 5
(Political Works of James Harrington, 416–17).
6. Harrington, Oceana, 172, in Political Works of James Harrington.
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discovered to be capable of leading or counselling in matters of com-
mon concernment, the many, by voluntary consent and agreement,
should put themselves under the guidance, under the command, if you
will, of the few; then, it is true, they would be under an obligation by
consent to obey; and the natural authority of the few, would be then
changed into a right to lead or command the many; but not to lead or
command contrary to the law of nature, because neither have the many
power to contract with the few for such submission and obedience,
nor have the few power (I mean moral power or right) to stipulate to
themselves such submission and obedience. 3. There is an inequality
amongst mankind intended by nature, or at least not contrary to na-
ture, in respect of external goods or the goods of fortune, all which
may be comprehended in one word wealth. But as superiority in respect
of the goods of the mind begets authority; so superiority in respect of
external goods, begets power or dominion, “in regard that men (as the
same Author expresses it) are hung upon these not of choice, as upon
the other, but of necessity, and by the teeth, for as much as he who
wants bread is his servant that will feed him; and if a man thus feeds a
whole people, they are under his empire. There is a real distinction
between authority and power. Wherefore, the leviathan, tho’ he be
right, where he says riches are power, is mistaken where he says, that
prudence, or the reputation of prudence, is power. For the learning or
prudence of a man is no more power, than the learning or prudence
of a book or Author, which is properly authority. A learned writer may
have authority, tho’ he has no power; and a foolish magistrate may have
power, tho’ he has otherwise no esteem or authority. The difference of
these two is observed by Livy in Evander, of whom he says that he
governed rather by the authority of others than <22> by his own power.
It is property that in proportion to it begets or gives power, or makes
necessary dependence.”7 But now what we said just now of authority,
will likewise hold here. Whatever superiority one may have over others
in dominion or empire, by the necessary dependence on him his su-
perior property creates, yet he can never have a right to exercise that
dominion, empire, or power, contrary to the law of nature: nor can his
7. Ibid., 163. Harrington’s reference is to Livy’s history of Rome (see Livy, The
Early History of Rome, bk. I, chap. 7).
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dependents come under any obligation, even by consent added to nec-
essary dependence, to be governed by his will, contrary to the law of
nature, and the essential and immutable obligations they are under to
obey it. And therefore dominion exerced contrary to the law of nature,
is exerced without right, nay, contrary to right and obligation: For
which reason, every dependent on any superior in power, has a right
to refuse submission to, and to shake off dominion exerced over him
contrary to the law of nature. That must be true; or of necessity it must
be said, that superiority in dominion releases from the obligations of
the law of nature; and that inferiority or dependence knows no other
law but the arbitrary lawless will of a superior in property, and by con-
sequence in power: which is to say, that there is no law of nature but
the law of strength or force. It is indeed absurd to say, that it is contrary
to the law of nature to seek, or to have superiority in property, i.e. to
have dominion and dependents. Whatever property is purchased by
honest industry, it, with all the superiority it gives, is a lawful purchase.
But it is no less absurd to say, that the law of nature does not extend
to those who have power, or does not limit its exercises, and lay it under
certain obligations. And yet unless there be no obligations with regard
to the exercise of dominion or power by the law of nature, there must
be an exercise of power that is unlawful, and to which consequently, it
is unlawful to submit or obey. Now, if it is asked, what is this law of
nature with regard to superiors and inferiors, we answer, with our Au-
thor, it is the law of love or benevolence. And he goes on in the suc-
ceeding chapters to shew, what that law of love and benevolence re-
quires in all different coalitions or societies of mankind, whether
natural, as that between parents and their children, or adventitious, as
that between masters and servants, and subjects and magistrates, &c.
Nor, as he observes, can we ever be difficulted in any case, to find out
the duties of the members of any society towards its head and towards
one another, or of any one society towards any other distinct indepen-
dent society, if we remember that societies are moral persons, invested
with the same rights, and lying under the same moral obligations as
physical persons. For that being remembered, it must, for instance, be
true, that societies are bound to justice and charity, as well as individ-
uals; and that societies have the rights of self-defence and preservation,
as well as individuals. If which two principles be granted, it will be an
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easy matter to resolve any question about the rights and duties of su-
periors and inferiors in any society; or about the rights and <23> duties
of any distinct independent societies. Mean time it is evident, that the
natural inequalities amongst mankind, or the inequalities made nec-
essary by the state and circumstances of mankind, and which must for
that reason be said to have been intended by the Author of nature, do
not destroy the moral equality and freedom of all mankind, essential
to man as such, i.e. the equal subjection of all mankind to the law of
nature, and their equal liberty and right to act agreeably to it, and to
demand from one another behaviour conformable to it. In this respect,
all men are equally bound and equally free; or all men have the same
common rights and duties.
346
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Of the duties belonging to the
matrimonial state, or society.
s e c t i on xxv
That God wills mankind should be propagated, and that the number of
those who daily pay their debt to nature should be supplied by a new
race, is plain from hence, that otherwise his end in creating mankind
could not be obtained (l. 1. §77.) they therefore who have this end in
view, propose a good end to themselves, and are obliged to have recourse
to the means for compassing that end. Since then this end cannot be
accomplished, unless a man and a woman consent to copulation, the
consequence is, that matrimony is a society (§13), and that it is honest
and lawful, being proper to a good end, which is very agreeable to God;
and because it consists of the fewest persons of different sexes that may
be, it is the simplest of all societies (§17).* <24>
* Hence the Greeks justly called the conjugal state, the root of all other societies,
and, as it were, the seminary of mankind, because without it man would be but of a
single age, as Florus says of the Romans while they had not wives, Hist. 1. 1. The
matter is reasoned most philosophically by Seneca the tragedian in Hippolyt. v. 466.
Providit ille maximus mundi parens,
Quum tam rapaces cerneret fati manus,
Ut damna semper sobole repararet nova.
Excedat, agedum, rebus humanis Venus,
Quae supplet ac restituit exhaustum genus:
Orbis jacebit squallido turpis situ.
Matrimony
is a lawful,
and the most
simple society.
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s e c t i on xxv i
But the end of God, as the author of mankind, being not merely that
men should exist, but that they should be truly happy (l. 1. §77), it fol-
lows, that mankind ought not only to be propagated, but that the off-
spring should be carefully educated, that they may not be useless burdens
on earth, but may grow up into useful members of the human state.
Now, since this duty of educating offspring can be incumbent upon
none but parents, in whose minds God hath, for that effect, implanted
a most tender regard to their offspring;* hence we justly infer, that par-
ents ought not only to have in their view, as the end of matrimony, the
And a little after he adds,
Caelibem vitam probet
Sterilis juventus: hoc erit, quidquid vides,
Unius aevi turba, & in semet ruet.
[[Seneca (the Younger), Hippolytus, 466–67: “The almighty father of the
world provided for this when he saw that the hands of Fate were so greedy,
so that losses would always be made good by new offspring. Well then, if
Venus were to depart from human affairs, she who supplies and restores an
exhausted race; the world will lie debased in a foul state.” 478–81: “Let sterile
youth approve the celibate life: this, which you see, will be the only crowd
of a single generation and it will collapse upon itself.”]]
* Men, as Justinian observes, l. un. §5. C. de rei uxor act. are strongly stimulated
by a natural impulse to the care and education of their children. Nay not only are
men thus impelled by nature, but the brutes likewise, who do not abandon their
offspring till they are capable of providing for themselves. But seeing God does noth-
ing in vain, it is evident that God requires of man, that love and care of his offspring,
which is the only end for which this instinct could have been implanted in us by him.
Hence Euripides justly observes, in a passage already quoted in Medea, v. 1098.
Sed quibus in aedibus est liberorum
Dulce germen, eos, video curis
Confici omni tempore:
Primum quidem, quo pacto illos bene educent,
Et unde victum relinquant liberis.
[[Euripides, Medea, 1098–1102, ed. Elliott: “But as for those in whose homes
sweet children are born, I see that they are consumed with care all the time:
first, how they are to bring them up well and from where they are to leave a
means of support for their children.”]]
Its end is not
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preservation of children, but likewise their education; and therefore
preservation and convenient education are the genuine end of mar-
riage. <25>
s e c t i on xxv i i
Matrimony therefore is a simple society between persons of different
sexes formed for procreation and education. And, from this definition,
it is plain, that marriage cannot be contracted without the consent of
the persons of both sexes (§13); and that the united parties are bound to
all, without which, procreation and convenient education cannot be ob-
tained,* and that every thing ought to be omitted which is repugnant to
this end, (§24).
s e c t i on xxv i i i
Since marriage cannot be formed without consent (§27), it is obvious,
that marriage between a ravisher and a ravished person is not valid, (l.
1. §109) unless the latter shall afterwards ratify it by consent† (§15); nor
* For certainly, it would be better not to procreate, than to give a bad education
to children. It would be but a small loss to mankind if every one was not equally
prolific. But mankind receive great hurt from any one who is a disgrace to the kind
on account of his bad education. How unhappy was it for mankind that there was a
Nero? And therefore Juvenal says with great gravity and judgment, Sat. 14. v. 70.
Gratum est, quod patriae civem populoque dedisti,
Si facis, ut patriae sit idoneus, utilis agris,
Utilis & bellorum & pacis rebus agendis.
Plurimum enim intererit, quibus artibus, & quibus hunc tu
Moribus instituas.
[[ Juvenal, Satires, Satire 14, lines 70–74, in Juvenal and Persius: “Thank you
for producing a citizen for your fatherland and your people, just so long as
you make him an asset to his fatherland, capable of farming, capable of ac-
tion in war and peace alike. The fact is, the habits and behavior you train
him in will make a huge difference.”]]
See likewise Seneca of benefits, 3. 30.
† That is, if real force was used. For often in ancient times maids suffered an
agreeable violence, not that they were averse to the marriage, but that they might not
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is marriage more valid, if any violence was done to either party (ibid.)
or if either of the parties was seduced by any knavish art into a marriage,
to which, had the party not been deceived, consent would not have been
<26> given (l. 1. §57). But tho’ this nuptial consent of the parties be
absolutely necessary, yet because there can be no society without consent
to the means as well as to the end, we think mere consent to the end
does not, by the law of nature, constitute marriage, but that immediate
consent to conjunction of bodies is requisite.
s e c t i on xx i x
Hence it is evident, at the same time, that consent to marriage is more
properly called, contract tomarriage, or betrothing, thanmarriage; so that
the distinction of the canonists between sponsalia de praesenti & de fu-
turo, is too subtle for the law of nature; yet, because betrothing is a pact,
and all pacts, by the law of nature, are perfectly obligatory (l. 1. §387),
none can question but a contract of marriage ought to be fulfilled,* un-
less any of these circumstances take place, by which, we have already
observed, that all other pacts are rendered null (l. 1. §382); or unless dif-
ference of tempers, or some other just reason, render it more adviseable
seem to rush into an embrace. This was an ancient custom, as is plain from Dion.
Halicarn. antiq. Rom. 2. p. 100. where, to excuse the rape of the Sabines by the Ro-
mans, he says, “That this kind of rape was not an injury, but done with a view to
marriage, according to a very old custom among the Greeks, which did honour to
the women desired in marriage.” [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities,
vol. 1, bk. II, chap. 30, p. 401.]] This was practised in other nations, it being judged
more decent, that a virgin should be taken with an appearance of violence, than that
she should give herself up to a man of her own accord. And that such force is not
repugnant to consent is very manifest.
* It may seem odd, that whereas the other Latin nations allowed an action upon
betrothment, ad id quod interest, if the pact was not fulfilled, (Gell. noct. Attic. 4.4.)
the Romans left the betrothed persons at perfect liberty to renounce, l. 1. c. de sponsal.
l. 2. c. de repud. But there being amongst the Romans so much liberty with respect
to divorce, it is impossible that this pact could be firmer than marriage itself was
among them, or that there could be less latitude with regard to it than there was with
respect to divorce after marriage.
The difference
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that it should be departed from, than that it should be compleated to
the great misfortune of the parties. <27>
s e c t i on xx x
Since the end of matrimony is procreation and convenient education
(§26), and nothing ought to be done that is repugnant to this end (§27);
it follows, that those who think of matrimony, ought to be of an age in
which it may be expected they can be fit for both these ends; and there-
fore matrimony is not allowed, by the law of nature, to infants, or such
young persons, as either have not vigour enough for raising up a new
vigorous seed, or not the virtue and prudence requisite to provide for a
wife and children, and to take care of their children’s education and
conduct.* <28>
s e c t i on xx x i
Hence likewise it is evident what ought to be said of the matrimony
between aged persons. For tho’, on account of the indissolubility of this
society (of which afterwards) married persons, who have become old in
the conjugal state, ought not to be separated; and tho’ marriage between
a man in the decline of life, who is yet vigorous, and a young woman,
is tolerable, because the end of marriage may yet be accomplished by
such matrimony; yet no person of sound judgment can approve of mar-
riage between two aged persons, or between a young man and a decrepit
* In this respect Lycurgus excelled all other legislators. For he, as Xenophon in-
forms us, de rep. Laced. cap. 1. §6. did not allow every one to marry when he pleased,
but provided that matrimony should be contracted when persons were in the best
condition for propagation. [[Xenophon, “Constitution of the Lacedaemonians,”
p. 139 in Xenophon, Scriptaminora.]] This he thought necessary in order to the prop-
agation of a wholesome vigorous race. And whereas he observed that many parents
were fitter to propagate than to educate, he gave the care of education to the public;
he made it a matter of public concernment; and an inspector of the youth was ap-
pointed from amongst those who had been employed in the supreme magistracy,
who was called Paedonomos.” See Xenoph. ibid. cap. 2. §2. And this is a piece of civil
prudence which ought not to be neglected in other states.
The hability
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old woman, by which there can neither be consent to the end nor to the
means of matrimony, without the most shameless immodesty.* <29>
s e c t i on xx x i i
Much less is marriage to be permitted to those who have been deprived
of their virility, either by accident or maliciously, or who are naturally
incapable of procreation; and therefore, tho’ examples of such marriages
be not wanting, they are contrary to the law of nature, unless the im-
potence of the man, or the sterility of the woman, be unknown and
uncertain, or be not beyond all hopes of cure, and the parties be satisfied
to wait in hopes of a change to the better.†
* For what is more impudent and shameless, than for an old woman, who as Mar-
tial says, Epig. 3. 64.
Cum tibi trecenti consules Vetustilla
Et tres capilli, quatuorque sint dentes,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Verumque demens cineribus tuis quaeris.
[[Martial, Epigrams 3.93. 1–2 and 19 (not 64): “Although, Vetustilla, you
have seen three hundred consuls out, and have three hairs and four teeth . . .
you madly search for a man for your burnt-out ashes [reading virum, not
verum ].”]]
These sort of matches are tolerated in commonwealths, tho’ they do not deserve the
name of marriage (since, as Quintilian expresses it, Declam. 306. quaedam & nu-
bendi impudicitia est) [[“Even marrying may involve a sort of wantonness” (Quin-
tilian, Lesser Declamations, vol. 1, 306.29, p. 183)]]; but of them Pufendorff of the
law of nature and nations says very justly, 6. 1. 25. “Perhaps we shall not speak im-
properly if we call these honorary marriages, as we term those offices honorary, in
which a title only is conferred, without action or business. Nero (Sueton. cap. 35.)
when he deserted his wife Octavia’s bed, excused himself with saying, ‘Sufficere sibi
uxoria ornamenta’; he was contented with the bare ornaments and badges of mar-
riage; in allusion to the triumphalia ornamenta, sometimes bestowed onpersonswith-
out the real solemnity of a triumph.”
† Such marriages therefore among the Egyptians were absurd, of which see Gro-
tius, ad Deut. xxiii. 2. as are those likewise among the Turks, of which Ricaut, in his
state of the Ottoman empire, 2. 21. And yet, even among Christians, it hath been
made a question whether such marriages are not lawful. There is a little treatise on
this question, entitled, de Eunuchi conjugio, reprinted Jenae, 1737. [[Hieronymus
Of eunuchs,
&c.
352 the laws of nature and nations
s e c t i on xx x i i i
Tho’ we may rightly conclude, from the same principle, that those con-
tract marriage allowably, who find themselves in proper circumstances
for answering its ends and uses; yet the obligation to marriage is not of
such a nature, as that he can be judged to have acted contrary to the law
of nature, who prefers chast celibacy to inauspicious marriage.*For since
omission of an action cannot be imputed to one who had noopportunity
of doing it, (l. 1. §114); and it often happens, that many accidents dis-
appoint one’s design of marrying, and so deprive him of an occasion;
surely, in such cases, celibacy cannot be blamable, sinceprovi-<30>dence
hath not offered an allowable opportunity of engaging in marriage.
s e c t i on xx x i v
But because procreation and convenient education are the ends and uses
of copulation, and every thing ought to be omitted which is repugnant
to these ends, nothing can be more certain, than that they are exceedingly
guilty who abuse that mean which is destined by divine appointment to
these ends for the gratification of their lust; and therefore all thesewicked
Delphinus, Eunuchi conjugiumCapaunen-Heyrath. ]] But such things may well be
reckoned amongst those prodigies of which Juvenal speaks in his time, Sat. 1. v. 22.
Quum tener uxorem ducat spado, Maevia Tuscum
Figat aprum, & nuda teneat venabula mamma:
Difficile est, satyram non scribere.
[[ Juvenal, Satires, Satire 1, lines 22–23 and 30, in Juvenal and Persius: “When
a womanly eunuch takes a wife!—when Mevia shoots a Tuscan boar, holding
the hunting spears with one breast bared! . . . then it is hard not to write
satire.”]]
* This was the opinion of the Jews, as Selden has shewn, jure nat. & gent. secun-
dum discip. Hebraeorum, 5. 3. But it cannot be inferred from Gen. i. 38. for that is
not a command but a blessing: And it is absurd to accuse those, who prefer celibacy
for just reasons to marriage, of not consulting the interests of mankind, as if mankind
could suffer great loss by the not marrying of one or a few, who are hindered from
it by allowable reasons. They seem to have forgot St. Paul’s precept, 1 Cor. vii. who,
leaving the paths of Christians, go into this Jewish opinion.
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kinds of venery, which it is better to have no idea of than to know, all
adultery, all whoredom, all stolen love, (which is, over and above its be-
ing contrary to the end of copulation, likewise attended with injuri-
ousness to others); all uncleanness and unchastity, and all the infamous
trade of bawding and pimping are diametrically repugnant to right rea-
son, and the law of nature; and, in fine, that there is no other lawful way
of propagating and supplying human race, but by the conjugal society
we have described.* <31>
s e c t i on xx x v
For the same reason, poluandri´a,1 that is, plurality of husbands is con-
trary to right reason; as likewise, that community of wives which was
permitted by Plato in his republic. (See Aristotle, polit. 2. 2.) For since,
in both cases, the offspring must be uncertain on the father’s side, and
this uncertainty will be a hindrance to the care of education, (§34); so
far is reason from approving such conjunctions, that even those nations
which permitted polygamy, or a plurality of wives to one husband, have
given no woman right to have more than one husband at a time.†
* These impure conjunctions are not designed in order to propagate, but to satiate
lust: And the ordinary effect of them is, that the persons who thus copulate are in-
dustrious to prevent progeny by such conjunctions. And if nature disappoints this
their wicked intention, so that children are procreated and brought into the world
contrary to their desire and intention, the parties are so far from having had any view
to education, the other end, that they (the father chiefly) utterly neglect the offspring,
leaving them to the public, as an uncertain birth; whence it happens, for the most
part, that such misfortunate children become rather a disgrace and a pest to mankind,
than an ornament. Now, since all these miserable consequences ought to be pre-
vented, it is plain that magistrates do not act unjustly, when they oblige lewd persons
to provide for their bastards, and force men to marry the women they had debauched
under promise of marriage.
† And therefore the contrivance of Papirius Praetextatus to elude his mother,
which is so well known, was very acute. See Gellius noct. Attic. 1. 23. But so far were
the Romans from permitting a plurality of husbands, that the most barbarous nations
never admitted of it, tho’ some have allowed the promiscuous use of wives. See Pu-
fendorff, law of nature, &c. 6. 1. 15.
1. Poluandri´a: polyandry, plurality of husbands. This is not a classical word.
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s e c t i on xx x v i
The question about the lawfulness of polygamy, or a plurality of wives,
is more difficult. For, 1. Such a conjunction does not hinderpropagation.
Nor, 2. Does it render offspring uncertain. Besides, 3. Many nations,
even the people of God, have approved of this, and seemed to think
themselves happy in having the privilege of taking home many wives.
Not to mention, 4. The Turks, and <32> other eastern nations, where
it is not worse in respect of procreation and education, when one has
many wives, than when one has but one wife. And, 5. Sometimes the
husband’s vigour, sometimes the wife’s intolerable humour, or her bar-
renness, sometimes the interest of the republic, and sometimes other
reasons plead in favour of Polygamy.*
* Those are the principal arguments by which the defenders of polygamy support
their opinions taken from reason. And as for those fetched from the sacred writings,
they belong to another chair. This question has been greatly agitated by Huldericus
Neobulus, of whose book on the subject see Seckendus Hist. Lutheran. 3. 79. addit.
3. litt. 10. p. 281. Bernardus Ochinus, who is expresly refuted by Beza de polygamia,
and by Jo. Gerard de conjugio, §207. of which author see Bayle’s dictionary sub
Ochinus; by Jo. Lyserus, who under the assumed names of Theoph. Alethaeus, Vinc.
Athanasius, & Gottl. Wahrmundi, has published several books on this subject, of
which see Vinc. Placcius Theatr. pseudonym. n. 97. 277. 2867. Against those authors
have written Jo. Brunsmannus, Jo. Musaeus, Dickmannus, Feltmannus, Gesenius
(who has been injurious to Pufendorff ) Jo. Meyerus and others. The defence of po-
lygamy hath been undertaken by one whose better studies such a design ought not
to have interrupted, Daphnaeus Arcuarius, not to mention the late writings of a law-
yer of Dantzick, in every body’s hands, which have been of very little service, if not
of great hurt to the church. [[Huldricus Neobulus (i.e., Johann Lening, 1491–1566)
was a German Protestant theologian who defended the second marriage of the Prot-
estant landgrave Philip of Hessia. Seckendus (i.e., Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff,
1626–92) was a Lutheran governmental administrator and writer, “Cameralist,” and
author of Commentarius historicus et apologeticus de Lutheranismo. Bernardinus
Ochinus (1487–1564) was an Italian Protestant convert from Catholicism and radical
reformer. Theodor Beza was a Calvinist theologian and author of Tractatio de poly-
gamia (Treatise on polygamy), which was reprinted several times in the late sixteenth
and the seventeenth century and was directed against the opinions of Ochinus. Jo-
hann Gerhard (1582–1637) was a German theologian, author of the Loci theologici
(Theological problems), which included a volume on marriage and related questions.
See Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), Dictionnaire historique et critique, 672–79. Johann[es]
Musaeus (1613–81) was a Lutheran theologian; Gerhard Feltmann (1637–96) a Ger-
Arguments for
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s e c t i on xx x v i i
But since it is the duty of married persons to avoid every thing repugnant
to the end of a married state (§27), and all discord about the end ormeans
is contrary to society (ibid.) and so much the more unavoidable as the
society is more numerous (§18); hence we justly conclude, that polygamy
is less agreeable to right reason than marriage with one woman; where-
fore, since the law of nature obliges us <33> to choose the best of two
goods* (l. 1. §92), we are rather obliged to monogamy than to polygamy.
s e c t i on xx x v i i i
Nor are the arguments brought in defence of it of such force as to oblige
us to desert our cause. For grant, 1. That the procreation of children is
not hindered by polygamy, yet the other end, convenient education,
which ought not to be separated from the former, is hindered by it (§26
and 37). 2. Tho’ progeny be certain in polygamy, yet this certainty does
man jurist. Johann Lyser published Alethophili Germani discursus inter polygamum et
monogamum de polygamia (A discourse by a truth-loving German between a polyg-
amist and a monogamist on polygamy), a response to Friedrich Gesenius’s Ad Sin-
cerum Warenbergium Suecum Epistola seu Dissertatio super polygamia simultanea,
which had been a reaction to one of Lyser’s earlier writings, the SinceriWahrenbergs
Kurtzes Gespra¨ch von der Polygami. The work by Vincenz Placcius, Theatrum anony-
morum et pseudonymorum, is a key to authors’ pseudonyms. See also Johann Bruns-
mann, Monogamia victrix: sive orthodoxa ecclesiae Christianae sententia, de unis dun-
taxat eodem tempore concessis Christiano nuptiis, a criminationibus vindicata; Johann
Meyer,Pyrrhonii undOrthophili Unterredung von der imnechsten Jahr unter demNah-
men Daphnaei Arcuarii ans Liecht gekommenen Betrachtung des . . . Ehestandes. Daph-
naeus Arcuarius was the pseudonym of Lorenz Beger, who wrote Daphnai Arcuarii
Kurtze, doch unpartheyisch- und gewissenhafte Betrachtung des in demNatur- undGo¨tt-
lichen Recht gegru¨ndetenHeiligen Ehstandes. It is not clear who the lawyer fromDanzig
is.]]
* This is most certain, that discord, jealousies, envy, and hatred, must arise among
many wives. But in this intestine war, what place is there for harmony, or consent in
the education of children of different and jarring mothers? The families of Abraham
and Jacob saw such sad effects, Gen. xvi. 5. xxi. 9. xxix. 30. xxx. 1. And what may not
happen when men maintain at home many wives, which instead of being virtuous
and good, are furies?
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not hinder but each mother may only love her own children, and pros-
ecute the rest with terrible hatred, or at least endeavour, by novercal arts,
to render them less agreeable to the father than her own. 3. To oriental
nations, of a hotter temper, and more prone to venery, which approved
of polygamy, we may oppose examples of more civilized nations which
disapproved it. Nor is the practice of the Jews a rule, since our Saviour
teaches us, that all things in which the Jews dissented from the primitive
rule, were rather tolerated than approved by God in them; “For the hard-
ness of their hearts,” Mat. xix. 8.* <34>
s e c t i on xx x i x
Of the same nature are all the other arguments by which polygamy is
defended. For, 4. What is said of domestic quiet and peace among the
Turks and other eastern nations, is partly false, according to the annals
of these countries, and is partly obtained by means repugnant to the
matrimonial society.† And what, pray, 5. is more incredible, than that
one is not sufficient for one? Or what is more uncertain, than that when
one has an immodest or indiscreet wife, that the other he brings home
shall be more modest and discreet? or that if one be barren, the other
shall be more prolific? what if he should get two furies instead of one?
* For no reason can be given why more regard should be paid to the primitive
institution of marriage in the question about divorces, than in that about polygamy.
Nay, from what our Saviour says of divorce, we may draw an argument against the
lawfulness of polygamy. For if he who unjustly divorces his wife and marries another,
be guilty of adultery, he is certainly much more guilty of adultery, who, while his
marriage subsists, takes another wife, because the reason given by our Saviour, viz.
that God, when he instituted matrimony, willed that “two should become one flesh,
Mat. xix. 5.” is no less an obstacle to polygamy than to divorce.
† It is known that in the eastern countries, those who have plurality of wives, keep
them in a Seraglio, as in a prison, and that they are no better than servants. Hence
Aristotle. Polit. 1. 2. says, That among the barbarous nations, wives and servants are
of the same rank. See a remarkable passage in Plutarch. in Themist. p. 125. “They are
confined by eunuchs; and the education of children, of the male-kind especially, is
seldom trusted to the mother, but for the most part, to some eunuch or servant. Now,
how contrary all this is to the end of the matrimonial society, is too obvious to be
insisted upon.” [[This passage does not appear to be in Plutarch’s life of Themistocles.
See Plutarch, Lives, vol. 2.]]
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But all their arguments depend upon a principle we have already shewn
to be false.
Sola est utilitas justi prope mater & aequi. (l. 1. §78)2
s e c t i on x l
It is a no less difficult question, whether by the law of nature reverence
is to be paid to blood, and whether, for that reason, it prohibits marriage
<35> within certain degrees of kindred and affinity? For since such mar-
riages are not repugnant to the end of matrimony, they cannot be for-
bidden on that account. Yet, since marriages between ascendants and
descendants are attended with the greatest and most hurtful confusion
of different natural relations amongst persons, reason itself perceivesand
acknowledges their turpitude; and therefore the Civilians justly asserted
these marriages to be incest by the law of nations, l. 38. §2. D. ad leg.
jul. de adult. And they likewise with reason pronounced marriages be-
tween persons of the nearer degrees of kindred, to be contrary to mod-
esty and virtue, l. 68. D. de ritu nupt.* <36>
2. This should be “atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi”: “Expediency
alone, we might say, is the mother of what is just and right” (Horace, Satires I, 3,
l. 98).
* For nature cannot approve of contradictory things, but such are the obligations
of wife and mother, father and brother, mother and sister: They cannot subsist in
the same person without the greatest confusion. Such marriages therefore cannot be
lawful which confound these relations together in one and the same person, as in the
marriage of Hersilus and Marulla, according to an old epigram.
Hersilus hic jaceo, mecum Marulla quiescit:
Quae soror, & genitrix, quae mihi sponsa fuit.
Me pater e nata genuit: mihi jungitur illa:
Sic soror & conjux, sic fuit illa parens.
[[“I, Hersilus, lie here, and with me rests Marulla, who was sister and mother
and wife to me. My father conceived me from his daughter; she was joined
to me: so she was my sister and wife, so she was my parent.”]]
Such marriages were looked upon by the Pagans as contrary to nature. See Ovid,
Metam. 10. v. 9. where Myrra thus speaks:
Tunc soror nati, genitrixque vocabere fratris?
Nec, quod confundas & jura & nomina, sentis?
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s e c t i on x l i
Since all copulation without marriage is unlawful, and there is no other
lawful way of propagating mankind but by marriage (§34); the conse-
quence is, that it is the interest of the married parties, and of the chil-
dren, that the design of contracting the matrimonial society should be
testified by some external sign, that thus a legal wife may be distinguished
from a concubine, and legitimate children from illegitimate ones;which,
since it cannot be done conveniently, unless marriage be publicly cele-
brated, we may easily see a good reason why almost all nations have
judged some solemnities requisite to indicate nuptial consent, and have
appointed some such.*
[[Ovid, Metamorphoses 10, line 348, vol. 2: “Will you be called the sister of
your son, the mother of your brother?” and line 346, “And do you not think
how many ties, how many names you are confusing!” though original text
reads “Et quot ” for “Nec ”—“Think how many ties, . . .” etc.]]
Among collaterals, the same degree of confusion is not to be feared: Yet a certain
confusion of relations cannot be avoided, if the same person be sister and wife. And
therefore we think it better to assert, that such marriages are not permitted, unless
absolute necessity render them excusable. And thus it is very accountable why the
children of Adam married without being guilty of incest, tho’ they are who now do
the same. For this prohibition of certain degrees is of those laws of nature which
must yield to providential necessity (l. 1. §162).
* There is no barbarous nation which hath not instituted some rites of marriage:
And therefore it is not to be wondered at, if all civilized nations have; such as the
Hebrews, the Greeks and Romans, &c. concerning which customs, antiquaries have
wrote such large and learned volumes, that I need not say one word on this subject.
Let me only add, that the Romans, when their ancient discipline degenerated, took
little or no care in this matter; and hence it was, that it was frequently so difficult to
determine whether a woman was a wife or a concubine; and it was necessary to have
recourse sometimes to the articles or instruments of dowry to determine this ques-
tion, l. ult. Inst. de nupt. and sometimes the thing could only be judged of from the
condition or quality of the woman, l. 24. D. de ritu nupt. l. 31. pr. D. de donat. But
how easily might these disputes have been avoided by performing marriage with cer-
tain rites?
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s e c t i on x l i i
The conjugal duties are obvious. For, since the nature of this society
requires consent (§32), which cannot be hoped for without love and con-
<37>cord, the consequence is, that husband and wife are obliged to love
one another; and not only to manage their common family interest*with
common care and prudence, but mutually to assist one the other, es-
pecially in the education of their children, and to have one common
fortune.
s e c t i on x l i i i
These are the duties which arise from the very nature of consent and
society. But from the end of matrimony we infer, that husband and wife
are obliged to cohabit, and to allow to one another only the use of their
bodies, and therefore to abstain from all adultery, whoredom, and stolen
love;† to love all their children with equal affection; and that the one
* Indeed what effect this community of goods ought to have after the decease of
one of the parties, or what part of the common substance belongs to the surviver,
and what to the defunct’s heirs, must be determined by pacts or by civil laws. But
that while marriage subsists, all ought to be in common, right reason teaches us. For
since associates, by unity of will, are one person (§19), and therefore have all the things
and rights belonging to their society in common (§20), it is manifest, that the same
must hold with respect to persons united by marriage; and so, however it came to be
afterwards, was it anciently among the Romans, according to Dionys. Halicar. Antiq.
Rom. l. 2. p. 95. for by Romulus’s law, there was, “Omnium bonorum & sacrorum
communio.” And even their later laws appointed, “Communem utrique conjugibon-
orum usum.” [[“Common ownership of all goods and sacred things”; “common use
of goods for each spouse.” (See Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, vol.
1, bk. II, chap. 25, p. 383.)]] Whence it is evident why Modestinus retaining the old
definition of marriage, and agreeably to his own time, says it is, “Conjunctio maris
& foeminae, consortium omnis vitae, divinique & humani juris communicationem,”
l. 1. D. de ritu nupt. [[“The union of a man and a woman, life-long cohabitation,
sharing in divine and human law.”]]
† Some think this duty belongs to the wife only, and not to the husband, because,
if he neglects it, the children are not rendered uncertain. But tho’ all copulation be
unlawful which renders progeny uncertain, yet it does not follow, that all is lawful
which does not render it uncertain (§38). See Gundlingii dissert. an major a seminis,
quam a viris, castitas requiratur. [[Gundling (praeses ) and Benz (respondens ),Disser-
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ought not, by any means, to disappoint or render ineffectual the other’s
care about their education. <38>
s e c t i on x l i v
Moreover, it is manifest that this society would be very imperfect, if it
were equal in such a manner that neither had the faculty of deciding in
any common dispute, because it may happen, in many cases, that the
two may differ in their opinions about the choice of means, and between
two, in such cases, the dispute would be endless; wherefore, tho’ the
prudentest counsel ought to be preferred (l. 1. §92),* yet, because itwould
often be controvertible which of the two parties in this society was in
the right, there is reason to approve the common practice in this matter,
tatio iuridica, qua doctrina vulgaris maiorem a feminis, quam a viris, requirens casti-
tatem.]] We draw an argument from this principal rule of natural justice, “what one
would not have done to him, &c.” But surely the husband would not have his wife
to love another man more than him, or grant any other the use of her person. And
therefore the husband is bound to the same duty. See Chrysostom. Homil. 19. in 1
Cor. vii. Lactantius Inst. divin. 6. 3. [[ John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Epistles of
Paul to the Corinthians, “Homily XIX,” 105–11; Lactantius,Divine Institutes, Books I–
VII, bk. VI, chap. 23 (not 3), 457–62]] Hieron. ad Ocean. & can. 20. Causs. 32.quaest.
5. But at the same time, we grant that the wife’s unchastity is more repugnant to the
end of marriage than the husband’s.
* For since the parties are bound to all, without which the ends of the society,
procreation and convenient education, cannot be accomplished (§27); they are
obliged to consent to this prerogative in one of them, without which consent in the
same means could not be expected. Now, because this prerogative in a society of
equals is due to the more prudent, and in the conjugal society the husband for the
most part is such, the wife is, for this reason, obliged to consent to the husband’s
prerogative.
Inferior matrona suo sit, Prisce, marito:
Non aliter fuerint femina virque pares.
Martial. Epig. 8. 12.
[[Martial, Epigrams 8.12.3–4, trans. Bailey: “Let the matron be subject to her
husband, Priscus: in no other way are a man and a woman equal.”]]
See Plutarch’s conjugal precepts, p. 139. [[Plutarch, “Advice to Bride and Groom,”
lines 303–9, in Plutarch, Moralia: in Fourteen Volumes, vol. 2.]]
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and so to give a certain prerogative to the husband about affairs belong-
ing to the common safety or advantage of the society. <39>
s e c t i on x l v
But since this prerogative of the husband extends only to affairs be-
longing to the welfare and interest of the society (§44); the consequence
is, that this marital authority ought not to degenerate into such an em-
pire of a master, as we have already observed to have taken place in some
barbarous nations;* nor does it reach to a power of death and life, as it
did in some nations. Gellius 10. 23. Tacit. annal. 13. 32. Caesar, de bello
Gallico, 6. 19. Tacit. de moribus German. c. 19. much less does it extend
to a power of selling or lending one’s wife to another, a custom among
some nations, and not disapproved of by the Romans, Plut. in Catone,
p. 770. Tacit. annal. 5. 1. Dio Cass. hist. l. 48. p. 384. But it consists in
the right of directing a wife’s actions by prudent counsel, and of de-
fending her; and in the right of chastising an immodest one suitably to
the condition and rank of both* (§21); and in divorcing her for such just
causes as shall be afterwards treated of (§21). <40>
* I say, chastise suitably to the rank and condition of both parties; because, since
they are one person (§19), an ignominious chastisement of a wife reflects ignominy
on the husband. And because both are bound to take care of their reputation (l. 1.
§153), a husband acts contrary to his duty if he chastises his wife in a manner that
tends to hurt both her and his character. This imprudent discipline of husbands is
severely lashed by Plutarch in his conjugal precepts, p. 139. “As some soft effeminate
persons who are not able to mount their horses, teach them to stoop to them, so some
husbands, who espouse rich and noble wives, are at no pains to amend themselves,
but accustom their wives to submission, that they may more easily rule over them,
tho’ regard ought to be had in the use of the curb, as in the one case to the spirit of
the horse, so in the other to the dignity of the wife.” [[Plutarch, “Advice to Bride and
Groom,” ibid.]]
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s e c t i on x l v i
But because this prerogative is only due to the husband on account of
his presumed greater prudence, and of the matrimonial burdens incum-
bent on him (§44); since it not seldom happens that a woman of superior
judgment and spirit is married to one of an inferior one, a richer to a
poorer, a queen to a private man; therefore, in all these cases, the woman
may stipulate the prerogative to herself.* None can deny, for we have
many examples of it, that a queen may marry a prince, without giving
him any power in her dominions, and likewise retain the superior power
in the conjugal society; except when the consort, being heir to a king-
dom, chuses to transfer the empire itself to her husband, contenting
herself solely with the dignity.
s e c t i on x l v i i
But since ordinarily the prerogative belongs to the husband (§44), he
cannot refuse the care of maintaining his wife and children, and of bear-
ing <41> the burdens of matrimony; tho’, because the children are com-
mon, and both are obliged to common care (§42), the wife ought cer-
tainly, as far as her estate goes, to bear a part of these burdens. And hence
* Thus what is related by Aristotle, Politic. 5. 11. and by Sophocles in Oedipo
Colon. v. 354. of the wife’s power over the husband among the Egyptians, was by
pact, as Diodor. Sicul. Bibl. 1. 27. informs us. But all the questions relating to a
Queen’s husband are fully handled by Jo. Philip. Palthenius, in a discourse on this
subject. [[ Johann Philipp Palthen (praeses ) and Samuel Palthen (respondens ),Disser-
tatio de marito reginae. ]] We have a noted instance of this in Earl Bothwell, who,
when he was to be married to Mary Queen of Scotland, took an oath, “That he should
claim no superior degree or pre-eminence on that account; but that he should con-
tinue to be subject to the queen as he had hitherto been.” Buchanan. rer. Scot. hist.
l. 16. p. 674. [[George Buchanan (1506–82), Scottish humanist scholar and author of
Rerum Scotiarum historia. ]] To all that is urged from scripture, Gen. iii. 16. 1 Cor. xi.
7. 1 Tim. ii. 11. Ephes. v. 23. Coloss. iii. 18. 1. Pet. iii. 1. Palthenius has given a full
reply at great length. But these things we leave undetermined, because we proceed
upon another foundation.
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the origine of dowry among the Greeks and Romans, brought to hus-
bands by wives, who were not excluded from succession to theirparents.*
s e c t i on x l v i i i
In fine, since every thing ought to be avoided that is contrary to the ends
of matrimony, because education, which is no less the end of matrimony
than procreation, requires a perpetual society between man and wife;
hence it is plain, that the liberty of divorce, authorised by some nations,
is quite repugnant to the end of matrimony. And yet because an intol-
erable temper and behaviour of either party no less hinder this end than
divorce; and a partner cannot be blamed if he severs from him an in-
jurious associate (§21); we think divorce is not unlawful, when either of
the parties behaves themselves so that the end of matrimony cannot be
obtained.† Now, that, this society being dissolved in any lawful way,
* In several other nations, women had a portion or dowry given them at marriage,
that they might not be quite cut off from all share in their parents estate, because
they were otherwise excluded from succession. The same was the case among the
Romans while the lex voconia obtained. But they used to give dowries to daughters
before it took place; and after it was abolished, tho’ married daughters shared the
paternal and maternal estate equally with their brothers. All this matter is elegantly
treated by Perizonius, in his dissertat. de lege Voconia, reprinted by us at Hal. 1722.
[[ Jacob Perizonius (1651–1715), professor of eloquence and history at the university
of Franeker, Dissertationum trias quarum in prima de constitutione divina super du-
cenda defuncti fratris uxore secunda de lege voconia feminarumque apud veteres heredi-
tatibus tertia de variis antiquorumnummis agitur, part 2:De lege voconia feminarumque
apud veteres hereditatibus.]] Hence the Roman lawyers acknowledge, that the dowry
was given in order to bear a part of the matrimonial expences or burdens, l. 7. pr. l.
56. §1. l. 76. fin D. de jure dot. l. 20. C. eodem.
† To these we refer not only adultery and malicious desertion, which are pro-
nounced just causes by the divine law, Mat. v. 32. xix. 9, 1 Cor. vii. 15; but every thing
that is an obstacle to the end of marriage, and renders it unattainable: We do not
take upon us to determine, whether our Saviour’s phrase, parekto`c lo´gou pornei´ac,
Mat. v. 32. signifies the same with what is called by Moses, Deut. xxiv. 1. some un-
cleanness, as Selden seems to think; but we are certainly persuaded, that pornei´an and
lo´gon pornei´ac, do not mean the same: For lo´goc signifies the condition, nature or
proportion of a thing (Synes. Epist. ad Joannem: to`n a◊uto`n lo´gon e⁄xousi, they are
of the same nature or rank). [[Parekto`c lo´gou pornei´ac: “except for the condition
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either may make another marriage cannot be doubted, since a partner,
his <42> partnership with one being dissolved, has a right to associate
another partner, and thus enter into a new partnership.*
s e c t i on x l i x
Tho’ all this be required by right reason in the conjugal society, yet it is
manifest that one duty hath a nearer relation to the end of matrimony,
and another a more remote relation; and therefore society betweenaman
and a woman does not cease to be marriage, if some changes are made
in it by pacts; wherefore marriage is valid tho’ imperfect; i.e. though
contracted for the sake of procreation and education privately, and with-
out any solemnity;† nor is that invalid which is called morgenatic mar-
of adultery.”]] Now, this being the meaning of the word, the sense is, that no other
cause of divorce is allowable, but such a one as is like to adultery, of the same nature
with it, i.e. no less repugnant to the end of matrimony than adultery.
* [[See preceding note.]]
† To this class belongs what is called mariage de conscience: as also concubinacy,
such as obtained among the Romans, concerning which we have said a great deal in
our comment. ad legem Juliam & Papiam, l. 2. c. 4. [[Presumably in his Elementa
iuris civilis. ]] For concubine is not to be confounded with whore; and differed only
in respect of dignity from a legal wife. Whence it is called unequal marriage, l. 3. C.
de natur. lib. On the other hand, that does not deserve the name, even of an imperfect
marriage, which is called by these barbarous terms ad talacho, emancibado, casato di
media carta; and is contracted on this condition, that a man, so soon as he has children
by a woman, may turn her away, or that the woman being pregnant, may desert her
husband when she pleases; such the marriages of the Amazons are said to have been,
tho’ Arrian doubts of the truth of this report, in his expedit. of Alexander, l. 7. p. 291.
See Sam. Petit. de Amazonibus, & Casp. Sagitt. Exercit. ad Justin. hist. 2. 4. [[The
author is Pierre (not Samuel) Petit, De Amazonibus dissertatio, qua an vere extiterint,
necne, . . . disputatur. The other work is Sagittarius (praeses ) and Ko¨pken (respon-
dens ), Antiquitates Amazonias exercitatione ad Justini historici lib. 2, cap. IV. ]] And
what is this indeed, but as Seneca expresses it, of benefits, 3. 6. exire matrimonii
caussa, nubere divortii caussa? [[“To divorce in order to marry, to marry in order to
divorce.” This is a not entirely accurate quotation from Seneca (the Younger), On
Benefits 3.16 (not 3.6).2 in vol. 3 of Moral Essays. ]] What can be more repugnant to
that convenient education, which we have observed to be the end of matrimony?
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riage;* nor putative, or reputed marriage, of which Jo. Nic. Hertius hath
published a curious dissertation.3 <43> <44>
* [It is not unfit to explain what our Author calls, ex legemorganatica matrimonium
ad morgangabicam, or as the writers on fiefs call it, ad morgenaticam, comes from the
German morgen-gab, which signifies a morning present. The person who marries a
woman in the manner here specified, or as the Germans express it, with the left hand,
the day after his wedding makes her a present, which consists in the assignment of a
certain portion of his goods to her and her future children, after his death, on which
condition they have no farther pretensions. Gregory of Tours calls this matutinale
donum, l. 9. 19. as Gronovius on Grotius observes [[Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis,
ed. Gronovius]], who likewise refers us to Lindenberg’s glossary on the Codex legum
antiquarum. See Barbeyrac on Grotius, l. 2. c. 8. 8. 3.] [[Grotius, Le droit de la guerre
et de la paix, trans. and ed. Barbeyrac.]]
3. Hertius, Commentatio iuridica de matrimonio putativo, originally published as
a Giessen University dissertation in 1690.
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Of the duties that ought to be observed in a
society of parents and children.
s e c t i on l
By the conjunction of which we have been treating in the precedingchap-
ter, children are procreated, who abide in society with their parents till
they themselves form new families, and go from under their parents au-
thority. For tho’ children, when they come into the world, can neither
expresly nor tacitely consent to this society; yet, because society may arise
from presumed consent, if, by the nature of the thing, we may judge one
to have consented (§16), and the condition of infants requires that they
should live in society with others, (§16); there is no reason why we may
not assert, that parents and children consent in the same end and means,
and consequently that there is a society betweenparents andchildren(§13).
s e c t i on l i
Because infants, nay, young boys and girls, are not capable of judging
how they ought to direct their actions and conduct, God, who willed
their existence, is justly understood to have committed the care of such
to others. And since he hath implanted not only in men, but in brutes,
an ardent affection to stimulate them to this duty (§26), and men con-
tract marriage for the sake of procreation and education, or ought to
have those ends solely in their view in forming this society (§ eod.); the
consequence is, that this duty is principally incumbent on the parents;
Connection.
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and therefore that there is no <45> other end of the society between
parents and children, but convenient and proper education of children.*
s e c t i on l i i
Education being the end of this society (§51); since it cannot be carried
on without directing the actions of children, the consequence is, that
parents have a right and power to direct their children’s actions; they
have therefore power over their children, and thus this society isunequal
and rectoreal. But as the duties of every society must be deduced from
its end (§14); so this parental power must be estimated by its end; and
therefore it is a right or power competent to parents, to do every thing,
without which the actions of children cannot be so directed, as that the
end of this society may be obtained.† <46>
s e c t i on l i i i
Since the duty of education is incumbent upon both parents (§51), the
consequence is, that this power must be common to both parents; and
* For tho’ a man and woman may join together, not with a view to have children,
but merely to satisfy their lust, yet they are not freed from this obligation, because
they proposed another end to themselves. All impure conjunctions without marriage
being repugnant to right reason (§34), it is no matter what end parents may really
have had in their view; but we are solely to consider what end they ought to have had
in view; nor is it in any one’s power to renounce the preceptive law, which appoints
this end of copulation (l. 1. §13).
† Hence then the origine of that power belonging to parents by the law of nature.
God wills that children exist, i.e. that they be preserved and made happy (l. 1. §77):
but they cannot be preserved and live happily without proper education (§51); and
they cannot be properly educated unless their actions be directed: Therefore God
wills that the actions of children be directed by those who educate children. But the
right of directing the actions of children is power over children (§52): And therefore
God wills that parents exercise power over their children. We therefore send Hobbes
apacking, de cive, 9. 3. who derives paternal power from occupancy. Nor does Pu-
fendorff ’s way, (of the law of nature, &c. l. 6. c. 2. §4.) satisfy us, who derives it
partly from the nature of social life, and partly from the presumed consent of chil-
dren. For presumed consent to this society, which we likewise acknowledge can be
inferred from no other principle than that we have now laid down.
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therefore, by the law of nations, this power cannot belong to the father
only, as the Roman law affirms; yet, since regularly the father, as hus-
band, has the prerogative in the conjugal society (§44), it is plain, that
when parents disagree, greater regard ought to be had to the father’s than
to the mother’s will, unless the father command something manifestly
base and hurtful to his children: For to such things, as being morally
impossible, neither mother nor children can be obliged.
s e c t i on l i v
Besides, because the duty of education, whence the parental power takes
its rise, is sometimes undertaken, upon the death of the parents, by
grandfathers and grandmothers, or other relatives, through affection;
sometimes it is committed by the parents themselves to others, whom
they judge more fit for the charge; sometimes a stranger desires a parent
would devolve that care upon him; it therefore follows, that this power,
as far as it consists in the right of directing the actions of children, is, in
these cases, devolved upon grandfathers, relations, pedagogues, and those
who adopt * children, or take them under their care; and therefore all such
* Adoption therefore is not contrary to the law of nature, but for another reason
than that upon which it is founded in the Roman law. For children being by that law
under the power of the father, i.e. in domino juris quiritium, l. 1. D. de rei vind.
Hence they inferred, that the father could alienate and sell his children, as well as the
other things (mancipi) in his full possession and power. And thus adoptions were
made by alienation and cession of right, as we have shewn on another occasion. Be-
sides, men only, and not women, could adopt, except by a special indulgence from
the prince to console them for the loss of their children, §10. Inst. l. 5. C. de adopt.
because they could not have any person under their power. But we derive adoptions
not from any dominion belonging to the father, or to both parents, but from the duty
of education, and the power of directing the actions of children, necessary to that
end; which duty, since sometimes it may be better performed by strangers, or at least
as conveniently as by the parents themselves, there is no reason why they may not
resign it to others, willing to undertake it, and thus give them their children in adop-
tion. Nor is there any difference whether a man or a woman, a married or unmarried
person adopt, because this adoption does not imitate nature, but only the duties of
parents. And we have an example of this kind of adoption, not only among the Egyp-
tians, Exod. ii. 10. but also among the Romans, among whom Lact. de mort. perseq.
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persons may exercise the parental power as far as the education under-
taken by them requires. <47>
s e c t i on l v
Since this power consists in the right of doing every thing necessary to
obtain the end of the society above defined (§52); it is obvious, that par-
ents have a right to prescribe to their children what they ought to do,
and to prohibit what they ought not to do; and not only to chide and
reprove the stubborn and disobedient, but to chastise them, as the cir-
cumstances of the case may require; and to use other severer methods
to reduce them into good order and due obedience; provided it be done
prudently, and with proper regard to age, the dignity of the family, and
other circumstances.* <48>
cap. 50. tells us, that Valeria Augusta, not on account of barrenness, but to console
her for the loss of her children, adopted Candidianus.
* Grotius, of the rights of war and peace, 2. 5. 22. and Pufendorff of the law of
nature, &c. 6. 2. 7. justly observe, that this power is greater over younger than more
adult children. For since the father may do every thing that education, the end of
this society, makes requisite (§52); because children of an imperfect understanding
can hardly discern by themselves what is right, the very nature of the thing requires,
that parents should direct their actions, and have a right to compel them to learn
some useful art, as likewise to embrace the religion they themselves approve, and to
chastise with the rod, or otherwise, the disobedient. But this a good father will not
do to a more grown up child, who, his judgment being more ripe, ought to be induced
to do what is right, rather by authority, and the weight of good arguments, than by
severity and rigid command; nor ought he to force any thing upon such a child by
way of command with respect to his future manner of life, against his will and in-
clinations. Thus, e.g. parents are right in forcing a boy against his will to attend the
school; but it would be wrong to force one come to the years of discretion, to marry,
or to follow a profession he does not like, &c. This we observe, in opposition to
Zieglerus, who in his notes on Grotius, 2. 5. 2. thinks this distinction ought not to
be admitted. [[Ziegler, In Hugonis Grotii De jure belli ac pacis libros, . . . notae.]]
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s e c t i on l v i
Hence it is plain, that the end of this society does not require the power
of life and death over children; unless, perhaps, in a state of nature,
where parents preside over a large and diffused family as its heads; and
in this case they exercise such power rather as princes and magistrates
than as parents.* Whence again we infer, that the law of nature does not
approve of the antient rigid power of the Romans, which was afterwards
disapproved of even by them; and therefore Justinian justly affirms, §2.
Inst. de patri. potest. “That no other people ever exercised such a power
over children as the Romans did.” <49>
s e c t i on l v i i
Much less then have parents, by the law of nature, a right to expose
their children to sale, of inflicting hurtful punishments upon them
for faults, and of acquiring to themselves all that comes to their chil-
dren, tho’ all these things were approved of by the antient Roman
laws. For none of these things is of such a nature, that the end of
society cannot be obtained without it (§52). But since this power con-
sists in directing the actions of children (§52), parents cannot be refused
the right of commanding certain work from their children, suitable to
their condition, and of making gain by their labor; nor of adminis-
* This is plain, because that power of life and death was proper to the father, and
not common to both parents, and extended even to wives and widow-daughters-in-
law. We have an example of the latter in Judah, Gen. xxxviii. 24. who, when he found
that his Daughter-in-law Tamar had play’d the harlot, ordered her to be brought
forth and burnt. Thus kings, because they are in a state of nature, exercise this power
over their wives, children, and their whole family; and this power fathers in ancient
times exercised, not as fathers, but as sovereigns. Thus Philip of Macedon sat as judge
between his sons, Liv. 40. 8. [[Livy, History of Rome 40.8.]] Thus Claudius Caesar
punished Valeria Messalina his adulterous wife, Sueton. in Claud. cap. 26. [[Sueto-
nius, “The Deified Claudius,” chap. 26 in Suetonius, vol. 2]] not to mention more
modern examples which have been examined by others. See Barbeyrac on Pufendorff,
of the law of nature and nations, 6. 2. 10.
Whether it
extends to the
power of life
and death?
Whether
parents have
the power of
selling, of
hurting delin-
quents, and of
acquiring by
their children?
book i i , chapter i i i 371
trating what comes to their children by the favour of men, or of prov-
idence.* <50>
s e c t i on l v i i i
We have said enough of the power of parents. As to their duties, they
are very obvious. For they are easily deducible from the end of this so-
ciety. Education is the end of this society, and therefore it is self-evident,
that parents are obliged to every thing without which this end cannot
be obtained, and to avoid every thing contrary to it (§24). But it is worth
while to give a full view or idea of education, that thereby the duties,
both of parents and children, may the more clearly and certainly appear.
s e c t i on l i x
The natural affection implanted in parents, inculcates, as wehavealready
observed (§26) the obligation of parents to educate their children. Now,
the love which parents owe to their children, is a love of benevolence (l.
1. §85), which consists in delighting to preserve and encrease, to the ut-
most of our power, the happiness of an inferior and more imperfect
* For since children themselves, while their judgment is imperfect, are subject to
the direction of their parents; why may not their goods be likewise administred by
them? But may this administration be gainful to them? I do not doubt of it. Whatever
things children stand in need of, such as clothes, meat, lodging, the expence of edu-
cation, &c. they have a right to demand them from their parents. They therefore do
not stand in need of fruits or profits, whereas the parents often greatly want them
for the support and education of their children. With what face then can children
demand restitution of fruits or profits from their parents, whom they can never repay,
if they would give up themselves and their all to them? Ismene says well in Sophocles,
Oedip. Colon. v. 523.
Patrem cura: nam parentum caussa
Etsi quis laborat, laborum tamen non meminisse debet.
[[Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, in Sophocles: Antigone; The Women of
Trachis; Philoctetes; Oedipus at Colonus, ll. 507–9 (not 523): “[S]tay here and
guard our father; when one takes trouble for a parent, one must not remem-
ber that it is trouble!”]]
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being (ibid.); the consequence from which is, that parents are not only
bound to take care of the conservation of their children, but likewise to
lay themselves out to promote their happiness to the utmost of their
power. And in this does education consist, by which nothing else is un-
derstood but the care of parents to preserve their children, and to make
them as perfect and happy as they can.* <51>
s e c t i on l x
If parents be obliged to the preservation of their children (§59), the con-
sequence is, that they are not only bound to provide for them all the
necessaries of life;† i.e. cloaths and food, according to their condition
of life, but likewise to take care of their health, and to preserve their
bodies sound and intire in all their members, as much as that lies in their
power; and therefore to keep them from gluttony, luxury, lasciviousness,
and all the other vices which tend to enervate, weaken, or hurt their
* For what so great merit is there in begetting children, if care be not taken about
their conservation? And what signifies it to have preserved them, if they are not so
educated as to be rendered capable of true happiness? So Seneca of benefits, 3. 31. Ad
bene vivendum minima est portio vivere, &c. [[“To live well, the smallest part is to
live.” This exact phrase does not appear in Seneca’s On Benefits 3.31, though another
phrase with a similar meaning (“Non est bonum vivere, sed bene vivere”) does: “It is
not a blessing to live, but to live well” (Seneca, Moral Essays, vol. 3).]]
† To this class belongs chiefly suckling. For that the mother is obliged to this is
evident, from the care of nature to furnish her with such plenty of milk, till the child’s
stomach is fit to receive and digest more solid food. Those mothers are therefore truly
neglectful of their natural duty, who either for their own ease and conveniency, or
for the sake of preserving their shape, delegate this care to nurses, often of littleworth,
if not bad women, as the heathens themselves have acknowledged, and proved by
many solid arguments. See Plutarch on education, p. 3. Aul. Gell. noct. Attic. 12. 1.
[[Plutarch, “The Education of Children,” pp. 13–15, inMoralia: in FourteenVolumes,
vol. 1; Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, vol. 2, pp. 353–55.]] But because necessity exeems
one from the obligation of an affirmative law (l. 1. §114), mothers of a delicate con-
stitution, or who have not milk, are not blameable if they give their child to a good
nurse. But what care a mother ought to take in this matter, is elegantly described by
Myia in a letter to Phyllis, apud Tom. Gale Opuscul. Mythol. Eth. & Physic. p. 750.
[[Thomas Gale, Opuscula mythologica physica et ethica. ]]
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bodies; and, on this account, not rashly to leave them to themselves, or
without some guardian.
s e c t i on l x i
To this duty are directly contrary, endeavours to bring about abortion,
exposing infants, abdicating and disinheriting them without a just
cause;* de-<52>nying them necessary sustenance, and other suchcrimes,
repugnant to the end of this society. They chiefly are very blameable,
nay, unworthy of the name of parents, who abandoning their children,
or, by their carelesness about them, are the cause of their receiving any
hurt in any of their senses, organs or members; this impiety of the par-
ents is so much the more detestable, that the soundness of their senses,
and the integrity of their members, belong not only to the preservation,
but to the happiness of children.
s e c t i on l x i i
Since parents are obliged to promote the perfection and happiness of
their children to the utmost of their power (§59), to which belongs the
cultivation of their understandings, in order to render them capable of
distinguishing true good from evil (l. 1. §146), it is certainly the duty of
* What difference is there betwixt murdering children and denying them neces-
sary sustenance? l. 4. D. de agnos. & alend. lib. But those parents withhold necessary
sustenance from their children, who abandon or desert them, or disinherit themwith-
out a cause: Nay, those laws are reprehensible which give so much indulgence to
parents, as to allow them to treat their children as they please, or at least pay more
regard to paternal power than to natural equity. For who can choose but blame the
laws of the Tarquinians, which suffered the testament of Demaratus to hold good,
“who not knowing that his daughter-in-law was pregnant, died without mentioning
his grand-child in his testament; and thus the boy being born after his grandfather’s
decease, to no share of his estate, was on account of his poverty called Egerius.” Liv.
1. 34. [[Livy, Early History of Rome, 72.]] And who, on the other hand, does not
approve of Augustus, “who, by his decree appointed C. Tettius, an infantdisinherited
by his father, to inherit his father’s estate by his authority, as father of his country,
because the father had acted most iniquously towards his lawful son, in deprivinghim
of his right by his father,” Valer. Max. 7. 7. [[Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings
and Sayings, vol. 2, 175.]]
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pa-<53>rents to instil early into the minds of their children theprinciples
of wisdom, and the knowledge of divine and human things, or to com-
mit them to the care of proper masters to be polished and informed by
them, and to save no expence in instructing and improving them, within
their power, and agreeable to their rank. Whence we also conclude, that
parents are obliged to give due pains to find out the genius of their chil-
dren, that they may choose for them a kind of life suitable to theirgenius,
rank, and other circumstances; and that being chosen, to exert them-
selves to the utmost for qualifying them to act their part on the stage of
life with applause.*
s e c t i on l x i i i
Since the will or temper is the seat of that love by which we perceive
true good or happiness, parents do nothing, whatever care they may take
about perfecting the understanding of their children, if they neglect the
formation of their will or temper. Parents, who take not proper pains
and methods to inspire early into their minds the love of piety andvirtue,
but train them up to vice, <54> if not to gross and manifest vices, yet
to cunning, avarice, ambition, luxury, and other such vices, by repre-
senting these vices to their minds under the false shew of prudence, fru-
gality, spirit, taste, and elegance. Parents, in fine, who set a pattern of
* Since one and the same person often sustains several different characters, as Her-
tius has shewn in a dissertation on the subject [[Hertius (praeses ) and Hasslocher
(respondens ), Dissertatio de uno homine, plures sustinente personas ]], education ought
to be so modelled, that children may not only be fit for the way of life chosen for
them, but likewise to act a becoming part in other characters. Hence, because children
ought to be qualified not only to be good merchants or artizans, but likewise to be
good citizens; the education of children ought to be accommodated to the state and
form of the republic to which they belong, as Aristotle has wisely observed, Polit. 5.
9. adding this reason for it, “That the best laws are of little advantage, unless the
subjects are early formed and instituted suitably to them (si leges sint populares po-
pulariter, sin oligarchicae, oligarchice), for if there be an unsuitable disposition to
the frame of government in any one of the subjects, the state will feel it.”
Their will or
temper ought
to be rightly
framed.
book i i , chapter i i i 375
wickedness before their children, and sadly corrupt their minds by a con-
tinued course of vitious example.* <55>
s e c t i on l x i v
Nothing is so flattering to youth as pleasure and ease; and therefore par-
ents ought to take care not to educate their children too softly and del-
icately; not to suffer them to become languid and indolent, to dissolve
in ease and laziness; not to breed them up to luxury and high living; but
* Those are the fatal methods by which we may observe children of the best nat-
ural dispositions to be corrupted and ruined. For as none is so careless about his own
reputation as to affect to shew his vices; and therefore every one endeavours to hide
his crimes under some false semblance of prudence and virtue, so parents, for the
most part, are not at so much pains to teach their children to live honestly and vir-
tuously, as to teach them to deceive others by a counterfeit appearance of virtue and
probity, i.e.
Ut Curios simulent, & bacchanalia vivant.
[[This is a slightly inaccurate quotation from Juvenal, Satires, Satire 2, 1. 3:
“[P]eople who imitate the Curii [i.e., representatives of traditional Roman
virtue] but live like Bacchanals.”]]
To this end are all their precepts directed, and this is the lesson their example incul-
cates. Insomuch that when some children, through the goodness of their natural
disposition, are in the way to virtue and real honour, their excellent turn of mind is
depraved gradually by the bad example of their parents. For as those who travel in a
dark night, are easily misled out of their right road by false lights; so the best dis-
positions are easily corrupted, if bad examples are continually seducing them; espe-
cially, if their parents themselves are by their practice perpetually shewing them the
inutility of all the discipline bestowed upon them. How mindful ought parents to
be of that important advice of Juvenal, Sat. 14. v. 44.
Nil dictu foedum visuque haec limina tangat,
Intra quae puer est, procul hinc, procul inde puellae
Lenonum, & cantus pernoctantis parasiti.
Maxima debetur puero reverentia. Si quid
Turpe paras, nec tu pueri contemseris annos:
Sed peccaturo obsistat tibi filius infans.
[[ Juvenal, Satires, Satire 14, lines 44–49: “Don’t let any foul language or sight
touch the threshold where there’s a father inside. Keep away, keep well away,
you pimps’ girls and songs of the parasite who parties through the night! A
child deserves the utmost respect. So if you’re planning something disgust-
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to inure them to hardship, to bear heat and cold, and to content them-
selves with homely fair, with whatever is at hand. For while the children
of peasants are thus bred up to work, and to homely diet, do we not see
how they surpass the youth of higher birth in health and vigour?*
s e c t i on l x v
Nothing so much depraves youth as bad company; and thereforeparents
ought to be watchful that their children do not associate themselveswith
corrupt companions, but with their equals, and such as are well edu-
cated. For tender minds are prone to imitation,† and easily moulded into
any shape by example, but averse to admonition; and the danger of their
being corrupted is so much the greater, that they are so little capable of
ing, you shouldn’t disregard his tender years. Rather, your baby soon should
be a deterrent when you are on the point of doing something wrong.”]]
* There is an excellent epistle to this purpose from Theanus to Eubules, apud
Thom. Gale Opuscul. ethic. physic. & mytholog. p. 741. “It is not education, but a
perversion and corruption of nature, when the mind is inflamed with the love of
pleasure, and the body with lust.” Nor are the precepts of Plutarch, in his excellent
treatise of education, less grave and serious.
† How propense youth is to imitation, is plain from the many instances of those,
who being bred up among the brutes, acquire their gestures, their voice and fierceness
to such a degree, that they are hardly distinguishable from them. Instances of this
sort are collected by Lambert Schaffnab. ad annum 1344. Hartknoch. de Polon lib.
1. cap. 2. p. 108. Bern. Connor. Evang. med. art. 115. p. 181. & de statu Polon. part.
1. ep. 6. p. 388. [[Hersfeld, Lamperti Monachis Hersfeldensis opera; Hartknoch, De
republica Polonica libri duo; Connor, Evangelium medici seu medicina mystica. The
work “de statu Polon.” is presumably Hagemeier’s Iuris publici Europaei de statuRegni
Poloniae et imperii Moscovitici epistola VIII. ]] In the Leipsick Acts 1707, p. 507. we
are told of a deaf and dumb boy, who, by frequenting the church, begun to imitate
all the motions and gestures of those he saw there, in such a serious-like manner, that
the clergy could no longer doubt of his having some sense of religion: And yet, when
he afterwards had learned to speak, it could not be found out in any way, that he had
ever had any notion of religion. [[Acta eruditorum. This was one of the most influ-
ential learned journals published in the German territories; it appeared between 1682
and 1731.]] If such be the force of example and imitation, is it to be wondered at,
that boys receive, as it were, a new nature from the society they frequent, and are by
drinking Circe’s cup transformed into beasts.
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distinguishing flatterers and parasites from true friends, corrupt from
good masters, or inducements to vice from wholesome precepts. <56>
s e c t i on l x v i
The duties of children to their parents are easily deducible from the state
and right of parents, and from the end of the society we are now con-
sidering. For since parents have the right of directing the actions of their
children, hence it is plain, that they ought to be regarded by their chil-
dren as superior and more perfect than them; and consequently that they
ought to be loved by them with a love of reverence and obedience* (l.
1. §85); whence it follows, that children ought to pay all reverence and
obedience to their parents (l. 1. §86), such reverence and obedience as is
due to their perfection and superiority (l. 1. §87). <57>
* Hence, all the ancients have acknowledged, that next to the love due to God, is
that owing to parents. So Gellius Noct. Attic. 4. 13. to prove which, he quotes Cato,
Massurius Sabinus & C. Caesar. [[Gellius, Attic Nights 5 (not 4).13, vol. 1.]] The
golden verses of Pythagoras are yet more express to this purpose.
Primum immortales Divos pro lege colunto
Et jusjurandum: heroas, clarum genus, inde.
Daemones hinc, terris mixti, sua jura ferunto.
Inde parentis honos sequitor; tum sanguinis ordo.
[[“First let the immortal gods be worshipped in accordance with the law, and
oaths: then the heroes, that famous race, next let spirits which are mixed with
earth bring their laws, then let the honour due to a parent follow; then the
order of blood.” The verses are a Latin translation of the first four lines of
the golden verses, which are in Greek (see Hierocles, Commentary on the
Golden Verses ).]]
In commenting upon which verses in his way, Hierocles observes, that in parents
there is the image of God. And Simplicius ad Epictet. Enchirid. c. 37. p. 199. tells us,
“That the more ancient Roman laws pay’d such veneration to parents, that they did
not hesitate to call them (Deos) Gods: And out of reverence to this divine excellence,
they called a father’s brothers (Thios) Divine, to shew the high respect they thought
was due by children to parents.” [[Simplicius, On Epictetus’ Handbook, vol. 2, p. 56.
This is a commentary on chap. 30 of Epictetus’ text.]]
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s e c t i on l x v i i
Because parents ought to be revered with a respect suitable to their per-
fection (§66), none can doubt but children are bound to prefer their
parents before all others, to speak honourably to them, and of them; yea,
to take care not so much as to shew disrespect by any look. And tho’ it
may happen, that one of the parents, or both, may not have the perfec-
tions requisite to beget veneration (l. 1. §87),* yet it is the duty of a good
child to overlook these imperfections, and rather to bear injuries from
them with patience, than to omit any thing which nature itself requires
of children.
s e c t i on l x v i i i
Since parents have power or right to direct their childrens actions, and
to curb and correct them, (§55), the consequence is, that parents ought
not only to be loved and revered, but feared. From this mixture of love
and fear arises filial fear (l. 1. §131);† and therefore we cannot choose but
* For even bad parents are still parents, i.e. they are, as Simplicius, ibidem p. 198.
justly calls them, the authors of our existence next to God: And this perfection alone
ought to incite us to dutifulness and reverence to our parents. Epictet. Enchirid. c.
37. says, “But he is a bad father. Have you then no union by nature but with a good
father? No sure, the union is with a father, as such. Do therefore your duty to him,
and do not consider what he does, but how your own conduct will be agreeable to
nature.” [[Epictetus, “The Manual,” chap. 30 of TheDiscourses as Reported by Arrian,
the Manual, and Fragments, vol. 2.]]
† What is said of the commands of magistrates by the apostles St. Peter and St.
John (“Whether it is more just to obey God or you, do you yourselves judge, Acts iv.
19.” “Is it better to obey God or men, Acts v. 29.”) may be applied to the precepts of
parents. For tho’ their authority be sacred, yet that of God is more such: Nor does
the paternal authority extend so far as to free their children from the laws of the
supreme magistrate (§23). Hierocles, in his commentary upon the golden verses of
Pythagoras reasons thus: “If any order of parents be repugnant to the divine will,
what else ought they to do to whom such a collision of laws happens, but to follow
the same rule that ought to be observed in other cases, where there is a competition
of duties? Two honest goods or pleasures being proposed, which cannot be both
enjoyed, the greater ought to be preferred to the lesser. Thus, e.g. it is certainly duty
to obey God; but it is also duty to obey our parents. If therefore both obligations
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con-<58>clude from hence, that good children will only have this filial
fear of their parents; and thus they will not be so much afraid of the
pain, the castigation and reprehension of their parents will give them-
selves, as of provoking their parents indignation against them by their
vices.
s e c t i on l x i x
But because obedience is likewise due to parents, (§66), children cannot
escape reproof and chastisement, if they do not readily and cheerfully
obey their parents commands; and the morosity and severity of parents
does not authorize children to withdraw their obedience. Yet, because
right reason teaches us, that the greater the perfection and excellence of
a being is, the greater veneration and obedience is due to that being (l.
1. §87),* the consequence is, that if parents command any thing that is
base and immoral, or contrary to the divine will, and to the laws of the
country, more regard is to be had to the divine will and the laws, than
to the commands of parents.* <59>
s e c t i on l x x
Moreover, since the necessity of the parents right to direct childrens ac-
tions is the sole genuine foundation of parental power (§52), none can
question but that end being gained, the means must cease; and therefore
the parental power does not continue till death, but expires then, when
male-children are come to such maturity of years and judgment, that
they are capable of directing themselves, and can make a new family, or
when daughters and grand-daughters marry, and go out of their father’s
or grandfather’s house into other families; so that the law of nature does
concur and draw you the same way, it is a double and unexpected gain, and without
controversy the greatest good. But if the divine law draw one way, and the will of
parents another, in this disagreement of laws, it is best to follow the better will, and
to neglect the will and command of parents in these cases, in which parents them-
selves do not obey God.”
* [[See preceding note.]]
As also
obedience.
How parental
power is
dissolved.
380 the laws of nature and nations
not approve that rigour of the old Roman law, which placed children,
with their wives and children, under the father’s power, till fathers or
grand-fathers, of their own free accord, emancipated and dismissed
them.*
s e c t i on l x x i
But when the parental power is dissolved (§70), that love which nature
hath implanted in the breasts <60> of parents towards their children
ought not to cease. And therefore it is the duty of parents to delight in
the welfare and happiness of their children, even after they are separated
from them, and out of their family; to assist them with their counsel
and their wealth to the utmost of their power, and to be no less benef-
icent to them than to those which are still in their family; and, in fine,
to do all they can to promote their happiness: Whence it is also evident,
why emancipated children ought to succeed to intestate parents as well
as those who are not.†
* This flows from the paternal power, or the dominium juris Quiritium peculiar
to the Romans. For time did not put an end to this dominion; nor could any one
lose it without some deed of his own. Hence those imaginary sellings made use of
in emancipations. For nothing appeared more consistent than that (res mancipi)
things in full possession and dominion should be alienated by selling. See A. Corn.
van Bynkershoek de jure occid. lib. cap. 1. p. 145. [[The work referred to concerns
the right of the ancient Romans to kill and expose their children (Bynkershoek,Curae
secundae de jure occidendi et exponendi liberos apud veteres Romanos ).]] But this do-
minion over children, as res mancipi, being unknown to the law of nature (§54), this
rigour we have above described, cannot belong to it.
† Wherefore, in this matter, many nations seem to have departed from natural
equity, in which married daughters, having got a certain patrimony by way of dowry,
were obliged to content themselves with it, and were excluded from any farther share
or succession to the paternal inheritance. This law was amongst the Hebrews founded
on a very solid reason, because such was the frame of that republic, that every tribe
had its lot, which could not pass to any other tribe, Num. xxvii. But the Syrian cus-
tom, of which we see an instance, Gen. xxxi. 14. & seq. was not equallycommendable.
See a curious dissertation by Jacob Perizonius, de lege voconia, p. 119. where there
are several learned observations on this subject. [[Perizonius, Dissertationum trias.]]
Much less still can we approve of the Roman law, which excluded emancipated sons
from succession to the paternal inheritance, since the Praetor had a power to soften
the rigour of it, and since Justinian entirely abrogated it, Novella 1. 118. For eman-
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s e c t i on l x x i i
Hence we also conclude, that it is not in the power of parents, at their
will and pleasure, to dismiss children, of whatever age, from their family,
nor to retain adult children under their power so long as they please; but
yet, that children are not excusable in deserting parents against their
<61> will, and in refusing to submit to their authority. For as it is unjust
in parents to omit any thing without which the end of this societycannot
be attained (§24); so children cannot, without injustice, shake off their
parents authority; because what one would not have done to himself, he
ought not to do to others (l. 1. §88).
s e c t i on l x x i i i
As the love of parents ought not to be extinguished when parentalpower
is dissolved (§71), so that love of veneration which children owe to their
parents ought much less to cease with parental power; yea, since every
one is bound to love his benefactor (which love is called gratitude )
(§226); the consequence is, that children, after the parental power no
longer takes place, are obliged to testify gratitude towards their parents
every way; not merely by words, but to repay benefits by benefits; and
therefore to undertake nothing of any moment, or that regards the hon-
our of the family, (such as marriage) without their consent;nay, to supply
them with the necessaries and conveniencies of life, if they want them.
This kind of gratitude, tho’ it belongs to the duties of imperfect obli-
gation, yet it is of such a peculiar nature, that civil laws may reduce
children, unmindful of their filial duties, into good order* (l. 1. §227).
<62>
cipation ought only to dissolve parental power, and not parental love, from which
we have shewn that succession to intestates ought to be derived (l. 1. §295).
* If what is told of the storks be true, that they provide for their aged parents,
those brute creatures reproach children who neglect their duty to parents. “The storks
(says Aelian. Hist. animal. 3. 23.) take tender care of their aged infirm parents: tho’
they be commanded to do this by no laws, yet they are led to it by the goodness of
their nature.” [[Aelian, De natura animalium 3.23 (Aelian, On the characteristics of
Whether it be
in the power
of the parents
and children to
dissolve the
parental power
at their
pleasure.
The obligations
of children to
parents after
parental power
is dissolved.
382 the laws of nature and nations
s e c t i on l x x i v
If parents die before children have arrived at a proper age to conduct
themselves, the nature of the thing requires that their education should
be committed to others, who are called tutors or guardians; and therefore
guardianship is nothing else, but the power of directing the actions of
children, and of managing their affairs and interests in room of their
parents, till the children are come to such maturity of years and judg-
ment, as to be fit to govern themselves* (§54). From which definition
we may infer, that tutors have the same power with parents, if it be not
circumscribed by the civil laws within narrower bounds; and are obliged
to the same fidelity, and all the same duties as parents; and, in fine, that
pupils or wards are no less obliged to veneration, gratitude and obedi-
ence, than children; and that this obligation is so much the more strict,
that the benefit done them is greater, when performed not in conse-
quence of any natural tie, but from pure benevolence. <63>
animals, bk. 3, chap. 23, p. 183).]] But shall not reason persuade men to what nature
excites the very brutes?
* How long children are to be held minors, the law of nature cannot determine,
so different are the capacities, geniuses and dispositions of children, some becoming
very early wise, and others continuing very long fools. But, because legislators in such
cases attend to what ordinarily happens (§44), they have done well to fix a certain
period to minority. But how various their determinations have been in this matter,
is shewn by testimonies collected from the most ancient histories, in a dissertation
of Jo. Petrus a Ludewig, de aetate legitima puberum & majorennium. [[ JohannPeter
von Ludewig (1668–1743), historian, philosopher, and professor of law at Halle.From
1721 he was chancellor of the University of Halle, and the relationship between Hei-
neccius and Ludewig was not free of tension and competition. The work referred to
here is his De aetate legitima puberum et maiorvm. ]]
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Concerning the duties belonging to masters
and servants, and that despotical society.
s e c t i on l x x v
We now proceed to consider the society of master and servants, which is
not, by nature, so necessary as the more simple societies of which we
have already treated, but yet has been most frequent among mankind
from the most antient times. And by it we understand a society between
a master or mistress, and men or women-servants, in which the latter
bind themselves to promote their master’s interest by their work and
labour, and the former bind themselves to maintain them; nay, some-
times to pay them a certain hire or wages. For since such is the condition
of mankind, that one stands in need of another’s work; and there is no
reason why one may not procure to himself what he wants by another’s
help (l. 1. §325); the consequence of which is, that we may stipulate to
ourselves the help or work of others by an intervening contract, and thus
form between us and servants a despotic society, which is evidently, in
its nature, unequal and rectoreal (§18).
s e c t i on l x x v i
By master or mistress we therefore understand a person who employs
others to promote his interest, and obliges himself to maintain them, or
over and above to pay them certain wages. Servants are persons who bind
themselves to promote their masters interest by their labour, either for
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their maintenance only, or for wages, together with maintenance. Now,
from these definitions it is manifest, that servitude of the latter kind is
mercenary, and <64> its foundation is none other than a contract of
letting and hiring; the former is perfect servitude, and may be called ob-
noxia, property; * and its foundation is dominion over the persons of
servants acquired by a just title.
s e c t i on l x x v i i
That mercenary servitude is not contrary to the law of nature none can
doubt; but neither is the other servitude, since experience teaches us,
that some men are naturally of so servile minds, that they are not capable
to govern themselves or a family, nor to provide for themselves the nec-
essaries of life.† But since every one ought to choose the kind of life he
* I use the word used by Phaedrus Fab. l. 3. praef. v. 34.
Servitus obnoxia,
Quia, quae volebat, non audebat dicere,
Adfectus proprios in fabellas transtulit.
[[Phaedrus, Fabulae, introduction to bk. 3, lines 34–35: “Slavery was hateful;
because he did not dare say what he wanted, he transferred his own feelings
into his fables.”]]
The Greeks distinguished between servants, which were property, whom they called
dou´louc, and domestic or hired servants, whom they called oi◊ke´tac, according to
Athenaeus Deipnos. 6. 19. [[Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, vol. 3, sec. 267, p. 203:
“But that ‘domestics’ may mean anyone living in the house, even if he be a free person,
is generally known.”]] Both kinds of servitude are very ancient. It is plain from Gen-
esis, xi. 5. xiv. 14. xv. 3. 4. xvi. 1. & seq. that Abraham had many servants, obnoxii, or
perfect servants, in the fourth age from the deluge. So that Jacob served Laban as a
mercenary servant for many years, is well known from Genes. xxix. 15. xxx. 28. Nay,
Noah makes mention of perfect servitude, Gen. ix. 25. And he condemns Chanaan
to it for injuries he had done to him. But Jo. Clericus Comment. in Genes. p. 72. has
justly observed, that this was rather a prediction of what was to happen a little after.
[[ Jean le Clerc, Genesis sive Mosis prophetae liber primus.]]
† This was observed by Aristotle, who says, that some men are fu´sei dou´louc,
servants by nature, Polit. 1. 3. For tho’ Pufendorff of the law of nature, &c. 3. 28. &
6. 3. 2. had reason to refute this philosopher, if his meaning were, that persons by
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is fitted for, (l. 1. §147), and such persons are fit for no other kind of life,
but to serve others for their maintenance, they certainly do nothing con-
trary to their duty, if they give themselves up perpetually to others on
that condition. <65>
s e c t i on l x x v i i i
Besides, extreme poverty, and other private or public calamities, may
induce some, who are not stupid, to become servants rather than perish.
For since man is obliged to preserve his life, and to avoid death and
destruction (l. 1. §143), and of two imminent evils, the least ought to be
chosen; it follows, that he whom providence hath placed in this situa-
tion, is not to be blamed, if, there being no other honest way of avoiding
death, he give himself up in servitude.*
their prudence, had a perfect right of enslaving, without any other cause, those who
are stupid, as the Greeks arrogated a right to themselves over the nations they called
barbarous; yet there is no absurdity in this saying, if it be understood of a servile
disposition, and of a natural condition, as Dan. Heinsius thinks it ought to be, epist.
ad Ge. Richterum, apud Jan. Rutgers. var. lect. 4. 3. [[Daniel Heinsius (1580–1655),
Dutch scholar and professor of Latin and Greek at Leiden. Heineccius is probably
referring to Jan Rutgers’s Variarum lectionum libri sex. ]] In this sense Agesilaus says,
in Plutarch, apophtheg. Lacon. p. 190. that the Asiatics were bad freemen, but ex-
cellent slaves. [[Plutarch, “Sayings of Spartans,” p. 333, in Plutarch,Moralia: in Four-
teen Volumes, vol. 3. This is a statement by Callicratidas rather than Agesilaus.]]
* Thus the Egyptians gave themselves up to their king as servants, that they might
not perish by famine, and held it for a favour that Pharaoh would accept of their
service for their living or maintenance. Hence, having accepted of the condition of
servitude, they answered Joseph, Gen. xlvii. 25. “Thou hast given us our lives, let us
find favour in thy sight, and let us be servants to Pharaoh.” Thus Pausanias tells us,
l. 7. c. 5. “That the Thracian women, tho’ freeborn, earned their bread among the
Erythraei, by voluntary servitude” [[Pausanias, Description of Greece, vol. 3, “Achaia,”
chap. V, p. 197]]; not now to mention the Frisians, of whom Tacitus, Annal. 4. 72.
nor the Gauls, of whom Julius Caesar de bello Gallic. 6. 13.
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s e c t i on l x x i x
Again, the fury of war much augmented the number of servants. For
because all things are lawful to an enemy against an enemy, it is law-
<66>ful to kill a subdued enemy (l. 1. §183). But because he who can
deliver himself from danger without hurting his aggressor, or by a lesser
evil, ought not rashly to proceed to killing (ibid. §181), it is certainly not
unjust for a conqueror to save the vanquished, and lead them captives,
that they may no longer have it in their power to hurt him; and to make
servants of them, that he may not have the burden of maintaining them
gratis; nor can they be blamed who choose to save their lives on these
terms, rather than perish.*
s e c t i on l x x x
But these kinds of perfect servitude cannot but produce the effect which
one is detruded into by the very fortune of birth. For since the foun-
dation of perfect servitude is dominion acquired by a just title (§76),
and all those we have already mentioned are just titles (§76 & seq.) the
consequence is, that all these servants are under the just dominion of
their masters. But since out of lawful matrimony (which can hardly take
place among some of those sorts of servants)† the offspring goes along
* Therefore, this society arises really from consent, tho’ not voluntary, but ex-
torted by just force (§15). For the conqueror is willing to save the conquered, but
upon this condition that they become his servants; the conquered is willing to serve,
that he may be saved. For if he would rather perish, what hindered him from rushing
upon the conqueror’s arms. Now the concurrence of two wills is consent (l. 1. §381).
Wherefore, society between a master, and servants taken in war, arises from consent.
† Matrimony is a simple society between persons of different sexes, formed for
the sake of procreation and education (§27). Those therefore who enter into this state,
ought to have it in their power to consent to this end, and to choose it, and the means
necessary to obtaining it. But the principal end, viz. convenient education, is not
always in the power of perfect servants, but it depends wholly on the will of their
master. Therefore, among some such men and women servants, there is no place for
lawful matrimony. We say it cannot take place among some such, as those namely
whom fortune has reduced to this condition, that their masters, after the manner of
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with the mother (l. 1. §252) it is no wonder that the offspring of such
women-servants undergo the same condition with the mother, as an ac-
cession to her; and therefore those kinds of servants are known to all
nations, which were called by the Romans vernae. <67>
s e c t i on l x x x i
These principles being fixed, it is easy to find out the duties of masters
and servants in this society, and what power masters have over their ser-
vants. For as to mercenary servants, since they are only bound by a con-
tract of letting and hiring, (§76) the master has no other power over
them, than to appoint the work to them for which they bind themselves,
and to make profit by their work, and to force them to serve during the
time for which they engaged: He has no right to exact any other work
or service from them, but that for which they bind themselves; andmuch
less to chastise them with great severity; tho’, if the servant do not fulfil
his contract, the master may not only mulct him of a part of his wages,
but turn him away from him as incorrigible (§21). <68>
s e c t i on l x x x i i
As therefore it is the master’s duty to fulfil his contract, and not to exact
other service than was contracted for from his servant, and to maintain
him as persons of that condition ought to be, and to pay him his prom-
ised wages;* so the servant is bound to reverence and obedience to his
the Romans might, descriptis per familiam ministeriis uti. But when every one has
his fixed seat and abode, as among the Germans, (Tacit. de morib. Germ. c. 25.) there
marriage among servants may more easily take place, as experience shews us. But tho’
the proper slaves of the Germans have the jus connubii, liberty of marriage, yet this
rule has force among them, that the birth follows the bearer, and is of the same con-
dition with the parents, except where alternate sharing is established (l. 1. §252).
* But neither wages nor maintenance are due, if a servant, by his own fault, or by
chance, is not able to perform the service he engaged to do (l. 1. §361). And therefore,
tho’ the humanity of those masters be very commendable, who maintain a servant
while he is sick, yet what humanity enjoins cannot be exacted by perfect right. On
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master as his superior; to perform his contracted service to him as his
hirer, and to promote his interest with all fidelity as his partner.
s e c t i on l x x x i i i
Perfect servants, we have said, are in dominion, (§76). But since he who
hath the dominion of any thing, hath the free disposal of it (l. 1. §306);
the consequence is, that a master may impose upon such a servant any
work he is capable of; make all profit by him; claim him and his children
as his property, and sell or alienate him and them upon any terms, unless
the servant, who voluntarily delivered himself into servitude, made this
condition, that he should not go out of the family, or be alienated to
any other master. As to the power of life and death, none will deny that
it belongs to such masters (l. 1. §308) unless either convention or law
forbid it. Much less then can it be denied, <69> that such masters have
a power to coerce and chastise such servants according to the exigence
of the case, provided the master still bear in mind that his servant is a
man, and by nature his equal* (l. 1. §177).
the other hand, it is most iniquitous in a master to deny a servant who has done his
work, the wages due to him, or to change his wages at his pleasure, contrary to the
terms of their contract, as Jacob complained that Laban had done ten times, Gen.
xxxi. 7. This conduct of Laban was so displeasing to God, that he took all his wealth
from him, and transferred it to Jacob, Gen. ibid. 9.
* For tho’ a servant may happen to be more perfect than his master, yet it cannot
be denied that the master is his servant’s superior: And this diversity of perfections
and states, does not alter the essence of man; so that a servant is still equally with his
master, a man (l. 1. 177). That maxim of the civilians is therefore far from being
humane, “That no injury can be done to a servant or slave,” l. 15. §35. D. de injur.
And that saying of a mistress in Juvenal is most inhumane. Sat. 6. v. 223.
O demens, ita servus homo est? Nil fecerit: esto
Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas.
[[ Juvenal, Satires, Satire 6, lines 223–24, in Juvenal and Persius: “You idiot!
Is a slave a person? All right, let’s accept that he hasn’t done anything. But
it’s my wish and my command. Let my will be reason enough.”]]
He is therefore no less excusable who hurts a servant, than he who hurts a free-man.
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s e c t i on l x x x i v
Since to a master belongs the possession of his own, and the right of
reclaiming it from every person (l. 1. §306) hence it follows, that a master
may defend himself in the possession of his maid or woman-servant by
any means, and reclaim his servants, whether they desert, or whether
they are unjustly carried off, from any one whomsoever, with the fruits
or profits, and accessions of the possession; and, in the first case, to pun-
ish the renegade according to his desert, and to take proper and effectual
measures to prevent his taking the same course for the future;* unless
this effect of the master’s dominion be restricted by the civil laws (l. 1.
§317). <70>
* Hence home-shackles, prisons, houses of correction, and other methods which
necessity obliged to, or the cruelty of masters, allowing themselves all corporal power
over their slaves, invented. For tho’ here regard ought to be had to humanity and
benevolence (§83), yet the coercive power ought not to be taken from masters, es-
pecially over servants taken in war, partly because such are upon the catch to find an
opportunity of flying and returning to their own country (which is not so very blame-
able, as Lorarius in Plautus observes, Plaut. Captiv. 2. 1. v. 14.
Lo. At fugam fingitis. Sentio, quam rem agitis.
Cap. Nos fugiamus? quo fugiamus? Lo. in patriam.
Cap. apage! haud nos id deceat,
Fugitivos imitari. Lo. Immo, aedepol, si erit occasio, non dehortor. )
[[Plautus, The Captives, lines 208–10, inPlautus, vol. 1: “‘Ah yes, you’re plan-
ning to run for it! I see what’s afoot.’ ‘Run—we? Where should we run to?’
‘Home.’ ‘Get out! The idea of our acting like runaway slaves!’ ‘Lord! why
not? I’m not saying you shouldn’t, if you get the chance.’”]]
partly because they still preserve a hostile disposition, insomuch, that what Seneca
says is particularly true of such servants, Ep. 47. So likewise Festus in voce: quot servi.
“Totidem quemque domi hostes habere, quot servos.” So many slaves at home, so
many enemies at home. [[Festus, De verborum significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli
epitome. ]]
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s e c t i on l x x x v
It will not now be difficult to ascertain the mutual duties of masters and
such servants. For because an obnoxious or perfect servant is in domin-
ion, (§76) and therefore a master may make all the gain he can of such
(§83), so that such a servant hath nothing in property; the consequence
is, that the master is obliged to maintain such a servant, and this obli-
gation does not cease, then especially, when he is not able to perform his
service.* And since a servant is, with regard to nature, equal to his master
(§83) it is obvious, that the master is culpable if he injuriously hurts his
servant; and he is worthy of commendation, if he endeavours to reform
a disobedient servant by benefits rather than by cruel methods. <71>
s e c t i on l x x x v i
Because as many different kinds as there are of servitude, so many duties
of servants there are, as correlates to the several rights of masters (l. 1.
§7) hence it follows, that perfect servitude obliges a slave to every sort
of work or service, to promote his master’s interest to the utmost of his
power, and to bear chastisement and correction, and the disposal of him
and his at his master’s will, with patience. That he acts contrary to his
duty, if he deserts his master, or defrauds his master, by stealing, as it
were, himself away from him; and that he ought rather to endeavour to
* A mercenary servant, besides his maintenance, receives wages (§82), so that he
has something wherewithall to sustain himself, if he be disabled by sickness or ac-
cident from performing his work; wherefore, since the master is obliged to maintain
such a servant only by the contract of hiring (§76), he is not perfectly bound to the
alimenting of such a servant, who is not able to serve (§82). But with respect to a
perfect servant or slave, the case is different: For he is not maintained for his work,
but as being under his master’s dominion, and having no wages, he has nothing be-
longing to him. Besides, charity and humanity oblige us to assist even strangers and
enemies (l. 1. §219); and therefore, with what face can we deny sustenance to a sick
slave, who has worn himself out in our service? Hence the Emperor Claudian gave
their liberty to slaves, who were exposed in their sickness by their cruel masters, Sue-
ton. in Claud. c. 25. l. 2. D. qui sine manum.
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merit his liberty and manumission by faithful and cordial service, thus
rendering himself worthy of so great a benefit.
s e c t i on l x x x v i i
From what hath been said, we may easily understand how this society
is dissolved. Mercenary servitude, depending upon a contract of letting
and hiring, is dissolved in the same manner such contracts are dissolved,
and more especially by the expiration of the time contracted for. Perfect
servitude is principally dissolved by manumission. For since anyonemay
derelinquish or abdicate his own (l. 1. §309), there is no doubt but a
master may renounce his right to a servant, which renunciation was
called by the antients manumission. Besides, renunciation being a kind
of alienation, and seeing <72> in alienation one may except or reserve
what he pleases (l. 1. §278) it is plain that manumission may likewise be
granted upon any honest conditions whatsoever.*
s e c t i on l x x x v i i i
Those slaves who are manumitted by their masters are called libertini,
and the liberti of the manumittor. Now, since masters, who give liberty
to their slaves, confer upon them the greatest benefit they can bestow;
and every one is obliged to love him who bestows favours upon him (l.
1. §226); slaves set at liberty (liberti ) are the most ungrateful of mortals,
unless they love the patrons who conferred so great a blessing uponthem,
and they are obliged to pay the highest veneration to them, and not only
* Thus the old Romans at manumission stipulated to themselves certain
handicraft-works, presents or gifts, l. 3. pr. l. 5. l. 7. §3. D. de oper. libert. And our
ancestors, when they manumitted their slaves, reserved a right to themselves to exact
from them such services as their mercenary servants, or even slaves were wont to
perform to them; so that abstracting from the title and condition of the servitude,
there was hardly any difference between slaves and libertines among them. And hence
Tacitus de moribus Germ. says, “That their freed-men were not in a much more
preferable state than their slaves.” [[Tacitus, Germania 25.2, p. 87.]]
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to perform to them cheerfully all that their masters stipulated to them-
selves upon giving them their liberty (§87) but likewise to be ready to
render to them all other good offices in their power; or, if the power of
serving them be wanting, at least to shew gratitude towards them inevery
manner they can* (l. 1. §228). <73>
* The ancients looked upon giving liberty to slaves as the greatest of benefits. Simo
in Terence says, And. l. 1. v. 10.
Feci, e servo ut esses libertus mihi,
Propterea, quod serviebas liberaliter:
Quod habui, summum pretium persolvi tibi.
[[Terence, The Woman of Andros, act 1, lines 37–40, in Terence, vol. 1: “You
were my slave, but I gave you your freedom, because you served me with the
spirit of a free man. I bestowed upon you the highest reward that was in my
power.”]]
For the Patron, by giving his liberty to a slave made him a person: and therefore, he
was to the freed-man in the room of a father, who on that account assumed his pa-
tron’s name, as if he were his son, Lactant. divin. Inst. 4. 3. Hence he was no less
obliged than a son to provide an aliment for his patron, if he happened to be in want,
l. 5. §18. l. 9. D. de agnosc. & alend. lib. And as a son, tho’ the obligation to gratitude
be otherwise imperfect, was forced to repay the benefits received from his father, and
to maintain him; so the freed-slave was forced to do the same, and could be reduced
into slavery again for pregnant ingratitude, Inst. §1. de cap. diminut. l. un. C. de
ingrat. lib.
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u ch a p t e r v u
Of the complex society called a family,
and the duties to be observed in it.
s e c t i on l x x x i x
We observed that lesser or more simple societies may coalesce or unite
into larger and more compounded ones (§17): and of this the societies
we have described afford us an example. For when these join and consent
into a larger society, hence arises a family, which is a society compounded
of the conjugal, the paternal and despotic society.* Whence the husband
and wife, parents, masters and mistresses, with respect to this society, are
called fathers and mothers, or heads of a family; the children are called
sons and daughters of the family, and the men or women-servants are
called domestics. <74>
* Ulpian’s definition comes to the same purpose, l. 195. §2. D. de verb. signif. “We
call a family, with its proper rights, as such, many persons subjected to one head,
either by nature or by law, (ut puta patremfamilias, matremfamilias, filiumfamilias,
filiamfamilias), and those who succeed into their room, as grandsons and grand-
daughters, &c. But we take the term in a somewhat larger acceptation. For, whereas
he only comprehends husband and wife, parents and children, we comprehend ser-
vants as a part of a family; as he himself a little afterwards calls them, §3. ‘servitium
quoque solemus vocare familiam,’ we also reckon servants a part of the family.” Be-
sides, among the ancients family signified the servants, “quasi familia,” as Claud. Sal-
mas. exercit. Plin. p. 1263. has shewn. [[Saumaise (Salmasius),Plinianaeexercitationes
in Caji Julii Solini Polyhistora.]] And the parents and children were called by them
domus, the house, as in Apuleius Apolog. p. 336. “ipse domi tuae rector, ipse familiae
dominus.” [[Apuleius, Rhetorical Works 98.7, p. 116: “In your house he and none but
he is the man in charge, the one who issues orders to the staff.”]] We shall therefore
use the word family, to denote what the ancients called domus and familia.
What a
family is.
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s e c t i on xc
But because the larger a society is, the less practicable is it that so many
members should find out necessary means for attaining the end of the
society by common consent and suffrage (§18) it is evident that this so-
ciety must be unequal and rectoreal; and therefore that the power of
directing the rest to the end of the society, must be transferred to one
of the members. Now, since the husband and father of the family has a
certain authority or prerogative over the wife (§44) and his command,
as father, ought to prevail over the mother’s when they disagree (§53);
and since he hath, as master, undoubted power over his servants of what-
ever sort; (§81 and 83) the power of directing the actions of the whole
family must belong to the father; * but in such a manner however, that
the mother is obliged, as sharer of his good or bad fortune, to give him
all the assistance she can of every kind (§42). <75>
s e c t i on xc i
Now, such a family is either in a state of nature, subject to none, or it is
united with other families into one state. In the first case, the end of this
society is not only to acquire the things necessary to its happy subsis-
tence, but likewise to defend itself against all invaders or enemies; and
therefore they judge right, who consider such a family as a species of the
lesser states or republics.† In the latter case, because every family is pro-
* But this is to be understood of what ordinarily or regularly happens. For that it
is sometimes otherwise, we have already shown (§46). Who will deny that a queen
who marries a stranger is still head of her family, and that in this case, no other part
belongs to the husband but what regularly belongs to the wife, viz. to give all manner
of assistance to his queen-wife? We have very recent examples of this.
† Thus Aristotle considers it, Polit. 3. 6. where he says, that segregate heads of
families, living by themselves, are with their families as states, and defend themselves
by the members of their families against all injurious invaders. Nor does Hobbes
philosophize about the manner differently. Leviath. c. 20. Tho’ properly indeed such
a family be not a state, as Aristotle acknowledges a little after, where he says, “Yet if
we accurately consider the matter, it is not properly a city or state”; yet it is very like
to one, and when it grows up into a great multitude of persons, it becomes a state or
To whom the
direction or
government
belongs in this
society.
The end of
this society
in a state of
nature, and in
a civil state.
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tected against the injuries of their fellow citizens or subjects by judges,
and against common enemies, by the common strength of the republic,
its end can be no other but the acquisition of things necessary to its more
comfortable and happy subsistence.
s e c t i on xc i i
But since the end of this domestic society, in a state of nature, is not
only to acquire the necessaries to convenient and comfortable living, but
likewise to defend itself against injuries (§91) the consequence is, that
the father of the family has all <76> the rights necessary to attain to
these ends; and therefore he may not only manage the family estate and
interest as seems best to him, and allot to every one in the family his care
and task, and call every one to an account for his management; but he
has likewise all the rights of a prince or supreme magistrate in his family,
and consequently can make laws, punish delinquents, make war and
peace, and enter into treaties.*
s e c t i on xc i i i
On the other hand, since the end of a family, coalited with other families
into the same state, can be no other but the acquisition of necessaries
and conveniencies (§91), it is very plain that such eminent rights do not
republic, as Plato observes in Politic. t. 2. op. edit. Serrani. [[A reference to JeanSerres’
edition of Plato’s works (see Plato, Platonis opera quae extant omnia ).]]
* We have examples of this in the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who, as
princes, or heads of segregate families, exercised all the rights of sovereignty. Thus
Abraham, when he heard his brother Lot was taken captive, armed his trainedservants
born in his own house, and joined with certain confederates, and made war against
the enemy, Gen. xiv. 14. The same Abraham entred into an alliance with Abimelech,
Gen. xxi. 22. which was afterwards renewed by Isaac, Gen. xxvi. 26. Jacob in like
manner made a covenant with Laban, Gen. xxxi. 44. and his family made war (tho’
an unjust one) against Hamor and his son Shechem, Gen. xxxiv. 25. Jacob likewise
gave a law to his houshold about putting away strange gods from among them, Gen.
xxxv. 2. Judah, his son, condemned his daughter-in-law to be burnt, Gen. xxxviii. 24,
25. Of these facts Nicolaus Damascenus was not ignorant. Excerpt. Peiresc. p. 490.
See likewise Justin. 36. 2.
The power of
the head or
father in a
state of nature.
In a civil state.
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belong to the heads of such families, but those only which we described
(§92), without which the family cannot have a comfortable subsistence;
and in this case the mother has some share; whereas the modesty and
character of her sex does not permit her to partake of <77> those rights
which belong to the father of a family, as the supreme magistrate of the
family.
s e c t i on xc i v
Moreover, since in more complex societies the interest of the more sim-
ple or lesser ought not to be opposed to that of the larger (§23), it is
plain, that the conjugal, the paternal, the domestic societies ought not
to be an obstacle to the end and interest of the whole united family;*
and hence arise certain duties peculiar to this complex society, some of
which belong to the father and mother with regard to one another;others
to both, with respect to the other members of the family; others to the
members of this family, with respect to the father and mother of the
family; and others, in fine, to the members with relation one to another.
See Wolfius de vita sociali hominum, §194.1
s e c t i on xcv
Since the father hath the principal part or character in this society (§90);
but so, that the mother is obliged to give him all possible assistance in
every way (ibid.); it follows, that it belongs to the father of the family
to command what he would have done, to maintain the whole family,
and each member, as every one’s condition requires, to coerce andpunish
those who do any injury or dishonour to the family, suitably to what the
rights of a more simple society permit, and to support the dignity and
* Because, in this case, one and the same person sustains several different person-
ages or characters, he is under so many respective obligations, and has so many re-
spective rights correspondent to, and depending upon these different characters and
relations of husband, father, and head of the family.
1. Christian Wolff, Vernu¨nftige Gedanken von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der
Menschen und insonderheit dem gemeinen Wesen.
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authority of the mother; and it is her duty to use her utmost care that
the children and servants obey their orders;* to act in the husband’s room
in <78> his absence; and, in fine, to shew an example to the whole family
of veneration and obedience, being sure to have so much the more au-
thority in the family, in proportion as she studies to maintain and aug-
ment that of her husband.
s e c t i on xcv i
Now, if the simpler societies ought to be so managed, that they may not
be a hindrance to the good of the whole family (§94), it is manifest that
the father acts contrary to his duty, if he is an impediment to the mother
in her care about the education of their children; and she is much less
excusable, if she makes the rebellious children worse by her indulgence;
and both are in the wrong, if they by their discords and jarrs, are a bad
example to the children, or if they are negligent of their education and
behaviour. In like manner it is evident, that a domestic society must be
in a very bad state, if the children are left to the care of the servants, and
are allowed to converse with them at their pleasure; or if, on the one
hand, the servants give ill advice to children, and induce them to, or
assist them in any crime; or if, on the other hand, the children are suf-
fered to treat the servants rudely.† <79>
* Socrates says in Xenophon. Oecon. c. 3. §15. “I think a wife who is a good partner
in a family, contributes as much to its interest as the husband. For very often wealth
is brought by the husband’s industry into a house, and the greater part of it is at the
management of the wife, which, if it be good, the family is enriched, if bad, it is
ruined.” [[Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, p. 389.]]
† For most servants being of the very dregs of mankind, and therefore very ill
educated, it is impossible but children must be corrupted by them. We see how justly
they are represented in Plautus and Terence, as often corrupting the children by flat-
tery, and exciting them to or assisting them in very bad practices. Plutarch upon
education wisely observes, “If you live with a lame person, you will insensibly learn
to halt.” And hence he infers, “That nothing can be more absurd and unreasonable
than the very common practice, when one has many good servants, some fit for ag-
riculture, some for navigation, some for merchandize, some for banking, others to
be stewards, if he finds one slave that is idle, drunken, and unfit for every other busi-
ness, to set him over his children.” [[Plutarch, “The Education of Children,” pp. 17–
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s e c t i on xcv i i
Hence it is plain, that the whole matter lies in preserving good order in
a family. But then are things said to be done in order, when all things
are managed and done as the circumstances of each affair requires. And
therefore in a family every one ought to have some business or task ap-
pointed to him, and to give a strict account of it; and each person ought
to be inured to do his business, not only with due care and diligence,
but also at a convenient time, and in a proper place; and, in fine, all the
furniture, and every utensil ought to be kept neat, clean, and intire, and
every thing ought to be found in the place appointed for it, or where it
is proper and convenient it should be placed.* <80>
s e c t i on xcv i i i
From what hath been said of the duties of the whole family, it is obvious,
that since all the members expect aliment from the head, each suitably
to his rank (§95) every one of them is obliged to take care of the common
interest of the whole body, and of that part committed to his trust in
particular, to render reverence and obedience to the father and mother
of the family; and, above all, to do nothing that may tend to interrupt
the conjugal harmony, or to hinder the education of the children; or to
19 in Plutarch, Moralia: in Fourteen Volumes, vol. 1.]] But it is evidently much the
same in effect, whether parents commit the care of their children to worthlesspersons,
or suffer them to be familiar with them.
* All this Xenophon hath delightfully explained in his golden treatise of oeco-
nomics, where he introduces Ischomachus discoursing with his wife about the man-
agement and oeconomy of a family. And cap. 8. she sums up all thus: That, as in a
choir, in an army, or in a ship, so in a domestic society, there is a first, a second, and
a last order, and that the perturbation of this order throws all into confusion, and
renders the largest stock of furniture useless. In the 8. chapter she adds, “The dis-
turbance of order seems to be like a farmer’s throwing wheat, barley, and legumes,
all together in a heap; and then when he wants bread, kitchen-stuff, or any other
thing, he must have the trouble of separating them, and to search through the whole
confused mass for what he has present need of.” [[Xenophon, Oeconomicus, chap.
VIII, pp. 429–33, in Memorabilia and Oeconomicus.]]
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bereave the head of the profits he might justly expect from the labour,
honesty, and diligence of his servants.
Remarks on This Chapter
Our Author hath treated very distinctly and fully of the duties of the
simpler societies, as he very properly calls them. But because it is com-
mon in arguing about government, or the civil state, to which our au-
thor is now to proceed, especially among the defenders of absolute
monarchy, to reason from the right of paternity, it will not be improper
to consider domestic or family dominion in its natural causes. This will
prepare the way for the consideration of civil government, ordominion
in its natural causes; And it is the more necessary, because the defenders
of absolute monarchy, in their reasonings to prove its jus divinum, from
the right of paternity, or the government of families, conceal, as Mr.
Harrington observes, one part of it. “For family government, says that
excellent author (for it is from him, of his works p. 385. upon the foun-
dations and superstructures of all kinds of government, I am now to
transcribe) may be as necessarily popular in some cases, as monarchical
in others. To shew now the nature of the monarchical family: Put the
case a man has one thousand pounds a year, or thereabouts, he marries
a wife, has children and servants depending upon him (at his good will)
in the distribution of his estate for their livelihood. Suppose then that
this estate comes to be spent or lost, where is the monarchy of this
family? But if the master was no otherwise monarchical than by virtue
of his estate, the foundation or balance of his empire consisted in the
thousand pounds a year. That from these principles there may be also
a popular family, <81> is apparent: For suppose six or ten, having each
three hundred pounds a year, or so, shall agree to dwell together as one
family, can any one of them pretend to be lord and master of the same,
or to dispose of the estates of all the rest? or do they not agree together
upon such orders, to which they consent equally to submit? But if so,
then certainly must the government of this family be a government of
laws or orders, and not the government of one, or of some three or
four of these men. Yet the one man in the monarchical family giving
laws, and the many in the popular family doing no more, it may in this
sense be indifferently said, That all laws are made by men; but it is plain,
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where the law is made by one man, then it may be unmade by one man;
so that the man is not governed by the law, but the law by the man;
which amounts to the government of the men, and not of the law:
whereas the law being not to be made but by the many, no man is
governed by another man, but by that only which is the common in-
terest; by which means this amounts to a government of laws, and not
of men. That the politicks may not be thought an unnecessary or dif-
ficult art, if these principles be less than obvious and undeniable, even
to any woman that knows house-keeping, I confess I have no more to
say. But in case what has been said be to all sorts and capacities evident,
it may be referred to any one, whether without violence, or removing of
property, a popular family can be made of the monarchical, or a mo-
narchical family of the popular. Or whether that be practicable or pos-
sible, in a nation upon the like balance or foundation in property,which
is not in a family. A family being but a smaller society or nation, and a
nation but a greater society or family. That which is usually answered
to this point is, That the six or ten thus agreeing to make one family,
must have some steward, and to make such a steward in a nation, is to
make a king. But this is to imagine, that the steward of a family is not
answerable to the masters of it, or to them upon whose estates (and not
upon his own) he defrays the whole charge: For otherwise, this stew-
ardship cannot amount to dominion, but must come only to the true
nature of magistracy, and indeed of annual magistracy, in a common-
wealth; seeing that such accounts, in the year’s end at farthest, use to
be calculated, and that the steward, body and estate, is answerable for
the same to the proprietors or masters; who also have the undoubted
right of constituting such another steward or stewards, as to them shall
seem good, or of prolonging the office of the same.
“Now, where a nation is cast, by the unseen ways of providence,
into a disorder of government, the duty of such particularly as are
elected by the people, is not so much to regard what has been, as to
provide for the supreme law, or for the safety of the people, which
consists in the true art of law-giving. And the art of law-giving is of
two kinds; the one (as I may say) false, and the other true. The first
consists in the reduction of <82> the balance to arbitrary superstruc-
tures, which requires violence, as being contrary to nature; the other in
erecting necessary superstructures, that is, such as are conformable to
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the balance or foundation; which being purely natural, requires that all
interposition of force be removed.”2
It is impossible to treat distinctly of family or of civil dominion,
without considering it in its natural causes, or its natural generation.
“The matter of all government is an estate or property. Hence, all gov-
ernment is founded upon an over-balance in propriety. And therefore,
if one man hold the over-balance unto the whole people in propriety,
his property causeth absolute monarchy: if the few hold the over-
balance unto the whole people in propriety, their propriety causeth ar-
istocracy, or mixed monarchy. If the whole people be neither over-
balanced by the propriety of one, nor of a few, the propriety of the
people, or of the many, causeth democracy, or popular government:
The government of one against the balance is tyranny; the government
of a few against the balance is oligarchy: the government of the many
(or attempt of the people to govern) against the balance, is rebellion
or anarchy; where the balance of propriety is equal, it causeth a state
of war: To hold that government may be founded upon community,
is to hold that there may be a castle in the air, or that what thing soever
is as imaginable as what hath been in practice, must be as practicable
as what hath been in practice. Hence it is true in general, that all gov-
ernment is in the direction of the balance.”3 All these truths, however
much neglected by writers upon government, are of the greatest mo-
ment: They have the same relation to or connexion with theories about
government, whether domestic or civil and national, whether consist-
ing of one or many families, as the real laws of matter and motion have
with theories in natural philosophy: For they are moral facts or prin-
ciples upon which alone true theories in moral philosophy or politics
can be built, as the other are the natural facts, laws or principles upon
which alone true axioms in natural philosophy can be erected. They
are all fully explained by the author already cited. And hence we may
see, “That the division of a people into freemen and servants, is not
constitutive, but naturally inherent in the balance. Freemen are such
2. Harrington, “The Art of Lawgiving” (1659), bk. I, “The Preface,” in The Po-
litical Works of James Harrington, 602–3.
3. With the exception of the last sentence this is from Harrington, “The Rota or
a Model of a Free State or Equal Commonwealth” (1660), in Harrington, Political
Works, 808.
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as have wherewithal to live of themselves, and servants such as have
not: Nor, seeing all government is in the direction of the balance, is it
possible for the superstructures of any to make more freemen than are
such by the nature of the balance, or by their being able to live of
themselves. All that could in this matter be done, even by Moses him-
self, is contained in this proviso, Lev. xxv. 29. If thy brother that dwells
by thee be grown poor, and be sold to thee, thou shalt not compel him to
serve as a bond-servant, but as a hired servant, and a sojourner shall he be
with thee, and shall serve thee to the year of jubilee: And then shall hedepart
from thee, both he and his children with him, and shall return to his own
family, and to the possession of his <83> fathers shall he return. Yet the
nature of riches being considered, this division into freemen and ser-
vants, is not properly constitutive but natural.” See Mr. Harrington’s
works, the art of lawgiving, p. 436, 437. Compare p. 248.4 I shall only
add upon this head, that the defenders of absolute monarchy can never
draw any conclusions to serve their purpose, either from paternal gov-
ernment, or from the power of masters over their servants. For with
regard to the former, what relation can be stricter than that between
parents and children: There cannot be stronger obligations to subjec-
tion upon any than there are upon children: This relation and obli-
gation is not the effect of consent, children being incapable of giving
their consent, but is the effect of the necessity of nature, and in a pe-
culiar sense, an authority or power of the author of nature’s appoint-
ment: Yet let it be remembered, that our Author, and all writers on the
laws of nature and nations allow, that the obligations of children do
not contradict the powerful law of self-preservation and self-defence,
in cases in which life, or any thing dearer than life, is concerned. But
if this be true, how can one imagine, that when the ruin of the public
happiness, which is as it were the life of the community, is attempted,
the same law of self-defence is of no force, and ought not to be re-
garded? Suppose the right of dominion over men secured by an over-
balance in property, and withal of divine appointment, in any con-
4. Harrington, “The Art of Lawgiving,” bk. III, chap. 1, in Harrington, Political
Works, 665–66. The edition Turnbull appears to be using is that edited by John To-
land (TheOceana andOtherWorks of JamesHarrington,Esq.). The reference top. 248,
therefore, is to bk. I, chap. 1 of “The Prerogative of Popular Government” and would
correspond to pp. 409–10 in Pocock’s edition of Harrington’s political works.
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ceivable sense of these words, yet, if it be as sacred as the right of a
father, it cannot extend beyond the right of a father, which does not
extend to the destruction of the right of self-defence, or to command
immoral actions without contradiction or resistance: Or if it be more
sacred than the right of a father (could that greater sacredness be con-
ceived) it cannot be more sacred than the law of nature, and the right
of God to exact obedience to that law, and to forbid the transgression
of it in obedience to whatever other authority, and so extend to the
demolishing of all the natural rights and duties of mankind: Power,
whatever be its title, or whatever be its foundation and security, if it be
exerced contrary to the laws of nature, contrary to the law of justice
and love, it is not right; it is power indeed, but guilty criminal power,
which it is, it must be a crime not to resist to the utmost of one’s power,
if the law of nature, i.e. the law of God be immutable, universally and
indispensably obligatory upon all men.
With respect to the power of masters over servants, or slaves con-
quered by just war, it is likewise true that such a master is a lawful su-
perior, and hath no equal in his family, yet hath his family, his servants,
his slaves a right to defend themselves against him, should he endeavour
to ruin or murder them; and such a master has no right to command
any thing in the smallest degree contrary to the law of nature; but every
one in his family hath a right, or more properly speaking, is obliged to
reject and resist such orders to the utmost of his power. None can have
a right to injure any one in making acquisitions of <84> property or
dominion, and none can have a right to exercise his acquired power,
property or dominion, in an injurious way to others, tho’ part of their
property or dominion; because tho’ dominion and property be not con-
trary but agreeable to the law of nature, yet the more considerable part
of the law of nature consists in limitations upon the exercise of do-
minion and property, or in prescribing duties to those who have do-
minion and property, with regard to the use and exercise of it. And (as
our Author hath often observed) where there is duty incumbent upon
any one, there is, ipso facto, a right vested in some other, who is the
object of that duty, to claim the fulfilment of it towards him. But we
shall have occasion to return to this subject afterwards. And it is suf-
ficient at present to have observed, 1. The natural cause or source of
dominion. And, 2. That there are boundaries set by the law of nature
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to the acquisition and exercise of dominion, which boundaries are,
with respect to subjects of dominion, rights belonging to, and vested
unalienably in them, by the same law which sets these limitations to
power and dominion, and by setting them to it, imposes certain in-
dispensable duties upon the possessors of power and dominion. This
must be, if the law of nature is not an empty sound, the supreme law,
with regard to those who have dominion, whether as fathers, masters
or kings (according to this definition of a King by Grotius, de jure belli
& pacis, l. 1. c. 3. “Paterfamilias latifundia possidens, & neminem alia
lege in suas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni suae, qui recipiantur, se
subjiciant.” “A master of a family, who having large possessions, will
not suffer any one to dwell in them on other terms than being subject
to him.”) viz. the greater good of their children, servants, family, or
subjects. This being fixed as the fundamental law, particular duties are
easily deducible from it. And this must be the supreme law, or man is
subject to no law, but may exerce his power as he pleases, i.e. in other
words, either the greater good of the whole society is the law,or strength
is free from all law, and may do what it can, and there is no such thing
as unlawful exercise of power. <85>
405
u ch a p t e r v i u
Of the origine of civil society, its
constitution and qualities, or properties.
s e c t i on xc i x
Tho’, in the societies we have described, men might have lived very com-
fortably; yet some reason hath prevailed upon men to form themselves
into those larger societies, which we call states or republics, and to prefer,
almost by universal consent, the civil to the natural state; there is almost
no nation so barbarous, in which we do not find some semblance of a
civil state or republic.* <86>
* They attest the truth of this who have visited the anciently unknown countries,
northern and southern, having found in most of them either great multitudes subject
to one king, or determining matters of common concernment to them by common
consent. For what some authors have said of the Cafri, and the people inhabiting
mount Caucasus, and of certain American Islanders, (see Hert. Elem. prud. civil. 1.
1. p. 45. Becmann. geograph. 9. 8.) [[Hertius, Elementa prudentiae civilis; Johann
Christoph Becmann (1641–1717), German historian and Protestant theologian, au-
thor of the Historia orbis terrarum, geographica et civilis ]] these accounts seem to be
given by persons who had not enquired very narrowly into the matter, and who
thought they saw no vestige of civil government, where they saw no palaces and
guards, nor nothing of the splendor and magnificence of a court. Petrus Kolbius,
who lived long in that corner of Africa, says of the Cafri, that they were divided into
seventeen provinces or nations, each of which had its own prince, whom they called
Kouqui, and that every village had its prefect, called in their language Kralle, who had
even the power of punishing criminals. As for public affairs, he adds, that all the
prefects met together, and consulted in a common-council, in which the prince of
the nation presided. I am afraid what Salust says of the Aborigines and Gaetuli, Catil.
cap. 6. & Jugurth. c. 18; and Strabo of the Numidians, geograph. l. 17. p. 1191. and
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s e c t i on c
Tho’ many, in their enquiries concerning the origine of civil society,have
thought that men were compelled to it by the want of several necessaries
(Plato de repub. l. 2.); yet this is the less probable; first, Because we have
an account of something like civil society in Genesis iv. 17. when the
world was not so populous as that there could be any want of necessaries.
And next, because nothing hinders commerce from taking place where
there is no civil government (§10); and, in fine, because there has been
a much greater indigence of all things, since, civil government being
established, luxury and wantonness began to spread and reign among
mankind.* <87>
Valerius Flaccus, Argonaut. l. 4. v. 102. [[Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica ]] of the Be-
bricii, Pliny of the Troglodites, hist. nat. 5. 8. and in fine, Homer of the Sicilians,
that all these accounts are equally groundless. The natural state of the Sicilians is
elegantly described by Homer Odyss. l. 10. v. 112.
Nec fora conciliis fervent, nec judice: tantum
Antra colunt umbrosa: altisque in montibus aedes
Quisque suos regit uxorem natosque, nec ulli
In commune vacat socias extendere curas.
[[Homer, Odyssey 9.112, ed. Stanford: “[Of the Cyclopes] They keep no
meeting places for councils, nor for a court; they rather dwell in shady caves,
their homes in the high mountains, and each man rules his own wife and
children, and never calls partners in common to share his concerns.”]]
* Thus we find Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who lived sometime in a natural state,
(§92), tho’ they only applied themselves to husbandry, and feeding of cattle, to have
lived very agreeably, and to have amassed great wealth, and to have wanted nothing,
Gen. xxiv. 35. xxxiii. 11. And indeed, seeing families living separately and indepen-
dently in very early times of the world, understood agriculture, and planting and
dressing of vines, and were no strangers to gold and silver, and the more useful arts
(Gen. xiii. 2. xxiv. 35.) what could men desire more, tho’ they lived in a state of nature,
if luxury were unknown, and made none of its exorbitant demands to which nature
is a stranger?
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Again, it can hardly be imagined that elegance and politeness were the
motives which induced men, in the primitive times of frugality, toprefer
a civil to a natural state. For besides that, what is called elegance, is really
vanity, and what is called politeness of manners, is truly but an affected
complaisance and flattery (§11);* there is nothing to hinder men, in a
state of nature, from improving their reason, and refining or polishing
their manners. Nay, the examples of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who
lived by themselves with their segregate families, and had not entred into
civil society, sufficiently shew us, that men, living in a state of nature,
may be quite free from all barbarity, and very decent and polite.
s e c t i on c i i
Equally groundless are other reasons for which men are imagined to have
coalited into republics or civil states. For as to what some say of justice,
<88> that civil society was formed for the sake of it, (as Hesiod. Theog.
v. 87),1 and others of interest, as if it had been done on that account,
(as Aristotle, Ethic. 8. 11.)2 and what others say, of the instigation of
nature, (as the same Aristotle, l. 1. & 2.)––All these reasons, we think,
* A proof of this is the mannerly polite speech of Abraham to Melchisedech,Gen.
xiv. 22. and his uncommon hospitality to strangers, Gen. xviii. 2. and his conference
with the sons of Heth, Gen. xxiii. 7. That Abraham had taught his servants to be
most observant of decency and good manners, appears from that message carried by
Eleaser to Nachor, Gen. xxiv. 22. Nor does that interview between Jacob, in his return
from Mesopotamia with Esau, savour in the least of barbarity, in which they strove
to outdo one another in civil words, presents, and other tokens of love and friendship.
Besides, if it be true, which Joseph. antiq. Jud. 1. 9. says of Abraham, that he was
skilled not only in numbers, but in astronomy; and what is said by others of skill in
the interpretation of dreams being brought to great perfection in his family (Suidas
Abraham. [[Suidas, Suidae lexicon, vol. 1, “Abraam”]] & Justin. hist. 36), none can
doubt but that the arts and sciences may be cultivated to a great degree of perfection
in a state of nature, and therefore that there is no need of a civil state in order to gain
that end.
1. Hesiod, Theogony and Works and Days, line 87.
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 8, chap. 11, in The Works of Aristotle, vol. 9.
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are of such a nature, that they might have contributed somewhattowards
it, but could not have been the sole motives which determined men to
commute a state of liberty and equality for a state of civil government
and subjection.* <89>
s e c t i on c i i i
Wherefore, when the matter is fully and accurately considered, they ap-
pear to have hit upon the true cause, who maintain that the strength and
violence of wicked men gave rise to the formation of civil states. For all
men being equal and free in a state of nature (§5 and 6); but such being
the temper and disposition of profligate men, that they have an insatia-
ble lust of power and wealth; of robbing others of their possessions and
rights, and bringing them under their yoke, it could not but happen that
several heads of families, of this temper and genius, would unite their
strength in order to subject others to them. And since a large society
cannot but be unequal and rectoreal (§17), the consequence is, that such
a band of robbers would choose a leader to themselves, and prescribe a
certain form of government to him, according to which he was to rule
* For why might not the heads of segregate families have made laws, and distrib-
uted justice each in his own family, (§92)? Again, why might not the more simple
societies have produced all the advantages of union, since in these every one was at
liberty to acquire what he pleased, and there would be none of those tributes, taxes,
imposts, upon persons or estates there, which now eat up the property and estates of
subjects in civil governments? Let nature be as abhorrent of solitude, and let a state
of solitude be as miserable as Pufendorff hath painted it out to be, yet we can never
say, that Abraham, for example, lived in a solitary state, who besides a wife and a
hand-maid, and many children by both, had such a numerous retinue of servants,
that he could bring into the field three hundred and eighty servants born in his family,
Gen. xiv. 13. However strong the natural propension of mankind to society may be,
yet surely they were not immediately led by natural inclination to form those larger
societies, in which there are many things very contrary to the natural dispositions of
mankind, as Pufendorff hath shewn at great length in his 7th book, cap. 1. §4. of the
law of nature, &c. It is however very certain, that in a civil state, if it be rightly
constituted, justice is well administred, and all the public and private interests of
mankind are wisely consulted and provided for; but those things are more properly
called consequences of good civil government, than motive causes to the formation
of it.
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and command them; and hence the origine of civil society or political
states,* which are nothing else but a multitude of people united under
a common head, upon certain conditions for their mutual security, and
dependent on, or subjected to no other mortal. <90>
s e c t i on c i v
The justest heads of families could not find any other remedy against
such consociations, but to repel force by force (§9). And a few not being
sufficient to accomplish that end, necessity, and the malice of wicked
men, forced other men to coalesce into large bodies; the consequence
from which is, that just and good heads of families were obliged, through
fear of violent and wicked men, to unite their forces, and joining to-
gether under a common head on certain conditions, to form a civil so-
ciety or political state† (§103); whence we infer, that there would have
been no republics in a state of integrity. See Becman. meditat. pol. 11.
* This is the most natural account of the rise of civil government, if we attend to
reason and the nature of things. But ancient history sets it beyond all doubt that it
was so. For that is found in the sacred writings. And these records assure us, that
before the deluge, not the sons of God, as they are called, Gen. vi. 1. but the posterity
of Cain, built the first city, Gen. iii. 17. For tho’ we should grant to the learned Jo.
Clerc. comment. p. 40. [[ Jean le Clerc, Genesis sive Mosis prophetae liber primus ]] that
this city consisted but of a few little cottages, set about with a mound or green hedge
(which is by no means certain or indisputable) yet a society of many families, without
some form of civil government, can hardly be conceived. Moreover we are told, that
after the deluge Nimrod the son of Chus, being mighty in possessions or territories,
founded the kingdom of Babylon, i.e. began to oppress others, and force them to
submit themselves to his command, Gen. x. 8. Nor is any more ancient kingdom
mentioned by Moses, tho’ the names and transactions of several kingdoms and dy-
nasties occur in the history of the time of Abraham, a few ages after. And who indeed
can doubt that civil states were originally formed in this manner, i.e. by violent op-
pression, since this has so often happened in latter times? Hertius prud. civil. 1. 3. 4.
p. 77. & seq. has shewn by instances brought from universal history, that the most
potent kingdoms took their rise from oppression and robbery.
† They are not therefore in the wrong who assert that fear and force were the
origine of civil society, as Bodin, de rep. 1. 6. 2. 6. [[ Jean Bodin (1529/30–1596),
French jurist and “absolutist”; see Bodin, Les six livres de la Re´publique, bk. I, chap.
6, p. 69: “La raison et lumie`re naturelle nous conduit a` cela, de croire que la force et
violence a donne´ source et origine aux Re´publiques.”]] Hobbes de cive. 1. [[Hobbes,
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5;3 and that it is trifling to obtrude upon us a state of innocence as the
first principle of the law of nature and nations (l. 1. §74). <91>
s e c t i on cv
Civil society is therefore of a two-fold origine; some were formed to
oppress the innocent, and for violence; others were formed to repel force
by force, and for common self-defence. The end of the former is most
unjust; that of the latter just. Wherefore the former is rather a gang of
robbers than a society; the latter is a lawful republic. But because things
which have an unlawful beginning may be afterwards amended when
the error is found out; and, on the contrary, things which had a very
laudable commencement are often perverted; a band of thieves and rob-
bers, having laid aside their oppression and violence, may become an
excellent commonwealth; and a lawful republic, forsaking their human-
ity, may degenerate into a tribe of ruffians; yet in both the same end,
viz. the security of the members is the end of consociation.*
On the Citizen 1.2, p. 24.]] nor they who say, that men formed civil societies for the
sake of enjoying their properties with security, Cic. de off. 2. 21. nor those who main-
tain, that the imbecillity of segregate families, was the reason why men changed their
natural liberty for civil government, as Grotius de jure belli & pacis, proleg. §19. &
l. 1. c. 4. §7. For tho’ all these opinions seem to differ in words, yet they come to the
same thing in effect.
* Thus, tho’ certain piratical republics in Afric were formed rather to plunder and
oppress, than merely for common safety, and therefore in this respect they differed
very little from bands of robbers; yet they had likewise common security for their
end, as well as lawful republics have; and for that reason, they put themselves in a
state of defence against all external force; and were rigid in the distribution of justice,
Ne vaga prosiliat fraenis natura remotis.
[[Horace, Satires II, 74: “Lest nature should spring forward when the reins
are removed and go wandering.”]]
This then is the common end of all civil societies; but with this difference, that the
former are not very sollicitous about virtue and equity, if that end be but obtained;
whereas the latter proposes that end, in order that they, as the apostle expresses it,
“may lead under kings, and all in authority, quiet and peaceable lives, with all god-
liness and honesty,” 1 Tim. 2. 2.
3. Becmann, Meditationes politicae.
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Since the common security of the members is the end of all civil societies
(§105); but it is from <92> the end of a society that we must judge of
the means, and of the rights and duties of its members (§14); the con-
sequence is, that they who unite into society, ought to do all, without
which the common end, viz. security, cannot be obtained. Now, since
the violence which is obstructive of public security, consists in theunited
force of wicked men (§103), it is necessary that others, who would secure
themselves against such violence, should unite their strength; and there-
fore it is proper, that as many men should form themselves into a more
large and compounded society, as may, with probability, be sufficient to
repel, by just force, the unjust violence of injurious neighbours.*
s e c t i on cv i i
A state or republic does not consist, as Nicias says in Thucydides, 7. 14.4
and Themistocles in Justin. hist. 2. 12. in a territory, in towns, in walls,
in houses, but in men; nor is it requisite to <93> constitute a civil state,
that whole families, composed of persons of both sexes, be united; but
it is sufficient, if many conjoin their forces and minds, so as to be able
* Hence it is an idle question, what number of persons constitutes a society? For
tho’ Apuleius thought fifteen freemen might constitute a republic, Apol. p. 304 [[Ap-
uleius, “Apology,” chap. 47, p. 71, in Apuleius: Rhetorical Works ]], and others have
said three tolerably numerous families might make one, Val. Max. 4. 4. 8. 4. 6. 5. yet
the authors of these opinions seem not to have had common security as the end of
society in their view, since that end cannot be accomplished by fifteen persons joined
together; but the number ought to be increased, in proportion to that of the enemy
feared. Accordingly, all history shews us, that states were very small in their begin-
nings, or confined within the narrow limits of a small territory. Nor were there any
larger ones in their neighbourhood, to make them afraid. But so soon as large empires
were formed by oppressing and swallowing up their neighbours, lesser republics
united either into one larger republic, or making a confederacy, became a system of
republics, that they might be able to resist their mighty and powerful neighbours, as
it happened in Greece after the Persian overthrow, and in Germany after the victories
of Drusus and Germanicus.
4. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, vol. 4, bk. 7, chap. 77, p. 159.
Nicias was an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War with Sparta.
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to conquer or outwit their enemies; though it cannot be denied, that a
civil state would be but of one age, if not composed of such families,
but of single persons, however great its numbers might be, Florus 1. 1.*
s e c t i on cv i i i
Since a republic consists in the union of such a number, whose united
force is not unequal to that of their neighbours (§105); but there can be
no <94> society without consent (§13); the consequence is, that civil
states or republics are constituted by an intervening contract, whether
some men voluntarily coalite into society, or whether their consent was
at first extorted by violence, or whether some men acceded in either of
these ways to a republic already formed; or whether, in fine, the descen-
dants of such citizens are presumed, from their having been bred up in
a society, as some time to succeed to their progenitors (§16) in it, to have
consented to continue members of it.†
* That a republic may consist without a territory, without towns, walls, or houses,
is plain from the example of the Hebrews, a most sacred republic, which wandered
forty years in the deserts of Arabia, without any fixed habitation or abode, without
houses or walls, till they were settled in the promised Palestine, Numb. xiv. And that
a republic may consist without families, none will deny, who has considered thePapal
monarchy, which hath been accurately described by Pufendorff and Thomasius.
[[See Pufendorf, Des Freyherrn von Pufendorff politische Betrachtung der geistlichen
Monarchie des Stuhls zu Rom. ]] I shall not now appeal to the kingdomof theAmazons;
all that is said of it having been called into doubt by many learned men. Whence it
may be concluded, that it is a convenient number of men united by consent, that
constitutes a republic; and that such a society does not become extinct, tho’ their
territory may be occupied by others, while its members survive that loss, and are in
a condition to contend with their enemies. Thus the republic of Athens still subsisted,
tho’ Attica was entirely possessed by the Persians, while the fleet subsisted, into which
Themistocles, with the whole body of the people, and every thing they could carry
with them, had betaken himself, Nepos Themistoc. cap. 2. And therefore, Adiman-
tus’s speech to him was very foolish, and his answer was excellent. The former said
he had no right to pretend to give law or dispence justice, having no country. The
other answered, that he had both a territory and a city much larger than theirs, while
he had two hundred well armed and manned ships, an invasion from which none of
the Greeks could resist, Herodot. hist. l. 8. p. 305. edit. Hen. Steph. [[Herodotus,
Herodoti Halicarnassei historiae libri IX et de vita Homeri libellus. ]]
† Thus the inhabitants of Albania, and that medley of shepherds and thieves
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Hence it is plain, that civil states, like other societies, are constituted or
augmented either by voluntary consent, or by forced consent (§15). In
the former case, the first and principal pact must be that by which all
consent to constitute the same state or republic. And since every pact
ought to be free, and may be made upon conditions, it is self-evident
that he who does not consent, or whose terms are not agreed to, remains
without that society, and is his own master.* <95>
s e c t i on cx
But since members of the same society must consent to the same end
and means (§13), which consent cannot be expected in a great multitude,
unless the society be rectoreal; therefore some governing power must be
instituted, by the will of which the whole people is to be ruled (§18); and
the consequence is, that this multitude ought to determine what the
who attaching themselves to Romulus, built huts on the banks of the Tiber, from
the beginning consented to form that republic. Dion. Halicar. antiq. l. 1. p. 72. [[Di-
onysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. I, chaps. 9 and 10.]] Thus the Sa-
bines acceded voluntarily to the Romans, after they had formed themselves into a
commonwealth, Liv. 1. 13. On the other hand, the Albans, their capital being de-
stroyed, augmented the Roman state against their will, l. 1. 29. Nor was it ever doubted
of, that the posterity of Roman citizens were Roman citizens, unless they either vol-
untarily abandoned their country, or being exiled, were forced much against their
inclination to leave it.
* This would hold, if any new republic were to be constituted at present by con-
sent. But it happens rarely that any one stipulates for himself and his family in this
manner in a republic already constituted. Yet we have an example in Ottanes of Per-
sia, mentioned by Herodotus, hist. l. 3. p. 124. who, after the Magi, who had usurped
the government were destroyed, when the Persian princes were assembled to consult
together about a form of government, his opinion for a popular state not being ap-
proved, at last said: “Ye factious men, since some of us must be named king by lot,
or by the election of the multitude, with the permission of the Persians, or some
other way, I shall not oppose you, because I neither desire to be above you, nor will
I be below any one of you. Upon this condition therefore do I give up my right of
empire, that neither I, nor any of mine, ever be subject to any of you.” [[Herodotus,
Histories 3.83 (see Herodotus, Histories, trans. Godley, vol. 2, p. 111).]]
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model of government ought to be;* and tho’ they be not obliged to stand
to the resolutions of the rest, who consented to the future republic, only
upon condition that a certain form of government in it should be agreed
to, if another form please the people (§109); yet those who entred into
the first pact without any conditions, ought to submit to the plurality
of suffrages. <96>
s e c t i on cx i
A form of government being agreed upon, nothing remains to constitute
a perfect civil society, but to nominate the person or persons a people
would have to rule over them,† and to prescribe the form of government
* They are much mistaken who affirm there never was any such pact. The Roman
history alone sufficiently overthrows that assertion. For when that rabble of Alba,
and herd of shepherds and robbers, who had enriched themselves by many depre-
dations, had agreed to coalesce into one republic, Romulus having called anassembly,
or convention, asked the people what form of government they would prefer. Dio-
nysius Halicar. has fully described the whole affair, Antiq. Rom. l. 2. p. 80. where he
tells us the answer of the people, which was to this purpose. “We do not stand in
need of a new form of government nor will we change that approved by our ancestors,
and handed down from them to us; but we will follow their sentiment who founded
our present form of government, not without great prudence, and are content with
the condition we are now in. For why should we find fault with it, since we have
enjoyed under kings the goods of the highest estimation among mankind, liberty and
empire over others. This is our opinion concerning our form of government.” [[Di-
onysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. II, chap. 4, p. 325.]]
† We find this order observed in the institution of the Roman republic, according
to Dionysius Halicarn. For when the greater part of the Albans who had been inured
to kingly government, had resolved to preserve that form of government, being then
sollicitous to choose a king, they added: “And this honour we think is due to none
so much as to you, as well on account of your virtue as your birth; but chiefly, because
you have been the leader of this colony; and we have experienced in your conduct,
in all your words and deeds, great prudence and valour.” In like manner, a little after,
when the people was divided into curiae and tribes, and a hundred fatherswere chosen
to compose the council or senate of the republic, the administration of the republic
was so divided, that the care of sacred things, the conservation of the laws and cus-
toms, the power of judging in crimes of the higher kinds, the right of proposing to
the senate, and of assembling the people, was given to the king; to the senate the
right of deciding whatever was propounded to them by the king, and passing the
opinion of the majority into an act or decree; and to the people under the senate
Another pact.
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agreed upon in the former pact, to him or them; which prescription will
then become, properly speaking, the fundamental law of the republic,
(since things settled by pacts are called laws ); and therefore it binds the
governors, whether one or many, no less than the subjects; so that noth-
ing is right that is done contrary to this primary law, or essential con-
stitution of the society. <97>
s e c t i on cx i i
Thus does society arise as often as a people voluntarily forms it. But so
often as a people, brought under dominion by a more powerful one,
coalesces into the same republic with their conquerors, the first pact is
undoubtedly a consent to form one common republic with them; be-
cause, if they did not consent, they would not accept the terms offered
by their conquerors, but rather perish than put themselves under such
a yoke. But such a people will hardly be consulted or hearkened to with
regard to the form of government, nor in the choice of rulers, but to
them will be left little more than the glory of obeying.* <98>
proposing, the right of creating magistrates, and giving the ultimate authority to laws,
and of determining upon war or peace, if the king would permit. This is the fun-
damental law or constitution of this new government, as it is described most accu-
rately by an author excellently versed in politics, and it lasted till the tyranny of Tar-
quinius. [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. II, chap. 4, p. 325, and
chap. 7, p. 333ff.]]
* Yet this whole matter depends upon the terms and conditions of the surrendry,
which are commonly better or worse, according as the victory is more or less ambig-
uous. Thus, while the Sabines and the Romans disputed upon a very equal footing
with regard to the event of war, they thought fit to put an end to it, by striking a
league, the articles of which are recorded by Dionysius. “That Romulus and Tatius
should reign at Rome with equal honour and power; that the city should preserve its
name derived from the founder, and the citizens should be called Roman Citizens as
before, but all should be called by the common appellation of Quirites, from the
country of Tatius; that the right of Roman citizenship should be given to as many
of the Sabines as should desire it, and that they should be admitted into tribes and
curiae, with their sacred usages.” Such was this treaty of union, by which the Sabines
were in some respect permitted to constitute the republic. [[Dionysius of Halicar-
nassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. II, chap. 46, p. 445.]]
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s e c t i on cx i i i
It sometimes happens, that a new form of government is obtruded upon
a conquered people;* and the victorious people stipulates to themselves,
that this new republic shall pay homage to them, as joined to their re-
public by an unequal covenant. In which case, the nature of the thing
shews us, that the pacts we have described above (§109, 111), and the
decree about a form of government, (§110), cannot take place; but the
conquered people consents to all, not voluntarily, but by force.
s e c t i on cx i v
But as all societies are understood to have one understanding and one
will (§19); so the same must be said of a state or republic thus constituted.
Now, as many associates cannot agree upon the same end and means
(§17), unless that business be committed to some one, or some certain
number; so in a state the same must be done.† But to do this, is the same
* It was the custom of the Athenians to obtrude upon those they conquered a
popular state, and of the Lacedemonians to force an aristocracy upon all whom they
conquered. The reasons of which are given by Xenophon, de republ. Athen. cap. 1.
§14. and cap. 3. §10. tom. 3. But one is sufficient, p. 249. [[Xenophon, “Constitution
of the Athenians,” in Xenophon, Scripta minora, 474–507. This piece is now believed
to be by an unknown author.]] The Athenians established, and often renewed, after
it had been overturned, a popular state among the Samians. But when they were
subdued by Lysander the Lacedemonian, he set up a decarchy among them in the
room of a democracy. What fortunes other states in Greece underwent, according as
the Athenians or Lacedemonians had the empire of the sea, is well known. And that
these things could not happen without force is perspicuous to every one.
† Many cannot otherwise have the same will than by consent in the same will; or
by submission of all to the same will. The first cannot be hoped for, as every one will
immediately see, who hath considered the different tempers, turns, geniuses and dis-
positions of mankind. Hence Seneca, ep. 102. “Putas tu, posse sententiam unam esse
omnium? non est unius una. Do you think all can have the same mind? no single
person is of one mind.” Therefore the latter way remains, which is submission to the
will of one or many. For as a ship, however well manned, would perish, did not all
agree to commit their safety to one pilot, skilled in navigation, who is to exert his
utmost to save the ship from storms and rocky seas: so it is impossible that so many
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as to submit one’s will to that of another; <99> whence it is plain, that
all the members of a republic ought to submit their wills to one or more;
and therefore that he or they govern to whom the rest have submitted
their will.
s e c t i on cxv
Hence it follows, that there can be no more but three regular forms of
republics or civil states. For subjects must either submit their wills to
one, many, or to the whole multitude. Now, when they submit their wills
to the will of one physical person, hence arises monarchy, a kingdom or
principality. * But if to the will or decrees of many, thence arises aristoc-
racy. And if to the whole people, that is, to what is decreed by the com-
mon suffrage of the whole people, then the form of government is pop-
ular, and called a democracy. <100>
s e c t i on cxv i
But since whether one, many, or all govern, none presides over the re-
public by any other right but this, that the rest of the citizens have sub-
mitted their wills to such a governor or governors (§114); theconsequence
is, that those command unjustly; i.e. without right, to whom the mem-
bers of a state have not submitted their will. Wherefore, if one such
myriads of men who have coalesced into one large society, should escape the civil
tempests to which they are continually exposed, and obtain safety and security, unless
they be governed by one or more common rulers. Arrian, diss. ep. 1. observes, “That
good citizens submit their wills to the law and authority of the state.” [[Arrian, “Dis-
courses of Epictetus,” bk. 1, chap. 12, sect. 7; see The Discourses as Reported by Arrian,
the Manual, and Fragments, vol. 1.]]
* Polybius Hist. 6. 2. distinguishes between monarxi´an and basilei´an, a monarchy
and a kingdom. He thus differences them: “The first, monarchy, is constituted with-
out any art, and by the force of nature: Kingdom follows it, and takes its origine from
it, then, when art comes to make emendations.” [[Polybius, The Histories, vol. 3, bk.
6, chap. 2, sec. 4, p. 275.]] But since things, less or more polished, do not differ in
species, we shall not here take notice of this difference.
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person command, monarchy becomes tyranny; if, instead of the senate
of the nobles, a few usurp the supreme command, aristocracy degen-
erates into oligarchy; and if, instead of the whole people, a certain rabble,
consisting of the very dregs of the people, manage all things at their
pleasure, democracy degenerates into ochlocracy. * These vitious forms
of government being very like to the regular ones, the latter easily de-
generate into the former, as Polybius justly observes, and experience has
abundantly confirmed. Polyb. hist. 6. 1. <101>
s e c t i on cxv i i
Now, since these regular forms of government may be perverted into as
many opposite vitious forms (§116), it is not to be wondered at, that there
are very few states to be found which have chosen any one of these three,
but that many have compounded all these forms into one,† or have so
* This is observed by the most excellent politician Polybius, ibidem p. 629.
“Therefore, there are six kinds of republics: The three we have just mentioned, which
are in every body’s mouth, and three nearly allied to them, the domination of one,
of a few, and of the mob; some by tyranny understand monarchy, because, as we
said above, this author had distinguished between monarchy and a kingdom. But he
himself adds a little after, ‘a kingdom, when it declines into the disease to which it
is obnoxious, viz. a tyranny.’ ” [[Polybius, The Histories, vol. 3, bk. 6, chap. 2, sec. 4,
p. 275.]] In these divisions and definitions, all the writers of morals or politics agree;
and therefore, there is no need of dwelling long upon them. By whom have they not
been repeated?
† Polybius pronounces this the best form of government, hist. 1. 1. p. 628. “’Tis
manifest, that a republic compounded of the three forms we have mentioned, is the
best.” [[Polybius, The Histories, vol. 3, bk. 6, chap. 2, sec. 4, p. 273.]] And cap. 8.
p. 638. he highly extols Lycurgus for not having founded a simple uniform republic,
but for having, by mingling the good qualities of all the best republics, composed
one, consisting of all of them blended together, and by that means so equally poised
and balanced it, that it could not degenerate into any of the vicious forms we have
mentioned, but was kept entire by various checks. [[Ibid., chap. 10, pp. 289–93.]] So
Dionysius antiq. l. 2. p. 82. after having told us, that the Roman republic was con-
stituted by Romulus much after the same manner, he adds, “This form of a republic
I prefer to all others, as being equally fit for peace or war.” [[Dionysius of Halicar-
nassus, Roman Antiquities, bk. 2, chap. 7, p. 333.]] I pass by several testimonies to the
same purpose by Cicero apud Non. Marcell. de verb. prop. 4. 292. [[Marcellus,Nonii
Marcelli nova editio, chap. 4, 342: “De varia significatione sermonum, per literas”;
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mingled two of them together, as that the one form might be a balance
or check on the other. And since names are generally derived from the
better or more eminent part; hence various kinds of kingdoms, aristoc-
racies and democracies could not but arise, which it very little concerns
us, whether they be called mixt or irregular republics. See Hert. element.
prud. civ. 1. 2. 8. p. 2320 & seq.
s e c t i on cxv i i i
Again, since whole societies may coalesce into a larger body (§17); hence
it follows, that many republics may, each preserving its form of govern-
<102>ment and its independency intire, make a confederacy for acting
with common consent for their common preservation and safety.* Such
confederated republics were the Achaian ones; and such are called systems
of republics.
a quotation from Cicero, De republica, arguing that the ideal state has a mixed con-
stitution with monarchical, aristocratic, and popular elements]], by Zeno apud Laert.
7. 131. [[Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, bk. 7, sec. 131, pp. 235–37]]
and by Tacitus annal. 4. 33.
* Pufendorff, singulari dissertat. de systematibus civitatum, to be found in the
collection of his dissert. Acad. selectae, p. 210. & seq. [[Pufendorf, Dissertationes aca-
demicae selectiores ]] and de jure naturae & gentium, 7. 5. 16. thinks systems of societies
are formed when several separate kingdoms, either by convention, or by marriage, or
by succession, or by conquest, come to have one king, but in such a manner that they
do not become one kingdom, but are governed each by its own fundamental laws;
or by a treaty of alliance. And Hertius elem. prud. civil. is of the same opinion, 1. 12.
6. & seq. But either one kingdom is so subjected to another, that it hath no share in
the common government, as anciently the kingdoms of Macedonia, Syria and Egypt
were subjected to the Romans; or each retains its own constitution, as now the Ger-
man empire, Hungary and Bohemia; or they coalesce in such a manner as to compose
one kingdom, as now England and Scotland, Poland and Lithuania. In the first case,
the conquered kingdom is reduced into a province, and does not constitute one sys-
tem with the other. Nor in the second case can two kingdoms be said to have coalited
into a system, since they have nothing in common, but one prince who sustains two
characters. There remains therefore the third case only, in which two kingdoms, or
two bodies of people uniting their will and strength for common defence, constitute
one larger society, and therefore are a system of republics, according to our definition.
See G. G. Titius ad Pufendorff de offic. hom. & civ.
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s e c t i on cx i x
Since monarchy is formed as often as all the subjects submit their will to
one person (§115); the consequence is, that it is the same what title of
honour he assume to himself, monarch, emperor, king, duke, or prince;
and that having no superior, he may change his title, and take any other
at <103> his pleasure,* tho’ he cannot so easily force other kings or re-
publics to acknowledge any new title he may take; and therefore it is
more prudent for a prince, before he assumes to himself any new title
or dignity, to know the sentiments of other kings and states about it,
and expresly to stipulate to himself such new titles of honour.
s e c t i on cxx
Hence it is evident that a monarch governs all by his will; and tho’ he
may take counsel from persons of prudence and experience, yet their
opinions are not suffrages but counsels; and that he acts at all times, and
* For since supreme powers live in a state of nature with regard to one another,
which state is a state of liberty and equality (§4. 5. 6.) it follows, that monarch is equal
to monarch, and nothing hinders any one from enjoying as much dignity in his own
state as any other in his; and therefore any one may take any title to himself, to support
which he finds himself equal. We have seen in our times two examples of it, to which
even future ages will pay reverence, in Frederick I. King of Prussia, and Peter I. Em-
peror of Russia; the former of whom first took the title to himself of King, and the
other of Emperor, and both of whom had these titles acknowledged to them after-
wards by other Kings and Emperors. It is true Pope Clement XI. shewed his intol-
erable arrogance, when Frederick I. a prince worthy of immortal glory, took the title
of King to himself, vainly pretending, that it depended on him alone to make Kings.
But this doctrine, more becoming a Hildebrand [[Hildebrand was the original name
of Pope Gregory VII (ca. 1020–85), the opponent of the emperor Henry IV in the
investiture contest]] than Clement, and detested even by princes the most devoted
to the Romish church, hath been sufficiently refuted by the worthy and learned chan-
cellor of our university Jo. Petr. a Ludewig, who had formerly fully treated that con-
troversy in several small treatises, de auspicio regio. Add to these a very elegant treatise
by V. C. Everardus Otto, de titulo Imperatoris Russorum, inserted among his dis-
sertat. juris publici & privati, part. 1. p. 135. [[Ludewig (praeses ) and Lilienfeld (res-
pondens ), Dissertatio iuris gentium, de auspicio regum; Otto (1685–1756), De titulo im-
peratoris Russorum. ]]
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every where; so that it was justly said in the times of Hadrian the Roman
em-<104>peror, “Roma est, ubi imperator est,” where the Emperor is,
there is Rome, Herod. hist. 1. 6. There is therefore no right of majesty
which a prince may not exerce (§111); yea, a kingdom hardly deserves to
be called a monarchy in which any other exerces any of the rights of
majesty independently of the king.*
s e c t i on cxx i
But tho’ a monarch governs all by his will, (§120), yet he ought not to
act otherwise than the end of the state, the security of its members re-
quires (§105); whence it follows, that the security and happiness of the
people ought to be the supreme law in a monarchy; and in this does it
differ from tyranny, which refers all to its own security and advantage;
and which being acquired by villainous practices, cannot be retained by
good methods, and therefore is very little concerned about the public
welfare, provided it can sustain and preserve itself.† <105>
* For the understanding and will, like that of one moral person, ought to be one
(§114). Now, if any exerces any of the rights of majesty whatsoever, independently
of the king, the whole republic would not have one understanding and will. Where-
fore, it would not be one republic, but a republic within a republic. And to this we
may apply what Homer says, Iliad. 2. “’Tis not good that many should rule: Let there
be one emperor, one king.” [[Not clear to which passage in the Iliad this refers.]]
Tho’ we are not ignorant that tyrants have often abused this maxim. See Sueton.
Calig. cap. 22.
† To this head belong all the tyrannical arts of which Aristotle hath treated most
accurately, Polit. 5. 10. Tyrants, conscious to themselves of the public hatred, are
fearful and suspicious; and therefore, being jealous of virtue, they oppress and bear
it down, and cut off the heads of the more eminent and worthy, like poppies which
overtop the rest: They bear hard upon the innocent, under the pretext of treason,
the only crime of those who have no crime: They sow discord and animosities among
their subjects: They extinguish all the light and splendor of useful literature: They
prefer foreigners to natives: The latter they bereave of all dignities and riches, and
reduce to the extremest misery: But how repugnant all this is to the end of civil
society, and how unjust, is glaring. Polyb. hist. 2. 59. p. 202. “For the very name
Tyrant, hath annexed to it all manner of wickedness and impiety, and includes in
it all the injuriousness and criminality that is to be found amongst mankind.”
[[Polybius, Histories, vol. 1, bk. 2, chap. 59, p. 387.]]
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s e c t i on cxx i i
Again, from the definition of aristocracy, we infer, that all the rights of
majesty or sovereignty belong to the whole senate or college of nobles,
and cannot be exerced but by the concurring consent of the whole sen-
ate. There must therefore be a certain place where they assemble to con-
sult about the common affairs of the state; and likewise a certain ap-
pointed time, on which the ordinary senate is held, unless some
unexpected emergencies demand the calling of a senate out of the or-
dinary course. Besides, because the consent of many can hardly be ex-
pected but by submission (§17); the consequence is, that even in aris-
tocracy the smaller number ought to submit to the greater number; and
therefore that the voice of the plurality should determine; but in an
equality of voices, nothing can be done, unless he who presides give the
deciding voice, or the case be such as that there is place for the Calculus
Minervae. * Moreover, since the vitious form of government, that is the
opposite of Aristocracy is called oligarchy (§116), and into it does aris-
tocracy easily degenerate (ibidem); the very nature of the thing demands
that no decree be valid, unless it be made when the greater part of the
senate is present, e.g. two thirds. <106>
* The Calculus Minervae is, when in an equality of condemning and absolving
voices, the pannel is acquitted. For when Orestes was tried for parricide, those who
condemned him being superior to his absolvers by one voice only, Minerva is said to
have added one to the latter, that in an equality of suffrages, he might be absolved.
And this became afterwards almost an universal law, as Euripides makes Minerva
foretel it should, in Iphigen. Taur. v. 1268. [[Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris, ll. 1471–
72, in Euripides, Euripides, vol. 2: “[A]nd this shall be a law—The equal tale of votes
acquits the accused.” ]] See Boecler. dissert. singul. de calculo Minervae, and a disser-
tation by Henr. Cocceii de eo quod justum est circa numerum suffragiorum, & de
calculo Minervae, cap. 7. where this learned author gives this natural reason for the
practice, “That the first state of the person accused is changed by condemnation, and
is continued by absolution; and therefore nothing is done: Wherefore, since the ma-
jority only can change a former state and introduce a new one, it follows, that in the
case of equality nothing is done; and consequently, the first state of the person con-
tinues to take place, and he is absolved.” [[Boecler (praeses ) and Forer (respondens ),
Isopsephia sive calculus Minervae; Cocceji (praeses ) and Meyer (respondens ),Disputatio
juridica inauguralis . . . de calculo Minerva. ]]
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It is the same in a democracy: For since in it whatever is decreed by the
common voice of the whole people is the will of the whole republic or
state (§115), it follows, that the sovereignty belongs to the people, and
that they have the right to exerce all the rights of majesty. But since that
cannot be done unless the people hold assemblies to consult about their
affairs, it is evident, that here also a certain place and stated days must
be fixed for the public assemblies; and that whatever is resolved by the
plurality of peoples suffrages in tribes, in curiae, or singly, is valid. In
fine, that a democracy may degenerate into an ochlocracy,* if the right
of voting be allowed to the minority of the people, the rest being ex-
cluded or absent, is evident from the very definition of ochlocracy(§116).
<107>
s e c t i on cxx i v
But since mixed republics, as they are called, are sometimes the best, and
were formed on purpose that one form might balance another, and keep
it within due bounds (§107), it is plain, that all, or some of the rights of
majesty, ought to be so shared in such states, either among the senators,
* Then is the condition of the republic most miserable, especially if demagogues
interpose their arts to stir up the people and promote faction, till one of them finds
an opportunity of becoming tyrant; and the same happens that Phaedrus represents
to have been the fate of Athens, Fab. 1. 2.
Athenae quum florerent aequis legibus:
Procax libertas civitatem miscuit,
Fraenumque solvit pristinum licentia.
Hinc, conspiratis factionum partibus,
Arcem tyrannus occupat, Pisistratus.
[[Phaedrus, Fables 1.2, lines 1–5: In the days when Athens flourished under
a democracy, freedom grown rank disturbed the civic calm and licence re-
laxed the reins of old-time discipline. Then diverse factions formed a com-
mon plot and soon a tyrant rose and seized the citadel, Pisistratus.”]]
Concerning the artifices of demagogues, see Hertius Elem. prud. civil. part. 2. §23.
§24. p. 496. [[ Johann Nikolaus Hertius, Elementa prudentiae civilis.]]
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or among the people, that one order cannot determine any thingwithout
consulting the other, and not to be so divided, that one may act either
without the knowledge, or against the will of the other. For, in this case,
nothing can hinder a republic from springing up within a republic.*
s e c t i on cxx v
As to systems of republics, since they are either constituted by thecoalition
of two kingdoms into one under a common head (§118), or by a con-
federacy between several independent states (ibid.) it is plain, in the for-
mer case, that unless they <108> be distinct, perfect kingdoms, besides
a common king, they ought to have a common senate, to which all the
orders of both kingdoms are called proportionably to their strength.But,
in the latter case, each state exercises by itself, at its own pleasure, all the
immanent rights of sovereignty; and the transeunt rights, relative totheir
common security, ought to be exercised in a common council, composed
of delegates from each, which is either perpetual or temporary; and in
which all affairs concerning their common security are determined, the
delegates having first consulted each his own state.†
* The Roman state became monstrous when it degenerated into such a condition
that the mob, stirred up by the factious fury of the tribunes, made laws, condemned
or absolved, and did every thing without consulting with the rest of the people; and
the people neither made laws nor administred justice, nor determined concerning
war or peace, without the populace. But when instead of the people a certain rabble
or mob decides every thing as they please, the popular state is corrupted into an och-
locracy; and that the Roman state was then not very far from such a condition, is very
evident.
† Such of old was the Amphyctionian council, of which see Boecler. dissert. de
Amphyct. and Ubbo Emmo vet. Graec. Tom. 3. p. 305. [[Boecler, Synedrion Am-
phyktyonikon; Emmo, Vetus Graecia.]] Of this we have an example at present in the
most flourishing states of Holland and Switzerland, which are described by Jos. Sim-
lerus [[ Josias Simler (1530–76), Swiss Protestant theologian and historian, author of
De Republica Helvetiorum libri duo ]], Sir Richard Temple [[Richard Temple (1711–
79), English statesman]], and other learned men; so that we need not say any thing
of them.
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But because such confederacies chiefly depend upon the articles or terms
of the agreement, there cannot but be a great diversity in this matter;
and some will be more closely united, and others more laxly; some will
have more, and some less in common. Thus some may have, by con-
federacy or treaty, a common treasury, a common mint, and a common
armory, and others not. In fine; some may have a certain president, who
is guardian of the confederacy, and takes the chair in the council and
others may be confederated in a very different manner; and, in a word,
neither the right of suffrage, nor the manner of contributing towards
the common security, nor any of the other constitutions can be every
where, or in all confederacies the same. <109>
Remarks on This Chapter
First of all, it is worth while to observe here, That tho’ it be very certain
that mankind may be very happy, and arrive at a considerable degree
of perfection in sciences and arts, to great politeness as well as opulence,
in segregate families living independently one of another, or with re-
gard to one another, in a state of natural equality and liberty; yet, as it
is beyond all doubt on the one hand, that an ill-constituted civil state
is the source of the greatest misery mankind can fall into; so on the
other hand, it is equally plain from the nature of things, and from ex-
perience, that there is a perfection and happiness attainable by a rightly
constituted civil state, to which mankind can no otherwise attain. Now
mankind may be justly said to be fitted and designed for the state of
the greatest perfection attainable by them in consequence of their
frame; and therefore to be designed for the civil state, by which the
greatest perfection and happiness of mankind is attainable. There must
be means to an attainable end; and all means cannot possibly be equally
fit for attaining the same end: But any end attainable by man in con-
sequence of his having the means for attaining to it in his power, is,
properly speaking, an end within human reach, according to the laws
of human nature. And it is but doing justice to the Author of nature,
and but speaking of the end for which mankind is designed by the
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Author of all things, in the same manner we speak of the ends forwhich
any mechanical structure of nature’s production (as the human body,
or any other animal body) or any mechanical structure produced by
human art, (as a ship, a watch, &c.) is designed, to say that mankind
are principally designed by the Author of nature for the best end, or
the highest perfection and happiness within human reach, in conse-
quence of man’s frame and constitution, the laws of his nature, and
the means within his power. If therefore the highest perfection and
happiness within human reach be attainable, and only attainable in a
rightly constituted civil state, and if men be sufficiently impelled to,
and furnished for rightly constituting a civil state, man may be said to
be intended for a rightly constituted civil state, and all the perfection
and happiness attainable in it, or by it, in the same sense that anyanimal
structure, or any machine, is said to be intended for its end. Our con-
clusion must hold, if the premises from which it is drawn be true.
Now, that there is a very high degree of perfection and happiness
attainable by man in a rightly constituted civil state, not otherwise at-
tainable by man, will appear from comparing civilized states one with
another, and with nations living without any order deserving the name
of civil government. But the manifold advantages of rightly consti-
tuted civil government having been fully proved by many authors,Har-
rington, Sydney, Locke, among the moderns, and by Plato, Aristotle,
Polybius, <110> Cicero, and others among the ancients; I shall only
add upon this head, a very remarkable saying of one ancient, with re-
gard to the greatest happiness attainable by man. HippodamusThurius
Pythagor. de felicitate,5 having described the principal ingredients of
human happiness, says,—Quae quidem omnia contingent si quis rem-
publicam bene constitutam nanciscatur. Id quod quidem Amaltheae quod
dicitur cornu voco. Etenim in recta legum constitutione sunt omnia; neque
maximum naturae humanae bonum vel existere absque ea, vel comparatum
& auctum permanere possit. Nam et virtutem, & ad virtutem viam in se
continet, quandoquidem in ea partim naturae bona procreantur, partim
& mores & studia; leges optime se habent & recta ratio, pietas sanctimonia
magnopere vigent. Quamobrem qui beatus futurus & seliciter victurus est,
5. Hippodamus Thurius, Peri eudaimonias (De felicitate ), in Diogenes Laertius,
De vitis, dogmatis et apophthegmatis clarorum philosophorum.
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eam in bene constituta republica & vivere, necesse est & mori, &c. “All
these blessings and advantages will accrue to one from a well constituted
republic. This we may justly call the horn of Amalthea, the horn of
plenty and felicity. For all depends upon the good orders, constitutions
and laws of a state: Nor can the greatest good of mankind be attained,
or being attained, be preserved, without right government. A well
framed government includes virtue, and the way to virtue in it: Good
orders make good men: There the goods of nature grow up as in their
proper soil; and there good manners and useful studies and employ-
ments will flourish: There the laws direct and impel into the rightpaths;
and there reason, virtue, piety, authority, must have their greatest splen-
dor and vigour. Wherefore, he who would be as happy as man can be,
and would continue while he lives to be such, must live and die in a
well framed, a well constituted or balanced civil government, &c.”
2. But let me just observe, in the second place, that ends and means
to ends, can only be learned from nature itself by experience, and rea-
soning from experience. This must be equally true with regard to nat-
ural and moral ends and means. The consequence of which is, that the
political art required time, observation and experience, to bring it to
perfection, as well as natural or mechanical arts. And for this reason,
in very early times of the world, men could not be so much masters of
the science upon which the framing of government aright must de-
pend, as to have had all the advantages and disadvantages of different
governments, all the various effects of different moral or political con-
stitutions in their view, in framing a government: They could only learn
these natural connexions of moral things from experience. And there-
fore, in treating of government, two separate enquiries ought never to
be confounded; the one of which is, “what ends right reason dictates
to mankind as the ends to be proposed in constituting civil govern-
ment; and what means, i.e. what orders and constitutions it points out
as the proper means in order to attain these good ends.” And the other
is, “how in fact various governments were formed, and how, <111> be-
ing formed, they changed gradually their frame to the better or worse.”
The one is a question of fact or history; and the principal advantage
reaped by history, is instruction in the natural effects of various con-
stitutions in different situations; or the knowledge of what moral con-
nexions and causes produce in different circumstances, and the knowl-
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edge of the rise of different circumstances, from internal or external
causes; which knowledge has the same relation to moral theory in moral
philosophy, that the history of facts in nature, with regard to the opera-
tion of natural causes in different circumstances, has to natural theory
or physics: that is, it is the only solid basis in both to build upon. For
as in physics it is now agreed that we can only come to solid or real
knowledge by induction from experiments; so in morals and politics it
is equally true, to use the words of a great man often quoted in these
remarks, “To make principles or fundamentals belongs not to men, to
nations, nor to human laws. To build upon such principles or funda-
mentals as are apparently laid by God in the inevitable necessity or law
of nature, is that which truly appertains to men, to nations, and to
human laws. To make any other fundamentals, and then build upon
them, is to build castles in the air.”6 The other question supposes
knowledge of human affairs, and the natural operations of moral
causes, learned in this way from fact, and reasoning from fact or ex-
perience; and it is properly a philosophical enquiry into what ought to
be done in consequence of the natural operation of moral causes, or
of the laws of human nature, known by experience, in order to frame
such a civil government as would make its members as happy as men
can be. And it is, when it proceeds upon facts or experiments, the most
pleasant and useful of all philosophical enquiries; and that certainly,
which, of all other studies, best becomes those, who, by their natural
happy lot, are delivered from drudgery to their backs and bellies. Nay,
may I not say, that it is the study, to which, if such do not betake them-
selves chiefly, they are absolutely inexcusable. For sure, if virtue and
benevolence be not empty names, they must lie under the strongest,
the most indispensable obligations to qualify themselves for promoting
human happiness: they are bound and obliged to be tutors and guard-
ians to mankind. And whatever other employment they may carve out
to themselves, or however thoughtlesly they may waste their time, if
they neglect this, they neglect the noble work providence hath put into
their hands to do. A work, (a happiness should I not rather say) than
which nothing can be higher, nobler, or more glorious. It is a work or
employment, and a happiness of the same kind with the work, em-
6. Harrington, Aphorisms Political, no. 85, in Political Works, 773.
book i i , chapter vi 429
ployment, and happiness of the great Author of nature, the all-perfect
God.
But let me observe, in the third place, that tho’ our author, in speak-
ing of the origine of civil governments, (which is a question of fact or
history) hath frequently come very near the matter, especially in the
scholium, where he speaks of the king-<112>dom founded by Nimrod,
yet he hath not fully spoke it out: and therefore it will not be improper
here to lay before the reader a series of propositions relative to that
subject; i.e. which shew government in its natural causes, or in its nat-
ural procreation and natural variations. And these truths having a nec-
essary connexion with what hath been already taken notice of in our
remarks with regard to property, or the acquisition of dominion over
things, they will be easily understood; so that there will be but little
occasion to do more than just mention them. And that I shall, for the
greater part, do in the very words of an excellent author, unknown to
foreign writers, from whom we have already borrowed so many useful
observations.7
1. The distribution of property, so far as it regards the nature or
procreation of government, lies in the over-balance of the same. Just
as a man, who has two thousand pounds a year, may have a retinue,
and consequently a strength that is three times greater than he who
enjoys but five hundred pounds a year. Not to speak of money at this
time, (of that we have already treated in another remark, viz. the remarks
on chapter 13. l. 1. which the reader may turn to ) which, in small terri-
tories, may be of like effect; but to insist upon the main, which is prop-
erty in land, (because to property producing empire, it is required that
it should have some certain root, or root-land, which, except in land,
it cannot have, being otherwise, as it were, upon the wing); to insist
upon this, which is the main, the over-balance of this, as it was at first
constituted, or comes insensibly to be changed into a nation, may be
especially of three kinds; that is, in one, in the few, or in many. The
over-balance three to one, or thereabouts, in one man against the whole
people, creates absolute monarchy; as when Joseph had purchased all
the lands of the Egyptians for Pharaoh. The constitution of a people
7. Turnbull is referring to Harrington. The following sections are a summary of
Harrington’s central ideas, mostly from Oceana.
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in this, and such cases, is capable of intire servitude. Buy us and our
land for bread, and we and our land will be servants to Pharaoh, Gen.
xlvii. 19. If one man be sole landlord of a territory, or overbalance the
people, for example, three parts in four, he is Grand Signior; for so the
Turk is called from his property; and his empire is absolute monarchy.
The overbalance of the land to the same proportion in the few against
the whole people, creates aristocracy, or regulated monarchy. The con-
stitution of a people in this, and the like cases, is (nec totam libertatem,
nec totam servitatem pati possunt, Tacit. )8 neither capable of intire lib-
erty, nor of intire servitude. And hereupon Samuel says to the people
of Israel, when they would have a king, “He will take your fields, even
the best of them, and give them to his servants, 1 Sam. viii.” If a few, or
a nobility with the clergy be landlords, or over-balance the people to
the proportion above-mentioned, it makes what is called the Gothic
balance. (See this treated of at large by Mr. Harrington.) The over-
balance of land to the same proportion in the people, or <113> where
neither one nor the few over-balance the whole people, creates popular
government; as in the division of the land of Canaan to the whole
people of Israel by lot. The constitution of a people in this, and the
like cases, is capable of intire freedom; nay, not capable of any other
settlement; it being certain, that if a monarch, or single person, in such
a state, thro’ the corruption or improvidence of their councils, might
carry it; yet, by the irresistible force of nature, or the reason alledged
by Moses, (I am not able to bear all this people alone, because it is too
heavy for me; Numb. xi. 14.) he could not keep it, but out of the deep
waters would cry to them, whose feet he had stuck in the mire. If the
whole people be landlords, or hold the lands so divided among them,
that no one man, or number of men, within the compass of the few,
or aristocracy over-balance them, the empire, (without the interposi-
tion of force) is a commonwealth.
2. If force be interposed in any of these three cases, it must either
frame the government to the foundation, or the foundation to the gov-
ernment; or holding the government not according to the balance, it
is not natural, but violent; and therefore, if it be at the devotion of a
prince, it is tyranny; if at the devotion of a few, oligarchy; or if in the
8. Tacitus, Histories I.16.28.
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power of the people, anarchy. Each of which confusions, the balance
standing otherwise, is but of short continuance, because against the
nature of the balance, which not destroyed, destroys that which op-
poses it. But there be certain other confusions, which being rooted in
the balance, are of a longer continuance, and of worse consequence.
As first, where a nobility holds half the property, or about that pro-
portion, and the people the other half; in which case, without altering
the balance, there is no remedy but the one must eat out the other; as
the people did the nobility in Athens, and the nobility the people in
Rome. Secondly, when a prince holds about half the dominion, and
the people the other half, (which was the case of the Roman Emperors,
planted partly upon their military colonies, and partly upon the senate
and the people) the government becomes a very shambles both of the
princes and the people. Somewhat of this nature are certain govern-
ments at this day, which are said to subsist by confusion. In this case,
to fix the balance is to entail misery; but in the three former, not to fix
it, is to lose the government; wherefore, it being unlawful in Turkey,
that any should possess land but the Grand Signior, the balance is fixed
by the law, and that empire firm. While Lacedemon held to the division
of land made by Lycurgus it was immoveable, but breaking that, could
therefore stand no longer.
3. Fixation of government cannot be provided for without fixing
the balance of property. But fixation of the balance of property is not
to be provided for but by laws. Now, the laws whereby such provision
is made, are commonly called Agrarian laws. This kind of law fixing
the balance in lands, was settled by God himself, who divided the land
of Canaan to his people <114> by lots; and it is of such virtue, that
wherever it has held, that government has not altered, except by con-
sent; as in that unparallelled example of the people of Israel, when
being in liberty they would needs choose a king. But without an Agrar-
ian, no government, whether monarchical, aristocratical or popular,
has a long lease. And as governments are of divers or contrary natures,
so are such laws. Monarchy requires of the standard of property, that
it be vast or great; and of Agrarian laws, that they hinder recess or
diminution, at least in so much as is thereby entailed upon honour. But
popular government requires that the standard be moderate, and that
its Agrarian prevent accumulation. In a territory not exceeding En-
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gland in revenue, if the balance be in more hands than three hundred,
it is declining from monarchy; and if it be in fewer than five thousand
hands, it is swerving from a commonwealth. In consequence of the
same principles, wherever the balance of a government lies, there nat-
urally is the militia of the same; and against him or them, wherein the
militia is naturally lodged, there can be no negative voice. If a prince
holds the over-balance, as in Turkey, in him is the militia, as the Jani-
zaries and Timariots. If a nobility has the over-balance, the militia is
in them, as among us was seen in the Barons wars, and those of York
and Lancaster; and in France is seen, when any considerable part of
that nobility rebelling, they are not to be reduced, but by the major
part of their order adhering to the king. If the people has the over-
balance, which they had in Israel, the militia is in them, as in the four
hundred thousand first decreeing, and then waging war against Ben-
jamin; where it may be enquired, what power there was on earth having
a negative voice to this assembly! This always holds where there is set-
tlement, or where a government is natural. Where there is no settle-
ment, or where the government is unnatural, it proceeds from one of
these two causes, either an imperfection in the balance, or else such a
corruption in the lawgivers, whereby a government is instituted con-
trary to the balance. Imperfections of the balance, that is, where it is
not good or downright weight, cause imperfect governments; as those
of the Roman and Florentine people, and those of the Hebrew Kings
and Roman Emperors, being each exceeding bloody, or at least turbulent.
Government against the balance in one is tyranny, as thatof theAthenian
Pisistratus; in the few it is oligarchy, as that of the Roman Decemvirs;
in the many, anarchy, as that under the Neapolitan Mazinello.
4. From these principles will the reader find the more remarkable
changes in the Athenian, Spartan, Roman, and other states, accounted
for naturally by Mr. Harrington. And from them he justly infers, that
wherever, thro’ causes unforeseen by human prudence, the balance
comes to be intirely changed, it is the more immediately to beattributed
to divine providence: And since God cannot will the cause, <115> but
he must also will the necessary effect or consequence, what government
soever is in the necessary direction of the balance, the same is of divine
right. Wherefore, tho’ of the Israelites God says, They have set up kings,
but not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not. Yet to the small
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countries adjoining to the Assyrian empire, he says, “Now have I given
all these lands into the hands of the king of Babylon my servant.—Serve
the king of Babylon and live.” The general truth here insisted upon,
which history abundantly confirms, is, that the over-balance of prop-
erty begets dominion, and that the balance of dominion will always
follow the balance of property, be under its direction, or vary as it varies.
And therefore this author says very justly (of his works, p. 70.)9To erect
a monarchy, be it ever so new, unless like Leviathan, you can hang it,
as the country fellow speaks, by geometry; (for what else is it to say that
any other man must give up his will to the will of this one man without
any other foundation?) it must stand upon old principles, that is, upon
a nobility, or an army planted in a due balance of dominion. “Aut viam
inveniam aut faciam,”10 was an adage of Caesar; and there is no stand-
ing for a monarchy, unless it finds this balance, or makes it. If it finds
it, the work is done to its hand; for where there is inequality of estates,
there must be inequality of power; and where there is inequality of
power, there can be no commonwealth. To make it, the sword, must
extirpate out of dominion all other roots of power, and plant an army
upon that ground. An army may be planted nationally or provincially.
To plant it nationally, it must be either monarchically in part, as the
Roman Beneficiarii; or monarchically in the whole, as the Turkish ten-
ants; or aristocratically, that is, by earls and barons, as the Neustrians
were planted by Turbo; or democratically, that is, by equal lots, as the
Israelitish army in the land of Canaan by Joshua. In every one of these
ways, there must not only be confiscations, but confiscations to such a
proportion as may answer to the work intended.
5. As nothing else can fix government but an Agrarian suitable to its
nature; so different superstructures are natural to different foundations
of government. Thus, such superstructures as are natural to an absolute
prince, or the sole landlord of a large territory, require for the first story
of the building, that what demesnes he shall think fit to reserve being
9. Harrington, The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington, Esq., 70 (see
Political Works, 198–99).
10. An adage of Julius Caesar: “Either I shall find a way or I shall make one.” As
Liljegren points out, this adage is probably a later invention; it has no warrant in
Caesar or in any of the ancient commentators on him ( James Harrington’s Oceana,
282).
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set apart, the rest be divided into horse quarters or military farms for
life, or at will, and not otherwise; and that every tenant for every hun-
dred pounds a year so held, be, by condition of his tenure, obliged to
attend his sovereign lord in person, in arms, and at his proper cost and
charges, with one horse, so often, and so long as he shall be commanded
upon service. These, among the Turks, are called Timariots. The second
story requires, that these horse-quarters, or military farms, be divided
by con-<116>venient precincts or proportions into distinct provinces,
and that each province have one commander in chief of the same, at
the will and pleasure of the Grand Signior, or for three years, and no
longer. Such, among the Turks, (unless by additional honours, they be
called Bashaws or Viziers ) are the Beglerbegs. For the third story, there
must of necessity be a mercenary army, consisting both of horse and
foot, for the guard of the prince’s person, and for the guard of his
empire, by keeping the governors of provinces so divided, that they be
not suffered to lay their arms or heads together, or to hold intelligence
with one another; which mercenary army ought not to be constituted
of such as have already contracted some other interest, but to consist
of men so educated from their very childhood, as not to know that they
have any other parent or native country, than the prince and his empire.
Such, among the Turks, are the foot, called Janizaries, and the horse,
called Spahys. The prince, accommodated with a privy council, con-
sisting of such as have been governors of provinces, is the top-stone.
This council, among the Turks, is called the Divan, and this prince, the
Grand Signior.
The superstructures proper to a regulated monarchy, or to the gov-
ernment of a prince, (three or four hundred of whose nobility, or of
whose nobility and clergy hold three parts in four of the territory) must
either be by personal influence, upon the balance, or by virtue of orders.
The safer way of this government is by orders; and the orders proper
to it, especially consist of an hereditary senate of the nobility, admitting
also of the clergy, and of a representative of the people, made up of
the Lord’s menial servants, or such as by tenure, and for livelihood,
have immediate dependance upon them.
An aristocracy, or state of nobility, to exclude the people, must gov-
ern by a king; or to exclude a king, must govern by the people. Nor is
there, without a senate, or mixture of aristocracy, any popular govern-
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ment; wherefore, tho’, for discourse sake, politicians speak of pure ar-
istocracy and pure democracy, there is no such thing as either of these
in nature, art, or example: where the people are not over-balanced by
one man, or by the few, they are not capable of any other superstruc-
tures of government, or of any other just and quiet settlement what-
soever, than of such only as consists of a senate as their counsellors, of
themselves, or their representative, as sovereign lords, and of a mag-
istracy answerable to the people as the distributers and executioners of
the laws made by the people. And thus much is of absolute necessity
to any, or every government, that is or can be properly called a com-
monwealth, whether it be well or ill ordered. But the necessary defi-
nition of a commonwealth any thing well ordered, is, that it is a gov-
ernment consisting of the senate proposing, the people resolving, and
the magistracy executing. To speak of different or-<117>ders in com-
monwealths, would be almost endless. Some commonwealths consist
of distinct sovereignties, as Switzerland and Holland; others are col-
lected into one and the same sovereignty, as most of the rest. Again,
some commonwealths have been upon rotation or courses in the rep-
resentative only, as Israel; others in the magistracy only, as Rome; some
in the senate and magistracy, as Athens and Venice; others in some part
of the magistracy, and in others not; as Lacedemon in the Ephori, and
not in the kings; and Venice not in the Doge, nor in the procuratori,
but in all the rest. Holland, except in the election of states provincial
(which is emergent) admits not of any rotations or courses. But there
may be a commonwealth admitting of rotation throughout, as in the
senate, in the representative, and in the magistracy, as that proposed by
Mr. Harrington in his Oceana. Rotation, if it be perfect, is equal elec-
tion by, and succession of the whole people to the magistracy by terms
and vacations. Equal election may be by lot, as that of the senate of
Lacedemon; or by ballot, as that of Venice, which of all others is the
most equal. The ballot, as it is used in Venice, consists of a lot, whence
proceeds the right of proposing, and of an unseen way of suffrage, or
of resolving. From the wonderful variety of parts, and the difference
of mixture (before Mr. Harrington scarce touched by any) result those
admirable differences that are in the constitution and genius of popular
governments; some being for defence, some for increase; some more
equal, others more unequal; some turbulent and seditious, others like
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streams in a perpetual tranquillity. That which causes much sedition in
a commonwealth is inequality, as in Rome, where the senate oppressed
the people. But if a commonwealth be perfectly equal, it is void of
sedition, and has attained to perfection, as being void of all internal
causes of dissolution. And hence many antient moral writers, Cicero
in particular, have said, that a well constituted commonwealth is im-
mortal, aeterna est. An equal commonwealth is a government founded
upon a balance, which is perfectly popular, being well fixed by a suitable
Agrarian, and which, from the balance, through the free suffrage of the
people given by the ballot, amounts, in the superstructures, to a senate
debating and proposing, a representative of the people resolving, and
a magistracy executing; each of these three orders being upon courses
or rotation; that is, elected for certain terms injoining like intervals.
And to undertake the binding of a prince from invading liberty, and
yet not to introduce the whole orders necessary to populargovernment,
is to undertake a flat contradiction, or a plain impossibility.
6. All I have further to add in this remark, designed to shew the
natural generation and variation of empire is, that these principles (as
Mr. Harrington has observed) were not unknown to ancient politi-
cians, and are sufficiently confirmed by history. That they were not
unknown to Moses, is plain from <118> the history given us of the
orders of the commonwealth instituted by him; nor to Lycurgus, is as
plain. I shall only just set down the passages Mr. Harrington quotes
from Aristotle and Plutarch. The first is Aristotle, in these words: “In-
equality is the source of all sedition, as when the riches of one or a few
come to cause such an overbalance in dominion, as draws the com-
monwealth into monarchy or oligarchy; for prevention whereof the
ostracism has been of use in divers places, as at Argos and Athens. But
it were better to provide in the beginning, that there be no such disease
in the commonwealth, than to come afterwards to her cure, Polit. 5.
3.” The second is Plutarch, in these words: “Lycurgus judging that there
ought to be no other inequality among citizens of the same common-
wealth than what derives from their virtues, divided the land so equally
among the Lacedemonians, that, on a day beholding the harvest of
their lots lying by cocks or ricks in the field, he laughing said, that it
seemed to him they were all brothers, Plutarch in Lycurg.”11 This ac-
11. This is a selective quotation from Plutarch’s life of Lycurgus, chap. 8 (Plutarch,
Lives, vol. 1, “Lycurgus,” 227–29).
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count of the rise, variation or fixation of empire, is abundantly con-
firmed by experience or history. To prove this I shall only here insert a
small part of what Mr. Harrington says of several ancient republics, in
order to excite the reader’s curiosity to have recourse to himself, (of his
works, p. 57).12 “Israel and Lacedemon, which commonwealths have
great resemblance, were each of them equal in their Agrarian, and in-
equal in their Rotation: especially Israel, where the Sanhedrim or senate
first elected by the people, took upon them ever after to substitute their
successors by ordination. And the election of the judge, suffes,13 or
dictator, was irregular, both for the occasion, the term, and the vacation
of that magistracy, as you find in the book of Judges where it is often
repeated, That in those days there was no King in Israel, that is, no
Judge: and in the first of Samuel where Eli judged Israel forty years,
and Samuel all his life. In Lacedemon, the election of the senate being
by suffrage of the people, tho’ for life, was not altogether so unequal,
yet the hereditary right of kings, were it not for the Agrarian,hadruined
her. Athens and Rome were inequal as to their Agrarian, that of Athens
being infirm, and this of Rome none at all; for if it were more anciently
carried, it was never observed. Whence, by the time of Tiberius Grac-
chus, the nobility had almost eaten the people quite out of their lands,
which they held in the occupation of tenants and servants: whereupon,
the remedy being too late, and too vehemently applied, that common-
wealth was ruined. These also were unequal in their rotation, but in a
contrary manner. Athens, in regard that the senate (chosen at once by
lot, not by suffrage, and changed every year, not in part, but in the
whole) consisted not of the natural aristocracy; nor sitting long enough
to understand or be perfect in their office, had no sufficient autho-
<119>rity to restrain the people from that perpetual turbulence in the
end, which was their ruin, notwithstanding the efforts of Nicias, who
did all a man could do to help it. But as Athens fell by the headiness
of the people, so Rome fell by the ambition of the nobility, through
the want of an equal rotation; which, if the people had got into the
senate, and timely into the magistracy (whereof the former was always
usurped by the patricians, and the latter for the most part) they had
12. Harrington, The Oceana and Other Works, 57 (Political Works, 184).
13. The suffetes (“suffes”) were the supreme executive magistrates of the ancient
republic of Carthage and later were considered comparable to the judges in Israel.
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both carried and held their Agrarian, and that had rendered that com-
monwealth immoveable.”
This short specimen of our Author’s way of reasoning about the rise
and fall, or variations of civil government, is sufficient to shew, that he
reasons from natural causes in these matters, as natural philosophers
do about phenomena commonly called natural ones. And indeed every
thing in nature, moral or corporeal nature, must have its natural course,
its natural rise, progress and variations. And as to know the one is to
be a natural philosopher, so to know the other is to be a moral philos-
opher or politician.
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u ch a p t e r v i i u
Of sovereignty, and the ways
of acquiring it.
s e c t i on cxx v i i
Since those who unite into a civil state lived before that in a state of
nature (§3), which is a state of equality and liberty (§5 and 6); the con-
sequence is, that a civil state is subjected to no person or persons without
it; may not be hindered or disturbed in doing any thing it judges nec-
essary for its conservation, but may freely exerce all its rights, and cannot
be forced to give an account to any of its transactions. But all those things
together constitute what is called supreme or absolute sovereignty or em-
pire; and therefore, in every civil state, there is supreme and absolute
empire or sovereignty.* <120>
* We are now speaking of a republic properly so called, which we defined to be
a multitude of people united together under a common head for their security, and
independent of all others (§103). And therefore, a people conquered and brought
under power by a conqueror, is not a republic, but a province, because subjected to
others. For the same reason, a multitude of people, united indeed under a common
magistracy, but subjected to a large kingdom or republic, does not properly come
under the appellation of a republic, but of a town-corporate: Wherefore the civilians
frequently call such towns-corporate republics, and thus make mention of the re-
public of Antioch, l. 37. D. de reb. auct. jud. possid. of the republic of the Helio-
politani, l. 4. C. qui pot. in pign. of the Tusculans, l. 38. §5. D. de legat. of the
Sebastiani, l. 21. §3. D. de ann. leg. of the Arelatenses, l. 34. D. de usu & usufruct.
leg. of the Sardiani, l. 24. D. de ann. legat. yet when they speak more accurately, they
deny those to be absent on account of the republic, who are sent upon a commission
by a city, l. 26. § ult. D. in quibus causs. mai. It is therefore of consequence how we
use the word republic.
All sovereignty
is supreme and
absolute.
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s e c t i on cxx v i i i
Because there is supreme empire or absolute sovereignty in every civil
state or republic (§127), and citizens or subjects may have submitted their
will either to one, or many, or to the whole people, (§114); the conse-
quence is, that to whomsoever they have submitted their will, he, or they
are vested with supreme power or sovereignty, and therefore they can be
judged by none but God alone; and much less therefore can they be
punished in any manner by the people; so that the doctrine of monarch-
killers, which makes the people superior to the king or prince, and places
in the former the real, and in the latter only personal majesty, is a most
petulant one.* <121>
* This is the doctrine of Franc. Hotoman. Stephen Junius Brutus, (under which
fictitious name some think Hub. Languetus, others think Buchanan lurked) Sidney,
Althusius, Pareus, Jo. Milton, and others, of which authors see besides the observ.
Halenses, 6. 1. Jo. Franc. Budd. hist. juris naturae & gentium, §52. [[Heineccius ar-
gues against the leading (Protestant) theories of resistance (the so-called Monar-
chomachs as set out in the following: Franc¸ois Hotman (1524–90),Francogallia (1573);
Stephanus Junius Brutus, pseudonymous author of one of the most influential Hu-
guenot writings on resistance, Vindiciae contra tyrannos, 1579; Algernon Sidney,Dis-
courses; Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), Politica (1603); David Paraeus (1548–1622),
German Protestant theologian, In divinam ad Romanos S. Pauli Apostali epistolam
commentarius; John Milton (1608–74), A Tenure of Kings andMagistrates (1650) and
ADefence of the People of England (1658) (in Milton,PoliticalWritings ). The “observ.
Halenses” are the Observationum selectarum ad rem literariam spectantium. The final
reference is to Johannes Franz Budde’sHistoria juris naturalis. ]] But the fundamental
error by which they are misled into allowing power and authority over kings, lies in
their making the constituent superior to the constituted; for that principle being pre-
supposed, the people which constitutes their prince or head (111), must be superior
to the prince or head constituted by them. Now this doctrine is no less absurd than
it would be to say, that a servant who hath voluntarily subjected himself to a master
(§78), is superior to his master, because he constituted him such. See Grotius of the
rights of war and peace, 1. 3. 8. Zach. Huber. diss. l. 2. p. 124. [[Zacharias Huber
(1669–1732), Dissertationes juridicae et philologicae. He was the son of Ulrik Huber
(see note on pp. 441–42).]] Reason rather tells us, that he cannot be superior who
hath subjected himself to another’s will, having thus renounced his own will. And
therefore, since a people does so when they unite into a republic (§128), with what
front can they call themselves superior to their sovereign?
The error of
monarch-
killers.
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s e c t i on cxx i x
But since subjects have only so far subjected themselves to the will of a
sovereign as their common security, the end for which they entred into
the civil state, requires (§14 & 106), we must infer from hence, that they
are abominable and flagitious flatterers of sovereigns, who persuade
them that they may do what they please, and can do no injury to their
subjects; but that their persons, lives, reputations and estates, are so ab-
solutely dependent upon them, that subjects have no more left to them
but the glory of absolute submission and obedience. From this corrupt
spring flow all those pestiferous tenets, which Machiavel and Hobbes
have attempted to impose upon mankind with the greatest assurance;
and, together with them, all the asserters and defenders of passive-
obedience in Great Britain. But who will deny that such doctrines are
no less pestilential than that of king-killing? * <122>
* The tenets of Machiavel and Hobbes are well known. Nor is the controversy so
warmly agitated between the authors of books intitled, Julianus and Jovinianus, and
other learned men in Great Britain, less notorious. [[The debate was about the pros-
pect of a Catholic king when James, Duke of York, was heir to the throne, and about
the implications this had for the status and character of the Anglican church. More
particularly, Turnbull refers to a fierce pen-fight between Samuel Johnson (1649–
1703) and George Hickes (1642–1715), both Anglican clergymen. The former’s Julian
the Apostate (1682) likened James to the fourth-century emperor and thus drew a
parallel between resistance to a pagan and a Catholic ruler. Hickes’s answer, Jovinian
(1683), invoked the eponymous Roman monk (d. ca. 406) who fought against fash-
ionable asceticism by denying any inherent value in celibacy and simple living. After
1689, Hickes became a non-juring bishop, Johnson a prominent Whigpamphleteer.]]
Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 1. 3. 8. is thought by not a few, to have given
some handle to this doctrine of passive-obedience and non-resistance. But whether
a people is subdued by force, or consents voluntarily to their subjection, it is unlawful,
highly criminal for a prince to injure his people, or oppress them in a hostile manner.
For in the first case, the people laid aside their hostile disposition, when they surren-
dered or gave themselves up. And in the latter case, the prince has no power but what
was transferred to him by the people, which none will say was a power to maletreat
them like slaves. That passage, 1 Sam. viii. 11. gives no authority to such abuse; for
whether we understand the jus regis there mentioned to be a narrative of fact and
custom, as jus latronis is used, l. 5. D. ad leg. Pomp. de parricid. or of the dominium
eminens, as the Jewish doctors interpret it, and with them Thomasius ad Huber. de
jure civit. 1. 2. 7. 13. p. 58. [[Thomasius, Annotationes ad Ulrici Huberi libros tres de
As likewise
of the
machiavelians.
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s e c t i on cxx x
Since sovereigns cannot be judged by any but God, much less be pun-
ished by their people (§128); hence we conclude that sovereignty is sa-
cred, and that Sovereigns are sacred; and therefore that sedition and re-
bellion are very heinous crimes. Tho’ we should grant in theory, that
Sovereigns who manifest a hostile disposition against their subjects, may
be resisted as tyrants; yet this rule would be in fact of no utility, because
Sovereigns can only be judged by God, and therefore God alone can
decide whether a Sovereign truly bears a hostile mind against his subjects
or not.* <123>
jure civitatis; Ulrik Huber (1636–94) was a Dutch jurist at the University of Franeker,
later at Utrecht and Leiden]] or of jus, right, so far obligatory that it may not be
resisted, as jus is used by Paullus, l. 11. de just. & jure, and as V. A. Zach. Huber
explains this place, ibid. p. 237, it cannot be proved from thence, that sovereigns have
any such right as Machiavel and Hobbes, and their disciples, a slavish race, have dared
to attribute to them. Surely a good prince will never arrogate such power to himself,
Qualis apud veteres divus regnabat Ulysses,
Qui nulli civi dicto factove nocebat.
Scilicet hoc hominem Dis immortalibus aequat.
[[“Among the ancients, Ulysses was such a divine king; he harmed no citizen
in word or deed. Surely this makes a man equal to the immortal gods.” The
source of this quotation is not clear.]]
* Thomas. ad Huber. de jure civ. 1. 9. 2. 20. p. 316. hath treated largely on this
subject. The example of Henry IV. Emperor, if it be carefully attended to, will suf-
ficiently convince any one how dangerous it is to allow the people a right of judging
of this matter. He was a most brave prince, and his only design was to recover to
himself the rights of empire and sovereignty, extorted from him in his minority. The
clergy, to whom that was imputed, were chafed; and it was easy to them to misrep-
resent and traduce a young headstrong prince, zealous of his rights, as an enemy to
the church and state, not only to the populace, but even to the princes of the empire
called secular, nay, and to Pope Gregory; and thus so to dispose things, that an ex-
cellent prince, tho’ he had an army that was for the most part victorious, was strip’d
by his own son of his kingdom and all his wealth, as an enemy to the church and
state. So perilous is it to allow not only the populace, but even the nobles, to judge
of the actions of princes. [[A reference to the so-called investiture contest between
Emperor Henry IV (1050–1106) and Pope Gregory VII, which culminated in 1077.
The dispute was linked to a revolt by the German princes against the emperor.]]
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But since every thing is not lawful to a prince (§129) the consequence is,
that he cannot impose any violence or restraint upon the consciences of
his subjects, nor command them to do any thing contrary to the will of
God the supreme lawgiver (l. 1. §87); neither can he, without a pregnant
and just reason, deprive any subject of his right, seeing subjects united
into a civil state chiefly for the security of their rights (§105). Subjects
therefore, in great distress, may try all methods in order to obtain their
rights, and, in extreme danger, leave their native country (§21); but they
may not take up arms against their prince or the republic (l. 1. §232).
<131>
[I cannot go further without observing, that it is surprizing to find so distinct
and clear an author, after he had laid down principles that lead, as it were, by
the hand, to the true conclusion about the rights of subjects, giving and taking
in such a manner upon this subject, that one cannot tell what he would be at.
But Grotius, Pufendorff, and all the writers of systems of the laws of nature
and nations, treat this important question in the same manner. I shall not stay
here to observe, that our Author runs into the common mistake about Ma-
chiavel’s doctrine; so unaccountably are that excellent politician’swritingsmis-
understood. Our Harrington, tho’ he differs from him in several points, has
done justice to him, and shewn him to be a friend to liberty, and to have un-
derstood the true principles of politics better than most writers on the subject.
But let me take notice, that the excellence of our constitution appears from
this, that our country has produced the best treatises on government: In this
matter we have left all other countries far behind. Mr. Barbeyrac, in his notes
on the chapters of Grotius and Pufendorff relative to government, has done
us justice in this point, and indeed in every thing. He hath set his Authors right
in this matter by the help of our Sidney, Locke and others. And no where is
this subject more fully and accurately handled than in an excellent treatiseupon
the measures of submission, published at a very seasonable time, by an in-
imitable defender of the rights and liberties of mankind (Dr. Hoadley Bishop
of Winchester) [[Benjamin Hoadley (1676–1761), controversialist and succes-
sively bishop of Bangor (1716), Hereford (1721), Salisbury (1723), and Win-
chester (1734); Turnbull is referring to Hoadley’s Measures of Submission ]]
whose name will be precious in our country, while the value of our constitution
is known, and we preserve a just sense of the best privileges men can enjoy, or
God bestow; privileges we cannot part with without the greatest of crimes,
because we cannot give them up, without degrading ourselves into a state far
below that for which God designed men, by making them rational and free
But yet it is
not lawful to
sovereigns to
do whatever
they please.
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agents. Our Author lays a mighty stress upon this maxim, That the inferior
cannot call the superior to account. But is there any absurdity in our excellent
Hooker’s [[Richard Hooker (ca. 1554–1600), Anglican theologian]]distinction
between singulis major and universis minor? [[“Singulis major”: “greater/more
powerful than the individual citizens”; “universis minor”: “less powerful than
the citizenry as a whole.”]] I am to return to this momentous question after-
wards. But what an odd jumble is our Author’s doctrine upon this article,when
all he says is brought together? It amounts briefly to this: “A prince has no right
to injure his subjects: It is unlawful or criminal in him to do it; and they are
base flatterers who tell princes they may do what they please; but God alone
can judge when they do injure their subjects; the people hath no right to judge
of the matter; and if they should, in extreme misery, feel they are injured, all
they, who may do every thing in that case to recover their rights, have a right
to do, is to leave their dear native country.” Who would have expected to have
found our Author talking any where in such a manner? Let us oppose to this
a few things, first from Mr. Sidney. “They who create magistracies, and give
to them such nature, form and power as they think fit, do only know whether
the end for which they were created be performed or not. They who give a
being to the power which had none, can only judge whether it be employed
to their welfare, or turned to their ruin. They do not set up one, or a few men,
that they and their posterity may live in splendor and greatness; but that justice
may be administred, virtue established, and provision made for the public
safety. No wise man will think this can be done, if those who set themselves
to overthrow the law are to be their own judges. If Caligula, Nero, Vitellius,
Domitian, or Heliogabulus had been subject to no other judgment, theywould
have compleated the destruction of the empire. If the disputes between Dur-
stus, Evenus III. Dardanus, and other Kings of Scotland, with the nobility and
people, might have been determined by themselves, they had escaped the pun-
ishments they suffered, and ruined the nation, as they designed. Other meth-
ods were taken; they perished by their madness; better princes were brought
into their places, and their successors were by their example admonished to
avoid the ways that had proved fatal to them. If Edward II. of England, with
Gaveston and the Spencers, Richard II. with Tresilian and Vere, had been
permitted to be judges of their own cases, they who had murdered the best of
the nobility would have pursued their designs to the destruction of such as
remained, the enslaving of the nation, the subversion of the constitution and
the establishment of a mere tyranny, in the place of a mixed monarchy. But
our ancestors took better measures. They who had felt the smart of the vices
and follies of their princes, knew what remedies were most fit to be applied,
as well as the best time of applying them. They found the effects of extreme
corruption in government, to be so desperately pernicious, that nations must
necessarily suffer, unless it be corrected, and the state reduced to its first prin-
ciple, or altered. Which being the case, it was as easy for them to judge whether
the governor, who had introduced that corruption, should be brought to order,
book i i , chapter vi i 445
or removed, if he would not be reclaimed, or whether he should be suffered
to ruin them and their posterity; as it is for me to judge whether I should put
away my servant, if I knew he intended to poison or murder me, and had a
certain facility of accomplishing his design; or whether I should continue him
in my service till he had performed it. Nay, the matter is so much the more
plain on the side of the nation, as the disproportion of merit between a whole
people and one or a few men entrusted with the power of governing them is
greater than between a private man and his servant.” Discourse upon govern-
ment, chap. 3. §41. The same author, chap. 3. §36. observes, “Neither are sub-
jects bound to stay till the prince has entirely finished the chains which he is
preparing for them, and has put it out of their power to oppose. ’Tis sufficient,
that all the advances which he makes are manifestly tending to theiroppression,
that he is marching boldly on to the ruin of the state.” [[Sidney, Discourses
Concerning Government, 1704 ed., chap. 3, sec. 41, p. 399. There are some mi-
nor discrepancies between Turnbull’s first quotation and the 1704 text. The
second quotation (chap. 3, sec. 36) does not appear in Sidney’s Discourses at
all. Turnbull, clearly, is using Barbeyrac’s note 1 on Pufendorf ’sLaw of Nature
and Nations, bk. 7, chap. 8, sec. 6, rather than Sidney’s text as the source of
these quotations.]]
The second is from Mr. Locke on government, chap. 18. §209. [[See Locke,
Two Treatises of Government, bk. II, chap. 18, §209–10.]] It is as impossible
for a governor, if he really means the good of the people, and the preservation
of them and the laws together, not to make them see and feel it; as it is for the
father of a family not to let his children see he loves and takes care of them
(§210). How can a man any more hinder himself from believing in his own
mind which way things are going, or from casting about how to save himself,
than he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in was carrying
him and the rest of his company toAlgiers, when he found him always steering
that course, tho’ cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisions,
did often force him to turn his course another way for some time, which he
steadily returned to again, as soon as the winds, weather, and other circum-
stances would let him.But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent
rebellion. No more, says Mr. Locke, than any other hypothesis. “1. For when the
people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of
arbitrary power, cry up their governors as much as you will for sons of Jupiter,
let them be sacred and divine, descended or authorized from heaven; give them
out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people, generally
ill-treated, and contrary to right, will be ready, upon any occasion, to ease
themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. 2. Such revolutions happen
not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the
ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human
frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny and murmur. 3. This power
in the people of providing for their safety anew by a new legislative, when their
legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their property, is the
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best fence against rebellion, and the most probable means to hinder it. For
rebellion being an opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded
only in the laws and constitutions of the government; those, whoever they be,
who, by force, break through, and, by force, justify the violation of them, are
truly and properly rebels.” [[Ibid., chap. 19, §224–26.]] The principle upon
which all this depends is self-evident, and clearly set forth by the same author, book
2. cap. 4. “No man can so far part with his liberty, as to give himself up wholly
to an arbitrary power, to be treated absolutely as that power thinks proper: for
this would be to dispose of his own life, of which he is not master. Much less
has a whole people such a right, as every one of those who compose it, is intirely
destitute of. The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power
on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to
have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man in society, is to be
under no other legislative power, but that established by consent in the
common-wealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law,
but what the legislative shall exact according to the trust put in it;—as free-
dom of nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature. This
freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to, and closely joined
with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits
his life and preservation together.” [[Ibid., chap. 3, §22, apart from the first
two sentences in this quotation, which seem to be a paraphrase rather than
a quotation.]]
The third is from Dr. Hoadley’s measures of submission, (the defence)
p. 70. [[Hoadley, Measures of Submission, 70]] “Supposing some should apply
this doctrine, which only concerns the worst of governors to the best, and
oppose good princes, under pretence that it is lawful to oppose tyrants and
oppressors, this cannot affect the truth of the doctrine; nor doth the doctrine
in the least justify or excuse them, but rather condemns them. Our blessed
Lord hath laid down a very reasonable permission in his gospel, that husbands
may put away their wives in case of adultery, and marry others; and is this ever
the less reasonable, because wicked men, under the cover of this, may put away
the most virtuous wives, and take others merely for the gratification of their
present inclinations? Or doth this permission of our Lord’s justify all pieces
of wickedness that may be acted under the pretext of it? It is certainly true,
that magistrates may, and ought to punish and discourage evil men, and dis-
turbers of human society: And is this ever the less true, because some magis-
trates may, under the pretence of this, punish and afflict the best and most
peaceable subjects? It is certainly true that a child may resist a father, if he
should attempt to take away his life: And is this ever the less true, because a
child may, through mistake, pretend against a good father, that he hath designs
against his life, and, under that pretence, dishonour and resist him? It is agreed
upon on all hands, as a good general rule, that men ought to follow the dictates
of their consciences: But surely this rule is not made false; nor can it be sup-
posed to justify a man, if he should be so void of understanding, as to be
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directed by his conscience to murder his parent or his prince, as a point of
indispensable duty.”
In this excellent treatise, all the objections against the doctrine of liberty,
and all the monstrous absurdities of the opposite doctrine of passive-
obedience and non-resistance are fully handled with uncommon strength and
perspicuity of argumentation. But our author may be refuted in a few words
from his own principles. He says expresly, (§129 in the scholium), that a prince
has no right to shew a hostile disposition, or to injure even a subdued people,
Nefas est principi, &c. Now, is not obligation the correlate of right; and have
not then a people a right to demand, exact, nay, force (i.e. a perfect right,
according to his own definition) their prince to treat them uninjuriously, that
is justly. If a prince has no right to injure, he is obliged not to injure; but if
he be obliged not to injure, the people whom he is obliged not to injure, hath
a right to demand just treatment from him, and to keep off injuries, otherwise
a prince may be under an obligation to a people, and yet the people mayacquire
no right by that obligation to them. If the law of nature extends to all men,
it extends to those vested with power, as well as to those under power; now,
as far as the law of nature extends, the law of justice and benevolence, or in
one word, the law of love extends; for that is the sum and substance of the
law of nature. But so far as the law of love extends, justice is of perfect obli-
gation, and benevolence is of imperfect obligation: Princes therefore, being
under the law of nature, are perfectly obliged to justice, and imperfectly
obliged to benevolence. Now, since none (as our Author often says) can be
under an obligation, without giving some right to some other; it is plain a
prince cannot be under the perfect obligation of justice, and the imperfect
obligation of benevolence, without giving the people, to whom he is perfectly
or imperfectly obliged, a perfect or imperfect right, correspondent to these his
different obligations to them. The people therefore must have a perfect right
to justice; that is, according to our Author’s definition of perfect right, they
must have a just title to exact, to demand, nay, to force it. There is no avoiding
this conclusion from our Author’s own principles, but by saying what he de-
nies, and never will say, “That men are only under the law of nature till they
have got subjects some how or other under their power; and that then power
is right, and they are no more under the law of nature.” For unless this be
asserted, whether a people be subdued, and, to make the best of their misfor-
tunes, hath surrendered themselves to their conqueror as their prince; or
whether a people voluntarily and freely chooses to subject themselves to one
or many as their governors, it must be true that a prince is under perfect ob-
ligation to justice, in the treatment of his subjects; and consequently, that they
have a perfect right to force justice from him. No misfortunes can, and far less
can voluntary consent destroy or annul the law of nature. And therefore the
right to justice common to all men, can neither be annulled by the superior
force of arms, nor given up by voluntary consent. To say that the people, tho’
they can judge of the obligations of other men to justice by the law of nature,
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yet cannot, or have not a right to judge of the obligations of their prince to
justice by the law of nature, is either to say, that men in civil government give
up not only their understandings, but their senses and feeling; or it is to say,
that tho’ they may still see, feel and understand injustice, yet by putting them-
selves under a prince, they put him in a state that exeems him from all obli-
gation to justice, and consequently annuls their right to it; which is to say, that
civil government annuls the law of nature; and which of these two is most
absurd, is difficult to determine. To say the people have in civil government a
perfect right to justice, and that the princes are by the law of nature perfectly
obliged to render justice to their subjects; and yet that the people have in the
case of unjust treatment by their governors or princes, no right left to them,
but that of leaving their dear native country, is to say they have a perfect right,
the exercise of which is unlawful; a perfect right which is no right at all. And
to say the right of subjects to justice under civil government, is a perfect right
to demand and exact justice from their governors, every way but by taking up
arms, is to speak of a right not defined by our Author, or any writer on the
law of nature and nations, by all of whom, either in our Author’ words, or in
others equivalent to them, right is divided into perfect and imperfect; and right
to justice is called perfect right. So that our Author must give up his conclusions
in the preceding sections, or he must say, That civil government being con-
stituted, the right of subjects to justice from their governors, becomes, instead
of a perfect right, an imperfect one, as the right to benevolence: nay, which is
more, he must say, That, tho’ in a state of nature a right to benevolence may
become, by the law of necessity, a perfect right (as our Author hath often said
it may), yet in a state of civil government, the right to justice, even in extreme
necessity, is none at all. For sure that right becomes none at all, which extends
no farther than to the right of tamely leaving one’s native country when one
cannot have justice, but is injuriously used, which is the whole of the right of
subjects according to our Author, notwithstanding the full and perfect obli-
gation of princes to justice. We may reason thus against our Author from his
own concessions, his own principles. But does it indeed require any proof, that
miracles from heaven cannot prove any person to have a right to exerce his
power over those who are under it, whether by consent or force, in an injurious,
cruel, oppressive manner? Miracles from heaven could not prove the doctrine
of passive-obedience and non-resistance to be a doctrine of God. It is an im-
moral doctrine, which overturns the law of nature, and destroys all moral ob-
ligations. Whence could our Author, or any writer on the laws of nature,derive
his conclusions, without laying down this fundamental principle, as our Au-
thor does, “That God wills the perfection and happiness of mankind, andgives
them a right to make themselves happy?” But is not this principle given up,
the moment it is asserted, That under civil oppression and tyranny, because it
is the effect of power, submitted to for common preservation, safety and hap-
piness (the only end of civil society) men must put up contentedly with all
hardships, injuries and abuses, and no more think of any probable means to
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Tho’ these things be true of Sovereigns in general, yet it may happen,
that empire is given to one with certain restrictions by pacts, and with
a commissory article to this effect, that the deed shall be null, if the
conditions be not fulfilled. Now, in this case, no injury is done to Sov-
ereigns, if after they have been frequently admonished, they do not cease
to invade the liberty of their subjects, and to oppress them, the Empire
be taken from them. And it is evident, from the nature of pacts, if free-
men hinder those from exercising rule over them, who assume it to them-
selves without any just title to it, or with whom they have made no pact,
no transference of power, no covenant, they cannot be blamed.* <133>
make themselves happy, of any probable means, should I not rather say, to
rescue themselves from misery into a state somewhat congruous to the natural
dignity of mankind, and to the only intention, God can be supposed, without
blasphemy, to have had in view by creating them such as they are made, for
religion, virtue, industry, ingenuity, social commerce, and all the goods, wis-
dom, benevolence, religion, virtue, good government, art and united strength
can procure to human society, many of which blessings may be attained to in
some degree in a state of nature, but can never be attained to in any degree
under absolute slavery, or despotic, injurious, lawless tyranny.]
* Hence we see, that Brutus and the other conspirators unjustly killed Caesar:†
For tho’ he usurped empire in a free city, and extorted liberty from his fellow-citizens
without any just cause; yet they had acquiesced in it, and renounced their liberty.
And indeed since Brutus himself in Cicero, Epist. ad Brutum, 4. [[Cicero, Epistulae
ad Quintum fratrem et M. Brutum, 4]] durst not accuse Antonius of a hostile dis-
position towards the republic, nor when the matter was referred to him, attack him
as an enemy; with what right could he murder Caesar, whom the senate and people
of Rome were so far from looking upon as an enemy, that they had rather solemnly
surrendered themselves to him. Wherefore, that saying of Lucan is not agreeable to
right reason, Pharsal. l. 1. v. 351.
Detrahimus dominos urbi, servire paratae.
[[Lucan, Pharsalia 1.351: “We are but dislodging a tyrant from a State pre-
pared to bow the knee.” Lucan, Pharsalia, books I–X, p. 15.]]
For if the whole city desired a master, what right had Caesar, or any other private
citizen, to oppose, by a civil war, their falling under domination?
† [I do not see how this conclusion follows. But not to enter into so trite a dispute,
it is sufficient to observe here, That by the confession of our Author, Grotius, Pu-
What if
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But since all empire is supreme and absolute, (§127), the consequence
is, that all the rights are joined with it, without which the end of civil
society, viz. security, cannot be obtained; all which united together con-
stitute majesty, or the rights of majesty. Now, this security being two-fold,
internal, by which the subjects are inwardly secured one against the
other, and external, by which the society is defended against the arms
fendorff, and every writer on the law of nature, these states, kingdoms or republics,
which are constituted by pact, and with what is called by the civilians lex commissoria,
(a peremptory condition, that in case the king act otherwise, the subjects shall not be
obliged) have the power of judging when their pact is satisfied, and of taking care it
be fulfilled. In such states, the sovereign and the people hold their respective rights
by the same express tenure or charter. But no pact being valid that is contrary to the
law of nature, the law of nature really lays this restriction upon every pact about
government, that the good of the people, or the governed, shall be the supreme law,
and that nothing shall be imposed upon subjects repugnant to their good, as much,
as if that restriction had been expresly made in the pact, by a commissory clause. All
immoral things are impossible things in the language of the doctors of laws and
civilians. And therefore a pact by a people, giving power to a prince to act contrary
to their happiness, or to prefer whatever he may fancy to be his private interest, to
their good, is a pact originally and in itself invalid. A pact by a people, giving a prince
power to rule over them, otherwise than agreeably to the law of nature, that is, the
law of justice and benevolence, or in one word, the law of love, and binding them-
selves to obey his commands, whatever they be, is a pact a people cannot make; it is
an impossible pact, because an immoral one; and therefore it can never be obligatory,
but to make it is a crime; and to stand to it, is to continue, nay, to increase the guilt.
It is a mutual agreement between prince and people, to put the arbitrary will of a
prince in the place of the law of nature, the law of God. And if such a pact can be
valid, why hath our Author so often pronounced all immoral pacts invalid? But if
such a pact cannot be valid, then every pact about government, and all consent to
government, express, tacite, or presumed, hath, in consequence of the immutability
and eternal obligation of the law of nature, this condition contained unalterably and
essentially in it, “Provided the government be agreeable to the law of nature, the law
of justice and benevolence.” There is therefore, in all pacts about government, in all
consent to government, this commissory article naturally and necessarily included,
inasmuch, as it cannot be left out, but must be understood to be there by the law of
nature itself, whether it be mentioned or not, its truth, existence, or obligation, being
of the law of nature, and therefore universal and indispensable.]
Empire exerts
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and force of outward enemies; hence it is plain, that the rights of majesty
are of two sorts; some relative to the citizens or subjects themselves,
called immanent; and others relating to foreigners, called transeunt. *
<134>
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If the internal security of a state consist in defending the subjects against
violence from one another (§133), of necessity there must be joined with
sovereignty the right of making laws, and of applying these to facts or
cases, which we may call supreme jurisdiction; as likewise the right of
punishing transgressions of the laws, and of exacting tributes and duties
proportionable to the exigencies of the state; the right of constituting
administrators and magistrates; of regulating all that relates to sacred
things, as well as to commerce, and the ornament of the state; and, in
fine, of watching that the republic suffer no wrong or hurt.
* All these are confounded by several writers, who having applied themselves to
the study of public law, have acted as if it had been their business, like Plautus’s
cooks, to mingle and confound the most distinct rights. Having read in Feud. 11. §6.
some things concerning regal rights usually joined with fiefs, they thought them the
very same with the rights of majesty, tho’ it be of great consequence whether one
exercise the rights of regality as a vassal, or dependently, as it is commonly termed;
or the rights of majesty as a sovereign, or independently. Besides, all the rights be-
longing to sovereignty, and which are exercised by it, not being recited in that place
of the feudal law, they thought, that there the rights which could not be commu-
nicated to vassals without encroaching upon majesty were only treated of; and hence
they called them regalia minora, to which they oppose regalia majora, i.e. in their
opinion, incommunicable ones. Thus several writers have proceeded, who are solidly
refuted by Thomasius ad Huber. de jur. civ. 1. 3. 6. 3. p. 91. & seq. But since we are
not treating here of the rights of patronage and vassalage, but of public and universal
law, it is proper to caution against the above division, and to deduce the rights of
majesty and their different kinds from the nature and end of civil society, i.e. from
the fountain-head, rather than from Henningius Arnisaeus, Regn. Sixtin, and other
authors of that class. [[Henning Arnisaeus (ca. 1575–1636) and Regnerus Sixtinus
(1543–1617) were authors of juristic and political treatises.]]
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And since those who coalited into the same republic, likewise intended
their common security against external violence (§133); the consequence
is, that from sovereignty cannot be severed the right of making alliances
and treaties, sending ambassadors, and makingwar and peace; sincewith-
out these rights the state could not be preserved safe and secure. For
without the right of making alliances and treaties, a weaker state would
often be a very inequal match for a more potent one; without the right
of sending ambassadors, treaties could not be <135> made; and without
the right of making war and peace, it would be impossible to repel force
by force; and therefore the end of society, which is security, could not
be obtained.
s e c t i on cxx x v i
Those rights of majesty flowing directly from the nature and end of
sovereignty, cannot be separated from it without destroying that unity
of will which is the essence of society, and rearing up a republic within
a republic (§120); yet, because all, or several forms of government, are
sometimes so blended together, that one may check or balance another,
(§117), it may happen, that all, or the greater part of the rights of majesty
may be exerced, not by one person, or by one college, but by many, or
by the whole people; and in this case, there must be an assembly, in which
the Sovereign exercises them according to the judgment of the different
orders composing it.* <136>
* The most potent and flourishing Kingdom of Great Britain is an example of
this, in which the prerogative of the King with regard to war and peace, remaining
entire and unviolated, neither new laws are made, nor new taxes imposed, nor any
other thing relating to the safety and glory of the nation done, but in the states of
the Kingdom, called a Parliament. Thus likewise in Germany, nothing relating to the
Empire is decreed but by the common resolution of the Emperor, Electors, Princes,
and other orders of the Empire: And almost the same is now done in Poland and
Sweden, with safety to the prerogatives belonging to the most august Emperor and
these most potent Kings: which prerogatives are called in Germany reservata. Yea,
some such thing takes place in particular sovereignties and republics of the German
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Moreover, because both the form of the government, and the governors
themselves, are elected by the same people, who also prescribe funda-
mental laws to them (§110); hence it is evident, that none can acquire
empire to himself in a civil state without the consent of the people, or
contrary to its fundamental laws. But, according to these, empire may
either be elective or successive; and this division extends not only to mon-
archies, but to aristocracies and popular governments.*
s e c t i on cxx x v i i i
Empire is elective, when the people in an interregnum creates aSovereign,
and transfers the empire to him with his consent. But, because thepeople
may either exerce this right themselves in a regular assembly, or give this
right in perpetuity to certain persons; the consequence is, that he who
is chosen by the one or the other of those who hath the right of choosing,
ought to be held as Sovereign, provided he accepts of the sovereignty
offered to him, and be qualified according to the fundamental laws of
the state to rule and govern; and provided the election be made in the
order, and with <137> the solemnities required by the public laws, or the
customs of the state.†
Empire, as is observed by Hertius de legibus consultat. & judic. in specialibus Imp.
Rom. Germ. rebuspubl. [[Hertius (praeses ) and Ehrhart (respondens ), Dissertatio de
consultationibus, legibus et judiciis in specialibus Germaniae rebuspublicis. ]]
* Thus, when the right of governing is included in a few families, seclusive of all
the rest, so that they and their descendents only have it by right of blood, aristocracy
in this case is successive. Such are the republics of Venice, Genoa, &c. at this day, as
is observed by Hertius, Elem. polit. 1. 10. 16. p. 212. On the other hand, if the nobles
or senators be chosen, either by the people or by the college itself, then aristocracy is
elective. See Huber. de jur. civ. 1. 8. 1. 17. p. 292. In like manner, if in a democracy
the right of suffrage be given to no others but the native citizens, it is in some sort
successive; but if it may be given likewise to strangers, it is in some respect elective.
† Wherefore, those are not lawful princes who are set up by a seditious mob, or
an army, which hath not the right of election. What confusion and ruin was brought
upon the Roman state in the latter way, we may see from the examples of Otho,
Vitellius, Vespasian, Pescennius Niger, Clodius Albinus, and Septimius Severus.
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s e c t i on cxx x i x
Moreover, it is evident, from the definition of an elective government
(§138), that in it an interregnum happens, that is, a state in which the
republic hath no Head or Sovereign, as often as the Sovereign dies or
abdicates, or is deposed by the people; unless the people, during the Sov-
ereign’s life, and with his consent, choose one who is to succeed to him;
and that the designed successor hath no more power or right, during the
Sovereign’s life, but what is given to him by the people with his consent,
or what the Sovereign himself delegates to him, either during his ab-
sence, or when he is hindered by any just cause from presiding over the
state himself.* <138>
[[These were Roman emperors at times of political turmoil. Otho was brieflyemperor
in a.d. 69 but was replaced by Vitellius. In the same year, however, Vitellius was
defeated and succeeded by Vespasian. Pescennius Niger was proclaimed Roman em-
peror by his troops in a.d. 193 but was defeated by Septimius Severus, who ruled as
emperor from 193 until 211.]] For which reason, Plutarch in his life of Galba, p. 1053
[[Plutarch, Lives, vol. 11, 209]], speaking of a time, in which, as Tacitus, hist. 1. 4.
says, this arcanum of empire was divulged, that a prince might be made any where
else as well as at Rome, “affirms, that the Roman republic was shaken and convulsed
by commotions like those of the Titans in the fable, the sovereignty being at that
time bandied from one prince to another, by the avarice and licentiousness of the
army, who being corrupted by bribes and largesses, drove out one Emperor by an-
other, as we do a nail by a nail.” See Petri Cunaei, orat. 9. p. 188. [[Presumably Petrus
Cunaeus, Orationes argumenti varii (Leipzig, 1735).]] It therefore greatly concerns a
civil state, in whom the elective power is lodged, to define by clear and fixed laws,
the electors and the persons capable of being elected, and the form and method of
choosing, that it may not suffer such violent convulsions.
* For since it is one thing to abrogate sovereignty from a sovereign, or divest him
of it, and another thing to nominate a successor to him, the designed successor can
have no right to take possession of the sovereignty, but when the sovereign is abro-
gated. Hence we may observe, that the Kings of the Romans, who are sometimes
chosen in the Emperor of Germany’s life, have no power unless theEmperordelegates
some to them, as we know Charles V. did. [[Charles V (1500–1558) transferred power
to his brother Ferdinand, who was elected Roman King on January 5, 1531; that led
effectively to the division of the Habsburg monarchy. After Charles’s death, Habs-
burg Spain was ruled by his son Philip II and Habsburg Austria by Ferdinand. The
election of the future emperor during the lifetime of the present incumbent (“vivente
imperatore”) increased the influence of the ruling Habsburgs over the seven (after
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, eight) prince electors.]] The case is almost the same
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But since an interregnum is a state in which the republic hath not its
regular or ordinary Head or Sovereign (§139); and yet the people would
not have the republic to cease, while it is consulting about the choice of
a new head; the consequence is, that certain extraordinary magistrates
ought to preside in the republic during that interval, by whatever name
they may be called, who ought either to be elected by the suffrages of
the orders in the republic at that time, or which is safer and better, be
appointed by a public law before hand, making provision for the security
and good order of the state on such occasions; but that their authority
ceases when a Sovereign is elected, is obvious. However, since they sup-
ply the Sovereign’s place for a time, it is strange to find learned men
disputing whether the republic truly subsists in an interregnum, and
what frame it falls into in that situation.* <139>
with regard to co-adjutors, as they are called, who while the bishops or prelates live,
have no other right but that of succeeding them, when their chairs come to be vacant,
as they speak. See Boehmer. jur. eccles. protest. 3. 6. 23. [[ Justus Henning Boehmer
(1674–1749), German jurist and poet, professor of law at Halle and author of the Jus
ecclesiasticum Protestantium, a major work on Protestant ecclesiastical law.]]
* Pufendorff, of the law of nature, &c. 7. 7. 7. reasons thus about this matter:
“Since the intrinsic perfection of the state, and the actual existence of the sovereign
power, were both owing to the latter compact between the prince and the people, it
follows, that the person in whom the sovereignty properly resided being extinct, the
kingdom sinks into an imperfect form, and is united only by the first antecedent pact,
by which we conceive the particular members of the community to have agreed to
incorporate in one society; (of this pactwe have treated §109) not but that theprimitive
pact uniting the general body, is during the time of an interregnum considerably
strengthened and assisted by the endearment of a common country, and that kind
of relation or affinity which results from thence, together with this consideration,
that the fortunes of most men are rooted or fixed in that particular soil, and the effects
of others not easily to be transported or removed. Tho’ we may with Livy, 1. 17. call
a nation during an interregnum, a state without government, and, as it were, an army
without a general; yet because communities at their first meeting, before the sover-
eignty hath been conferred either on a single man, or on a council, seem to bear the
semblance of democracies; and further, since it is natural that all persons upon the
decease of him, to whom they committed their guidance and safety, should take care
of themselves, therefore an interregnum hath the appearance of a kind of temporary
democracy.” This is also observed by Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 1. 3. 7.
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s e c t i on cx l i
Empire is successive when by the decree of the people a royal family is
elected, one of which is always to have the supreme power, while any
one of its posterity is capable of holding it by the public constitutions.
When such a form of government is agreed upon, either the people de-
termine the <140> manner of succession, or leave it undefined. In the
latter case, the people is presumed to have approved of the commonright
of succession to intestates. But, because females are not presumed to
have so much prudence as men (§44), and because a kingdom might
happen to pass by a woman to a foreigner as dowry, therefore women
are not admitted to succession but as subsidiaries, and failing male-heirs.
In fine, since unity of will is, as were, the life and soul of a republic (§114);
and this cannot be expected, if two or more have the joint administration
of a monarchical kingdom, or share it between them; the consequence
is, that among many equally near to the last king, the first-born is justly
honoured with the prerogative (l. 1. §297).*
Hertius follows the opinion of Pufendorff, Elem. prud. civ. 1. 12. 14. and also Hou-
tuyn. Polit. general. §100. n. 6. & seq. [[Adrian Houtuyn, Politica contracta generalis.]]
But since for the most part an interrex is previously designed, or if not, some one or
more persons are elected by the common suffrage of all the orders in the state, who
for a time preside over the republic with the same power, and sometimes with larger
power than the Sovereign himself is vested with; and exercise all the rights of Majesty,
about things at least which do not admit of delay; there is no imaginable reason why
this constitution of a state, tho’ temporary, may not be called perfect, and monar-
chical, if this power be lodged in one hand, duarchical if in two, and aristocratical
if confided to many, as it were intercalar princes.
* There are some who have pronounced females quite unqualified and inhabile
to succeed to sovereignty, as Jo. Bodinus, but upon principles of Roman law, which
do not bind free nations. And since even in the Jewish state, Deborah executed the
office of a judge with great honour, and the annals of almost all nations celebrate
Queens who acquired immortal glory to themselves by their prudent government
and great actions; who will declare women unworthy of reigning? However, since
nature hath generally given a pre-eminence to men above women, it is not absurd to
say, that they ought only to be called to succession as subsidiaries. So Aristotle, Polit.
1. 3. “A man is more fit by nature to reign than a woman, unless she hath some qualities
very uncommon to her sex.”
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When the people hath settled and fixed the order of succession, it is plain
that this rule ought to be adhered to (§111), and whether the French
constitution take place, by which females are excluded; or the Castilian,
which doth not exclude the women, but postpones them to the men,
and runs back to the female again, in case the males, who were superior
or equal to them in other respects, <141> shall happen to fail, together
with their issue; (i.e. in the same degree of the same line, the younger
males are preferred to the elder females; yet so as that no transition is
made from one line to another on the bare obstacle of the sex); or
whether greater regard be had to the line, or to the nearest degree of
kindred; or whether there be any new or unusual method of succession
fixed by the public law, that rule, whatever it be, ought to be observed
as a sacred, as a fundamental constitution; whence, moreover, we con-
clude, that a people may give their Sovereign the power of appointing
his successor, and may interpose when disputes arise about the right of
succession; tho’ experience teaches us, that (to use the words of Ennius)
in such a difficult situation, “Non in jure manum conseri, sed mage rem
ferro agi”; it is not right, but the sword that decides.*1
* Many examples are brought by Pufendorff of the law of nature, &c. 7. 7. 14.
But the most regular way is the lineal, in which the first-born male, and his first-born
male succeed, while any one of the line remains; and this line being extinct, the first-
born of the next line comes in, and so on while there is any one subsisting of the first
Sovereign’s posterity. We know it was formerly disputed whether the first-born, tho’
born before his father came to the throne, or the first-born after he began to reign,
had the right of primogeniture. But since in the right of primogeniture, regard is had
to the order of birth only, there is no reason why a younger brother should be pre-
ferred to his elder, merely because the court heard the former squaul in a purple cradle.
1. Actually: “Non ex iure manu consertum, sed magis ferro” (Ennius, Annals, bk.
8, l. 252).
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Since in elective government a single person only is chosen (§138), but
in successive governments a royal family is elected (§141); because, in the
first case, the right expires with the person elected; whereas, in the latter,
it subsists while the royal family subsists; the consequence is, that in the
first <142> case there is an ordinary interregnum upon the decease of
the elected person; in the latter, there is an extraordinary interregnum,
when the royal family is extinct; and then it falls into the power of the
people to confer the regal honour upon any family they please, and to
continue the same kind of government and order of succession, or to
confine both within more narrow limits, as they shall think fit.*
s e c t i on cx l i v
Those are the ways of acquiring empire when a people constitutes its
own Sovereign; but it is often acquired by arms and force; in which case
also, a conquered people, tho’ forced, does yet, without all doubt,
consent to that sovereignty under which they are brought; and whether
the conqueror promises to govern them according to their former laws,
or stipulates to himself and his successors new terms and larger power,
or remits to the conquered people some things which their former
princes arrogated to themselves, that rule must be the rule to their pos-
terity.† <143>
* We have an example of this in the French history. See Glab. Radulph. Hist. 2.
1. and Aimon de gest. Francorum, ann. 987. “Convenientes totius regni primates
Hugonem, Ducem Parisiensem, in regem ungi fecerunt.” [[Glaber, The Five Books
of the Histories; The Life of St. William, bk. 2, chap. 1, 50; Aimon de Fleury (965–
1008), Historiae Francorum libri IV: “The leading men of the whole kingdom met
and had Hugh, Duke of Paris, anointed king.”]] And in Russia, when after various
commotions, they chose a new royal family, from which came Alexius, John, two
Peters, and Ann. For that Catharine the Empress did not succeed by right of suc-
cession, but by the last will of Peter I. every one knows.
† Hence Grotius, of the rights of war and peace, says justly, 3. 8. 1. 3. “Empire
may be acquired by victory, either as it subsists in a King or Sovereign, and then it is
succeeded to just as it is, and no more power is acquired; or as it subsists in the people,
and then the conqueror acquires it in such a manner that he can alienate it, as the
people might have done.” But what he says of alienation, deserves a more accurate
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Wherefore all the ways of acquiring empire depend upon the consent
of a people either voluntary, or forced and extorted either by a just or
unjust cause. And therefore we think there is very little foundation for
the distinction between patrimonial and usufructuary empire. For tho’
Grotius first invented that distinction (of the rights of war and peace,
2. 6. 3. & 1. 3. 12.) and hath been followed in it by a numerous tribe of
learned writers; yet this whole doctrine is loaded with so many difficul-
ties, that we cannot tell what kingdoms may be called patri-<144>mon-
ial, and what usufructuary. See Thomas. ad Huber. de jur. civ. 1. 3. 2. 15.
p. 69. & seq.
s e c t i on cx l v i
Grotius thinks some kingdoms are so much under the dominion of their
Sovereigns, that they may be alienated by them either in their life, or in
the prospect of death; and these he calls patrimonial. And that others
inspection. We say then, that a conqueror either waged war with a King only, or with
the people themselves. In the first case he succeeds to the rights of the conquered
prince, and ought to change nothing in the form of government, as, e.g. William
Prince of Orange, the War with James being ended, made no change in the British
government: But in the latter case, he has a right to transact with the conquered
people, and it depends on his will to reduce the conquered state into a province, as
the Romans for the most part did; to impose a harder yoke upon them; or to give a
specimen of his clemency, and remit some things to them. Thus Alexander, at first
a most merciful conqueror, having made himself master of the Sidonian Kingdom,
made no change in the form of their government, but restored it to Abdolominus,
Q. Curt. 4. 1. [[Curtius,History of Alexander, bk. 4.1.]] The Turks, on the other hand,
having conquered the Byzantine Empire, by the right of victory, imposed upon them
much severer conditions, being of the opinion of Ariovistus in Caesar, de bello Gal-
lico, “That by the right of conquest, the conqueror may command the conquered as
he pleases.” [[Caesar, Gallic War, bk. I, chap. 36, p. 55.]] In fine, Agesilaus, according
to Xenophon de Agesilao Rege, cap. 1. §22. “Whatever states he subdued, he exeemed
them from those things to which slaves are obliged by their masters, and only com-
manded those things in which freemen obey their magistrates.” [[Xenophon, “Age-
silaus,” 71, in Xenophon, Scripta minora. ]] But that indeed rarely happens, and much
more rarely still what Justin hist. 1. 1. says of the times before Ninus, “That those
who made war fought for glory, and satisfied with victory, did not affect empire.”
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are such, that their Sovereigns cannot alienate them, which he calls usu-
fructuary ones; tho’ Thomasius jurisprud. divin. 3. 6. 135. thinks theymay
be more properly called fideicommissory or trusts. But, 1. Since patri-
monial things are no longer common (l. 1. §235) and therefore notpublic,
because that supposes at least private communion (l. 1. §237), it is plain
that a kingdom ceases to be a republic, and degerates into a family (§89),
if it be in the dominion or patrimony of one. Besides, 2. Since all civil
states are constituted, not for the sake of the Sovereign, but for common
security (§105); for that reason, a kingdom cannot be patrimonial, with-
out ceasing to be a civil state. See a dissertation of the illustriouspresident
of this province, Jo. Gothofredi de Cocceiis, de testamentis principum,
part 2. §16. & seq.*2 <145>
s e c t i on cx l v i i
Hence we think it may be justly concluded, that no Sovereign can sell,
give, barter, divide, leave by last-will to any one his kingdom, or transfer
it in any of those ways, one can dispose of his patrimony in his life, or
in view of death to others, unless the people consent, or have given him
expresly the power of alienating his sovereignty or disposing of it.†
* A patrimonial kingdom implies a contradiction, because a kingdom is a species
of a civil state (§115); but a patrimonial kingdom is a thing under private dominion.
And indeed the whole reasoning about this matter commonly runs in a circle. For,
if you ask whether a prince has the right of alienating his Sovereignty or not? The
answer is, That there is a great difference between patrimonial and usufructuary king-
doms. But if you insist, and enquire what is the difference between these two? they
tell us, that by the former is meant a kingdom that can be alienated by its sovereign,
and by the other, one that cannot: So that they have as yet given us no certain mark
by which the one may be distinguished from the other. For nothing hinders why
despotic kingdoms, or kingdoms acquired by war, may not be unalienable, as Huber
has justly observed, de jure civ. 1. 3. 2. 18.
2. H. von Cocceji (phrases ) and J. G. Cocceji (respondens ), Disputatio juridica . . .
de testamentis principum.
† Nor do the examples brought by Grotius, Pufendorff, and others, prove any
thing. For tho’ we read that some have divided their kingdoms, and that others have
disposed of them in their last wills; yet the justice of such alienations must be de-
termined, not from what has been done, but from the principles of right reason. And
therefore the illustrious Baron de Cocceiis, gives a proper answer to all these argu-
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Remarks on This Chapter
It will be easy to determine what the law of nature prescribes in other
cases, if we can determine what it prescribes with respect to the exercise
of the absolute empire, which is the effect of, and rooted by an over-
balance in property. We have already taken notice of the natural causes
of Empire, to which, if moral writers had attended, they would not
have debated so much about the origine of civil government or Empire.
If one man, it hath been said, be sole land-lord, or over-balance the
many in property to a certain proportion, he will be sole monarch. But
now, how ought such a land-lord, and absolute master, to exercise his
dominion or empire? What rules does the law of nature prescribe to
him? Doth it not prescribe to him these very immutable, universal laws
of justice and benevolence, which have been already explained? In gen-
eral, therefore, may we not answer, that such a master is under perfect
obligation to exercise justice towards his subjects or servants, let them
be called which you will, and under imperfect obligation to exercise
beneficence towards them? But not to rest in so general an answer, the
following propositions may be laid down with re-<146>gard to such
empire, in consequence of what hath been said by our Author, and in
the preceding remarks subjoined to him, to his two last chapters in
particular. 1. It is lawful to acquire and to possess dominion; for if it be
lawful to acquire property, it must be lawful to acquire all that is nec-
essarily attendant upon property, i.e. the dominion which an over-
balance in property will necessarily produce. 2. As an attempt to change
government, without changing the over-balance of property, or to fix
government without a fixation of the balance of property, is an attempt
contrary to nature; so to endeavour to violate property in order to
change government, is unjust force. All violation of property is unjust.
3. But he or they who hold the over-balance of property, and conse-
quently the reins of government, are certainly obliged by the law of
nature to make their dependents as happy as they can, as much men as
they can. This must be true, or the law of love is a mere empty sound.
ments, when he says, de testament. principum part 2. §17. “Either these alienations
had no effect, or they were done with the consent of the people, either tacite or
express; or it was force that prevailed.”
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And therefore, 4. Tho’ it cannot be pronounced unlawful for one or
many, who have the over-balance in property, to hold it, no more than
it is for one or many, to make use of the authority their superiority in
wisdom may give them; yet it is certainly unlawful to exercise power
in consequence of property in an injurious, oppressive manner over
dependents, as if they were not men; as it is unlawful to make use of
superior prudence, or rather cunning, in order to deceive and mislead
those who pay submission and reverence to it, to their ruin or hurt. 5.
It is certainly the natural right, nay, the natural duty of a people, when
providence puts it in their power, by any revolution bringing property
to such a balance, that an equal happy government can be constituted,
to constitute such a government, and to fix and secure its duration by
the only natural way of fixing and securing it. This must be their duty,
if it be a people’s duty to consult their best interest, or to provide for
their own greatest good, and the secure continuance of happiness to
their posterity. And then does providence give this opportunity, and
consequently call to this duty, when by the course of things, without
forcible removal, or violation of property, the people come to have the
balance. And, 6. Whoever hold the over-balance of property, and by
consequence the reins of empire, one or the few, he or they are under
the same obligation, to constitute such orders of government as may
best promote and secure the general happiness of the dependent peo-
ple, that they are under to benevolence, because this is what benevo-
lence manifestly requires at their hands. I have said the same obligation
that they ly under to benevolence, because of the distinction already
explained, which is admitted by all moral writers between perfect and
imperfect obligation. And that it is a glorious and noble part to act,
who can doubt, who hath a just idea of true glory, I had almost said,
any feeling of humanity? Let it not be said that this cannot be expected
of mankind. This is an unjust reproach. Our Author has, in the scho-
lium to §144. <147> named some instances of generous princes, who
made no other use of the rights, even of just conquest, but to make
the conquered happy and free. And let me add some other examples
from ancient history yet more heroic, as they are narrated, by an author
often referred to and quoted in our remarks, with great satisfaction,
with all the joy every beneficent mind must needs be touched with, by
such god-like instances of generosity and public spirit. “In those an-
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cient and heroic times (when men thought that to be necessary which
was virtuous) the nobility of Athens having the people so much en-
gaged in their debt, that there remained no other question amongthese,
than which of those should be King, no sooner heard Solon speak, than
they quitted their debts, and restored the commonwealth, which ever
after held a solemn and annual feast, called the Sisacthia or Recision, in
memory of that action. Nor is this example the Phoenix; for at the
institution by Lycurgus, the nobility having estates (as ours here) in
the lands of Laconia, upon no other consideration than the com-
monwealth proposed by him, threw them up to be parcelled by his
Agrarian.
The Macedonians were thrice conquered by the Romans, first under
the conduct of Titus Quintus Flaminius, secondly, under that of Lu-
cius Aemilius Paulus, and thirdly, under that of Quintus CaeciliusMe-
tellus, thence called Macedonicus. For the first time Philip of Mace-
don, who (possest of Acrocorinthus ) boasted no less than was true, that
he had Greece in fetters, being overcome by Flaminius, had his king-
dom restored to him, upon condition that he should immediately set
all the cities which he held in Greece and in Asia at liberty; and that he
should not make war out of Macedon but by leave of the senate of
Rome, which Philip (having no other way to save any thing) agreed
should be done accordingly. The Grecians being at this time assembled
at the Isthmian games, where the concourse was mighty great, a crier,
appointed to the office by Flaminius, was heard among them proclaim-
ing all Greece to be free; to which the people, being amazed at so hope-
less a thing, gave little credit, till they received such testimony of the
truth as put it past all doubts; whereupon they immediately fell on run-
ning to the proconsul with flowers and garlands, and such violent ex-
pressions of their admiration and joy, as, if Flaminius, a young man
about thirty three, had not also been very strong, he must have died of
no other death than their kindness, while every one striving to touch
his hand, they bore him up and down the field with an unruly throng,
full of such ejaculations as these: How! is there a people in the world,
that at their own charge, at their own peril, will fight for the liberty of
another? Did they live at the next door to this fire? Or what kind of
men are these, whose business it is to pass the seas, that the world may
be governed with righteousness? The cities of Greece and Asia shake
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off their Iron-fetters at the voice of a crier! Was it madness to <148>
imagine such a thing, and is it done? O virtue! O felicity! O fame!
In this example we have a donation of liberty to a people, by res-
titution to what they had formerly enjoyed, and some particular men,
families or cities, according to their merit of the Romans, if not upon
this, yet upon the like occasions, were gratified with Latinity: But
Philip’s share by this means did not please him; wherefore the league
was broken by his son Perseus; and the Macedonians thereupon, for
the second time, conquered by Aemilius Paulus, their King taken, and
they some time after the victory summoned to the tribunal of the Gen-
eral, where remembering how little hope they ought to have of pardon,
they expected some dreadful sentence: When Aemilius in the first place
declared the Macedonians to be free, in the full possession of their
lands, goods and laws, with right to elect annual magistrates, yielding
and paying to the people of Rome one half of the tribute which they
were accustomed to pay to their own Kings. This done he went on,
making so skilful a division of the country, in order to the methodizing
of the people, and casting them into the form of popular government,
that the Macedonians, being first surprized with the virtue of the Ro-
mans, began now to alter the scene of their admiration, that a stranger
should do such things for them in their own country, and with such
facility, as they had never so much as once imagined to be possible. Nor
was this all; for Aemilius, as if not dictating to conquered enemies, but
to some well-deserving friends, gave them, in the last place, laws so
suitable, and contrived with such care and prudence, that long use and
experience (the only correctress of works of this nature) could never
find fault in them.3
In this example, we have a donation of liberty to a people, that had
not tasted of it before, but were now taught to use it.
But the Macedonians rebelling, at the name of a false Philip, the
third time against the Romans, were by them judged incapable of Lib-
erty, and reduced by Metellus to a province.”
Now, with respect to incapacity of liberty, I beg leave to adda remark
3. The first paragraph of this quotation (pp. 462–63, above) is from Harrington,
Oceana, 241, in Harrington, Political Works. For the remainder see ibid., 326–27,
though there are some omissions.
book i i , chapter vi i 465
from the same author. “A man may as well say, that it is unlawful for
him, who has made a fair and honest purchase, to have tenants, as for
a government, that has made a just progress, and enlargement of itself,
to have provinces. But how a province may be justly acquired apper-
tains to another place.4 (Our author treats of just war afterwards; and
this Author treats of propagation and holding at great length)—The
course Rome took is best; wherefore, if you have subdued a nation that
is capable of liberty, you shall make them a present of it, as did Fla-
minius to Greece, and Aemilius to Macedon, reserving to yourselves
some part of that revenue which was legally paid to the former gov-
ernment, together with the right of being head of the league, which
includes such levies of <149> men and money as shall be necessary for
the carrying on of the public work. For if a people have, by your means,
attained to freedom, they owe both to the cause and you such aid as
may propagate the like fruit to the rest of the world. But whereas every
nation is not capable of her liberty to this degree, lest you be put to
doing and undoing of things, as the Romans were in Macedon, you
shall diligently observe what nation is fit for her liberty to this degree,
and what not; which is to be done by two marks: the first, if she loves
the liberty of mankind; for if she has no care of the liberty of mankind,
she deserves not her own. But, because in this you may be deceived by
pretences, which continuing for a while specious, may afterwards van-
ish; the other is more certain, and that is, if she be capable of an equal
Agrarian; which, that it was not observed by excellent Aemilius in his
donation of liberty, and introduction of a popular state among the
Macedonians, I am more than moved to believe for two reasons. The
first, Because at the same time the Agrarian was odious to the Roman
patricians. The second, That the Pseudo-Philip could afterwards so eas-
ily recover Macedon, which could not have happened but by the no-
bility, and their impatience, having great estates, to be equalled with
the people: For that the people should otherwise have thrown away
their liberty, is incredible.”5
But because it will be very easy to draw a solution from the principles
which have been laid down to all the questions about government; and
4. Ibid., 167.
5. Ibid., 330.
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because the enquiry, what constitution of government is best, belongs
not to the present subject, we shall take leave of our author here, and
add no more to what he says; but in the first place, That no maxim is
more false than that whatever government is best administred is best.6
That only is good, which is, by its frame, well secured against bad men,
and bad administration. 2. Nor is another maxim in politics less dan-
gerous, which asserts that good men make good laws. It is the maxim
of Demagogues. The truth is, that good laws or orders make good men.
And a government ought to trust to its constitution and orders, and
not to men. 3. The chief matter, the whole mystery of government is
revealed to us every day (to use the words of an excellent author) by
the mouths of babes, as often as they have a cake to divide; for this is
their natural language, “I will divide, and you shall choose.”7 To which
we may apply what Horace says of other natural instincts or directions.
Unde nisi intus monstratum? 8 The whole secret of a well poised equal
government, lies in dividing and choosing, as the same author we have
so often quoted hath shewn at great length. Dividing and choosing, in
the language of a commonwealth, is debating and resolving. And in
order to a right division and choice, as the council dividing, should
consist of the wisdom of the commonwealth, so the assembly or coun-
cil choosing, should consist of the interest of the commonwealth. The
wisdom of the few may be the light of mankind, <150> but the interest
of the few is not the profit of mankind, nor of a commonwealth.
Therefore, as the wisdom of the commonwealth is in the aristocracy,
so the interest of the commonwealth is in the whole body of the people.
6. Pope, Essay on Man, epistle III, lines 304–5.
7. See Harrington, Oceana, in Harrington, Political Works, 172: “that such orders
may be established as may, nay must, give the upper hand in all cases unto common
right or interest, notwithstanding the nearness of that which sticks unto every man
in private, and this in a way of equal certainty and facility, is known even unto girls,
being no other than those that are of common practice with them in divers cases.
For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between them.
That each of them therefore may have that which is due, ‘Divide,’ says the one unto
the other, ‘and I will choose; or let me divide and you shall choose.’ If this be but
once agreed upon, it is enough; for the divident dividing unequally loses, in regard
that the other takes the better half, wherefore she divides equally, and so both have
right.”
8. Horace, Satires II, 1.52: “From where, unless from an internal instinct?”
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And whereas this, in case the commonwealth consist of a whole nation,
is too unwieldy a body to be assembled, this council is to consist of
such a representative as may be equal, and so constituted as can never
contract any other interest than that of the whole people. Whence it
follows, 4. That government, de facto, may be an art, whereby some
men, or some few men subject a city or nation, and rule it according
to his or their private interest: which, because the laws, in such cases,
are made according to the interest of a man, or of some few families,
may be said to be the empire of men, and not of laws. Yet government,
de jure, is an art, whereby a civil society of men is instituted and pre-
served upon the foundation of common right or interest, which is
properly called by Aristotle, an empire of laws, and not of men.9 The
necessary definition of a government, any thing well ordered, is, that
it is a government, consisting of the senate proposing, the people re-
solving, and the magistracy exercising. Our excellent constitution hath
been judged by the most renowned politicians the very best. See our
author, §116 in the scholium. But the discussion of this equally curious
and important subject, belongs not to the present question.
9. Aristotle Politics 3.16.
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u ch a p t e r v i i i u
Concerning the immanent rights of
majesty, and the just exercise of them.
s e c t i on cx l v i i i
The immanent or internal rights of majesty, are rights so inseparably con-
nected with it, that the security of the subjects cannot be attained with-
out them (§134). Since therefore this security consists in this, that no
subject may be injured by any other, and every one may have his own,
or whatever he has a perfect right to demand; the consequence is, that
it lies chiefly in external justice, by which we understand conformity of
external actions to law; and therefore they are not in the wrong who
contend, “That civil states were constituted for the sake of justice; or
that (Velleius Pater. hist. 2. 80),1 by giving force to laws,* and authority
to <151> courts of justice, industry and religion might be encouraged,
and property might be sure, and every one might enjoy with security his
1. See Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History, bk. 2, chap. 89 (not
80), p. 237.
* For tho’ none can deny, that internal justice, or a constant disposition to injure
no person, but to render to every one his own, be a more noble degree of virtue; yet
that such virtue is not to be expected from so many men as coalesce into the same
civil state, will not be controverted. It will therefore be sufficient, so to hold men to
their duties by laws, that they shall conform their external actions to laws, and not
refuse to any one what he hath a perfect right to demand, or do any thing contrary
to justice and equity. Yet it becomes good rulers to take all proper methods, by the
right education and discipline of their subjects, to make internal justice or virtue to
flourish among them. “It is the duty of prudent magistrates, (says Isocrates in Ar-
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own lawful acquisitions”: And therefore they justly assert that a civil state
cannot subsist, unless that justice prevail in it, by which subjects are kept
to their duty, Aristot. polit. 1. 2.
s e c t i on cx l i x
Because external justice, necessary to the security of a civil state, consists
in the conformity of external actions to law (§148), the consequence is,
that it is the office of the supreme powers to arm a state with laws; and
therefore they must have the right and power of law-making, and of
executing the laws, and consequently of adjusting the laws to the end,
form, and interest of the republic.* They have therefore power and right
to add to them, take from them, abrogate or change them, as the good
of the state may require; which power is expressed by the Roman lawyers
in a stile <152> accommodated to the nature of the Roman government,
by rogare, obrogare, derogare, abrogare, surrogare, Ulpian fragm. 1. 3.2
eopag. p. 27.) not to multiply laws, but to endeavour to render their subjects sincere
lovers of justice. For it is not laws and edicts, but good education that will make a
state truly happy. Men who are not rightly formed will dare to despise the best laws;
but those who are well educated, are led by their inward disposition to approve good
laws.” [[A paraphrase rather than a quotation from Isocrates, “Areopagiticus,” secs.
40–42, pp. 129–31, in Isocrates, Isocrates, vol. 1.]]
* Because there is this difference between natural and civil law, that the former
hath for its object good and bad actions, internal as well as external; the latter respects
indifferent and external actions, as far as the safety of a people or state requires the
regulation of them (lib. 1. §18.); it is therefore impossible that the laws of all states
should be uniform. Whence it is very difficult to determine which state hath the best
laws; and Herodotus says very justly (apud Stobaeum serm. 21. p. 180.), “If one should
lay before a people laws of all sorts, and bid them choose the best, every one would
approve of the laws of his own state; every people thinks their own laws the best.”
And indeed the laws which are best with regard to one state, because of its end and
form of government, may not be proper for another state; but, on the contrary, what
is very advantageous to one may be very hurtful to another.
2. Ulpian, “The Rules of Ulpian” (3), p. 223, in Justinian, The Civil Law, vol. 1.
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s e c t i on c l
Since there ought to be one understanding and one will in a state (§114),
which thus happens, when all the members have the same end in view,
and choosing the same means, regulate all their actions by the same rule;
an agreement that cannot be expected, considering the diversity of hu-
man dispositions, otherwise than by the submission of all the members
of a state to the will of its rulers (§114); hence it follows, that the supreme
power ought to make the rule known to which he would have them to
conform their external actions, which are in themselves indifferent.
Now, this can only be done by prescribing laws to them; and therefore
civil laws are commands of the supreme power in a state concerning the
regulation of external, indifferent actions for the good and honour of
the state; whence it is evident, that this legislative <153> power cannot
extend to the subversion of divine laws (l. 1. §17).
s e c t i on c l i
We say, that civil laws consist in the adjustment of the external indif-
ferent actions of subjects to the honour and interest of the state (§150).
For tho’ it be often necessary that magistrates repeat some divinepositive
as well as natural laws, and extend and interpret them;* give actions and
civil remedies against transgressors of them; and threaten punishments
* It is true, God hath commanded that nothing be added to or taken from the
divine law, Deut. iv. 2. But the former ought certainly to be understood of super-
stitious rites contrary to the divine law, or of will-worship, to which the Jews were
so propense. But this is no reason why the civil legislative may not extend a divine
prohibition to cases not expresly included in it, that thus the divine law be more
strictly fenced and guarded. The Hebrew doctors call this a mound to law, by which
men are kept at a greater distance from the violations of it, and the first steps towards
transgression are guarded against. See upon this subject Schickard, jur. reg. cap. 5.
theor. 18. p. 391. and Carpz in his notes on that place, and Jo. Selden, de uxor. Heb.
1. 2. [[Wilhelm Schickard (1592–1635), German mathematician and orientalist,
professor of Hebrew and Aramaic at the University of Tu¨bingen, author of Jus re-
gium Hebraeorum. The 1674 edition includes the notes by Carpzov referred to in the
text.]]
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to those who shall dare to violate laws established by God himself; yet
it is plain, from the nature of the thing, that then these laws do not owe
their original obligation to the will of the civil magistrate, but that he
then only exerts himself, as guardian of the divine laws, to make their
authority sacred in the state.
s e c t i on c l i i
Because civil laws are commands of the chief magistrate concerning the
regulation of external indifferent actions for the good and honour of
the state (§150); but such is the nature of mankind, that internal obli-
gation alone is not sufficient to influence them (l. 1. §8); nay, civil laws
cannot <154> produce internal obligation (l. 1. §7); the consequence is,
that all civil laws must be enforced by some penal sanction; and therefore
a perfect law consists of two parts, the preceptive part, and the penal sanc-
tion: But rewards are not due by a republic to those who obey its laws;
unless something be not promiscuously enjoined to all the subjects, but
it be proper that some should be excited by a particular condition to do
something extraordinary for the public good.*
* This it is proper to observe in opposition to Cumberland of the laws of nature,
proleg. c. 14. & cap. 5. §40. where he asserts the promise of rewards to be no less
necessary to maintaining the authority of laws than the commination of punish-
ments. [[Richard Cumberland, A Treatise of the Laws of Nature, 260 and 587–88.
Cumberland (1631–1718) was bishop of Peterborough and a political theorist. His
treatise on the laws of nature (De legibus naturae ) first appeared in 1672.]] But a
legislator does not owe rewards to those who do what it would be criminal in them
not to do, but to those only who do any thing extraordinary for the common good
(lib. 1. §99). Hence in vain does he expect a reward, who does not commit murder
or adultery, or theft, since he who perpetrates any such crime is worthy of punish-
ment. But one hath a right to claim a reward, if the legislator having proferred a
recompence, he is thereby excited to carry provisions to ships, to furnish arms at his
own expence, or to do any such like good service to the public, to which all and every
one are not obliged. And in this appears the wonderful goodness of God, that whereas
he hath a right to threaten punishments to the transgressors of his laws, without
promising rewards to the obedient, he profers recompences, recompences even to a
thousand generations, to them who obey his will, Exod. xx. 6.
The constituent
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s e c t i on c l i i i
Seeing by punishment is understood an evil effect of the transgression
of a law (l. 1. §99), which evil effect may consist not only in a certain
evil of suffering, but likewise in the nullity of the act done in disobe-
dience to a law; yea, in both: For this reason, a law which both pro-
nounces an act contrary to it null, and renders a transgressor liable <155>
to some evil of suffering, is called by the Civilians a perfect law; and other
laws are called imperfect, or less than perfect, Ulpianus fragment. 1. 1.3
Moreover, because an illicite action may be either determinate or in-
determinate, and may be varied by a great diversity of circumstances (l.
1. §100), the consequence is, that punishment may be definite or indef-
inite and arbitrary.
s e c t i on c l i v
Because laws would be ineffectual, were they not applied to facts; i.e.
unless enquiry were made into the agreement or disagreement of actions
with laws (l. 1. §95); it follows, that there must be some person, in a civil
state, who hath the power of judging of the imputation of actions;
which power, is nothing else but a power of judging of the actions of
others (l. 1. §97); whence it is plain, that judiciary power is necessary in
a republic. Now, because between equals neither magistracy nor pun-
ishment can take place (§6), this judiciary power in a republic must be-
long to the superior; i.e. to the supreme power in it;* and therefore it is
one of the internal rights of majesty (§134).
* Indeed a father of a family may administer justice in a natural state to his seg-
regate family, as we have already observed (§92). But in a republic that cannot be
done, but so far as the laws permit the head of a family to do it (§93). Judiciary power
therefore in civil states, belongs to the supreme magistracy, which is chiefly consti-
tuted for this very end, according to the ancients, Hesiod. Theog. v. 88.
Hac una reges sapienti lege creantur,
Dicere jus populis, injustaque tollere facta.
[[Hesiod, Theogony, line 88: “Kings are created by this one, just law, to pro-
nounce justice to the people and to remove unjust deeds.”]]
3. Ulpian, “The Rules of Ulpian” (1), p. 223, in Justinian, The Civil Law, vol. 1.
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s e c t i on c l v
But it being the office of a judge to apply laws to facts or actions, and
actions contrary to law being either detrimental to the republic itself, or
to <156> private persons; it follows from hence, that all judgments are
either private or civil, public or criminal; the former of which consist in
determining suits or controversies; the latter in punishing bad actions,
Cic. pro Caecin. c. 2. And tho’ a prince cannot be blamed, if he delegates
the judiciary power to prudent and good men, skilled in the laws (l. 1.
§101), and so constitute magistrates and judges every where; yet there
ought always to be access to the supreme power for those who think
themselves oppressed by an unjust decree of the judges; and therefore,
the ultimate determination of doubtful causes belongs to the Sovereign
of a state.*
s e c t i on c l v i
Because it belongs to a judge to apply laws to facts, and to determine
whether an action be imputable to a person or not (l. 1. §95); but to
impute an action, is to declare whether the effect assigned by a law to a
certain action takes place or not (l. 1. §99); hence it follows, that the
Sovereign, who has the supreme judiciary power, has also the power
of inflicting punishments. And be-<157>cause it cannot be denied, that
he who hath the power of making laws, must also have the power not
only of taking away a part of a law, or of making some exception to it,
* Therefore, it belongs in monarchical states to Kings and Princes; in aristocracies
to the college of nobles; and in democracies, the right of appeal is to the people; nor
ought any tribunal rashly to be established from which there is no appeal: This the
Romans could not long brook under their Kings and Dictators, l. 1. 26. 2. 8. 3. 55. 10.
9. But because the right of appealing may be not a little abused, it is not to be won-
dered at, that various remedies have been invented to restrain it within due bounds.
Such are, the power of determining without appeal lodged in some magistrates, a
certain sum being defined by the law above which appeal may be made, an oath of
calumny, a certain sum of money to be deposited by the appellant in case he should
be cast, and the like; which, whether they be expedient or not, is rather a question
of civil prudence than of natural jurisprudence.
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but even of abrogating a law (§149); much less can it be refused, that he
hath the power of exeeming a delinquent for just reasons from a law, so
as to give him a remission from the punishment due by it.*
s e c t i on c l v i i
Hence again we conclude, that there is no right of punishing among
equals,† and that neither one’s integrity of life, nor another’s confirmed
inveterate habit of sinning, gives an equal any right of punishing; and
therefore, that the nature of punishment is not fully pointed out by Gro-
tius’s definition of it, who says, “It is an evil of suffering inflicted for an
* The stoics denied this. Their maxim is known to every one: “Sapientem non
dare veniam, nec ignoscere,” Diogenes Laert. 7. 123. Senec. de clement. 2. 6. 7. [[“The
wise man does not grant pardon nor forgive” (see Diogenes Laertius, Lives, bk. 7, sec.
123); Seneca, De clementia, bk. 2, chaps. 6–7, in Seneca, Moral Essays, vol. 1).]] But
if the most just God forgives sins without violating his essential justice, why may not
a supreme magistrate, who hath the power of making penal laws, cancel these laws;
and why therefore may he not pardon a criminal? But we have said for just causes: For
as laws ought not to be enacted but for grave and important reasons, so neither ought
any indulgence to any one to be granted without just and good reasons. But what if
the punishment be appointed by a divine law? If it can be made appear that there is
such a penal law, we scruple not to affirm, that no Sovereign hath power to change
such a law, or to dispense with it (lib. 1. §17). But whether there be any such law,
hath been much disputed among the learned, and is yet undetermined. See Tho-
masius dissert. de jure adgrat. princip. circa poenam homicid. [[Thomasius (praeses )
and Clusener (respondens ),Dissertatio inauguralis juridica, de jure aggratiandiprincipis
Evangelici in causis homicidii.]]
† For we are speaking here of civil punishment, properly so called, and appointed
by law, and not of conventional, to which one of his own accord subjects himself;
nor of that revenge by which one deprives another of certain benefits on account of
his crimes, renounces his friendship and acquaintance, &c. nor of these natural evils,
such as diseases, pains, infamy, &c. which one brings upon himself by his wicked
practices. Again, there is a great difference between punishing and that right of chas-
tising which the laws give to parents, and sometimes to a husband, and to a master.
For chastisements are applied at pleasure by way of discipline: But punishment, prop-
erly so called, is inflicted by the prescription or appointment of a law, in the way of
jurisdiction. Whence it is self-evident, that an equal cannot punish an equal; but he
alone can punish who hath the right of making laws, and of applying them to facts:
Which since the supreme magistrate alone hath the power of doing (§151 and 154),
he alone therefore hath the power of punishing. It is then a very singular opinion of
Grotius (of the rights of war and peace, 2. 20. 3. 1.) to say, “That nature sufficiently
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evil of doing.” Nor by Becmann’s, “who defines it to be pain inflicted
for a crime.” The evil of suffering inflicted by the sufferer, is not pun-
ishment, but revenge; and if it be inflicted by a third person, who is not
a superior, it <158> is injury. But that neither of these ought to be per-
mitted in a civil state, is plain from hence, that the judiciary power in it
belongs only to the supreme magistrate, and those to whom he hath
delegated and intrusted it (§154, 155). <159>
s e c t i on c l v i i i
Nor will it be difficult to determine what is the end of punishment from
the very reason which makes it requisite. For since punishment,properly
so called, took its rise upon the introduction of civil government (§6),
and the right of inflicting it, is one of the immanent rights of civil maj-
esty (§134); the end of which is nothing else but the security of subjects;
the consequence is, that the same must be the end of punishments. But
because subjects are rendered secure, by reducing them in such manner,
that they shall no more be disposed to transgress, or that they shall no
longer have it in their power; i.e. either by amending them, or by taking
the power from them of offending for the future; hence it is evident,
that the former is the end of punishments, which are inflicted without
taking away the criminal’s life; and that the latter is the end of capital
punishment, “punishment joined with the loss of life,” as Justinian
shews it to be most proper that punishments should be inflicted by a superior; but
that it cannot be demonstrated, that it is necessary, unless the word superior be taken
in such a sense as to signify, that he who does a bad action, does thereby, as it were,
detrude himself out of the rank of men, into that of the brutes subjected to men.”
As if moral superiority or pre-eminence could give any mortal the right of punishing,
and superiority of empire were not necessary. See Thomasius, jurisp. divin. 3. 7. 31.
Wherefore, if an offender is punished by the person injured, it is not punishment,
but revenge; and if he is punished by a third person, it is an injury. But that both
these are prohibited in a civil state, Grotius does not deny. And therefore Sanio in
Terence reasons much better, Adelph. 2. 1. v. 34. “I am a pimp, I confess: the bane
of youth: a perjured villain: a common nuisance and pest: but I have done you no
injury.” [[Terence, “The Brothers,” act 2, lines 188–89, in Terence, Terence, vol. 2,
271.]]
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speaks, §2. Instit. de pub. jud.* And because sufficient provision would
not be made for the security of the state, if those only who had offended
should cease to transgress, and the like transgressions may still be ap-
prehended from others; it is obvious, that by the same punishments, as
by examples, others ought to be admonished of the danger of trans-
gressing; and therefore the guilty ought to be punished publickly, unless
some weightier reason forbid it. <160>
s e c t i on c l i x
These principles being fixed, it is very perspicuous, whether there be any
obligation upon a delinquent to suffer punishment. For since he who
lives in a civil state, is obliged to all, without which its end, i.e. the public
security, cannot be obtained or expected (§106), undoubtedly a delin-
quent is obliged to suffer the punishment defined by the law, tho’ not
to punish himself, and therefore not voluntarily to offer himself to cruel
sufferings:† no injury is done to one who suffers condign punishment,
* Hence it appears, that to human punishments, the end, of which some speak
so much, does not belong, viz. the expiation of guilt, and the satisfactiondue todivine
justice: For neither can we absolve those from cruelty, like that of Phalaris, who pun-
ish delinquents for no other end but to torment them. Nor could the suffering of a
guilty person make any satisfaction to the infinite divine justice, had it not been sat-
isfied by another satisfaction truly infinite. But they who talk in this manner do not
consider the origine of punishments, which is nothing else but the necessity of them
to the security of a civil state; and seem at the same time not to attend to the dis-
tinction between human and divine justice, and between civil punishments and those
eternal ones which abide sinners in the life to come.
† Yea, because punishment is an evil of suffering, from which nature is abhorrent,
what one is willing to undergo would not be a punishment. Quintilian Declam. 11.
says, “He is mistaken who measures the atrocity of torments by their names: Nothing
is a punishment but what is unwillingly undergone. We suffer no pain but by im-
patience, and it is fear that alone can make a thing appear cruel or terrible. Will any
one call that a punishment to one, to which one runs, and which he calls for? Drag
condemned malefactors whither they are unwilling to go.” [[Quintilian, “XI: The
Case of the Rich Man Accused of Treason,” 142, in TheMajor DeclamationsAscribed
to Quintilian, 137–44.]] It is a barbarous custom to force men to lay violent hands
on themselves, to rip up their bowels, or to take poison, or to choose any other way
of death. For we are not obliged to be ourselves the instruments of the punishment
we are obliged patiently to submit to.
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being convicted of a crime; nor is it lawful to any one to resist the su-
preme power, when it inflicts the punishment appointed by law. <161>
s e c t i on c l x
Now, from the end of punishments (§158), we infer, that they ought to
be adjusted to the end of the republic, and therefore to be of such a
nature as is most proper for its internal security. Whence it follows, that
the supreme power is obliged to punish such crimes as disturb the se-
curity of the state, or hinder the subjects from living conveniently and
tranquilly. But it is not necessary to punish vitious acts which rest in the
mind, nor yet such minute faults as every man is liable to; nor the omis-
sion of the offices of humanity, unless these crimes become, by their
prevalence, dangerous, or disgraceful to the state, and therefore necessity
oblige to restrain even them.*
s e c t i on c l x i
It is abundantly plain, from the very definition of punishments (l. 1.
§99), that they only ought to be punished who have committed any evil
action; not their heirs or their families,† or sureties, who bound them-
* Thus we find in matters of treason, the very thought or knowledge of it in some
states is punished; and in some nations inhospitality is punished: We have given some
examples of this, (lib. 1. §216). And we shall now add, that the ancient Germans
commanded humanity to strangers by laws, with penalties annexed to them. There
are such sanctions in the Lex Burgund. 33. 1. Capitular. 1. 75. in which a pecuniary
mulct is ordered against those who shut their house or the market-place against a
stranger. The Goths ordered by a law the houses of those to be burnt who had three
times refused access to travellers, Joan. Mag. hist. Goth. 4. 1. See Element. juris Germ.
1. 18. §420. [[Burgundian Code, 38.1. Capitularia Regum Francorum. Johannes Mag-
nus, Gothorum Sueonumque historia. The last reference is to Heineccius’s own Ele-
menta iuris Germanici. ]]
† The Persians were so barbarous, of which cruelty, see Barn. Brisson. de regno
Persic. 2. 227. p. 591. [[Brisson,De regio Persarumprincipatu libri tres. ]]Wehavesome
traces of it in Daniel, vi. 24. and Esther ix. 14. And that this barbarity still prevails
very universally in the eastern nations, hath been observed by those who have de-
scribed their manners with the greatest accuracy. But as this usage is absolutely re-
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selves to punishment for others, contrary to right and justice (l. 1. §146).
But since whole societies constitute one moral person (§19), and there-
fore are bound by the same laws prescribed to the rest (§23), it is obvious,
<162> that communities and societies may be punished, tho’ humanity
itself pleads for the mitigation of the punishment, that the innocentmay
not suffer equally with the guilty; and that those who transgressed by
mistake, or thro’ weakness of judgment, may not feel the same severity
with those who were the stirrers up and ringleaders in such tumults. And
in punishing large bodies, corporations or communities, that the remedy
may not be worse than the disease, care ought to be taken that fear may
affect all, and punishment may reach but to few.
s e c t i on c l x i i
What kind of, and how great punishments ought to be inflicted, is plain
from the nature and end of punishment. For since the end of punish-
ment consists in the security of the subjects (§158), the consequence is,
that punishment ought to be sufficient to impress fear, and to restrain
and coerce evil dispositions. But such being the nature of mankind, that
any evil concupiscence, which hath once got possession of the heart,
cannot be restrained, but by setting before men a greater evil or good,
(l. 1. §52); hence we have reason to conclude, <163> that a penal sanction
will not impress sufficient fear, unless men judge it a greater evil to un-
dergo the threatened punishment, than to omit the crime forbidden un-
der that penalty, and be deprived of the pleasure or profit they expect
from it.*
pugnant to right reason, so it is not possible by any prudence to prevent the falling
of punishment inflicted upon parents, indirectly, at least, upon their children, es-
pecially when their estates are confiscated by law. And this consideration hath moved
more humane legislators very rarely to use this punishment, and not but in case of
treason, to confiscate all the goods, that as much as it was possible for them to do,
they might prevent punishment from extending so much as indirectly to the children
of the punished.
* The punishment of injuries by the laws of the twelve tables, furnishes us with
an example. For it struck so little terror into wicked rich men, that they rather took
pleasure in committing insults, which could cost them but a very trifling fine. The
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s e c t i on c l x i i i
From these principles we further conclude, that the security of the civil
state does not admit of the punishment of retaliation, or like for like.*
Nor is the rule about proportion between the crime and the punishment
a just one, unless it be understood, not so much of the actions them-
whole matter is related at great length by Aulus Gellius Noct. Attic. 20. 1. who tells
us there, “That the fine for an injury or insult being a very few pence, that hardly any
one was so poor, as that he could be restrained by it from indulging his arrogance
and insolence. And therefore Labeo in his commentary on the twelve tables, did not
approve of this law. He mentions one L. Neratius, a person of remarkable pride and
insolence, whose great joy it was to give a freeman a blow on the face with his fist,
and who went about diverting himself in this outrageous manner, attended with his
servant, who carried a purse to count down the fine of five pence, appointed by law
for the offence to every one he cuffed. For which reason, the Praetors afterwards
abolished this law, and published an edict, in which they constituted themselves re-
pairers of estimable injuries.” [[Gellius, Attic Nights, bk. 20, chap. 1.13, pp. 411–13.]]
So far then was such a slight penalty from checking, that it rather provoked and
encouraged insolence and injuriousness.
* God himself seems to have approved this law, Exod. xxi. 23. Levit. xxiv. 50.Deut.
xix. 19. That law of the Decemviri is also well known, “Si membrum rupsit, ni cum
eo pacit, talio esto.” apud Gell. Noct. Attic. 20. 1. [[Gellius, Attic Nights, bk. 20,
chap. 1: “If one has broken another’s limb, there shall be retaliation, unless a com-
promise be made.”]] But as the Jewish Rabbis themselves so interpret the divine law,
that such injuries might have been expiated by money consistently with it: So Cae-
cilius denies that ever this law took place among the Romans, apud Gell. ibid. And
they are perhaps proverbs indicating, that he is not injured by one who suffers the
same from another, he himself did to him, tho’ perhaps the same thing may not
occasion equal suffering to both. See Jo. Clericus ad Exod. xxi. 22. In which sense
Pythagoras said punishment was compensation, or equal suffering. However thatmay
be, that the law of like for like hath not always place, may be proved from these
considerations. 1. That sometimes such a punishment would scarcely deserve the
name of punishment, e.g. if I should be ordered to take as much money from one
as he had taken from me, in the highway; or if a man of no rank give a blow to a
magistrate, should be struck himself by the magistrate. 2. Sometimes it cannot be
done, i.e. the one cannot be made to suffer as much as the other, e.g. if a person with
one eye should beat out another’s two eyes. 3. Sometimes equality cannot be so ob-
served but that the delinquent must suffer more than the person injured. Thus, e.g.
I know an instance of one run through the body by a night-walker in such a manner,
that his intestines not being touched he soon recovered. But could all the physicians
in the world, with their united skill, thus run a sword through one without doing
him more mischief?
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selves, as of the disposition to perpetrate them. Besides, since some
crimes are more noxious to the public than others, and some tend more
than others to its dishonour, it is easy to find a reason why an action,
which is more hurtful to the public security, is fenced against <164> by
more severe and awful punishment, and punishment is augmentedwhen
crimes become more frequent.
s e c t i on c l x i v
But, as in the imputation of other human actions, so likewise in the
imputation of crimes, all circumstances ought to be attended to; for one
circumstance often changes the whole affair (l. 1. §100). And therefore
it may happen, that one ought to be more severely punished thananother
for the <165> same crime; and in defining punishments, regard ought
to be had not only to the person of the delinquent, but likewise to the
person injured, and also to the object, the effect, the place, the time, and
like circumstances.*
* Thus, with respect to the delinquent, he deserves a greater punishment whom
kindred, prudence, age, dignity ought to have kept back from a crime, than a stranger,
an ignorant unthinking person, one under no special obligation, a boy or stripling,
one of the lower rank of mankind (l. 1. §113). A robust person will require a severer
corporal punishment than one of a weakly delicate constitution; and if a pecuniary
mulct is to be inflicted, more ought to be laid upon a rich Neratius, than upon a poor
man. In like manner, if an injury be done to a magistrate, or to a person of dignity,
who will deny that it ought to be more heavily punished than an affront to one of
the vulgar and dregs of mankind? Besides, if it be a crime to seize the goods of a
private person to make gain of them; how much greater a crime must it be to rob
the public, or to commit sacrilege? Thus we find a soldier’s deserting from his post
in an encampment is more severely punished than one’s running away from winter-
quarters, on account of the more dangerous consequences of the former. And in like
manner, all equal judges pronounce an injury done in church, or during divine wor-
ship, more heinous than one done in a private place, and at another time. So that the
public sense does not approve the doctrine of the Stoics, concerning the equality of
all crimes, Cic. Paradox. 3. Diogen. Laert. 7. 120. against which we find Horace rea-
soning thus:
Non vincet ratio hoc, tantumdem ut peccet, idemque,
Qui teneros caules alieni infregerit horti,
Et qui nocturnus divuˆm sacra legerit. Adsit
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s e c t i on c l x v
Nor ought it to be forgot, that since all punishments are not intended
to cut off the flagitious delinquent; but they are often only intended to
reform <166> him, and make him more regular and circumspect for the
future (§158); care ought therefore to be taken, that all who suffer for
their faults be not marked with ignominy; because they would thus be
no longer useful members in the republic, and could scarcely gain their
living by any honest art or employment.
s e c t i on c l x v i
To the internal rights of majesty belongs the power of exacting tributes
and taxes from subjects, and of applying their goods to public uses when
necessity so requires; which last is called eminent dominion. * Forallbeing
in the power of a Sovereign, without which the end of a republic, viz.
internal and external security, cannot be obtained (§133); which cannot
Regula, peccatis quae poenas irroget aequas:
Ne scutica dignum horribili sectere flagello.
Horat. Serm. 1. 3. v. 115.
[[Horace, Satires I, 3.115: “Nor will reason prove this, that the sin is one and
the same, for one who cuts the young cabbages from someone else’s garden
and for one who steals the sacred objects of the gods by night. Let there be
a rule to assign fair penalties to offences, to avoid flaying with the terrible
scourge what only deserves the strap.”]]
* We confess that this term is not very apposite to express the thing, the ideas of
empire and dominion being very different, and because the former and not the latter
belongs to Sovereigns. Wherefore, what Grotius (of the rights of war and peace) first
termed dominium eminens; Seneca of benefits, 7. 4. has more properly called potestas.
“Ad reges, potestas omnium, ad singulos proprietas pertinet.” [[“[E]verythingbelongs
to the king, and yet property, to which the king lays claim by his universal right”
(Seneca, Moral Essays, vol. 3, 465).]] See V. A. Corn. van Bynkersh. Quest. jur. publ.
2. 15. p. 290. [[Bynkershoek, Quaestionum juris publici libri duo, vol. 1, 290.]] And
hence certain lawyers of Wirtemberg have contended against Jo. Fr. Hornius [[ Jo-
hann Friedrich Horn (ca. 1629–65), German jurist]], that this supreme right is not
to be derived from dominion, but from sovereignty. (See Guil. Leyseri collectio scrip-
torum eristicorum pro imperio contra dominium eminens.) [[Wilhelm Leyser (1592–
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be obtained without contributions from the subjects for bearing the nec-
essary charges of the republic, and unless the Sovereign may sometimes
apply the goods of subjects for public uses; the consequence of this is,
that Sovereigns must have a right to exact contributions from subjects,
and likewise a right of exercing an eminent dominion. <167>
s e c t i on c l x v i i
Now, since a Sovereign hath this right (§166), it is obvious, that to him
belongs the protection and guardianship of private properties;* that
when the exigencies of the state require it, they may be ready, and in a
condition to answer the necessities of the republic; and therefore he has
a right of making laws concerning the right use of property, and con-
cerning alienations and conveyances (l. 1. §317); as likewise of settling
commerce by treaties, and of restricting it according as the interest of
the republic may require; of regulating import and export, promoting
manufactures and arts, making sumptuary laws; and, in one word, of
doing every thing to make the state thriving and opulent, and sufficient
to defend and maintain itself in a flourishing condition.
1649), Dissertatio pro imperio contra dominium eminens. ]] But this debate being about
words, while all are agreed that a Sovereign hath the right of applying the goods of
subjects to public uses, when necessity requires it, there is no reason for exploding a
received phrase.
* Upon this depends the right of Sovereigns to give tutors and curators to minors,
to persons labouring under any disease which incapacitates for business, to mad per-
sons, to prodigals, to women, &c. and of prescribing rules to such administrators,
calling them to an account, and removing them from their trust, if they areunfaithful.
See Plato de legibus, l. 11. where he says, that pupils are under the care and guardi-
anship, not of private persons, but of the public, and are one of its most sacred
charges. Hence the Germans, from the most ancient times, claimed from their Em-
perors a certain supreme guardianship or tutorage, of which I treated long ago in a
dissertation de suprema principum & magistratuum tutela. [[Heineccius (praeses )
and Russel (respondens ), De suprema principummagistratuumque tutela dissertatio iur-
idica inauguralis. ]]
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Such is the right of sovereignty in the ordinary state of a republic. But
because it is in an extraordinary state of the republic that eminent do-
minion takes place (§166), the consequence is, that a Sovereign has the
right, in time of war, to make en-<168>campments upon the fields of
private persons, and to make necessary fortifications and public works
upon them, l. 9. C. de oper. public. to bring in corn and other necessaries
by foraging; to make new highways through the lands of subjects when
the old ones fail, l. 14. §1. D. quemadm. serv. amitt. throw down houses
in the suburbs when Hannibal is at the gates, and such other like things.
s e c t i on c l x i x
But since this right only takes place in urgent necessity (§166), and since
that is necessary, without which the public good, the supreme law in every
state (§24), or liberty, property and security, cannot be maintained and
preserved; hence we may justly infer, that this right may not only take
place when the extreme necessity of a republic requires it, but even as
often as it is truly requisite to the public utility; especially since utility
often becomes necessity (V. A. Corn. van Bynkersh. ibid. p. 292).4 But
this right scarcely takes place, when it is merely the private interest of
the Sovereign that demands it, if any one’s just right is taken from him
by it; much less, when it is not his real utility but pleasure that is the
motive. And, in fine, of such a nature is this eminent dominion, that a
good prince will easily submit to fixing bounds to it, and will use it very
modestly (Bynkersh. ibid.).* <169>
4. Bynkershoek, Quaestionum juris publici libri duo, vol. 1, p. 292.
* We have added these limitations, because without them this right would de-
generate into the highest injuriousness. Hence God was exceeding wroth with King
Achab, when he would have violently extorted Naboth’s vineyard from him, because
contiguous to his palace, that he might make a Kitchen-garden of it, 1 Kings xxi. 2.
For such a demand proceeded rather from the wantonness and voluptuousness of a
wicked King, than from real utility. The Roman senate refused an action to the Prae-
tors against M. Licinius Crassus, when they would have carried an aqueduct thro’ his
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s e c t i on c l x x
Since equity teaches us that the common burdens of the republic ought
to be supported at the common charge (§166), the consequence of this
is, that one subject ought not to be loaded more than another; and there-
fore, that compensation ought to be made to him who must part with
any thing for the public utility out of the treasury or the public coffer.*
And if that cannot be done immediately, they who are thus deprived of
any part of their property have a right to exact it, unless they build con-
trary to law, and such an edifice, or whatever kind of work it is, be de-
stroyed, the public utility so requiring. For, in this case, so far are they
from having a right to demand refunding the value, that they are liable
to the penalty appointed by the laws. V. A. Corn. van Bynkersh. ibid.
p. 297. <170>
ground, because they said it was rather a matter of pleasure and ornament than of
public utility, Liv. 40. 51. Thus the case is represented by Marc. Zuer. Boxhorn. Dis-
quisit. polit. casu 31. [[Boxhorn, Disquisitiones politicae. ]] Yet Bynkersh, hath pro-
duced a charter by William Prince of Orange, in which he gives power to the mag-
istracy of Leyden, of taking possession of the court-yards of private persons, paying
them the price, even though it was not otherwise necessary, but for the ornament of
the Academic buildings, and the pleasure of the students: upon which, however, he
adds this remark, “Such a right I would not use, nor did the Roman senate use it in
the case of Crassus; nor did even Augustus use it, of whom Sueton tells us, Aug. c.
56. ‘That the Roman Forum was made narrow by him, because he would not take
the neighbouring houses from their proprietors.’ ” [[Bynkershoek,Quaestionum juris
publici libri duo, vol. 1, p. 295.]]
* This is acknowledged by Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 2. 14. 7. by
Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 8. 5. 7. by Huber de jure civitatis, 1. 3.
6. 44. and by all who have treated at any length of this dominion; among whom
Bynkersh. ibid. deserves the first place, who has shewn that the Romans followed this
maxim, from Tacitus Annal. 1. 75. and l. 9. cod. de oper. pub. And undoubtedly the
same principle of equity takes place here, upon which the Rhodian law concerning
goods thrown over board, was founded, Paulus l. 1. D. ad leg. Rhod. viz. That what
is given up for all should be made up by the contribution of all.
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Besides, from the same definition it is plain that this right can only be
exercised upon the goods of subjects, and not upon the goods of for-
eigners who are not enemies. Wherefore those princes are hardly excus-
able, who lay their hands upon the goods and merchandize of nations
in friendship with them, force them to lend them money, or seize their
ships to transport troops or provisions. But such pressing, as it is called,
is frequent, and defended under this colour, that foreign ships, found in
the harbours of a prince, are subject to him;* and it is practised by a
received custom among nations and empires.
s e c t i on c l x x i i
So much for the eminent dominion or transcendental propriety. As to taxes
and imposts, it is the interest of a republic to be strong in money on a
dou-<171>ble account. First, in order to support its Sovereign suitably
to his dignity. And secondly, that money, the nerves of all business, may
not be wanting either in time of war or peace; and therefore in republics
there are usually two public coffers, one of which is intended for the
suitable maintenance and support of the Sovereign, and is called the
exchequer; the other for the public use, which is called the treasury. † That
* Since the Greeks returning from the expedition of Cyrus, could not so much
as use this colour, what they did is so much the less excusable, tho’ Grotius does not
seem to condemn it (of the rights of war and peace, 2. 2. 10). By Xenophon’s advice,
as he himself tells us, de expedit. Cyr. 5. 1. 6. they, “having the most pressing occasion
for shipping, seized such as passed by, but so that the cargo was preserved untouched
for the owners, and to the seamen they not only gave provisions, but paid them the
freight.” [[See Xenophon, Anabasis, vol. 2, bk. 5, chap. 1, 10–12.]] This indeed had
been excusable on account of necessity, had it been a public expedition. But we can-
not see how this right could in any way belong to a handful of soldiers, who had
engaged in an expedition with Cyrus without the consent of their several states, an
expedition more memorable by its greatness than its justice.
† It is right to distinguish these two, tho’ not unfrequently in monarchies princes
take all to themselves in such a rapacious manner, that there is in fact no difference
between the two. Dion. Cassius, hist. 53. p. 506. tells us, That Augustus had both
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both of these should be well filled, is greatly the interest of every civil
state.
s e c t i on c l x x i i i
Since the money destined for the support of a Sovereign is brought into
the (fiscus ) or exchequer, (§172), some nations have thought fit not only
to assign to their Sovereigns certain lands and territories, out of the rev-
enues of which their dignity is to be supported, which are now called
demesnes of the crown, or crown-lands; but likewise certain customs,
duties, tollages, or taxes; and all things within the territory of the re-
public not under dominion (l. I. §243 & seq.); which latter way of en-
riching the king’s treasury hath been the more readily agreed upon in all
nations,* that it is done with the least cost to particulars. <172>
money and soldiers at his absolute command; and he adds, “And tho’ in words he
distinguished between his own money and the public treasury, yet in fact he made
use of both at his pleasure.” [[Cassius, Roman History, bk. 53, chap. 22, p. 251.]] But
here we are not enquiring what is done, but what ought to be done: and therefore,
it is proper to distinguish between these two public coffers, as is carefully done even
in aristocracies and other republics.
* The nations of German origine chiefly, of whom Grotius of the rights of war
and peace, lib. 2. c. 8. §5. says, “The people of Germany consulting about making
some allowances to their Princes and Kings to support their dignities, thought it
proper to begin with such things as might be given without damage to any one, such
are those which no person could lay particular claim to, which I find that the Egyp-
tians also practised. For there the King’s Intendant, whom they called i⁄dion lo´gon,
seized on all such things to the use of the crown.” But what Grotius says here of the
Egyptians, as from Strabo, whom he quotes in the margin, Geog. l. 17. p. 1148. edit.
noviss. does not relate to the Egyptians, but to the Romans, after they had reduced
that country to the form of a province. [[Presumably the “editio novissima” of
Strabo’s work is the Rerum geographicarum libri XVII, published in Amsterdam in
1707.]] The office which Strabo calls i⁄dioc lo⁄goc, was the same as the Digest calls
Procurator Caesaris, or Rationalis. What Strabo says is this, “There is another officer
called i⁄dioc lo´goc [[a kind of “special agent” of Caesar (see Strabo, Geography, vol.
8, bk. XVII, chap. 1.12, p. 51)]] whose business it was to demand such things as had
no master, and consequently ought to fall to Caesar.” This is justly observed by Ca-
saubon on this passage of Strabo.
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Since therefore the demains of a Sovereign are intended for the main-
tenance of his dignity (§173), it is plain that they cannot be alienated,
and therefore may be reclaimed by a successor singular or universal, if
they are alienated; nor does it make any difference whether they are alien-
ated in part or in whole, since of what is not ours we cannot alienate the
smallest part, as Grotius justly observes (of the rights of war and peace,
2. 6. 11.) where he remarks, that such alienations made with the consent
of the people are valid,* and the fruits of this demain or patrimony of
the crown are to be distinguished from the patrimony itself. <173>
s e c t i on c l x x v
Moreover, because things having no master have been assigned to Sov-
ereigns (§173), it is not difficult to find a reason why the crown every
where pretends to a right to all those things which are by the Roman law
pronounced either common or public, as the seas which wash their ter-
ritory, rivers, large forests, and therefore the rights of fishing and hunt-
ing; as also the right of digging for minerals and metals, and of taking
possession of vacated goods, and of gems or precious stones cast out by
* Whether the people originally consented, or afterwards ratified the alienation,
of which innumerable instances hath happened in Germany. For the ancient Em-
perors being so very profuse in giving away their demains, especially to the church,
that at present hardly any of them remain; none will say, that the Emperor can now
reclaim them, since these alienations have been confirmed long ago by the orders of
the Empire; yea, tho’ the Emperor usually promises to recover the rights and revenues
of the Empire, Capitul. Caroli 6. art. 10. yet this is understood by the interpreters of
the public law of Germany, to mean so far as it can be done consistently with the
public laws. [[This refers to the so-called electoral capitulation of Charles VI, Holy
Roman Emperor from 1711 to 1740. The electoral capitulation contained the con-
cessions the emperor elect made to the Holy Roman Empire’s electoral princes in
return for their votes (see Charles VI, Capitulatio Caroli VI ).]] And the Emperors
and Kings, who were sollicitous about this recovery, had very bad success, such as
Henry V. Rudolph I. Albert I. and others. See Schweder dissert. de domanio imperii.
[[Schweder (praeses ) and Pregitzer (respondens ), Dissertatio inauguralis de Domanio
S. Romani. ]]
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the sea, alluvions, new islands, deserted channels, and, in some places,
trove-treasure, and vagabonds and bastards; tho’ all these things differ
according to the different usages of nations, as Huber has justly ob-
served, de jur. civ. 2. 4. 4. 48. p. 468.* <174>
* The disputes about the dominion of the sea between Grotius and Selden, Rob.
Jonston, Petr. Bapt. Burgus, Guil. Welwood, Jo. Isaac Pontanus, Theod. Graswinck-
elius, and more lately between Pufendorff, Huber, Jac. Gothofredus, Jo. Hen. Boecle-
rus, Corn. van Bynkershoek, and Christ. Thomasius, and others, are known; nor need
we enter into the controversy. [[These works are Grotius’sFree Sea (1609);Selden,Mare
clausum (1635), written around 1618; Robert Johnson, Nova Brittannia (1609); Borgo
(Burgus), De dominio serenissimae Genuensis reipublicae inMari Ligustico libri II (1641);
Welwood, “Of the Community and Propriety of the Seas” (1613), in Grotius,Free Sea;
Pontanus, Discussionum historicarum libri duo (1637); and Graswinckel, Maris liberi
vindiciae (1652), which was directed against Borgo’s treatise. Pufendorf, Huber, and
Thomasius did not publish separate treatises on the freedom of the seas, though they
referred to this question in their more general juristic works. The jurist Jacques Gode-
froy (Jacobus Gothofredus, 1587–1652) published De imperio maris deque iure naufragii
colligendi (1637). The work by Boecler (1611–72) presumably is a university dissertation
for which he acted as praeses, with the title Minos maris dominus (1656); Bynkershoek
published De dominio maris dissertatio (1703). It is not clear who “Rob. Jonston” is.]]
We are of opinion, that as none can doubt that the sea is under the dominion of none,
so it cannot be questioned but it may be occupied, and falls to the occupant, (lib. 1
§241); especially since that hath been long ago done, and is still, as experience teaches
us. But because things of exhaustless use are not occupied, nor is it lawful to exclude
others from the use of them by occupancy, (lib. 1. §235), some things in the sea being
of exhaustible use, such as the larger kinds of fishes, pearls, tolls, and such other emol-
uments; and other things being of inexhaustible use, as navigation; others may be ex-
cluded from the former, but not from the latter. Much more then have they who have
certain territories beyond sea, a right to exclude all others from navigation to them,
whether with a view to occupancy or for commerce, unless it be otherwise provided by
treaties and pacts; since it depends upon the will of every nation, to permit ornotpermit
commerce with foreigners to its subjects. But navigation to other territories not be-
longing to us, for the sake of commerce, is as unjustly denied by us as the use of a
public road, unless this navigation be hindered by pacts and treaties. This is our opinion
about this celebrated question. Nor need we be very anxious about it, since this matter
is rather decided by force than by words and arguments; so true is what Horace says,
Carm. 1. 3. v. 21.
Necquidquam Deus abscidit
Prudens Oceano dissociabiles
Terras, si tamen impiae
Non tangenda rates transiliunt vada.
Audax omnia perpeti
Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas.
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Since it is the interest of the republic that the exchequer should be as
rich as possible (§172), it is not strange that other advantages and means
of gain are given to it; especially the right of coining money, mulcts,
and contreband goods, and the right of seizing* all unlawful acquisi-
tions, and other such, which are commonly, tho’ not so justly, called the
regalia minora (§133). But here the customs of nations are different, ac-
cording as kingdoms allow more or less to Sovereigns, or they have ar-
rogated more or less to themselves by long use. <175>
s e c t i on c l x x v i i
As for the public treasury, it is chiefly filled by taxes and duties, unless
there be so much public land that the republic can be preserved by its
revenues. For since (§172) republics can do nothing without money, ei-
ther in war or peace (Tacit. hist. 4. 74), and, there not being a sufficient
quantity of public land, that can be no otherwise got than from the
subjects; the consequence is, that the chief magistrate can impose trib-
utes and taxes upon the subjects, either with or without the consent of
the different orders of people in the state, according to the different
forms of government; and that they may lay them upon persons, lands,
merchandize imported and exported, consumable commodities, man-
ufactures and commerce, as is most convenient, provided regard be had
to the condition of the people and the quality of things,* and subjects
[[Horace, Odes 1.3.21ff. in Odes and Epodes: “All to no avail did God delib-
erately separate countries by the divisive ocean if, in spite of that, impious
boats go skipping over the seas that were meant to remain inviolate.”]]
* This appeared most equal to Serv. Tullius King of the Romans, and by that
means he was very popular, Dion. Halicar. antiq. Rom. lib. 4. p. 215. He declared he
would not suffer the poor to be over-loaded with taxes, and to be obliged to contract
debt; and therefore, that he would rather make a valuation (census ) of the estates of
his subjects, and make every one contribute according to his fortune, as used to be
done in well constituted and regulated states. “For (said he) I reckon it just that he
who has large possessions should contribute largely, and that little should be exacted
from those who have but little.” [[Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities,
vol. 2, bk. IV, chap. 9.7, p. 297.]]
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be not so oppressed, that they, like slaves, do not acquire to themselves,
but to their Sovereign.
s e c t i on c l x x v i i i
But if in levying taxes, regard ought to be had to every one’s faculties,
and the subjects ought not to be oppressed with burdens (§177), it is
manifest that what is above the power of the subjects, ought not to be
exacted from them; nor ought they in <176> times of peace to be so
spunged, that they can be able to contribute nothing in case of danger:
Besides, this contributed money ought not to be collected with toomuch
rigidity, and it ought to be honestly and faithfully managed, and em-
ployed for the purposes to which it is destinated, or which the very end
of the contribution requires. This is evident from the nature of the thing.
s e c t i on c l x x i x
Moreover, another of the internal rights of majesty, is to constitutemin-
isters and magistrates (§134). By ministers we understand those who gov-
ern a part of the republic entrusted to them in the name of theSovereign:
By magistrates, who manage a part committed to them in their own
name, but dependently on the Sovereign. Since therefore ministers act
in the name of the Sovereign, and magistrates dependently on him, the
consequence is, that the Sovereign has the sole right of nominating
them, unless he hath granted to others the right of choosing and pre-
senting, or to a community the right of election: that they are under
particular obligation to him, and are bound to render account to him,
and may be justly degraded from their dignity by him, if they do not
acquit themselves well in their charge; nay, may be punished, if they be
guilty of knavery, or any gross misdemeanor, as the demerit of their
crime requires.* <177>
* But an unfraudulent counsel or design, disappointed by the event, is not pun-
ishable, since none can be obliged to answer for the event of things. Nor does he
deserve punishment who executes the commands of his prince or country, if it be
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As a part of the public concerns is entrusted to ministers as well as mag-
istrates (§179), it therefore is the duty of a prince to know his men well,
and to take care to choose none but such as are proper for the trust; and
it is the duty of subjects, on the other hand, not to ambition trusts to
which they are not equal; and much more is it so, not to brigue for them,
or to use bribery, largesses, and other vile arts to procure them, or to buy
them, unless it appear to the Sovereign to be for the interest of the re-
public that such offices should be matter of commerce. Moreover, it is
self-evident that every minister and magistrate is obliged to all diligence
and fidelity, and to regard the happiness of the state as his chief, his
supreme law; and much more is this obligation incumbent upon a first
and chief minister, upon whose shoulders the Sovereign hath laid the
chief burden of the government.* <178>
not contrary to justice and morality. See V. A. Corn. van Bynkersh. Quaest. jur. publ.
2. 2. p. 196. & seq. [[Bynkershoek, Quaestionum juris publici libri duo, vol. 1, p. 196.]]
It was therefore a barbarous custom of the Carthaginians to punish their best Gen-
erals, if their designs missed of success. Nor is that custom of the Turks and other
eastern nations less detestable, who measuring a counsel by the event, condemn those
whose designs prove successless. For this is not only contrary to justice, but to pru-
dence. “If any one,” says that excellent writer, “desire advice in difficult affairs; there
are many who are capable of giving it; but none will answer for the event; and if you
require this, none will assist you with their counsel, no, not one.”
* Such are usually called (ministrissimi ) chief ministers; and concerning these, two
questions are commonly asked; first, whether it be for the interest of a state to entrust
the care of the whole state to one: And secondly, whether it can be lawfully done.
The first is a question of civil prudence or expediency, upon which it is worth while
to read Hert. Elem. prud. civil. 1. 10. 11. Guil. Schroeter and Jac. Thomas their dis-
sertations on this subject. [[ Jacob Thomasius (praeses ) and Georg Heinrich Groer
(respondens ), De ministrissimo. Wilhelm Schroeter’s (d. 1689) treatise on chief min-
isters continued to appear in several editions in the early eighteenthcentury, including
one in 1737 (Fu¨rstliche Schatz- undRent-Kammer ).]] The latter may be easilyanswered
by any who have considered with any attention the principles of the law of nations.
For since we may delegate to another what we do not think ourselves sufficient to
manage, why may not princes likewise delegate their office to others, especially when
age, the weight of government, and other just reasons induce to it: And if it be not
unjust to put a Kingdom under tutorage, while the King is not of an age to take the
reins of government into his own hands, why should it be deemed unjust for a King
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s e c t i on c l x x x i
One of the chief immanent rights of Sovereigns is the right relative to
religion, sacred things, or the church, by which we understand a society
formed on account of religion. Now, since (§23) all communities and
societies of the simpler kind ought to be so subordinated, that they may
do nothing contrary to the interest of the larger society; the consequence
is, that a church ought to be subordinate to the republic; and therefore,
that the chief magistrate has the right of directing its affairs and con-
cerns.* This may be proved from this consideration, that a republic
ought to have one will (§114), which could not be the case, if the church
in a state were not subject to the chief magistrate, but constituted by
itself a free and independent community, not subject to the chief mag-
istrate. Besides, that since all the rights belong to majesty, without which
the security of the subjects cannot be obtained (§133); and experience
has abundantly shewn us how much the internal and external security
to commit it to a minister? However, a prince would act most unjustly, if he should
devolve the care of the public upon a first minister, merely that he might pursue his
pleasure, and not be troubled with it, since he ought to use him as a minister, and
not transfer the government absolutely to him. The Persians seem to have been sen-
sible of this, when they called ministers the eyes and ears of theKing, XenophonCyrop.
8. 2. 7. p. 483. of which Brisson. de regno Persic. has discoursed at large, lib. 1. §190.
p. 264.
* Therefore this right belongs to a Sovereign as Sovereign, and not as Bishop, as
some have said, who have been solidly refuted by Hen. Boehmer. dissert. de jure
Episcop. princip. evangel. [[Boehmer (praeses ) and de Becquer (respondens),Doctrina
de jure episcopali principum evangelicorum. ]] And therefore that distinction of Con-
stantine the great (in Eusebius vita Constant. mag. 4. 24) between the oversight of
things without the church and within the church, is without any foundation. [[Eu-
sebius of Caesarea (260–339), author of the Vita Constantini (Life of Constantine ).]]
Nor do they come nearer to the truth, who attribute this right about sacred things
to a Sovereign, as the primary member of the church; or they who derive it from
compact; the first of which opinions is defended by Jaeger. de jure suprem. potest.
circa sacra, cap. 3. p. 74. & seq. [[ Ja¨ger, De concordia imperii [et ] sacerdotii sive de
jure potestatum supremarum circa sacra. ]] For it being a right of majestyor sovereignty,
a Sovereign wants no other title to the exercise of it but his sovereignty; whence the
Roman lawyers have pronounced long ago, “Jus publicum etiam in sacris & sacer-
dotibus consistere,” [[“That public law also extends to sacred affairs and priests,”
trans. T. A.]] l. 1. §2. D. de inst. & jur.
The right in
sacred things
belonging to
Sovereigns.
book i i , chapter vi i i 493
of subjects hath been disturbed under the pretext of religion; who then
can deny that a Sovereign has the right of so directing religious affairs
that the republic may suffer no detriment? <179>
s e c t i on c l x x x i i
Religion, on the account of which men coalesce into the particular so-
ciety called a church (§181), consists chiefly of two things. The first is a
just idea of God (l. 1. §127). The last is perfect love to God (ibid. §130).
Now, from hence it is evident, that with regard to the former a Sovereign
can have no power, since the understanding cannot be forced (l. 1. §129);*
and therefore his right ought not to be stretched to a right of imposing
new articles of faith upon his subjects, and proscribing former ones; (i.e.
of imposing a yoke upon their consciences); tho’ it be incumbent upon
him to take care, that his subjects be instructed in the doctrines he judges
to be agreeable to reason and revelation; and that these doctrines be ren-
dered subservient to promote piety and virtue, instead of feuds and di-
visions, to the equal detriment of the church and state. <180>
* The doctrine of Hobbes and others is therefore monstrous, which subjects the
consciences of subjects to a Sovereign (§129). [[Heineccius’s harsh criticism of
Hobbes is unfounded, since Hobbes clearly makes the distinctionbetweenconscience
(foro interno ) and external actions (foro externo ); cf. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 3.27,
p. 54, and Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 16, p. 110. See also Leviathan, chap. 46, p. 471:
“There is another Errour in [ . . . ] Civill Philosophy [ . . . ] to extend the power of the
Law, which is the Rule for Actions only, to the very Thoughts, and Consciences of
men.”]] For not to insist upon what was just now said, that the understandingcannot
be forced; and that a Sovereign can no more command it to believe or not believe,
than he can command the eye not to see what it sees; what horrible butchery would
these principles occasion, if a Nero or a Domitian, possessed of sovereignty, should
take it into his head that the Pagan or Mahometan religion was better for society than
the Christian, or to forge a new one? Nay, who does not see, that this doctrine, de-
spising the true, the sole end of religion, perverts it into an engine of tyranny.
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As for divine worship, we said before it is either internal or external.
Now, the internal is of such a nature, that the obligation to it is obviously
deducible from principles of right reason (l. 1. §130); and therefore, no
mortal hath power to change it, (l. 1. §17); and consequently, a Sovereign
can neither abrogate nor alter it; tho’ all men being obliged to promote
the glory of God to the utmost of their power (l. 1. §128); a prince must
be obliged, and have the right to take care that his subjects be duly in-
structed in the internal worship of God; to use proper methods to reform
the impious, and bring them to a just sense of the reverence they owe
to the Supreme Being; i.e. by reasoning and argumentation; and toguard
his state against the spreading either of atheism or superstition, by such
fences as the nature of religion and persuasion admits.
s e c t i on c l x x x i v
External worship consists partly in external actions flowing from love,
fear, and trust in God (l. 1. §135), partly in arbitrary indifferent actions
(ibid. §138). With regard to the former, the same rule takes place as with
respect to internal worship; and therefore, with regard to it, a goodprince
will arrogate no power to himself, besides that of endeavouring to the
utmost to promote it by due methods.* The latter are neither prescribed
nor dis-<181>approved by reason (l. 1. §138); and therefore they are sub-
ject to the direction of a Sovereign; and he hath all the right and power
with regard to them, which is neither repugnant to reason nor revelation.
* Hence it is plain, that the supreme magistrate has no right to hinder any one
from praising God with hymns, and offering prayers to him, or performing other
such religious actions; but he hath a right to prescribe the order and manner in which
these actions ought to be publickly performed. Therefore, the command of Darius,
that none should dare to petition either God or man during thirty days, was most
absurd, Dan. iv. 7. But the care of David and other pious Kings, to order the worship
of God in such a manner, that the people might neither want hymns to sing to God,
nor be ignorant of the most serious and decent way of singing them, was most
reasonable.
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Since all direction with regard to the arbitrary acts of external worship,
which is neither repugnant to reason nor revelation, belongs to sover-
eignty, (§184); the consequence is, that the chief magistrate hath the right
of reforming and of abolishing abuses truly such, so far as the public
laws or pacts permit; the right of making and amending ecclesiastical
laws; the care of ecclesiastical goods or possessions, and of applyingthem
to their proper uses; the right of jurisdiction over all persons, causes, and
things ecclesiastical; and of conveening and directing synods and coun-
cils;* and finally, the right of permitting meetings of dissenters; or of
not tolerating them, but obliging them to leave the kingdom, when im-
portant reasons require such severity. <182>
s e c t i on c l x x x v i
Schools and academies are seminaries to the church and to the state; nurs-
eries for ministers, magistrates and good citizens, as well as for divines,
their end being to instruct the youth in all useful arts and sciences nec-
essary to qualify them for the various offices of life, and the several dif-
ferent stations in which they may be placed, or professions they may
* They are called for various reasons; as to confirm doctrines called into doubt by
new decrees and creeds, and to consult about indifferent rites; and in fine, to settle
matters relating to discipline. Synods of the first kind are contrary to the nature and
genius of religion; first, because that is not always true, which appears to be such to
the greater number; and in matters of opinion and belief, ’tis not the plurality of
votes but the weight of arguments that ought to preponderate and determine. Next,
because these decrees of councils are obtruded upon the members of a church by
way of laws, with public authority, whereas laws cannot be given to the understand-
ing. Besides, it often happens, that one part of the judges usurps power over the rest,
and thus the wounds of the church are not so likely to be healed as to be festered;
which is so confirmed by experience, that Gregory Nazianzenus, ep. 55. ad Proco-
pium, says, “That he never expected any good from councils, and that they generally
rather exasperated than cured any evil.” [[Gregory of Nazianzus (ca. 330–ca. 389),
Greek saint and theologian.]] The other synods may be sometimes of use to the
church; but only when the church has no legislative power without the direction and
authority of the supreme magistrate.
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choose, as well as to form their manners to virtue and probity, and de-
cency of conduct. For which reason, it is the duty of the supreme power
in a state to establish such schools, and to adorn them with good laws
and constitutions, and with learned and well qualified professors or mas-
ters; to take care that no hurtful doctrines be taught in them, that dis-
cipline be kept upon a good footing; and, above all, that turbulent ge-
nius’s do not sow divisions and contentions in them;* so as to render
them like the school of Megara in ancient times, ou◊ sxolh´n, a⁄lla xolh`n;
“Not a school, but a seat of choler and scufling,” Diogenes Laert. 6. 24.
<183>
s e c t i on c l x x x v i i
The other right of magistracy which remains to be considered, is what
regards commerce (§134). For since mankind, far less a republic, cannot
subsist without commerce (l. 1. §325), the governors of a civil state ought
to take care to promote and maintain it, and to direct it into a right and
proper channel. And therefore they have all the rights relative to it, with-
out which these ends cannot be obtained (§133); the consequence of
which is, that they can make laws concerning traffic, manufactures, ex-
port and import, payment of bills and debts, and about money or coin;
give privileges to traders, stipulate security to foreign commerce by
* The mischief scholastic wars do to youth, and to useful learning, cannot be
expressed. They are frequently occasioned by stupid sluggish men, to whom the learn-
ing and industry of others in their proper business is an eye-sore. For the more learned
men are, the further they are removed from a spirit of contention. And the scufle is
carried on with calumnies, libels, and fraudulent arts, by which they hope to bear
down their enemy, or render him suspected by his auditors. And hence it comes
about, that the hours which ought to be devoted to the education and instruction of
youth, are consumed in writing controversial pamphlets, and that the students, tho’
not capable of judging of the dispute, and unacquainted with the true nature and
rise of it, are divided into factions; so, that from words it not seldom comes to blows.
But how prejudicial such feuds must be to the most flourishing universities, is very
manifest.
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treaties, and defend it by arms; grant immunities and rights to larger
societies of merchants; and, in general, do every thing necessary to sup-
port and promote trade, consistent with pacts and treaties made with
other princes or states.* <184>
* This whole subject is well illustrated by two dissertations: one by Jo. Fridr. L. B.
Bachovius ab Echt dissert. de eo quod justum est circa commercia inter gentes, Jenae
1730. [[Bachovius, i.e., Johann Friedrich Freiherr Bachoff von Echt (1643–1726),Ger-
man jurist and civil servant (1680, Geheimrat) at the court of Sachsen-Gotha (Ba-
choff von Echt, De eo quod Iustum est ).]] Another by Jo. Jac. Mascovius de foederibus
commerciorum, Lip. 1735. [[ Johann Jacob Mascov (1689–1761), German jurist and
historian, Ratsherr (councillor) in Leipzig; see Mascov (praeses ) and Plessen (respon-
dens ), De foederibus commerciorum. ]] To which, if we add the writings pro and con
with regard to the disputes between the Dutch and the Imperial Netherlands, about
the Ostend Company, we shall not need to look further into this subject. See Re-
futation des argumens avance´s de la part de Mrs. les Directeurs de Compagnies d’
orient & d’ occident des provinces-unies, contre la liberte´ du commerce des habitans
des Pais-bas, Hague 1723, and Jo. Barbeyrac Defense du droit de la compagnie Hol-
landoise des Indes orientales, contre les nouvelles pretensions des habitans des Pais-
bas Autrichiens. [[Macneny, Re´futation des argumens avance´s de la part de MM les
directeurs des Compagnies d’Orient et d’Occident des Provinces-Unies contre la liberte´ du
commerce des habiters des Pays-Bas; Barbeyrac, Defense du droit de la Compagnie Hol-
landoise des Indes Orientales contre les nouvelles pre´tensions des habitans des Pays-Bas
Autrichiens. ]]
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Because all empire is supreme and absolute, (§127), it follows, that dif-
ferent empires or civil states are independent, and subject to no common
authority on earth (§ eodem). But such states are in a state of nature,
and therefore in a state of natural equality and liberty (§5 & seq). And
because in such a state the injured have no defence or protection but in
themselves, and therefore in it every one has a right to repel violence and
injury, and to extort by force what is due to him by perfect right (§9), it
is abundantly evident, that every civil state or republic has the right of
making war.* <185>
* This might be proved by other arguments. For nature hath not only endued
men, but even brute animals with a principle of self-defence; and hath furnished the
latter with certain arms to protect themselves.
Ut, quo quisque valet suspectos terreat; utque
Imperet hoc natura potens, sic collige mecum.
Dente lupus; cornu taurus petit. Unde, nisi intus
Monstratum? Horat. Serm. 2. 1. v. 50.
[[Horace, Satires II, 1.50–53: “How everyone, using the weapon in which he
is strong, terrifies those he fears, and how powerful nature commands that
this should be so, you must infer, along with me, in this way: the wolf attacks
with its fangs, the bull with its horn; from where did this come, except from
an internal instinct?”]]
Many testimonies of the ancients to this purpose are collected by Grotius, of the
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By war we understand a state in which free and independent men or
nations, living in a state of nature, contend in prosecution of their rights
by force or stratagem, while they retain that intention.* From which
definition, it is plain that war does not consist in the act itself of con-
tending, but in a hostile state, and in the fixed purpose of contending;
and therefore truce does not belong to a state of peace, but to a state of
war; and, on the other hand, the quarrels and tumults, the private or
public violences of men who are not their own masters, but subjected
to civil government, do not come under the definition of war. <186>
rights of war and peace, 1. 2. 1. 4. Again, since private persons living in society have
the right of self-defence, when they cannot have recourse to public protection (lib.
1. §181), much more must it be allowable to a free people to defend themselves, since
in a state of nature there is no common magistrate to judge between the injurer and
the injured, and to defend against violence (ibid. §183). The ancient fathers of the
church have brought several arguments from the sacred writings against the right of
war, as Tertullian de idolol. cap. 18. & de corona milit. cap. 11. [[Tertullian, De ido-
lolatria, ed. Waszink and van Winden; Tertullian, De corona militis, in Tertullian,
Tertulliani libri tres.]] Origen adv. Cels. l. 8. p. 425. [[Origen, Adversus Celsum, in
part 2 of his Opera quae quidem extant omnia.]] Erasmus in milite Christiano, &
Adagiorum Chil. 4. Cent. 1. adag. 1. and likewise the Anabaptists, of whom Arnold.
in Hist. eccles. & haeret. part. 2. l. 16. cap. 21. n. 24. [[Erasmus, Enchiridion militis
Christiani; Erasmus, Adages iv.i. 1, vol. 35, of Collected Works of Erasmus; Arnold,
Unpartheyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie.]] But these objections have been suffi-
ciently answered by Grotius in his masterly way (ibid. §5. & seq.) and by Huber de
jur. civ. 3. 4. 4. 6. & seq.
* Thus we think it proper to define war, tho’ it be otherwise defined by others.
According to Cicero (off. 1. 11.) all contention by force is war. But Grotius (of the
rights of war and peace, 1. 1. 2. 1.) observing, that not the act but the state is properly
denominated war, amends this definition, by calling war a state of contention by
force, as such. Yet because this definition agrees as well to tumults, or private and
public violence, as to war, the definition of Albericus Gentilis (of the rights of war,
1. 2.) is rather preferable. [[Albericus Gentilis (1552–1608), Italian jurist considered to
be the founder of the theory of international law. Grotius drew extensively on his
main work, De jure belli.]] He defines it to be a just contention by public arms. But
the best of all, is the definition given by V. A. Corn. van Bynkersh. Quaest. juris
publ. 1. 1. which we follow.
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Since war is made by free nations, and men who live in a state of nature
(§189), the consequence is, that in the latter case the right of war belongs
to all promiscuously, as being all equal (§5 & 9); but in the former to the
supreme power only (§135); and therefore it is the right of the Sovereign
to levy or hire troops,* to build fortresses and fortify towns; to raise
money for the maintenance of an army, to make provision of arms, war-
like stores, ammunition, and other necessaries for war; to build, man,
and store ships, to declare war, wage war against an enemy, and thus
expose soldiers to the greatest danger, and make laws relative to military
discipline and exercise, and such like things. For the end of this right
being the external security of the state (§135): because the chief magis-
trate of a state must have all the rights, without which that end cannot
be obtained (§133); every one may easily see that the right of war must
make one of them. <187>
* It is well known, that there are three kinds of armies: one when every subject
bears arms for his country, as in the Grecian republics of old, and among the Romans
during their freedom, and as at present in Switzerland: another is mercenary, when
soldiers, even foreigners, are listed for money; which kind of army Augustus, by the
advice of Maecenas, preferred for certain reasons to the other, Dion. Cass. hist. lib.
52. p. 482. and which is at present preferred by all monarchs, who are not secure of
the hearts of their people: another is confederate, when republics by alliance, or in
consequence of due homage, are bound to furnish a certain quota of forces; such
were the auxiliaries furnished by the Latins to the Romans: of which kind of armies
see a curious dissertation by Herm. Conringius. [[Hermann Conring (1606–81),Ger-
man philosopher at the University of Helmstedt and councillor and doctor to the
Swedish queen Christina. Conring held views similar to those of Machiavelli on the
uselessness of mercenary armies. Heineccius here is probably referring to Conring
(praeses ) and Koch (respondens ), Discursus politicus de militia lecta, mercenaria et so-
ciali.]] Concerning hired or mercenary troops, it hath been often questioned,whether
it be lawful for a prince to keep up such amidst his well-affected subjects. Upon which
question, see V. A. Corn. van Bynkershoek, Quaest. jur. publ. 1. 22.
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s e c t i on cxc i
From the same definition of war, it is evident that an inferior magistrate,
or the governor of a certain province or fortress, cannot make war; tho’
that such may defend the towns or provinces under their command and
government against any aggressor whatsoever, on a sudden attack, even
without a special order, none can doubt; nay, because a province may be
so remote, that its governor cannot inform the Sovereign of its imminent
danger speedily enough to receive proper instructions, in this case cer-
tainly, if the right of making war be given to the governor by a general
mandate, there can be no doubt of his right to make war without par-
ticular order from his superiors.* <188>
s e c t i on cxc i i
Moreover, from this definition we learn that single combats areunlawful,
unless undertaken by the command of the supreme powers;† and there-
fore Grotius’s distinction between private and public war hath no foun-
* Hence the war of Cn. Manlius [[Gnaeus Manlius, Roman proconsul in 187
b.c.]] against the Gallo-Graeci was unjust. And for this reason, he was refused a tri-
umph, Liv. 38. 45. “because, says he, he did it without any reason, and without the
authority of the senate, or the command of the people, which none ever had dared
to do.” And it is known that the senate were not far from giving up Julius Caesar to
the Germans, for having made war against them without the command of the people,
Sueton. Jul. Caes. cap. 24. But the governors sent by the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch,
&c. into American provinces, have commonly such full power of making war and
peace, that the news of the victory are often the first news of the war.
† For such kind of single combats were a sort of representative war, used among
the ancients, when they chose persons out of each army to decide the fate of the war
by a single combat, agreeing that the party which had success in it, should have the
right of victory or conquest. Ancient annals are full of such examples. Many of them
are gathered together by Grotius, (of the rights, &c. 3. 20. 43. & seq.) who, however,
pronounces such combats unlawful, because no person is master of his life and mem-
bers. But sure, if a Sovereign may expose whole armies to an enemy, he may expose
one or a few persons. Whether this practice be agreeable to civil prudence, is another
question. Of that there is reason to doubt, because thus the whole republic is sub-
mitted to one chance, nor can they afterwards try their fortune with the remains of
their strength, as the Albans felt to their sad experience, Dionys. Halicar. antiq. lib. 3.
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dation, nor does it quadrate with the definition of war. Much less can
that be called war which is carried on by citizens against one another,
and is commonly called a civil war. Again, the state of violence and
enmity, which pirates and robbers are in with all mankind, as it were, is
not a state of war, but of robbery and plunder; and therefore such per-
sons have not the rights of war, but ought to be punished as disturbers
of the public security.
s e c t i on cxc i i i
Since war is carried on by free nations (§189) in prosecution of their
rights, the consequence is, that there are only two just causes of war: One
is, when a foreign people injures another people, or attempts to rob them
of their liberty, wealth, or <189> life: the other is, when one people de-
nies another their perfect right.* The first is a just cause of defensive war,
the last of offensive; and therefore the third, first mentioned by Grotius
(of the rights of war and peace, 2. 1. 2. 1.) viz. the punishment of crimes,
* Nor does the reason assigned by Grotius prove any thing else, ibid. n. 1. “As
many sources as there are of judicial actions, so many causes may there be of war.
For where the methods of justice cease, war begins. Now in the law there are actions
for injuries not yet done, or for those already committed. For the first, when securities
are demanded against a person that has threatened an injury, or for the indemnifying
of a loss that is apprehended, and other things included in the decrees of the superior
judge, which prohibited any violence. For the second, that reparation may be made,
or punishment inflicted; two sources of obligation, which Plato has judiciously dis-
tinguished. As for reparation, it belongs to what is or was properly our own, from
whence real and some personal actions do arise; or to what is properly our due, either
by contract, by default, or by law; to which also we may refer those things which are
said to be due by a sort of contract, or a sort of default, from which kind all other
personal actions are derived. The punishment of the injury produces indictments
and public judgments.” [[Grotius, Rights of War and Peace, bk. II, chap. 1, 2.1.]] So
far Grotius. But as we cannot reason from a state of nature to a civil state; so no more
can we reason from a civil state to a state of nature. One nation hurts another, either
by its default, or does not hurt any other, e.g. if it worships idols, or eats human flesh.
In the first case, the injured people attacks the delinquent people with a just and lawful
war, not a punitive but a defensive war. In the last case, there is absolutely no right
to make war, because none but a superior can punish a delinquent.
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is not to be admitted as a just cause of war; the rather, that it is certain
an equal cannot be punished by an equal; and therefore one nation can-
not be punished by another (§157). <190>
s e c t i on cxc i v
As the denial of perfect right only is a just cause of war (§193), hence it
follows, that it is not allowable to have recourse to arms for the refusal
of an imperfect right (§9); and therefore these are not just causes of war;
as, for instance, if one refuses passage to an army, or denies access to a
people in quest of a new habitation, will not grant the liberty of com-
merce to a people at their desire, or furnish money, provision or shelter,
to those who are carrying on war, unless these things be due by an an-
tecedent treaty, or be demanded in extreme necessity, or be of such a
kind, that they may be granted without any detriment* (§9 & seq.). For
then a refusal of such things becomes an injury, and is therefore a most
just cause of defensive war (§193).
s e c t i on cxcv
But it being sometimes the same whether we ourselves are immediately
injured, or we are so thro’ the side of another; and, in like manner the
same, whether perfect right be denied to us or to others, whom we are
obliged, either by treaties, or on our own account, to assist; hence we
may justly conclude, that war may be engaged in for allies and confed-
erates; yea, and for neigh-<191>bours, if it be very certain that we must
suffer by their ruin. For who will blame one for hastening to extinguish
* That rarely happens. For either there is danger from the army that demands
liberty to pass, or from the enemy, who may take it amiss that passage was granted.
But if the passage be absolutely without danger, and so necessary that there is no
other way for them who ask it to take, he does an injury who refuses such passage.
And to this cause we may refer the war waged by the Israelites at God’s command,
Num. xxi. 21, 22. But the Idumeans were not touched for the same reason, Num. xx.
21. either because that passage was not so safe, or not so necessary, there being another
way to Kadesh.
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fire near to his own house? Who does not consent to the truth of the
antient saying, “Your interest is at stake, if your neighbour’s house be
on fire”? However, since we cannot make war even for ourselves without
a just cause (§193), much less will a war be just and vindicable, if we
engage in the behalf of others for injustifiable reasons.
s e c t i on cxcv i
But tho’ these just causes be easily distinguishable from the mere pretexts
often used by those who make war most unjustly; yet men, who regard
nothing but their own interest, often lay more stress on the latter than
the former. However, it is plain, that if these causes we have mentioned
be the only justifiable causes of war (§193), war must be very unjust, if
made merely because opportunity, and the weak, defenceless state of
another nation invites to it, or purely to gain some great advantage, and
to extend one’s empire, for the glory of martial achievements, or from
religious enmity, without any other just cause.* <192>
* And I know not but the cruel wars carried on in the middle ages against the
Mahometans by Christians, must be referred to this class: as likewise those which the
Spaniards dared to undertake against the Americans, a nation not inured to war, and
that had never done any injury to the Europeans. The former were not coloured over
with any other pretext, but that the Holy-land, Jerusalem chiefly, were possessed by
aliens from the Christian church, and that it was the interest of Christians thus to
promote and propagate their religion. The latter with this only pretext, that theAmer-
icans were impious idolaters, or rather worshippers of demons. But since Christianity
does not permit of propagation by force; and neither reason nor revelation allows
places which appear sacred to certain men, to be therefore claimed by arms and vi-
olence; and since besides all this, all wars in order to punish are unlawful (§193), these
wars must needs be pronounced most unjust. Wherefore, Herm. Conringius ad Lam-
pad. p. 242. says very justly, “Tho’ many things were done in them which deserve the
praise of zeal and courage; yet, if we may speak the truth, all these expeditions were
owing to the weakness, imprudence, and superstition of the Kings and Princes of
that age.” [[Conring, “Discursus ad Lampadium posterior ex manuscripto editus,”
in Conring, Opera, vol. 2, pp. 238–461.]] See likewise Jo. Franc. Buddeus, exercitat.
de expeditionibus cruciatis, §5. & seq. [[Budde (praeses ) and Greulinck (respondens ),
De expeditionibus cruciatis dissertatio politica.]] As to the opinion of the Spaniards,
about a right to punish the Mexicans for their crimes against nature, which Grotius
defends (of the rights of war and peace, 2. 20. 40. & seq.) it is given up even by the
Spanish doctors themselves, Victoria, relat. 1. de Indes. n. 40. Vasquius controver.
illust. 1. 25. Azorius, Molina, and others. [[Vitoria, Relectio de Indis; Vazquez, Illus-
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s e c t i on cxcv i i
Many nations have thought that war, so soon as resolved upon, ought
to be solemnly declared; and hence the known distinction between sol-
emn or just, less solemn, or unjust war. The former, in the opinion of
most writers, is that which is undertaken by one who hath the right to
make war with a previous solemn denunciation. The latter, that which
is undertaken by one who hath not the right of war, and is not previously
declared. But tho’ we grant that this is become almost an universally
received rule, and victory is generally thought more glorious, when it is
obtained by a war that was previously declared by a manifesto, or by
heralds, or with other solemn rites; yet, because rites and solemnities are
arbitrary, and such customs do not constitute a part of the law of nations
(l. 1. §22); * we think there is no difference as to legal effect between war
declared and not declared; and therefore, that this division is of very little
moment.* <193>
s e c t i on cxcv i i i
But right reason clearly teaches us, that recourse ought not to be had
immediately to arms; but then only, when a people hath shewn a hostile
disposition against us (l. 1. §183). But seeing he shews a hostiledisposition
trium controversiarum, aliarumque usu frequentium libri sex. Luis de Molina (1535–
1600) was a Spanish Jesuit theologian, as was Juan Azor (1535–1603).]]
* Grotius of the rights of war and peace, and Alberic. Gentilis of the rights of
war, lay great stress on this distinction, who are followed in this matter by Pufendorff,
Huber and others, for a double reason. First, because by such an appeal or declaration,
it is made evident, that we cannot otherwise obtain what is due to us. And secondly,
because thus it appears that the war is made by the consent of the whole body in both
nations. But these reasons only prove, that a previous declaration of war is of use and
laudable, not that it is necessary to make a war just, because both these facts may be
evidenced by other means, besides a solemn declaration. Wherefore, Dio. Chrysos-
tom. Orat. ad Nicomed. asserts with reason, and agreeably to the principles of the
laws of nations, “Several wars are undertaken without denunciation.” [[Dio Chry-
sostom, “The Thirty-eighth Discourse: To the Nicomedians, on Concord with the
Nicaeans,” p. 67, in Dio Chrysostom, Dio Chrysostom, vol. 4, pp. 48–93.]] But this
subject hath been exhausted by Thomasius ad Huber. de jur. civ. 3. 4. 4. 27. and by
V. A. Corn. van Bynker. Quaest. jur. publici, 1. 2. p. 5. & seq. who hath there likewise
treated of the most modern European customs.
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against us, who obstinately rejects all equal terms and conditions of
peace (§ eodem); hence we justly infer, that before we take violent meth-
ods, what is due, or we think is due to us, ought to be demanded, and
the dispute ought to be clearly stated with the arguments on both sides,
and all means ought to be tried to prevent war;* which being done, he
certainly takes up arms justly, who, having proposed good and adequate
reasons, cannot obtain from his enemy any reasonable satisfaction.
<194>
s e c t i on cxc i x
Seeing princes and free nations make war in order to vindicate their
rights (§193), the consequence is, that every thing is lawful against an
enemy, without which these rights cannot be obtained. But they cannot
be obtained but by reducing the enemy to such a state, as that he either
cannot, or will not any longer shew a hostile disposition: and therefore
every one has a right to use force or stratagem against an enemy, and to
* Three means are particularly recommended by Grotius, of the rights of war and
peace, 2. 23. 7. and Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 5. 13. 3. and 8. 6. 3.
an interview or friendly conference, reference to arbitrators, and lot. But as for the
last, besides that it can rarely have place but when a thing is to be divided, princes
and states seldom choose to submit their fortunes to chance. The other methods are
received in all civilized nations, and are most agreeable to right reason; for no wise
man will take a dangerous way to obtain what he may have without force (lib. 1. §181),
so true is what the soldier in Terence says, tho’ upon a ridiculous occasion,
Omnia prius experiri, quam armis, sapientem decet.
Qui scis, an, quae jubeam, sine vi faciat?
[[Terence, The Eunuch, lines 789–90: “The wise man should try everything
before resorting to arms. For all you know, she will do what I tell her without
force” (see Terence, vol. 1).]]
For this end are these public writings called Manifestos and Declarations, tho’ the
former are more commonly published at the very point of striking the blow, rather
to declare and justify the war, than with a view to decline and prevent it. See Jo. Henr.
Boecler. exercitat. de clarig. & manifestis. [[Boecler (praeses ) and Barnekow (respon-
dens ), Dissertatio de clarigatione et manifestis.]]
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employ all means against his person or effects, by which he can be weak-
ened, without regard even to the offices of humanity, which then cease
(l. 1. §208); nay, we cannot call it absolutely unjust to make use of poison
or assassines, tho’ such practices are with reason said to be repugnant to
the manners of more civilized nations, and to what is called (ratio belli )
the humanity of war.* <195>
* Grotius (of the rights of war and peace, 3. 4. 15. and 18.) is of a different opinion.
But actions, because they are more glorious, and shew more greatness of mind, are
not for that reason so obligatory, that it is unjust not to do them. Poison is not used
by more civilized nations; but the Turks and Tartars poison their darts and arrows.
We may therefore call them less humane on that score, but not unjust, because every
thing is lawful against an enemy. Thus we may justly refer to the class of greatness
of mind, what the Roman consuls are said to have wrote to Pyrrhus, “We do not
choose to fight by bribery or by fraud,” Gell. Noct. Attic. 3. 8. But we cannot call
Ehud unjust for killing Eglon, Jud. iv. 20; nor Jael for driving a nail into the temples
of Sisera, Jud. iv. 21. or Judith for cutting off Holofernes’s head, if the story be true.
Besides, the manners of nations, who pretend to greater politeness than others, often
degenerate into vile dissimulation; of which see Bynker. Quaest. jur. publ. 1. 3. p. 17.
[[Bynkershoek, Quaestionum juris publici libri duo, vol. 1, 17–18.]] “To such a height
did flattery rise in the preceding age, and is it at present, that princes do not lay it
aside even in war. For now it is common for enemies most politely to wish oneanother
all prosperity, and to exchange compliments of condoleance. So do the letters of the
States General to the King of England run, 10th July, 16th September, and 26th
November 1666, and those of the King of England to the States General, 4th August
and 4th October 1666, tho’ they were then preparing for destroying one the other,
yet the states wrote, that the offices of friendship might take place amidst the rights
of war, July 10. ep. 1666. So the King of France, tho’ he was in war with the King
of England in the year 1666, sent an envoy to condole him upon the burning of
London. It is indeed glorious to exercise humanity, clemency, and other virtues of a
great mind in war, but it is silly and absurd to use such unmeaning unsincere words.
For what is it but to use deceitful false words, to regret the burning of a city one
would willingly have set fire to?” Are not these rare specimens of humanity? Shall we
then pronounce C. Popilius Laenas [[Roman consul in 172 b.c.]] more unjust than
those princes and states, who being saluted by Antiochus [[king of Syria]], declared
he would not return his salute till they were friends; and refused the King’s hand
when he stretched it out to him? Polyb. Excerpt. legat. cap. 92. [[probably Polybius,
Ex libris Polybii Megapolitani selecta de legationibus ]] Liv. 45. 12. These are harsher
methods, but not unjust, yea much more decent than hostile adulations and false
compliments.
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s e c t i on cc
But since it is against an enemy only that it is lawful to use force or strat-
agem (§199), the consequence is, that it is not lawful to use either against
those with whom we are in treaty; because then we pledge our faith to
them not as an enemy, but as a people treating with us.* Whence it is evi-
<196>dent, that they are guilty of abominable perfidiousness, who break
a short or long truce before it is expired; tho’ it be very true that both
parties may exert defensive acts during that time, Pufendorff of the law
of nature and nations, 8. 7. 10. Nor is their treachery less abominable,
who basely violate the articles of surrendery, pacts concerning the con-
veyance of provisions, or the redemption of prisoners, foolishly pretend-
ing to justify themselves by this pretext, that all is lawful against an enemy.
s e c t i on cc i
From the same principle we conclude, that none may use the rights of
war against such as are in peace and friendship with them, under the
pretext that an enemy may seize their castles and fortresses, or harbours,
and make advantage of them against us; nor is it lawful to seize or hurt
enemies or their ships in the territory, or within the ports of a people in
peace with us, unless that people designedly gives reception to our en-
emy, because such violence is injurious to the people with whom we are
in peace, whose territory or ports are entred by force. See V. A. Corn.
van Bynkershoek. quest. <197> jur. publ. 1. 8. On the other hand, there
* Agesilaus in Plutarch, p. 600, well distinguishes between an allowable stratagem
and perfidy. There is there recorded an excellent saying of his: “To break the faith
of a treaty is to contemn the Gods: but to outwit an enemy is a laudable, and withal
a saving method.” [[Plutarch, “Agesilaus,” in Plutarch, Lives, vol. 5, p. 23.]] But what
if an enemy had formerly proved treacherous and false? May we not then render like
for like? I think not. For tho’ the perfidy of one of the contracting parties exempts
the other from his obligation (l. 1. §413), yet this is to be understood of the same
bilateral pact, the conditions of which are not fulfilled by one of the parties. But
if we make a new pact with one who had not stood to his former, we are deemed
to have passed over his former perfidy, and are therefore bound to fulfil our new
contract.
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is no reason why we may not hinder such a people from conveying arms,
men, provisions, or any such things to our enemy, and hold such things
for contreband;* (Bynkers. ibidem, cap. 9. & seq.) tho’ equity requires
that we should not promiscuously condemn the goods belonging to our
friends with those belonging to our enemies. (Bynkers. 1. 12. & seq.).
See likewise our dissertation de navibus ob mercium illicitarum vec-
turam condemnatis.1
s e c t i on cc i i
We have observed, that the persons and estates of enemies may be
spoiled or taken (§199); whence it is plain, that it depends on the will
and pleasure of an enemy to lead persons taken in war captive into ser-
vitude, or which is now the prevailing custom in European nations, to
detain them till they are exchanged or ransomed. The effects of enemies,
moveable or immoveable, corporeal or incorporeal, fall to theconqueror;
moveable, so soon as they are brought within the conqueror’s station;
immoveable, and other things, from the moment they are occupied, tho’
the possession of them be not secure, till peace being concluded, treaties
about them are transacted. But that moveable things, as well as persons
and territories, being retaken, or recovering their antient liberty, have
the right of postliminy, none can call into doubt.† <198>
* This is granted by Grotius, l. 3. cap. 17. §3. but with a restriction. “It is the duty,”
says he, “of those that are not engaged in a war, to sit still and do nothing that may
strengthen him that prosecutes an ill cause, or to hinder the motions of him that hath
justice on his side.” But because a neutral party ought not to take upon them, as it
were, to sit as judges, and determine upon which side justice lies, but, on the contrary,
to take no part in the matter, as Livy observes, 35. 48; hence it is evident, that there
is no place for this restriction. See V. A. Corn. van Bynkersh. Quaest. jur. publ. 1. 9.
p. 69.
† Here many questions occur in Grotius, 3. 5. & seq. Pufend. 8. 6. 20, as how
things taken in war are acquired? whether incorporeal things and actions, &c? But
since all these things depend rather upon the customs of nations than the laws of
nations, and many of them may be easily decided from the principles already ex-
plained, we shall not insist upon them. All these are handled by V. A. Corn. van
Bynkershoek Quaest. jur. public. l. 1. cap. 4. & seq. in a masterly manner.
1. Heineccius (praeses ) and Kessler (respondens ),Denavibus obmerciumillicitarum
vecturam commissis.
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s e c t i on cc i i i
From the definition of war it is plain, that if there is no controversy
between nations and states themselves, when we lay hands upon persons
or effects belonging to another republic in peace with us, on the account
of justice refused to any of our society, this cannot be called war, but is
making reprisals. * But since this may very probably give rise to a war, it
ought not to be done by any private person, but with the approbation
of the Sovereign; and it ought to be carried no farther, than to make
satisfaction to our member to whom justice was refused. <199>
s e c t i on cc i v
But since in a state of nature the right of defence lasts while an enemy
shews a hostile disposition (l. 1. §183), which he cannot be said to have
laid aside, who is not willing to return into friendship, but repels all
reasonable conditions of peace, (ibidem) no injustice certainly is done
to the conquered, if we prosecute our right till they are fully subdued,
and we have obtained compleat empire over them; and we may consti-
tute this empire as we judge proper, and exercise it, till peace being con-
cluded, some articles are agreed upon with relation to it; or the nation
* This right, since ever it hath been practised, hath been called Reprisals. The an-
cients not being acquainted with it, there is no word in the Latin language that prop-
erly expresses it, (Corn. van Bynkersh. ibidem. 1. 24). Grotius derives this right from
the right of taking pawn, competent to every person (of the rights of war and peace,
3. 2. 7. 3.); and so likewise Bodinus de republica, 1. 10. [[Bodin, De republica libri sex.
This was Bodin’s own translation of his Les six livres de la Re´publique.]] But this
opinion is refuted by Hertius ad Pufendorff, 8. 6. 13 [[Pufendorf, Acht Bu¨cher vom
Natur- undVo¨lkerrecht ]]; and before him by Ziegler de jure majestatis, 1. 34. 8. [[Zieg-
ler, De juribus majestatis ]] where he asserts, §32. that this right proceeds rather from
the rights of war. And certainly, if a republic may justly vindicate by war an injury
done to it and its members (l. 1. §245), it may likewise lay its hands on the goods of
others, for an injury done to any one of its subjects, unless the greater and not the
less may be allowable.
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not being totally overthrown, and no treaty being yet made, recovers its
antient liberty, or is bravely rescued by their former Sovereign.* <200>
s e c t i on ccv
Another right of majesty, which may be reckoned among the external
or transeunt ones, is that of making treaties among free nations about
things belonging to the utility of both, or any of them. From which
definition it is plain, that some of them are equal, in which the condition
of both parties are equal; others are unequal, in which both parties have
not the same rights granted to them, but one has better, and the other
worse conditions; which, as examples shew us, may be either with regard
to the conditions to be fulfilled, or to the manner of performing them.†
* And then in both these cases, it is most equal that recovered towns, cities, prov-
inces, nations, should have the right of postliminy (§202), and thus recover their
former rights, if their falling into the enemy’s hands was not by their own fault, or
even if it be not very clear, that they could have made a longer or stronger opposition
to the enemy. Hence, when the French Garisons having left the country, a dispute
arose between the states of Utrecht and Friezeland about the right of precedency,
upon pretext that the former had given themselves up without resistance, yet the
province of Utrecht recovered its former place and state, Huber. Prelect. ad Dig. l.
49. tit. 15. §9. But the case would be quite different, if a city or province, which,
unmindful of their faith to their Sovereign, had wilfully deserted and gone over to
the enemy, should afterwards be recovered by war. For such would be justly deemed
unworthy of this benefit, and therefore it is in the conqueror’s power and right to
reduce them into any condition he pleases. Such examples did the Romans make of
the Brutii, Lucani and Campani, who deserted to Hannibal; of Capua chiefly, which
city was so far from having its ancient rights restored to it, that it was deprived of its
municipal privileges, its right of magistracy, and its territories, and reduced into the
form of a province, Liv. 26. 16. & seq.
† Thus one of the confederate parties being stronger, engages to furnish the other
not so powerful, a certain pecuniary subsidy, or a certain quota of ships, troops, or
marines, and stipulates little or nothing to itself. In this case the treaty or alliance is
unequal, in respect of the things to be done. But it is often provided by treaties, that
one republic shall be bound to pay homage to another; not to undertake war without
another’s consent; not to keep a fleet; to pay an annual tribute; to make use of no
iron or iron-smiths, except for agriculture, 1 Sam. xiii. 19, 20. which Pliny, hist. nat.
34. 14. says was done in the first treaty of Porsena with the Roman people. All these
are unequal treaties with respect to the manner of doing, since the one makes itself
the other’s client by this manner of treating.
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s e c t i on ccv i
Because free nations can contract about things relating either to the util-
ity of either or of both, (§205), it follows, that those good offices which
are owing by natural obligation, may be stipulated to themselves by free
nations or states; and these are called leagues of friendship. * And other
things may be stipulated, to which there was no prior <201> obligation;
which treaties we call treaties of particular obligation. The first are not
unnecessary, because there is no other way of securing another’s perfor-
mance to us of the duties of humanity, but by pacts (l. 1. §386). And it
often happens, that war puts an end to all the duties of humanity (§199),
and therefore it is absolutely necessary that friendship should be renewed
by pacts and covenants.
s e c t i on ccv i i
A thing may be useful to a state either in peace or war, and therefore
some treaties relate to peace, and others to war; but it being the interest
of a state, that peace be rendered as durable and stable as possible, and
* To these treaties Grotius (of the rights of war and peace, 2. 15. 5. 3.) refers leagues
which provide for the entertainment of strangers, and the freedom of commerce on
both sides, as agreeable to the law of nature. But since the law of hospitality com-
prehends many good offices, which are not perfectly due by the law of nature alone
(of which Jo. Schilterus has treated very accurately) [[Schilter, De jure hospitii ]], and
since the permission of commerce with foreigners depends upon the will of the su-
preme powers in every state (§187), such leagues can hardly in any case be referred to
those, by which one nation stipulates to itself from another nothing more than is due
by the law of nature. As to leagues of commerce, that there is not so much difficulty
about any others as about them, is proved by Jo. Jac. Mascou. dissert. de foeder.
commerc. §6. [[Mascov (praeses ) and Plessen (respondens ), De foederibus commer-
ciorum ]] by an example from Jac. Basnag’s Hist. Belg. tom. 1. p. 51. and 439. [[Bas-
nage, Annales des Provinces-Unies.]] And the Athenians, Smyrnians, and other re-
publics, struck medals to be monuments of such treaties, as the same author has
shewn from Ezek. Spanheim. de usu & praestantia numismatum, diss. 3. p. 143. &
dissert. 13. n. 4. as likewise in his Orbe Rom. cap. 4. [[Spanheim, Dissertationes de
praestantia et usu numismatum antiquorum; Spanheim, Orbis Romanus ]] and from
Vaillant de numis imp. Graec. p. 221. [[Vaillant,Numismata imperatorum.]]Butwho
ever thought a simple league of mere friendship worthy of being commemorated by
such monuments?
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as profitable to its subjects as may be, we may refer to the first end, treaties
by which certain guarantees engage their faith, that the ar-<202>ticles
of peace shall be faithfully observed, and promise assistance to the in-
jured party;* as likewise treaties about building new fortifications, or for
admitting and keeping garisons in certain fortified places, for defending
frontiers, commonly called barrier-treaties; for not sheltering fugitive
soldiers or subjects; or not giving reception to enemies, &c. to the latter
of the above mentioned ends we may refer treaties of commerce.
s e c t i on ccv i i i
But in time of war various treaties are made by free nations with friends
and enemies. With the former, treaties are made sometimes about joining
their forces against a common enemy, which are <203> called offensive
and defensive treaties; sometimes about free passage through a territory,
and furnishing provisions; and sometimes about not interposing in the
war, which last are called treaties of neutrality. With the latter, treaties
* Upon these treaties it is worth while to consult Ulr. Obrecht. diss. de sponsore
pacis, the seventh of his Academic dissertations, and Henr. Cocceii de guarantiapacis,
Franckfort 1702. [[Ulrich Obrecht (1646–1701), German jurist and historian, pro-
fessor of history and eloquence in Strasbourg; see Obrecht (praeses ) and Stauffer
(respondens ), Sponsor pacis sive de garantia dissertatio. Cocceji (praeses ) and Stephani
(respondens ),Disputatio juris gentium publici de guarantia pacis.]] The principal ques-
tion that is moved on this subject is, whether the guarantees of a peace be obliged in
general to enter into a war-alliance with the injured party, for any breach of peace
whatsoever? But Pufendorff (of the law of nature and nations, 8. 8. 7.) has justly
denied that the guarantees are bound to send aids in any war that takes its rise from
other reasons than the violation of the articles of peace of which they are guarantees.
For as it would be absurd for a creditor to demand a debt from a surety, contracted
by the principal debtor after the suretiship; so it would be no less unjust for a prince
or a state to demand that a guarantee should take up arms in his defence, if the war
takes its rise from some new cause. For a guarantee is only bound, when the peace
of which he was surety is broken. But peace (as Grotius has well observed, 3. 20. 27.
& seq.) is broken, if any thing be done contrary to what is included in every treaty
of peace, or may be inferred from the very nature of peace in general, or to the express
articles of a particular peace. And the matter is clear enough in general theory; yet
when the question comes to be, whether a particular deed be a violation of a certain
treaty of peace; it is not so easily determined, as very recent examples abundantly
prove.
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are made, sometimes about paying tributes, sometimes about giving up
certain towns, sometimes about the redemption or exchange of pris-
oners, which are called Cartels. (Of these Hertius has expresly handled
in his diss. de lytro) and sometimes about a truce of hours, days, or
months,* and other like matters.
s e c t i on cc i x
Besides, that interest, for which treaties are made, either respects the per-
son of the Sovereign only, or the state itself. For which reason, some
treaties are personal, and others real; and the former expire with the per-
sons; the latter continue after both the contractingSovereignsareextinct.
Now, from these definitions it is plain, that all treaties for the conser-
vation of a prince or his family are personal, and those relating to the
utility of a state itself are real.† And to this division may all those of
Pufendorff (of the law of nature and nations, 8. 9. 6.) be most conven-
iently referred. <204>
* Here it is usually asked, when that time commences? Grotius 3. 21. 5. insists that
the day from which the measure of the time is to commence, is not included within
that measure or compass of time: but he is solidly refuted by Pufendorff of the law
of nature and nations, 8. 7. 8. And therefore, if for instance, it should be agreed that
there shall be a truce from the first of July to the first of September, both these days
are included; and in like manner, if from the first of June for thirty days, the first
day of June is the first day of the truce, and the thirtieth day is the last day of it, so
that the day after it is lawful to take arms.
† This question arose when the Romans changed their regal government. For the
Sabines having contracted with their Kings, upon the change of the government they
declared war against the Romans, pretending that the Roman people, in a popular
state, had no right to the advantage of treaties made with their Kings, Dionys. Hal-
icarn. Antiq. l. 5. p. 307. In the year from the foundation of Rome 267, the Hernici
had recourse to the same plea, denying that they had ever made any treaty with the
people of Rome, and asserting that their treaty made with Tarquin had ceased, be-
cause he being dethroned had died in exile, Dionys. Hal. 8. p. 530. But both these
nations having made a treaty upon their being conquered by the Roman arms (See
Dionys. ib. l. 4. p. 252. & seq.) it is indisputable that they had not contracted with
Tarquin only, but with the Roman state, and therefore their treaties continued oblig-
atory even after his expulsion.
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s e c t i on ccx
What is advantageous to a state is likewise advantageous to its allies and
confederates; and therefore we may consult not only our own interest,
but that of our allies likewise, in treaties; and that either by mentioning
them in general, or specially and particularly. And here it is plain from
the nature of the thing, that in the last case, the treaty cannotbeextended
to any others but those mentioned in the articles. But in the first case,
it extends to all our allies at the time the treaty was made; but not to
such allies as joined themselves to us afterwards;* because pacts cannot
be extended to comprehend things not thought of when they were en-
tered into (lib. 1. §393). <205>
s e c t i on ccx i
Moreover, because a league is a convention between free nationsor states,
it is plain (§205), that none can make leagues but those who have a com-
mission to do it, either expresly, tacitely or presumptively. And therefore,
what ministers of a Sovereign have promised without a commission
from him, if it be not afterwards ratified, comes under the denomination
of sponsion, and not of league. Now, hence it is evident that a republic
is not bound to ratify a pact made without their order; but it is certain,
on the other hand, that a minister who contracts with a state is obliged
* This question really happened when Hannibal besieged Saguntum. For the Ro-
mans complained that Hannibal had unjustly attacked them, because the Carthagin-
ians were bound by their treaty with the Romans not to annoy their allies. The Car-
thaginians insisted, on the other hand, that the Saguntini were not comprehended
in their treaty, because they were not allies to the Romans at the time it was made,
Polyb. hist. 3. 29. Liv. 21. 19. But tho’ both these authors take the part of the Romans,
I do not hesitate to say with Grotius, 2. 16. 13. that this treaty could not hinder the
Carthaginians from making war against the Saguntines, and yet the Romans had a
right to make new allies, and to defend them against the Carthaginians. For the Ro-
mans had not in the treaty made any provision for their future allies, and could not
oblige the Carthaginians to understand as comprehended in the treaty things not
thought of in making it; nor did the Carthaginians stipulate to themselves from the
Romans, that they should make no new allies; and therefore they had no right to
object against their defending their new allies.
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to make satisfaction to that state, which by the fecial law of the Romans,
consisted in giving him up naked with his hands tied behind his back.*
And it is no less certain, that the exception against a treaty for want of
a commission to the minister, is for the most part a cavil, seeinga republic
who gives the command of an army or province to a minister with full
powers, is justly deemed to have given him all the power, without which
an army or province, nay, the republic itself, cannot be secure. <206>
s e c t i on ccx i i
Because treaties are made by free nations (§205), it is plain that it makes
no difference, whether a people profess the same religion we do, or one
which we look upon as impious and abominable: for as a private person
may lawfully contract or bargain with one of a different religion; so nei-
ther a republic nor its rulers ought to be blamed if they make useful
treaties for their people with infidels; and that revelation hath made no
alteration with respect to this natural truth, Grotius has fully demon-
strated (of the rights of war and peace, 2. 15. 9. & seq.).† <207>
* There are two remarkable instances of this in the Roman history, the Sponsio
Caudina & Numantina, Liv. 9. 8. & seq. and 55. 15. The Romans would not stand
to the treaty by which Posthumius Coss. and the other Generals had extricated the
army at the Furculae Caudinae, nor to that of Hostilius Mancinus with the Nu-
mantines, pretending that both were done without their orders. But who can doubt
but Generals, when an army is in danger, have all the power necessary to deliver them
from it, and which the safety of the army and the state requires. Such sponsionsought
therefore either to have been confirmed, or things ought to have returned to the
posture they were in before the sponsions, if the Romans had not been more ingen-
ious in devising cavils, than faithful in observing their treaties. See Christ. Thomasius
and G. Beyerus de sponsionibus Numantina & Caud. [[Thomasius (praeses ) and
Ryssel (respondens ), Dissertatio juris publici ad l. 4. de captiv. & l. ult. de legation;
Thomasius (praeses ) and Brix von und zu Montzel (respondens ), De sponsione Ro-
manorum Caudina. There does not appear to be a dissertation by the jurist Georg
Beyer (1665–1714) on this subject.]]
† Thus before the Mosaic law was given, Abraham and Isaac made a covenant
with Abimelech, and Jacob with Laban, who most certainly worshipped idols, Gen.
xxi. 22. xxvi. 26. xxxi. 44. And after the law of Moses was given, we know David and
Solomon made leagues with Hierom King of the Tyrians, 2 Sam. v. 11. 1 Kings v. 12.
We likewise read in the sacred records, of the alliances of Abraham with Escol and
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s e c t i on ccx i i i
Moreover, since treaties are conventions (§205); the consequence is, that
all we have said above of pacts, takes place likewise in treaties. So that
nothing ought to be held more sacred than treaties, nor nothing more
detestable than the perfidiousness of treaty-breakers. Yet because no so-
ciety is obliged to prefer another’s interest to its own (§22), a republic
cannot be obliged by an alliance or treaty to assist another, if its own
condition doth not permit; as, e.g. if it be overwhelmed in war, or be in
any imminent danger;* nor is a republic ever obliged to engage in an
unjust war for its allies.
s e c t i on ccx i v
So far have we treated of leagues in general, the noblest of which un-
doubtedly is that pact by which an end is put to war among free nations,
commonly called a treaty of peace. But peace being the ordinary state of
a republic, and, as it were, its natural state; and war being its extraor-
dinary and preternatural state, it is evident, that Sovereigns are obliged
to maintain peace, and to restore it, if it be interrupted; and conse-
quently that these are savage wars, which are carried on, not with a view
to peace, which is better than a thousand million of triumphs. <208>
Aner, Gen. xiv. 13. of David with Achish King of the Philistines, 1 Sam. xxvii. 2. &
seq. and with Toi King of Hemath, 2 Sam. viii. 10. of Asa with Benhadad, 1 Kings
xv. 18. & seq. The objections brought from Scripture are answered by Grotius.
* But this is to be understood, not of pretended but real danger. For that false
pretexts are used by Sovereigns, as well as by private persons, is daily complained.
And the excuses and delays of friends are elegantly represented by Aesop in the fable
of the Lark in Aulus Gellius Noct. Attic. 2. 29. who there advises every one to place
his chief dependence on himself, and not on his friends or allies, who often promise
mountains of gold, and do nothing. This is likewise the counsel of Ennius in his
Satires, preserved to us by the same Gellius.
Hoc erit tibi argumentum, semper in promtu situm:
Ne quid exspectes amicos, quod tute agere possis.
[[From the Satires of the Roman poet Ennius, quoted in Gellius,AtticNights,
bk. II, chap. xxix, 20: “This adage ever have in readiness; Ask not of friends
what you yourself can do.”]]
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s e c t i on ccxv
By a treaty of peace we understand a convention between free nations
involved in war, by which their quarrels are accommodated by way of
transaction. From which definition it is plain, that peace, in its own na-
ture, ought to be perpetual; and therefore, if it be made for a certain time
only, however long, it is not properly peace, but a truce;* because the
quarrel which engaged the nations in war is thus not ended, but the
design of disputing it by arms still subsists; which state, as we observed,
is a state of war, and not of peace, (§189).
s e c t i on ccxv i
Peace being made by way of transaction (§215), the consequence is, that
it may be made giving, retaining, or promising something; and therefore,
that equality in its articles is not requisite; nor can either of the parties
justly complain of being wronged, however enormous the wrong may
be; since the conqueror may impose any terms, and the conquered may
prefer any terms never so hard to perishing.† <209>
* And yet such truces not unfrequently are called peace, because not only allhostile
acts cease, but even a state of war ceases, as if the contending parties had laid aside
their hostile intentions. Thus we are told by historians, that the Lacedemoniansmade
peace for fifty years; the Romans for a hundred years, Justin. hist. 3. 7. Livy. 1. 15.
Sozom. hist. eccles. 9. 4. [[Sozomenos (fifth century a.d.), Greek ecclesiastical his-
torian (see Sozomenos, Historia ecclesiastica ).]] And we have more recent examples
of such truces between Spain and Portugal, Sweden and Denmark, England and
Scotland, Venice and the Turks, who seldom make peace with Christians, but for a
limited period of time. See Pufendorff 8. 7. 4. & ibidem Hertius, p. 1249.
† Provided it be evident, from the articles of the peace, that the conquered sub-
mitted to these terms. For if by malitious cavil, invidious interpretation, or by open
force, harder terms are obtruded on the conquered than they consented to, they have
just reason to complain that they are injured. Thus Q. Fabius Labeo egregiously cav-
illed, when Antiochus having promised to deliver up to him the half of his navy, he
ordered all his ships to be cut in two, and thus ruined his whole fleet, Valer. Maxim.
7. 3. which piece of false cunning he had perhaps learned from the Campani, who,
as Polyaenus Stratag. 6. 15. [[Polyaenus, Stratagems of War ]] tells us, had thus de-
stroyed the arms of their enemies, one half of which was to be surrendered to them
by treaty. And how detestable was the open force with which the Galli Senones in-
What a treaty
of peace is.
If the
exception of
inequality
be valid.
book i i , chapter ix 519
s e c t i on ccxv i i
Much less can an exception of fear or force be opposed to a treaty of
peace; for this exception never takes place when one has a right to force
another (l. 1. §108). But war is as just a way of forcing among indepen-
dent free nations, as the authority of a judge in a civil state (§9); nor is
it to any purpose to say that the war was unjust, and therefore that the
victor used unjust violence in extorting hard conditions from the con-
quered. For besides, that neither of the parties engaged in war hath a
right to make himself judge in his own cause, and determine concerning
the justice of the war, the conquered, by transacting with the conqueror,
remits that injury, and consents to the amnesty included in all such trea-
ties.* <210>
sulted the Romans, with whom, tho’ conquered by them, they had transacted, oblig-
ing themselves to pay them a thousand pound weight of gold, when they not only
brought false weights, but put a sword into the scale with the gold, saying insolently,
vae victis esse [[“Alas for the conquered”]], Liv. 5. 48.
* And hence we may see what ought to be answered to Pufendorff, who maintains
against Grotius, that this exception takes place. See Grotius l. 2. cap. 17. §20. & ib.
3. cap. 18. §11. and Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 8. 8. 1. For these are
two very different things, viz. to oppose an exception of fear, and to renew the war
because the conquering party had taken occasion to do something contrary to the
articles of peace. In the latter case we readily grant there is a just reason for war (§117);
but we deny that the first is valid. But these two are not sufficiently distinguished by
Pufendorff, as is plain from the example he brings. Polyb. hist. 3. 30. asks whether
the Carthaginians had just reasons for their declaring the second punic war against
the Romans? And he thinks they had, on this account, that the opportunity the Car-
thaginians took to revenge themselves, was of the same kind with that the Romans
had taken to injure them; which is the same as if he had said, that the Carthaginians
might justly plead the exception of fear, because, while they were embroiled in trou-
bles and confusions at home, the Romans had forced them to give up Sardinia, and
extorted a vast sum of money from them. But tho’ in the articles of peace between
the Romans and the Carthaginians, nothing was transacted concerning Sardinia, yet
the Romans acted unjustly, and contrary to their treaty of peace, in taking advantage
of the confusions the Carthaginians were involved in at home, to make themselves
masters of Sardinia, as Polybius himself acknowledges, 1. 88. And therefore the Car-
thaginians did not object an exception of fear against the treaty of peace which put a
period to the first punic war, but they complained that this treaty was broken by the
Romans, by their taking occasion from their distress to force them to give up Sardinia.
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s e c t i on ccxv i i i
Grotius 3. 19. 6. and Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 8. 8.
2. ask whether a commonwealth or government is obliged to observe a
treaty of peace made with rebellious subjects? And they justly affirm it
ought, against Boxhornius, instit. polit. 1. 14. 19.2 and Lipsius. For peace
is made by way of transaction (§215); but he who transacts with one who
had injured him, is deemed to have remitted the injury done to him.
And therefore Sovereigns, by making a treaty of peace with rebellious
subjects, give an indemnity to them for their rebellion; and thus this
peace cannot be broken without injustice, unless for a new cause; except
it was not valid from the beginning, either on <211> account of some
fraud on the part of the rebels, or of the state of the prince who made
the treaty.*
s e c t i on ccx i x
Besides, as other treaties, so those of peace ought to be (§213) most re-
ligiously observed; and therefore the time within which articles ought to
be fulfilled, must be strictly observed, and delays cannot be easily ex-
cused. See Grotius 3. 20. 25. It is likewise evident to every one, that me-
diators, who undertake the office of making peace, and guarantees, who
answer, as it were, for the contractors, are obliged, by pact, to the con-
* Thus in the year 1488, the people of Bruges having invited Maximilian I. to their
city, forced him by an unparalleled treachery to a very shameful pact with them: But
so far was the Emperor Frederick, from ratifying it, that in a convention of the nobles
at Mechlin, it was decreed that Maximilian was not bound by these promises, Jo.
Joach. Muller Reichs-tags-Theatr. in Maximilian I. act. 1. cap. 8. [[Mu¨ller, Des Hei-
ligen Ro¨mischen Reichs, Teutscher Nation, Reichs Tags Theatrum, wie selbiges, unter
Keyser Maximilians I. Maximilian I was king of Germany and later Holy Roman
Emperor from 1493 to 1519.]] And surely the people having by knavery and unjust
force made a prisoner of the King till he should promise whatever they were pleased
to demand of him; such an extorted promise was no more binding upon him than
the promise a robber on the highway forces from one.
2. Boxhorn, Institutionum politicarum libri tres.
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tracting parties;* because, having undertaken the business, they oblige
themselves to whatever it requires. Whence we conclude, that it is the
duty of mediators not to favour one party more than another, but to
judge impartially of the cause on both sides, and to persuade each to
what is most equal and advantageous; and the duty of guarantees to use
their utmost endeavours that the articles of the treaty be fulfilled on both
sides, and to assist the injured party by their advice and aids, and with
forces, if promised. <212>
s e c t i on ccx x
Sovereigns having the right of making leagues and peace with enemies
(§135), which cannot be done without employing agents or messengers;
the consequence is, that they are allowed to have the right of sending
ambassadors. Now, since he who receives another’s ambassadors, by that
very deed is deemed to promise them a safe admission and exit (l. 1. §391);
the consequence is, that ambassadors ought to be held sacred amongst
enemies, and not only as exeemed from the jurisdiction of him to whom
they are sent (of which V. A. Corn. van Bynkersh. hath admirably dis-
* The same is to be said of hostages, i.e. persons pledged for the faith of a state,
whether they voluntarily offered themselves, or they were given up as such by the
supreme power in a state. Grotius of the rights of war and peace, 3. 4. 14. In the
former case they are bound by their own consent; in the latter, by the convention
between their sovereign and the other state with whom the peace is made. Whence
it is plain, 1. That hostages may not fly. Nor, 2. a republic receive them by the right
of postliminy. Therefore, when Cloelia being a hostage, fled, Porsena demanded that
the hostage might be sent back, threatening to hold the treaty as broken if it was not,
and the Romans acted justly in delivering back this pledge of their treaty. 3. That
hostages ought not to be treated as slaves, or even as prisoners of war. And therefore,
4. That their estates cannot be confiscated as persons incapable of testating, tho’ this
was the old rigid Roman law, l. 31. D. de jure fisci. 5. That their obligation expires
with their persons; and therefore, that when one hostage dies, ransom only is due for
the other. 6. But if the treaty of peace be broken, the hostages may be kept in chains,
and spoiled of their liberty and effects, tho’ it be very hard, to kill them, if the treaty
be violated without any fault of theirs. But of all this see Grotius of the rights of war
and peace, 3. 20. 52. & seq. Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations, 8. 8. 6. and
Schilter. opusculum singulare de jure obsidum. [[Schilter, De jure et statu obsidum
dissertatio juridica.]]
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coursed in his treatise de foro legatorum );3 but as having the right of
saying, writing, and acting whatever they are ordered by their constituent
republics or Sovereigns, to speak, write, <213> or do, provided they shew
no hostile disposition against the state to which they are sent.*
s e c t i on ccx x i
Other matters relating to ambassadors, which are treated of at great
length by Marselarius, Wicquefort,4 and others, may either be easily de-
duced from the preceding principles, or belong to the customs of na-
tions, and not to the laws of nature and nations; such as the jurisdiction
of an ambassador over his own family, his rights with regard to the ex-
ercise of his religion in his family, his immunities, his right of giving
protection, and the solemnities of his reception, entry, and taking leave;
his titles and honours, and the forms of audience; and the different or-
ders and degrees of ambassadors, their titles of honour, precedency, and
many other such like questions; as likewise concerning what is become
now universal usage, the inviolability of trumpeters, drummers, andher-
alds (as among the Greeks of old) of whom Homer often makesmention
(Odyss. 10. v. 59. & 102. & 19. v. 294. and Iliad 10. v. 14. & 178). But
upon these matters it does not concern us to dwell. <214>
* If there are evident proofs of this hostile disposition, neither a prince nor a
republic is obliged to receive an ambassador, and may command him to get out of
their territories, as is usually done when war begins to rekindle between two states,
the treaty of peace being broken: For we are not obliged to admit an enemy into our
bosom or house, and therefore not his minister or commissioner.
3. Bynkershoek, De foro legatorum tam in causa civili, quam criminali liber
singularis.
4. Fredericus de Marselaer (1584–1650), author of the treatise Legatus libri duo.
Abraham van Wicquefort (1598–1682), author of a treatise on ambassadors (L’ambassa-
deur et ses fonctions ) published in French, German, and English editions in the early
eighteenth century.
Different
customs of
nations with
regard to
ambassadors.
523
u ch a p t e r x u
Of the duties of subjects.
s e c t i on ccx x i i
Hitherto we have treated of the rights of the supreme magistrate both
within and without his dominions. Let us now enquire into the duties
of subjects; but all of them may be so easily deduced from the rights of
Sovereigns as correlates to them, (l. 1. §7), that we shall quickly dispatch
them. For as subjects may be considered either as members or parts of
the state entrusted to them, or as their subjects, their duties are either
general or special; the former of which arise from the commonobligation
they lie under to the sovereign power; the latter, from their particular
stations in the state.
s e c t i on ccx x i i i
Their general duties are either owing to the state itself, or to the supreme
power in it, or to their fellow subjects and citizens. But since the whole
state is one society, and every member of a society is bound to adjust his
actions to the common end of the society (§21); it follows, that nothing
ought to be dearer or more sacred to a subject than the security and
public welfare of his state; that he ought to prefer its good to his life and
all the advantages of life,* and to promote it by every just and honest
method. <215>
* And this is that obligation to one’s country, which some ancients carried to such
a height, that they said, it comprehended in it all the other branches of benevolence,
The duties of
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s e c t i on ccx x i v
Again, because the life of a republic consists, as it were, in this, that all
the subjects submit their <216> wills to the will of the supreme power
(§114); the consequence is, that subjects are obliged to pay to the su-
preme magistrate, as to their superior, a love of veneration and obe-
dience* (l. 1. §86). And since they are likewise bound by pact, it is evident
and that none ought to hesitate about sacrificing his life for his country, when its
good called for it at his hands. Cicero in his offices, 1. 17. 3. 23. The ancient saying,
“Dulce est pro patria mori,” is in every one’s mouth. But Jo. Clericus, in his exam-
ination of this maxim, Ars Critica, 2. 2. 5. 16. says, “Men rarely know what they mean
by the word country. And in reality,” says he, “what was it an Athenian or a Roman
called his country? If by it was understood the soil of Italy or Attica, there is no more
reason why it should be a more glorious thing to die for it, than to die for that of
Africa or Asia. For the soil in which one is born no more belongs to him, than the
soil upon which he may live conveniently: It is therefore foolish to prefer dying in a
country lying to the east or west, to living in another that lies to the south or north.
If by it was understood the inhabitants, what were the Athenian and Romanrepublics
but societies of robbers, if we look narrowly into the matter? And therefore, he who
died for them was a robber, and sacrificed his vile life for a band of thieves.” [[ Jean
le Clerc, Ars critica, part 2, sec. 2, chap. 5.16, pp. 428–29.]] But all this is very empty
stuff, of which we may justly say,
Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce duri.
[[Horace, Epistles 2.1.31, in Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica: “The olive has
no hardness within, the nut has none without.”]]
For by one’s country is meant not a spot of ground, nor yet a set of men among
whom there may be many knaves and fools, but that civil constitution whichconnects
our happiness and safety with that of the whole state: And certainly, it is better to
die than to see that society dissolved, upon which our liberty, dignity, and all our
happiness depends. The prophet Jeremiah philosophizes in a very different manner
from Mr. le Clerc; Jeremiah xxix. 7. “And seek the peace of the city, whither I have
caused you to be carried away captive, and pray unto the Lord for it, for in the peace
thereof you shall have peace.” Might not these captives have said, Why should we be
more concerned about this soil than any other? Why should we pray for so many
robbers, idolaters, for so many impure and wicked persons, with which this city of
Babylon is filled? But God does not command them to be concerned about the Bab-
ylonian soil, nor its inhabitants, but about the republic, upon the safety of which
their safety depended. “In the peace thereof shall ye have peace.”
* And that not only internal but external, which consists in giving them certain
titles, and paying them certain honours, according to the custom of the state. Thus,
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that they are bound to fidelity, and that it is incumbent upon them not
to be factious, and thus disturb the state by their feuds and animosities,
but to pay allegiance to their rulers, and not to hurt them by word or
deed, but to hold them sacred, and to render dutiful obedience to all
their laws and orders.
s e c t i on ccx x v
Besides, it being the duty of fellow subjects to live together, as the com-
mon end of their society requires; they are certainly obliged to love one
another, to live peaceably together, and not only to render justice one to
another, but likewise to be more humane towards one another than to
strangers. In fine, not to be invidious, or calumniators; not to envy those
whom either birth, the benevolence of the prince, or merit has raised to
greater dignities;* those who excel in any virtue, or those to whom prov-
idence hath been more favourable <217> with respect to their outward
circumstances or fortunes.
among the Persians the subjects were obliged to call their Kings Basile´ac Basile´wn,
and to salute them with this acclamation vivas aeternum, and other such like. Of
other titles of honour and gestures of respect, many have treated, as Becman Notitia
dignitatum, diss. 6. [[Becmann, Notitia dignitatum illustrium civilium, sacrarum,
equestrium.]] But tho’ Sovereigns may justly require certain titles and ceremonies of
honour and respect from their subjects; yet there is no reason why strangers should
be forced to pay them, as the ambassadors of other princes or republics, who do their
duty if they render reverence to a foreign prince according to the received manner
and custom of their own nation. See Corn. Nep. Conon, cap. 3. [[Nepos, “Conon,”
chap. 3, p. 105, in Cornelius Nepos, Cornelius Nepos.]]
* This is the vice to which democracies are exceeding liable; for such governments
can neither bear with vices, nor brook more eminent virtues. Hence that horrible
decree of the Ephesini, on account of which Heraclitus pronounced them all worthy
of dying in the prime of life. “Let none of our citizens excel others in merit; if he
does, let him live elsewhere and with others.” (Diogenes Laert. 9. 2.) How many
eminent men suffered at Athens by their ostracism is well known. See Corn. Nep.
Themistocles, cap. 8. Aristides cap. 1. Cimon. cap. 3. and Sigonius de Republ. Athe-
niensium. 2. 4. [[Sigonius, De republica Atheniensium libri IV, in Jacobus Gro-
novius, Thesaurus Graecarum antiquitatum, vol. 5 of Attici imperii amplitudinem ac
mutationes.]]
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s e c t i on ccx x v i
All the special duties of subjects flow from the ends of the particular
station of each in the republic; and therefore they are all obliged to do,
every one, what the end of his station requires; and not to do any thing
that is repugnant to its end; and moreover, not to desire any offices for
which they are not equal. From which few rules, one may easily perceive
what must be the duties of generals, counsellors, ambassadors, treas-
urers, magistrates, judges, ministers of the church, professors and doc-
tors in universities, soldiers, &c.*
s e c t i on ccx x v i i
Moreover, the general duties of subjects oblige as long as they continue
subjects; the special, only so long as they continue in the stations to
which their respective duties belong. But one ceases to be a subject several
ways. For a republic consists of a number of men (§107), whom we call
a people; whence it follows, that the people being extinct or <218> dis-
persed (which may happen by an earthquake, war, inundations, and
other public calamities) a few surviving persons cease to be subjects, un-
less they maintain their state till they grow again to a sufficient number
of people.† But one does not cease to be a subject, if a people, being
conquered in war, accedes as a province to another state, because he then
* It is not therefore necessary to speak more fully of the special duties belonging
to every station. Of those Pufendorff of the duties of a man and a citizen, 2. 18. 7.
has treated at large, and may be consulted.
† A few so surviving, Grotius, 2. 9. 4. thinks, may, as private persons, seize the
dominion or property of the things which the whole people formerly possessed, but
not the empire. But so long as the surviving persons have a mind to have a common
supreme magistrate, and to submit themselves to his will for their common internal
and external security, why does not the republic remain? Thus did the Athenian re-
public remain, when the people were reduced to the greatest extremity, insomuch,
that all fit to bear arms being destroyed, they gave the right of citizenship to strangers,
freedom to slaves, indemnity to condemned persons, and after all, that medley was
scarcely able to maintain their liberty, Just. Hist. 5. 6.
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becomes the subject of another state; nor if the form of the republic be
changed, because a people does not then cease to be the same.
s e c t i on ccx x v i i i
But because the people remains the same, tho’ the form of their gov-
ernment be changed (§227); the consequence is, that the real treaties
made by a people with other states (§209), and the public pacts made
with private persons, while the former government remained unaltered,
still subsist; and therefore the obligations of the people still are valid,
tho’ their form of government be changed. But that subjects are not
bound by the deeds of those who unjustly usurped the government, or
did any thing contrary to their fundamental laws,* is certain, for this
reason, that they never consented to their power or empire. <219>
s e c t i on ccx x i x
Moreover, from the same principle (§226), we conclude, that one does
not cease to be a citizen or subject, if one state is divided into many, or
many coalesce into one system; tho’ it may happen, in the former case,
that one is no more a subject of the same, but of another state. If a
republic or state resolve to send a colony, it is of great moment of what
kind that colony is. For some may go out of a larger country to constitute
* Thus the Athenians, when they had got rid of the thirty tyrants, made a law that
all their acts and judgments, private or public, should be null, Demost. in Timocrat.
p. 782. [[Demosthenes, “Against Timocrates,” chap. 56, p. 409, in Demosthenes.]]
The Emperor Honorius made a like constitution with relation to the deeds of the
tyrant Heraclianus, l. 13. C. Theod. de infirm. quae sub tyrann. But here prudence
and moderation are requisite, 1. If the obligation arise from something that hath been
profitable to the people, and turned to their advantage. 2. If one chosen by the people
holds the sovereignty for some time by mistake, l. 3. D. de off. praet. upon which law
there is a most learned dissertation by Jac. Gothofredus, De electione magistratus in-
habilis. [[ Jacques Godefroy (Jacobus Gothofredus), 1587–1652, author of De electione
magistratus inhabilis seu incapacis per errorem facta.]] 3. If one’s government was orig-
inally just, and he afterwards degenerates into a tyrant, to which case I refer l. 2. &
3. C. Theod. eodem, where Constantine the Great justly confirms all the lawful deeds
and rescripts of Licinius.
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a republic that shall not be obliged to any thing with regard to its me-
tropolis, but homage; and others, so as still to remain a part of their
mother-country.* Now, it is plain, that the former case is the same as
when an empire is divided; and in the latter there is no alteration with
respect to the first obligation of the subjects who make the colony.<220>
s e c t i on ccx x x
Again, since one is a subject, in regard that he constitutes with others
one republic, or with regard to a republic into which he willingly enters
(§108); it follows from thence, that one ceases to be a citizen, so soon as
he willingly removes with that design from his native country, and joins
himself to another state, settling there his fortune and family, unless the
public laws forbid subjects to remove, as among the citizens of Argos,
of whom Ovid says, Metam. l. 15. v. 28.
* Such colonies the ancient Greeks used to send. Whence in Thucydides, l. 1. p. 25.
the Corcyraeans say, “They are not sent into colonies on these terms that they may
be slaves, but that they may be equal to those who still remain in their native country.”
To which the Corinthians answer, “We did not plant a colony of them to be affronted
and despised by them, but that we might still remain their masters, and have homage
paid by them to us. For the other colonies love and respect us.” [[Thucydides,History
of the Peloponnesian War, vol. 1, bk. I, chap. 34, p. 61.]] Therefore, it was the only
duty of those colonies to pay respect to their mother country, and to testify that
respect by some solemnities, as the same Thucydides speaks, p. 18. ibidem, adding
(as his scholiast explains it) that these honours chiefly consisted, in giving, at the
public sacrifices, when they distributed the entrails, the first share to the citizens of
the metropolis. Hen. Valesius not. ad Excerpta Peiresc. p. 7. has largely treated of
the other honours rendered in colonies to the subjects of their ancient mother-
country. [[Henri de Valois (Valerius) (1603–76), French scholar and editor of Polybii,
Diodori Siculi, Nicolai Damasceni, Dionysii Halicar., . . . excerpta; a reference to de
Valois’ edition of manuscripts acquired by his countryman Nicolas-Claude Fabri de
Peiresc (1580–1673).]] But the customs amongst the Romans were different: For their
colonies received their laws and institutions from the Romans, and did not makethem
themselves. See Gellius Noct. Attic. 17. Yet the Albanian colony was theirownmasters
from the first, and not only did not pay any homage to their primitive country, but
scrupled not to bring it under subjection to them; for which Metius Fufetius re-
proaches them in Dionys. Halicarn. Antiq. Rom. l. 3. p. 143.
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Prohibent discedere leges,
Poenaque mors posita est patriam mutare volenti.1
or that liberty be indulged only with regard to a part of one’s effects,
which is the custom in several European nations. That they change their
seat, but not their obligation to their country, who desert to an enemy,
is manifest; and therefore, when they can be brought back, they are justly
punished. <221>
s e c t i on ccx x x i
In fine, because those who are members of any society, and do not con-
form to its laws, may be severed from the society by the other members
(§21); the same right certainly belongs to members of a civil state; and
therefore, bad subjects may very justly be exiled; and this being done,
they certainly cease to be subjects. But this is not the case with respect
to those who, tho’ sent out of a country, still possess estates in it, or to
those who are transported to a certain place subject to the country, there
to lead a disagreeable life, or perform some task by way of punishment.
In general, I should think, that those who are deprived, for any crime,
of the right of citizenship, are deprived of the privileges of subjects, but
are not thereby freed from their obligation to their country, so far at least,
as that they may molest it, or, imitating Coriolanus, take up arms against
their countrymen, Liv. 2. 35. <222>
1. Ovid, Metamorphoses 15, line 28, vol. 2: “[H]is country’s laws prohibited his
departure. The punishment of death was appointed to the man who should desire
to change his fatherland.”
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SUPPLEMENT
Concerning the Duties of
Subjects and Magistrates.
We have had little occasion to differ, very considerably at least, fromour
Author, except in one important question, about the measures of sub-
mission to the supreme power; and as little occasion to add to him, ex-
cept with relation to the natural causes of government, and their nec-
essary operations and effects; a consideration of great moment in moral
and political philosophy, which hath however been overlooked, not by our
Author only, but by Grotius and Pufendorff, and all the moral-systemwriters
I have seen.
These few things excepted, which we have endeavoured to supply in
our remarks, our Author will be found, having had the advantage of
coming after several excellent writers, to have given a very full compend
of the laws of nature and nations, in which, they are deduced by a most
methodical chain of reasoning, from a few simple and plain principles,
and they are applied to as many proper cases as is requisite to initiate any
attentive intelligent reader into this science, and enable him to decide,
by his own judgment, any questions that may occur in life concerning
justice and equity, between subject and subject, in whatever relations,
natural or adventitious, as parent, husband,master,&c. between subject
and magistrate; or finally, between <223> separate and independent
states. Now, upon a review of what our Author hath done, every one, I
532 the laws of nature and nations
think, must perceive that the science of morals may be divided into two
parts. The first of which is more general, and very easy and plain, con-
sisting of a few axioms, and certain obvious conclusions fromthem,with
relation to the general conduct of our life and actions. The second con-
sists in finding out from these more general rules, what equity requires
in various more complicated cases. And here, as in all other sciences, for
the same reason, the deduction must be longer or shorter, according as
the conclusions lie nearer to, or more remote from the first fundamental
truths in the science. There is no science in which the first axioms or
principles are more evident than that of morality. Thus, for example,
the only principle our Author, or any other moral writer requires, or has
occasion for, in order to demonstrate all the social duties of mankind,
is, “That it is just to hurt or injure no person, and to render to every one
his own, or his due; or in other words, That it is just and equal to do to
others, as we would have them to do to us.” The reasonableness of this
principle is self-evident; and there is no case, however complex, relating
to social conduct, wherein the reasonable part one ought to act may not
be inferred from this principle. Certain general rules of conduct obvi-
ously arise from this principle. And the resolution of particular cases
consisting of many circumstances by it, only appears difficult till one
hath been a little practised in attending to circumstances, and separating,
weighing, and balancing them.Here indeed study is requisite, as inother
sciences, where the first principles are likewise very simple; and many
truths are easily deducible from them, but others lie more remote, and
require a longer train of argumentation: But yet it may be averred, that
the remotest truths, and the most complex <224> cases in morals, are
not so difficult to be resolved, or do not lie so distant from their first
principles, as the higher truths in most other sciences. And therefore, it
is justly said by moralists, that the science of morality is more level to
every capacity than any other science; tho’ certainly a thorough acquain-
tance with it requires a good deal of close thought and attention, and
considerable practice in the examination of examples or cases. This, I
think, every one, who hath read our authorwith any degree of attention,
will readily acknowledge, whatever he may have thought, while he
viewed this science at a greater distance. But, in order to give a short view
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of the extent of this science, and distinguish what is more easy and ob-
vious in it from what is more complex and difficult, let us first consider
an excellent summary given us by Cicero of the general laws or obli-
gations of nature; and then let us cast our eye on what he says upon the
design of civil law, which is to settle the rules of equity inmore complex
or compounded cases. We find him discoursing thus of the general laws
of nature. “The law of nature,” says he, “does not consist in opinion
merely, neither is the sense of its obligation wholly formed by education
and art; but it is from nature: we are led, directed, and impelled to fulfil
its obvious dictates by certain dispositions cogenial with us: we feel its
force, so soon as objects proper to excite and stir certain affectionsdeeply
inlaid into the frame of ourminds, are presented to us.Nature thus leads
us to religion, to piety, to gratitude, to resentment of injustice, to esteem
and veneration, to veracity and candour. Religion consists in reverence
toward some superior divine nature, and concern to approve ourselves
to that Being, by whom we and all things subsist. Piety directs us to the
love of our country, our parents, and of all who are endeared to us by
natural ties of blood. Gratitude teaches us to main-<225>tain a kindly
resentment of good offices, and to love, honour, and reward our bene-
factors. Resentment of injustice impels us to ward against and punish
all injuries to ourselves, or to others who ought to be dear to us; and in
general, to repel all iniquity and violence. Reverence is naturally excited
in us by grave and wise old age, by eminence in virtue, or worth and
dignity. Veracity consists in fulfilling our engagements, and acting con-
sistently with what we promise, profess or undertake.” Cicero de inven-
tione rhetorica, l. 2. n. 22. & n. 54.1 where he adds excellent definitions
of prudence, justice, magnanimity, patience, temperance,modesty, per-
severance, and all the virtues which make men good and great.
This is Cicero’s succinct abridgment of the more general laws of na-
ture: And he calls them laws of nature, because the obligation to them
is founded in human nature; the happiness of mankind consists in the
observance of them; and mankind are pointed and prompted to fulfil
them by natural dispositions or principles in theirminds. Insomuch that
1. Cicero, De inventione 2.22.66 and 2.54.163–64.
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the idea of a supreme Governor of the universe cannot be presented to
our minds, without exciting religious veneration and love in them; nor
can the idea of our parents, our relatives by blood, or of our country,
be set before us, and we not feel certain kindly affections stir within our
breasts, which are very properly called, in a peculiar sense, natural af-
fections; nor the idea of a generous benefactor, and our hearts not burn
with gratitude towards him; nor the idea of injustice to ourselves, or
even to others, and we not be filled with indignation and resentment;
nor the idea of great wisdom, virtue and integrity, andwe not be affected
with esteem and reverence towards such characters; nor finally, the idea
of consistency, faithfulness and candour, andwenot admire andapprove
the beautiful image; and own such conduct to be truly <226> laudable
and becoming. We are naturally affected by the several objects that have
beenmentioned in the manner described: And it is easy to perceive, that
the private happiness of every individual, and the common happiness
of our kind, which we cannot reflect upon without feeling a very high
satisfaction in it, and a very strong tendency to promote it, are insepa-
rably connected with the practice of those virtues. They are therefore,
in every sense, of natural obligation. This, I take to be a just paraphrase
upon what Cicero says in the passages above referred to, and to be suf-
ficient to shew the strength and evidence of the more general rules of
morality.
Now Cicero, agreeably to this account of human nature, and of the
primary laws and obligations arising from it, thus defines the end of civil
society (to which nature likewise strongly excites and impels us) and of
its laws. (Topic ad Tribatium, n. 2.) “The end of civil society, and civil
laws, (says he) is security of property, and equal treatment to the mem-
bers of the same state, in consequence of just constitutions, formed and
guarded by mutual consent.”2 And how elegantly doth he elsewhere en-
large upon the advantages of good civil laws, which secure themembers
of a state against all violence and injustice, and all feuds, animosities and
quarrels, in the peaceable unmolested possession and use, each of his
own honest acquisitions, (Orat. pro Caecinna, n. 26). “—A remarkable
2. Cicero, Topica 2.9, in Cicero, De inventione.
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thing indeed, and worthy of your attention and remembrance, ye pro-
tectors of civil rights, on this very account. For what is the end of civil
law? Is it not a security for our properties and rights, which cannot be
biassed by affection, bended by force, nor corrupted by money; and
which, tho’ not totally violated, yet if but deserted in the smallest degree,
or if negligently observed, we are neither sure of inheriting what our
fathers may leave to us, nor of making our children our heirs? For what
signifies it, to <227> have houses or lands left us by a father, if our pos-
session be precarious and uncertain? Let an estate be yours by the fullest
right, yet how can you be sure of keeping it, if this right be not suffi-
ciently fortified, if it be not protected by civil and public law against the
covetousness of the more powerful? What avails it, I say, to have an es-
tate, if the laws relating to confines, marches, possession, use, the rights
of water, passage, &c. may be changed or disturbed on any account?
Believe me, many greater advantages redound to us from good laws, and
the conservation of justice, than from those who leave us an inheritance.
A piece of land may be left me by any one, but my secure possession
and use of it depend upon the inviolability of the civil laws. My patri-
mony is left me by my father, but the usucapion of this estate, which
puts an end to all sollicitude, and secures against all vexatious suits, is
not left me by my father, but by the laws. My estate, with the rights of
water, air, passage, light, &c. is left me by my father, but my security for
the undisturbed possession of these rights, is an inheritance I owe to the
laws. Wherefore, we ought to be no less concerned about this public
patrimony, the good laws and constitutions handed down to us fromour
ancestors, than about our private estates; not only because these are se-
cured to us by the laws, but because tho’ one may lose his estate without
hurt to any other personbut himself, yet right cannotbe violatedwithout
the greatest detriment and injury to the whole state, &c.” 3
Here Cicero briefly runs through some of the principal points which
ought to be settled by civil laws, agreeably to natural equity, for the en-
couragement of honest virtuous industry, and in order to exclude all
injustice, violence and molestation; such as, succession by testament,
3. Cicero, Pro Caecina, chap. 26, in Cicero, Pro lege Manilia.
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and to intestates, possession, use, usufruct, perfect or im-<228>perfect
dominion, services, contracts, &c. And it is the rules of equity with re-
gard to these and such like matters, which it is the business of themoral
science to deduce from certain and evident principles, for the direction
of society in fixing and determining its laws. And therefore, to be amas-
ter of the moral science, it is not enough to know the first axioms of it,
and its more general and obvious rules; but one must be capable of fol-
lowing them thro’ all their remotest consequences, in these and other
such complicated cases, so as to be able to judge of civil laws by them.
And surely, however close attention and long reasoning this more dif-
ficult part of morality may require, it does not require long reasoning
to prove, that this is the most proper study of those whose birth and
fortunes furnish them with time and means for improving themselves
to serve their country in the highest stations of life. Who doth not at
first sight perceive that this is the character every man of birth ought to
aim at, and that his education ought to be adapted to qualify him for
attaining to, even that glorious one which Cicero (ibidem) gives of C.
Aquilius? “Wherefore, let me aver it, that the authority of the person I
have just mentioned, can never weigh too much with you. Aquilius,
whose singular prudence the people of Rome hath so often proved, not
in deceiving, but in rightly advising them, and who never severed equity
from civil law. Aquilius, whose extraordinary judgment, applicationand
fidelity, have been so long devoted to the service of the public, and have
been on many occasions so ready and powerful a stay to it. One so just
and good, that he seems to have been formed for giving counsel and
administring justice, rather by nature than by discipline: One so wise
and knowing, that he seems by his study of the laws to have acquired
not merely knowledge, but likewise virtue and probity: One, in fine,
whose understanding is <229> so clear and accurate, and his integrity
so habitual and impervertible, that whatever ye draw from this fountain,
ye perceive, ye feel to be pure and unadulterated.”4 For such excellent
qualities shall the memory of a Talbot be ever dear and precious: And
hence the manifold advantages we daily receive under the upright and
4. Ibid., 27.77.
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prudent guardianship of a York.5 And all our youth, who have the noble
ambition to be equally useful, and equally loved and honoured, must
pursue their paths, and add to the same incorruptible integrity, the same
thorough knowledge of natural equity, and of our excellent constitution
and laws.* It is in order to contribute my mite to as-<230>sist them in
this glorious pursuit, that I have given them this admirable abridgement
of the laws of nature and nations in English, with some necessary sup-
plements. For every science hath its elements, which, if they be well
understood and carefully laid up, not in the memory but in the judg-
ment, the science itself may be said to be mastered, it being then very
easy to make progress in it. Let me only suggest here, that it will still be
necessary, after having well digested this small system, to read Grotius,
* Because this study is generally supposed to belong only to thosewho are to follow
the law as a profession, and not to make a necessary part of liberal education, I can’t
choose but insert here the account that is given us of ancient education in the schools
at Apollonia, to which Augustus was sent by Julius, andMaecenas by his parents. See
Dion. lib. 45. p. 307. [[Dio Cassius, Dio’s Roman History, vol. IV, bk. 45, p. 413]]
and Velleius Paterculus, l. 2. cap. 59. with Boecler’s note upon these words,—“Apol-
loniam cum in studia miserat.” (edit. Petri Burmanni.) [[See Velleius Paterculus,
Compendium of Roman History, bk. 2, chap. 59. The editionTurnbull is usingappears
to be C. Velleii Paterculi quae supersunt ex historiae Romanae voluminibus duobus
(1719).]] First, it is observed, that Julius took care to have Octavius instructed in all
the arts of government, and in every thing requisite to qualify him for a suitable
behaviour in the exalted station for which he had designed him. Then the several
particular parts of his education are mentioned, such as the languages, rhetoric,mili-
tary exercises, and which was chief, morals and politics, ta` politika` kai ta` a◊rxika`;
and in all these useful arts it is said the youth were instructed diligently, accurately
and practically, to` a◊krizwc, to` e◊r◊rwmenwc, to` isxurwc. Boecler refers to Lipsius, l.
1. polit. c. 10. where there are several observations on this subject. [[Politicorum sive
civilis doctrinae libri sex. ]] And how indeed can that but be a principal part in the
education of young men, whose birth and fortune call them to the higher stations
of life? What good purpose can their education serve if this be neglected? Or what
is principal, if that be not, which is absolutely necessary to qualify them for their
principal duties, and for the noble employments by which alone they can acquire
glory to themselves, or do good to their country? Is the art of ruling, law-giving, or
of discharging any important office in the state, the only one that requires no prep-
aration for it, no previous study or practice?
5. Charles Talbot, first baron Talbot of Hensol (1685–1737), lord chancellor from
1734; Philip Yorke, first earl of Hardwicke (1690–1764), succeeded Talbot as lord
chancellor in 1737.
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and together with him his best commentator Pufendorff,* and several
other authors, the treatises of Bynkershoek so often commended by our
Author in particular; and after having read these excellent writers, it will
not be improper often to return to our Author, and review him as a good
compend of them all. And to add no more on the utility of this study,
as without some acquaintance with the principles of moral philosophy,
it is impossible to reap more than mere amusement by reading history;
sowhen one hath once taken in a clear viewof themore important truths
inmorality andpolitics, it will be equally easy, pleasant andadvantageous
for him to apply these truths, as a measure or standard, to the facts or
cases he meets with in history, to private or public actions, and their
springs or motives, and to the laws, constitutions and policies of differ-
ent states: And it would not certainly be an improper way of studying
our laws, first to get well <231> acquainted with the laws of nature (large
commentaries upon which are generally at the same time commentaries
upon the Roman laws, the examples being commonly taken from
thence), and then to go over the same laws of nature again in order, and
to enquire into our laws under each head, and try them by the laws of
nature, as the Roman laws are commonly canvassed by the maxims of
natural equity, in treatises upon universal law.
But tho’ I could not take my leave of our author without saying these
few things about the nature and use of the science to which his treatise
is so good an introduction; yet the design of this supplement is chiefly
to treat a little more fully than he hath done of the duties of subjects
and magistrates; and here I shall only cut off some things, and add a few
others to what is to be found in the learned Barbeyrac’s notes upon the
tenth and following sections in the eighth chapter of the seventh book
of Pufendorff of the law of nature and nations.
The duties of subjects are either general or particular. The first arise
* I have said his best commentator; because he is constantly examiningGrotius’s
reasonings and determinations, and very rarely differs from him. And they ought to
be read together, which may be easily done, Barbeyrac in his notes upon Grotius
having all along mentioned the chapters in Pufendorff where each question in Gro-
tius is handled.
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from the common obligation they are under, as submitting to the same
government. The others result from the different employments andpar-
ticular offices with which each subject is honoured or entrusted. 1. The
general duties of subjects respect their behaviour either towards the gov-
ernors of state, the whole body of the people, or their fellow subjects.
1. As to the governors, every one ought to shew them the respect, fidelity
and obedience which their character demands. So that subjects ought
not to be factious or seditious, but to be attached to the interest of their
prince, and to respect and honour him. This is certainly just. But then,
in order to this, a prince must deserve love and honour. For tho’ power
may force submission, ’tis merit only that can create respect, give au-
thority, or beget love. The <232> command to honour a king must be
understood as the command to honour any other person must be un-
derstood; not as a command to honour him whether he deserves it or
not; for that would be an absurd command; a command to prostitute
honour and respect. ’Tis good princes alone that can be honoured, be-
cause they alone deserve it, or have the great and amiable qualities that
can excite esteem. We ought even to have a veneration for the memory
of good princes; but for those who have not been such, behold the ju-
dicious reflections of Montagne.
“Among those laws,” says he, “which relate to the dead, I take that
to be the best, by which the actions of princes are to be examined and
searched into after their decease. What justice could not inflict upon
their persons while they were alive, and equal to, if not above the laws,
is but reasonable should be executed upon their reputation when they
are dead, for the benefit of their successors. This is a customof singular
advantage to those nations where it is observed, and by all good princes
as much to be desired, who have reason to complain that thememories
of the tyrannical and wicked should be treated with the same honours
and respects as theirs. We owe indeed subjection and obedience to all
our kings alike, for that respects their office; but as to esteem as well as
affection, those are only owing to their virtue. Should it therefore be
granted, that we are to be very patient under unworthy princes while
they hold the rod over us? Yet, the relation between prince and subject
being once ended, there is no reason why we should deny to our own
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liberty, and common justice, the publishing of our wrongs.—Livy,
with abundance of truth, says, that the language of men educated in
a court was always full of vanity andostentation, and that the characters
they give of their princes are seldom<233> true.And tho’ perhaps some
may condemn the boldness of those two soldiers, one of whom being
asked by Nero, why he did not love him? answered him plainly to his
face, I loved thee whilst thou wast worthy of it; but since thou art be-
come a parricide, an incendiary, a waterman, a player, and a coachman,
I hate thee as thou dost deserve: And the other being asked, why he
should attempt to kill him? as warmly replied, Because I could think
of no other remedy against thy perpetual mischiefs. Yet who, in his
right senses, will blame the public and universal testimonies that were
given of him after his death, and will be to all posterity, both of him,
and of all other wicked princes like him in his tyrannies and wicked
deportment? I am scandalized, I own, that in so sacred a government
as that of the Lacedemonians, there should be mixed so hypocritical a
ceremony at the interment of their kings, where all the confederates
and neighbours, all sorts of degrees of men and women, as well as their
slaves, cut and slashed their foreheads in token of sorrow, and repeated
in their cries and lamentations, that that king (let him be as wicked as
the devil) was the best that ever they had; by this means prostituting
to his quality, the praises which only belong to merit, and that which
is properly due to supreme merit, tho’ lodged in the lowest and most
inferior subjects, Essay, l. 1. cap. 3.6
2.With respect to the whole body of the people, it is the duty of every
good subject to prefer the good of the public to every other motive or
advantage whatsoever, chearfully to sacrifice his fortune and life, and all
that he values in the world, for the preservation and happiness of the
state. Union is generally recommended to subjects as their duty. It is said,
that union will make a people flourish, and dissention will ruin any peo-
ple. <234> But there must be care taken to have a just notion of the
meaning of those words. An union serviceable to a state, is what designs
the universal good of those who live in it. For if, e.g. in a monarchical
state, where the power of the Sovereign is limited by the laws, the prin-
6. See Montaigne, Essays, vol. 1, bk. I, chap. 3, pp. 26–27.
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cipal subjects of the state should willingly, or by force, consent to submit
all the laws to the prince’s pleasure, such an union would not be advan-
tageous to it in any respect. It would change a society of free people into
a company of miserable slaves. The ready compliance of the Chinese to
obey their king blindly, does but strengthen his tyranny, and add to their
misery. But it is asserted, that the general obedience of the Chinese is
of service to preserve the peace of their country, and that they enjoy by
it all the advantages which the strictest union can procure. They must
mean all the advantages that can be possessed in slavery. But sure there
is not a free-man but had rather see the most frequent commotions than
suffer an eternal slavery. Moreover, it is false to affirm that there are no
intestine wars under such a form of government. The most enslaved
people will, in time, grow weary of an exorbitant tyranny, and upon the
first opportunity shew that the desire of liberty cannot be quite stifled
in the souls of men born to freedom. This happens among the Chinese
and Turks. The union of those who govern an aristocratical state would
be useless, if it did not preserve the observation of the laws, and the
universal good of the commonwealth. This we may understand from
the history of the thirty tyrants of Athens and the Decemviri of Rome.
The union of thosemen served only to crush the people, andmake them
miserable; because their principal design was to gratify their passions,
without having the least respect to the public good. Union may be also
considered with regard to the people, who, when the <235> state is
happy, and well administred, ought to esteem themselves happy, and to
obey chearfully. Now, to keep the people in so firm an union, it is req-
uisite that not only theymay be the better for it, but also that they should
be sensible of their own happiness. In general, the agreement and union
both of governors and people, ought to tend to the public good: from
whence it follows, that whatsoever has not such a design is injurious, and
ought rather to be termed a conspiracy than an union; since the name
of a virtue cannot with reason be attributed to a thing which injures and
ruins a society. Public spirit is the motive that ought to lead and govern
subjects. And then is one truly public-spirited, when nothing is dearer
to him than the liberty and happiness of his country. Yet we must here
observe, that the engagement of every particular person does in some
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measure depend upon the performing of what the rest are obliged to do,
as well as himself, for the public good. For indeed the public good is
only the consequence of the united forces and services of many con-
ducing to the same end. If then in a state it is become customary for the
generality openly to prefer their ownprivate interest to thatof thepublic,
a good subject will not, in that case, be to blame in the least, in not caring
to expose his person or his fortune by a zeal impotent and useless to his
country.
Lastly, the duty of a subject towards his fellow subjects, is to live with
them in a peaceable and friendly manner; to be good humoured and
complaisant to them in the affairs of human life, and to give mankind
no uneasiness by peevish, morose, and obstinate temper; and, in short,
not to envy or oppose the happiness or advantages of any one.
2. The particular duties of subjects are annexed to certain employ-
ments, the discharge of which <236> influences, in somemeasure, either
the whole government, or only one part of it. Now, there is one general
maxim with regard to them all, and that is, that no one aspire to any
public employment, or even presume to accept of it, when he knows
himself not duly qualified for it.What consciencesmust thosemenhave,
who not only accept of, but brigue for places they are absolutely un-
qualified for; as for example, a seat in the supreme judicatures of anation!
A trust which requires, besides great virtue, great knowledge and wis-
dom; a thorough acquaintance with the constitution and laws of a state,
and the interests of the people. And yet (as Socrates observed very truly)
themanner of the world is quite otherwise. For tho’ no body undertakes
to exercise a trade, to which he has not been educated, and served a long
apprentiship; and how mean and mechanical soever the calling be, sev-
eral years are bestowed upon the learning of it; yet, in the case of public
administrations, which is, of all other professions, themost intricate and
difficult (so absurd, so wretchedly careless are we) that every body is
admitted, every body thinks himself abundantly qualified to undertake
them. Those commissions are made compliments and things of course,
without any consideration of mens abilities, or regarding at all whether
they know any thing of the matter; as if a man’s quality, or the having
an estate in the country, could inform his understanding, or secure his
a supplement 543
integrity, or render him capable of discerning between right andwrong,
and a competent judge of his poorer (but perhaps much honester and
wiser) neighbours. See Charron sur la sagesse.7 To buy public offices, or
procure them by bribery, or to give it a softer name, largesses, is stillmore
infamous and abominable, themost sordid, and themost villainousway
of trading in the world. For it is plain, he that buys in the piece, must
make himself whole <237> again by selling out in parcels. Besides, thisway
of procuring public trusts corrupts a people, and renders them merce-
nary and venal, and fit to be sold. And a dishonest, corrupt people, nei-
ther deserves to be free, nor can they longpreserve themselves frombeing
bound with the fetters, their vile prostitution of honour and conscience
to sordid gain demerits. Let me only add upon this head, that to a free
people, who have the right of making their laws, and laying on their own
taxes by their representatives, it may be justly said, as it was to the people
of Israel of old, That their evil is of themselves; whatever they suffer, they
have themselves to blame for it; and consequently, the guilt of it lies upon
themselves. A horrid, inexpiable guilt, of which the greatest misery that
a nation can fall into, is but the just punishment, for which no com-
miseration is due to them who brought it upon themselves; but to their
unhappy posterity, whomust curse them, if they are not quite insensible
of the value of the liberty and happiness their ancestors basely gave up,
and the deplorable condition they are depressed into by the corruption
and venality of those who gave them birth, i.e. till slavery, as long con-
tinued slavery never fails to do, detrudes them into a state not far re-
moved above that of the brutes. But we must be a little more particular
with regard to the duties belonging to employments.
1. Ministers of state, or privy counsellors, ought, with the greatest
application, to study, and perfectly to know the affairs and interests of
the state in all the parts of government, and to propose faithfully, and
in themost propermanner,whatever appears to themtobeadvantageous
to the public, without being influenced by either affection, passion, or
any sinister views. The public good ought to be the only design of all
their advice and endeavours, and not the advancement of their own pri-
7. Pierre Charron, De la sagesse.
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vate fortunes, and the promoting their <238> own power and greatness.
Nor must they ever, by vile and nauseous flattery, countenance or en-
courage the criminal inclinations of the prince. 1. They ought, first of
all, to be men of virtue and good principles. 2. Persons of great abilities,
well acquainted with politics, and particularly well versed in the consti-
tution, laws and interests of the nation. 3. Persons tried before,whohave
come off with honour and success in other trusts; men practised in busi-
ness, and accustomed to difficulties. For hardships and adversities are
the most improving lessons. “Fortune,” says Mithridates in Salust, “in
the room of many advantages she has torn from me, has given me the
faculty of advice and persuasion.”8 Men, at least of ripe years, to give
them steadiness, experience, and consideration; for it is one of themany
unhappinesses attending youth, that persons then are easily imposed
upon. 4. And finally, they ought to be men of openness, freedom and
courage in all their behaviour when they are consulted with; who will
use their utmost care that all their proposals be for the honour and ad-
vantage of their prince and their country; and when once they have se-
cured this point, that the advice is good, will lay aside all flattery and
disguise; detest and despise all equivocations and reservations, and craft-
iness of expression, by which theymay seem to aim at ingratiating them-
selves, or to contrive thatwhat they saymaybe acceptable to theirmaster:
The very reverse of those men whom Tacitus describes, “Who accom-
modate their language as they see occasion, anddo not so properlydiscourse
with the prince, as with his present inclinations and circumstances.” 9
2. The clergy, as being the public ministers of religion, ought to dis-
charge their duty and function with the utmost gravity and application;
should teach no doctrine, nor advance any opinion in religion, which
does not appear to them to be sincerely true; and should be themselves
a shining <239> example by their own conduct of those instructions
which they deliver to the people. “Never did a covetous preacher make
his hearers liberal. Never did a voluptuous clergyman persuade any one
to abstain from pleasures, or to use themwithmoderation; at least,when
8. Sallust, “Letter of Mithridates,” sec. 4, 433, in Sallust, Sallust.
9. It is not clear which work by Tacitus Turnbull is referring to here.
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those persons were discovered to be what they really are.”10 Their bad
example will do abundantly more mischief than their best sermons can
do good; for example is more powerful than precept.
3. Magistrates, and all other officers of justice ought to be of easy
access to every body; protect the commonpeople against theoppressions
of the more powerful; be as forward in doing justice, and that with the
same impartiality to the mean and poor as to the great and rich; not spin
out a cause to an unnecessary length; never suffer themselves to be cor-
rupted by bribes and sollicitations; examine thoroughly into the matter
before them; and then determine it without passion or prejudice; re-
gardless of every thing while they are doing their duty. Tho’ it be an
excellent qualification in a magistrate, to temper justice with prudence,
and severity with gentleness and forbearance; yet it must be confessed
to be much more for the common advantage, to have such magistrates
as incline to the excess of rigour, than thosewho are disposed tomildness
and easiness and compassion. For even God himself, who highly rec-
ommends, and so strictly enjoins all those humane and tender disposi-
tions on other occasions, yet positively forbids a judge to bemovedwith
pity. The strict and harsh magistrate is the better restraint, the stronger
curb.
From the duties of inferior magistrates, let us pass to those of the
supreme magistrate. And how happy is that post which every minute
furnishes opportunities of doing good to thousands! But, on the other
hand, how dangerous is that station which every moment exposes to the
injuring of millions! The <240> good which princes do, reaches even
to the most distant ages; as the evils that they occasion are multiplied
from generation to generation to the latest posterity. If the care of a
single family be so burdensom, if a man has enough to do to answer for
himself, what a weight, what a load is the charge of a whole Kingdom.
Isocrates calls a Kingdom the greatest of human affairs, and such as re-
quires more than ordinary degrees of prudence and foresight.11AndCy-
10. The source of this quotation is not clear.
11. See Isocrates, “To Nicocles,” secs. 4–6, in Isocrates, vol. 1.
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rus well observes, that he who is above all the rest in honour and au-
thority, should be so in goodness too.12
A prince and his court, as experience teaches us, is the standard of
manners as well as of fashions. For nothing is truer than what Pliny says
(Paneg. C. 45. n. 6.) “Nec tam imperio nobis opus, quam exemplo, &
mitius jubetur exemplo.” “We do not want precepts somuch as patterns,
and example is the softest and least invidious way of commanding.”13
The virtues requisite to a prince, and of which he ought to be the best
pattern, are, 1. Piety, which is the foundation of all virtues: a solid and
reasonable piety, free from hypocrisy, superstition and bigotry. 2. The
love of justice and equity. For the chief design a prince was made for, is
to take care that every man has his right. And this obliges him to study not
only that part of human learning, which qualifies those famous civilians,
that are fit to be legislators themselves, who go up to that justice which at
first regulated human society, who exactly knew what liberty nature has left
us in civil government, and what freedom the necessity of states takes from
private people, for the good of the public: But that part of the law too, which
respects the rights, and descends to the affairs of particular persons. 3. A
prince must above all things accustom himself to moderate his desires.
The philosopher Arrian, de exped. Alex. says, “That it is easy to see from
the example of Alexander, that whatever fine actions a man performs to
out-<241>ward appearance, it signifies nothing to true happiness, if one
does not at the same time know how to rule and moderate himself.”14
4. Valour is requisite to a prince, but then it must be managed with
prudence. 5. And above all, a prince ought to shine in goodness and
clemency. ’Tis by no othermeans, but by the sole good-will of thepeople
that he can do his business; and no other qualities but humanity, truth
and fidelity, can attract their goodwill. Nihil est tam populare quam bo-
12. Again, the exact source of this is not clear, though it may be a reference to
Xenophon, Cyropaedia, vol. 1, bk. II, chap. ii, 20.
13. Pliny, Panegyricus 45.6, in Pliny, Letters and Panegyricus, vol. 2. The phrase “&
mitius jubetur exemplo” is missing in the Loeb edition.
14. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander the Great. It is not clear which specific
passage Turnbull is referring to here, but Arrian repeatedly criticized Alexander for
his immoderate ambition.
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nitas, says Cicero; nothing is so popular as goodness, Orat. pro Ligar. cap.
12.15 A prince who does not reign in the hearts of his people, does not
reign over the better part of his subjects. Their minds are not obedient
or submitted to him. ’Tis love only that can produce cordial obedience.
Cicero gives us this enumeration of the virtues of a prince, Orat. pro
rege Deiotar. cap. 9. “Fortem esse, justum, severum, gravem, magnanimum,
largum, beneficum, liberalem; hae sunt regiae laudes.” 16 And to fortitude,
justice, gravity, temperance, magnanimity, liberality, beneficence,which
are allowed to be virtues necessary to make a prince great and glorious,
he adds another, which he says is generally thought to be a private virtue
only, viz. frugality. “Sed praecipue singularis & admiranda. frugalitas, etsi
hoc verbo, scio, reges non laudari solere. Ut volet, quisquam accipiat: ego
tamen frugalitatem, id est, modestiam & temperantiam, virtutem maxi-
mam esse judico.” 17 Cicero tells us, de legibus, l. 3. c. 3. “That the good
of the public ought to be the sole rule and motive of a prince’s conduct,
salus populi suprema lex esto.” 18 And an excellent author said (Marcus
Antonin. l. 4. c. 42.)19 “A prince ought always to have these twomaxims
in view; To do for the good of mankind all that the condition of a leg-
islator and a king requires of him. And the other, To change his reso-
lution, whenever men skilled in suchmatters give him better advice. But
still the change must be made from <242> the motives of justice, and
the public interest, and never for his own pleasure, his own advantage,
or his own particular glory.”
15. Cicero, Pro Ligario 12.37, p. 493, in Cicero, The Speeches.
16. “Bravery, justice, earnestness, dignity, magnanimity, liberality, kindliness,
generosity—these are the qualities we commend in a king.” Cicero, Pro rege Deiotaro
9.26, p. 525, in Cicero, Pro T. Annio Milone, . . . Pro rege Deiotaro.
17. Ibid. “[I]n nothing is he more remarkable and more admirable than in his
sobriety; although I know that kings are not commonly praised in such terms. . . .
Everyone is free to put what construction he pleases upon my words; none the less I
pronounce sobriety, by which I mean moderation and temperance, to be the highest
of virtues.”
18. Cicero, De legibus 3.3.8 (see Cicero. De re publica; De legibus ).
19. Presumably a reference to Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, though in that case
the book and chapter number are incorrect and it is not clear which passageTurnbull
had in mind.
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The truth of it is, that the very interest of the Sovereign requires that
he should direct all his actions to the public good.
Qui sceptra duro saevus imperio regit;
Timet timentes; metus in auctorem redit.
Seneca in Oedip. v. 705.20
The following quotation from Mr. de Cambrai21 will serve to explain
and illustrate this sentence. “Where the sovereign command is most ab-
solute, these princes are least powerful. They take and ruin every thing,
and are the sole possessors of the whole state; but there the state lan-
guishes, the country is uncultivated, and almost desert, the towns every
day decay and grow thin, and trade is quite lost. The king, who cannever
be such by himself, but must be such with regard to his people, undoes
himself by degrees, by insensibly undoing his subjects, towhomheowes
both his riches and his power; his kingdom is drained of money and
men, and the loss of the latter is the greatest, and the most irreparable
of losses. His arbitrary power makes as many slaves as he has subjects;
they all seem to adore him; and all tremble at the least motion of his
eye. But see what will be the consequences upon the least revolution;
this monstrous power, raised to too excessive an height, cannot long en-
dure; it wants supplies from the hearts of the people; it has wearied out,
and exasperated the several ranks of men in the state, and forces all the
members of that body to sigh with equal ardour for a change: and at the
first blow, the idol is pulled down, and trampled under foot. Contempt,
hatred, fear, resentment, jealousy; in a word, all the passions combine
together against so injurious and detestable a power. The king, who in
the days <243> of his vain prosperity, could not find one person that
durst tell him the truth, shall not findone inhis adversity thatwill vouch-
safe to excuse or defend him.”22 All writers on this subject take notice
of the danger of flattery to which kings, and sons of kings, are so much
20. “One who wields the sceptre with tyrannical harshness / fears those who fear
him; terror rebounds on its author.” Seneca, Oedipus, line 705, in Seneca, Tragedies.
21. Franc¸ois Fe´nelon, bishop of Cambrai (1651–1715).
22. Fe´nelon, Telemachus, bk. 10, pp. 170–71.
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exposed. And on this occasion a famous saying of Carneades is com-
monly quoted, “That sons of princes, and other great and wealthymen,
learn no art but that of horsemanship well, because their horses cannot
flatter them.”23 But there is an excellent book upon the education of a
prince, lately translated into our language from the French, in which all
the qualities, virtues and duties of a prince are admirably described.24
And therefore, I shall add no more upon this subject, but the short ac-
count Cicero gives us of Plato’s doctrine concerning the business and
duty of supreme magistrates, and one most beautiful passage fromCic-
ero himself concerning empire, founded not in love, but fear. The first
is in his first book of offices, chapter 25. “Rulers, or those who design to
be partakers in the government, should be sure to remember those two
precepts of Plato. First, To make the safety and interest of their citizens
the great aim and design of all their thoughts and endeavours, without
ever considering their own personal advantage. And secondly, so to take
care of the republic, as not to serve the interest of any one party, to the
prejudice or neglecting of all the rest. For the government of a state is
much like the office of a guardian or trustee, which should always be
managed for the good of the public, and not of the persons to whom it
is entrusted; and those men, who, whilst they take care of one, neglect
or disregard another part of the citizens, do but occasion sedition and
discord, the most destructive things in the world to a state. From this
root have sprung many grievous dissentions among the Athenians, and
not only tumults, but even deadly civil wars in our <244> own republic.
Things, which one who deserves to hold the reins of the government,
will detest; and will give himself so to the service of the public, as to aim
at no riches or power for himself; and will so take care of the whole
commonwealth, as not to pass over any part of it.”25 The other is in the
second book, chapter 7. “It is well observed by Ennius, Whom men fear,
they hate; and whom they hate, they wish out of the world. But that no
23. This is quoted in Plutarch, “How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend,” chap. 16,
sec. 58, in Moralia: in Fourteen Volumes, vol. 1.
24. Presumably a reference to Fe´nelon’s Telemachus.
25. Cicero, De officiis 1.25.85–86.
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force of power or greatness whatever can bear up long against the stream
of public hate, if it were not sufficiently known before, was of latemade
appear by an instance of our own. And not the violent death of that
tyrant only, who by force of arms oppressed the city (which now most
obeys him, when taken out of the world) but the like untimely ends of
most other tyrants, who have generally been attended with the same ill
fate, are a manifest token that the hatred of the people is able to ruin
the most absolute power. For obedience, proceeding from fear, cannot pos-
sibly be lasting; whereas that which is the effect of love, will be faithful for
ever.” 26 <245>
26. Ibid., 2.7.23.
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a
DISCOURSE
Upon the Nature and Origine of
Moral and Civil Laws, &c.
It will be acknowledged that subjects of importance deserve to be set in
various lights. Let us therefore endeavour to set the first principles of the
science of laws in a light, which, if not altogether new, yet may perhaps
prove more satisfactory to several understandings, than that in which
they are more commonly represented. One great thing to be avoided in
the first steps of a science, is dispute about words. And we think that it
will contribute not a little to this good effect in the science we now pro-
pose to explain the first foundations of in the clearest manner we can,
if, for some time, we only make use of terms well known to those who
are in the least acquaintedwith natural philosophy, in the very sense they
are used in that science.
s e c t i on i
Natural Philosophy is defined to be the science of the laws, according
to which nature operates in producing its effects, and to which human
art must conform in order to produce certain effects. And the settled
methods, according to which nature works, and human arts must work,
in order to produce certain effects, are called laws of nature. <248> An
example or twowill shew the truth and justness of thesedefinitions.That
part of natural philosophy, which is properly called mechanics, consists
What is called
a law of nature
by natural
philosophers.
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in shewing the laws of motion, and what it is in particular that consti-
tutes the quantity of motion in a body, and in deducing from thence
certain rules to be observed by human art in the contrivance of ma-
chines, in order to give them a certain useful force. And this connexion
in nature is found to be the principle of mechanics, or the rule according
to which machines for raising weights, or overcoming obstacles, must
be constructed, viz. That the moment of a body being its quantity of
matter inducted into its velocity, any other body, however short of an-
other in quantity of matter, will be rendered equal to it in moment, by
adding to the less heavy body, just as much more in velocity as it wants
of the heavier in quantity of matter. For this plain reason, that because
if a body have a quantity of matter, as four, and a velocity as two, its
force of motion or moment will be four multiplied by two; i.e. eight;
and if another body have a quantity of matter, as two, and a velocity, as
four, its force or moment will likewise be as two multiplied by four; that
is, as eight; i.e. the two will be equal in moment. This principle is there-
fore called the law of mechanic powers, or the law of nature, with respect
to quantity of motion. And upon this principle are balances, levers,
cranes, pullies, wedges, screws, and inclined planes constructed. And he
who attempts to assist mankind in raising weights, or overcoming ob-
stacles, upon any other principle besides this, attempts tomake new laws
in nature, and his aim will prove absurd and lost labour. In the same
manner, optics is a science which shews the laws observed by nature in
the reflexion and refraxion of light, and points out the way of assisting
vision, and attaining to certain other optical ends, as magnifying, di-
minishing, or <249> multiplying objects, &c. And the laws observed by
nature in reflecting and refracting light, are the laws of this human art;
the laws according to which it must work to answer these purposes.
s e c t i on i i
Now, in the same sense, that in these, and other parts of natural phi-
losophy, certain settled methods, according to which nature operates,
are laws to human arts; in the same sense must any other connexions in
nature be laws to other human arts, or laws to other human actions, if
What is called
a law in moral
philosophy.
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they are the established means or orders, according to which certain
other ends can only be attained by us. If therefore there are any other
ends distinct from those called natural ends, or the ends of mechanical
arts; which, to distinguish them from the latter, may properly be called
moral ends; the established connexions in nature with regard to the at-
tainment of these latter ends, will be, properly speaking, the connexions
which constitute means to moral ends; and the science of these means
and ends will be properly called moral philosophy. And this philosophy
will naturally divide itself into the same parts as natural philosophydoes;
i.e. into the part which investigates the connexions or laws of nature,
and reduces effects into them; and the part which shews how certain
ends may be attained by human art or action, in consequence of the
settled laws of nature; the first of which is justly denominated a theo-
retical, and the other a practical science. So that as there are two parts in
natural philosophy, one of which rests in the explication of phaeno-
mena, by reducing them into laws of nature already found out by in-
duction from experiments; and the other of which directs human labour
in pursuing ends for the conveniency or ornament of life; in likemanner,
there are two parts of moral philosophy, one of which is employed in
investigating <250> by experiments the laws according to which phae-
nomena of the moral kind are produced, and in reducing other phae-
nomena into these laws so ascertained; and theother consists indeducing
rules for human conduct in the pursuit of certain moral ends from the
established connexions and laws of nature relative to them.
It cannot be said, that we here take it for granted, without any proof,
that there are moral ends and means; for in the sense we have hitherto
used moral, we have taken nothing for granted, but that there are certain
phaenomena or certain ends and means, which are distinct from those
commonly called natural, physical, or mechanical. And hardly will it be
called into question, that there are phaenomena, and means and ends,
which do not fall within the definition of those which are the object of
natural philosophy. Who will deny that there are phaenomena, means
and ends relative to our understanding and temper; relative to progress
in knowledge, to the acquisition of habits, to constitution of civil so-
ciety, and many other such like effects, which do not all belong to what
What is meant
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is properly called natural philosophy? In short, nonewill say that the regu-
lation of our affections and actions, in order to promote our own hap-
piness, or the common happiness of mankind, is not an end quite dis-
tinct from that proposed in physics. And this being granted, we have
gained all we plead for at present, which is, that if there be other ends,
for attaining to which there are established means by nature, besides
those considered in natural philosophy, such as the regulation of our
inward affections, &c; these may be called moral ends, to distinguish
them from the objects of natural philosophy. And by whatever name
they are called, they are a very proper subject of enquiry for man. For
it must be granted in general, to be a very proper sub-<251>ject of hu-
man study, to enquire into all the good ends within human power, and
into the established means, in order to the attainment of them. And all
such establishments or connexions in nature, are, with regard to men,
principles or laws, according towhich theymust act, if theywould attain
to certain ends; no end, of whatever kind, being otherwise attainable by
us, than as it is the effect of certain means, or as there are certain laws
constituting a certain order of operation, according to which it may be
attained. All such connexions are therefore in the same sense laws of
nature; and do no otherwise differ from one another, but as their re-
spective distinct ends, physical andmoral, differ. Let not, however,what
hath been said be understood as if the laws of nature, with regard to the
attainments of moral ends, had not a title to be called moral laws in
another peculiar sense, which cannot belong to any other laws of nature.
For we shall by and by see that they have. But if what hath been said be
true, whatever other titles the laws of nature relative tomoral ends,may,
ormay not deserve, it is certain that these lawshighlymerit ourattention.
And the following general conclusion, with regard to us, must, in con-
sequence of what hath been premised, be incontrovertible.
s e c t i on i i i
That the frame and constitution of man, and the connexions of things
relative to him andhis actions; i.e. in oneword, thenatural consequences
of human affections and actions within and without man, are a natural
The frame and
constitution of
man is a natu-
ral law to him.
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law to man. They limit, fix or settle the effects of his behaviour and
conduct; they shew what are the different results of different manners
of acting; and so determine what must be done to get certain goods, and
what must be done, or not done, to avoid certain evils. <252> Andman
can no more alter these connexions of things, than he can alter the con-
nexions upon which mechanical arts depend.
Now hence it follows, 1. That it is necessary for man to enquire into
these connexions of things upon which his good or evil, his enjoyment
or suffering, his happiness or misery depend, in order to attain to any
goods. And, 2. That it is necessary for him to regulate his actions ac-
cording to these connexions, in order to attain to any goods. And there-
fore these two may be called the primary laws of our nature: viz. the
necessity we are in of knowing the connexions relative to our happiness
and misery, and the necessity we are in of acting conformably to these
connexions, in order to have pleasure and avoid pain.Wemay, if wewill,
call the necessary determination of every being capable of distinguishing
pain from pleasure to pursue the one and avoid the other, the first law
of nature. But it is more properly a determination essential to and in-
separable from every reflecting being, and that which constitutes the ne-
cessity of its attending to the connexions of things relative to its hap-
piness and misery, than a law or rule relative to the means of its
happiness. The two first things therefore that offer themselves to our
consideration with regard to beings capable of attaining to any goods,
or of bringing any evils on themselves by their actions, are the necessity
of understanding the connexions established by nature with regard to
the effects or consequences of their actions, and the necessity of regu-
lating their actions according to these fixed connexions.
s e c t i on i v
Now that all connexions of nature, of whatever kind, whether those
respecting matter andmotion, andmechanical powers and arts, or those
respecting the consequences of our affections and actions, can only be
learned from experience, by attention to the <253> effects of different
methods of operation, is too evident to be insisted upon. And therefore
Whence this
law is learned,
and whence it
comes.
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we shall only add upon this head, that as when speaking of the laws of
nature, which are the object of natural philosophy, tho’ they are shortly
called laws of matter and motion; yet by them is really meant consti-
tutions and connexions established and taking place in consequence of
the will of the Author of nature: so the moment we have found out any
connexions relative to happiness or misery with regard to human affec-
tions and actions, we have found certain constitutions or connexions
relative to them, established and taking place by virtue of the will and
appointment of the Author of nature; so that tho’, speaking shortly, we
call them natural laws, or moral laws of nature, yet in reality by them
must be meant rules, laws or connexions of the Author of nature. For
this must be true in general, that certain setled and fixed orders and con-
nexions of things can only take place by virtue of the will of somemind
sufficient to give them subsistence and efficiency. Laws,whether inphys-
ics or in morals, can only mean certain appointments by the will of the
mind who gave being to the world, and by whom it subsists. If by laws
the appointments of some supreme Being be not meant, they are words
without anymeaning. So thatwemayhenceforth indifferently say, either
the connexions of things relative to man, the laws of nature relative to
moral ends attainable byman, or the law andwill of theAuthorof nature
with regard to the consequences and effects of human conduct. This we
may certainly do without begging any thing in morality which we have
not proved, since natural philosophers use or may use these phrases pro-
miscuously; and we as yet only desire to be allowed to use those phrases
in the same sense they are used by natural philosophers, when they speak
of means and ends, or connexions in nature, according to which effects
are produced, <254> and human arts must operate in order to be
successful.
May we not now therefore go on to enquire, if we can find out any
of themore important connexions in nature relative to our good or hap-
piness, which are the laws of our nature, or the laws of the Author of
nature with regard to our conduct, thatmay be calledmoral laws, or laws
relative to moral ends.
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s e c t i on v
In order to this, it is plain we must enquire what affections belong to
our nature. For nothing can be more evident, than that without partic-
ular affections no object could give us more pleasure than another, or to
speak more properly, nothing could give us pleasure or pain: And the
happiness of any one particular nature can only be the happiness or good
of that particular nature. The happiness of an insect, for example, can
only make an insect happy: Another nature, that is, a nature consisting
of other affections, will require other objects to make it happy; that is,
objects adjusted to the gratification of its particular affections. These
things are very evident: For tho’ after having experienced several partic-
ular pains and pleasures, we can form to ourselves a general idea of hap-
piness, and a general idea of misery, which ideas will excite a general
desire of happiness, yet there is no such thing in nature as general grat-
ification to general desire of happiness. Every pleasure is a particular
pleasure; a particular gratification to some particular affection.Wemay
be properly said to desire happiness in general; but every gratification
we meet with, is a gratification to some one particular appetite or affec-
tion in our nature. As our eyes are said to be so formed as to receive
pleasure from colours; but yet it is always some particular colour ormix-
ture of colours that gives us that pleasure we call pleasure <255> arising
from colours; so it is with regard to all other pleasures. We may class
pleasures under different general names, and say very intelligibly, we
would have pleasure of such a sort; but in order to have our longing
satisfied, some particular object must be applied to satisfy it: Or wemay
say more generally, we would have pleasure without fixing so much as
upon a general class of pleasures, as pleasures of sight, of hearing, of
smell, &c. But still it must be some particular object, suited to some
particular affection, or particular sense of pleasure in our nature, that
satisfies us in this undetermined longing or restlessness of the mind. In
fine, however much philosophers talk of a general desire of happiness,
and of our being actuated by this desire, which is properly called self-
love, in all our pursuits; yet it is particular objects, adjusted to certain
particular affections in our nature, that constitute our happiness. And it
Every being
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is only by gratifying some one of these particular affections that we can
have pleasure. Nor is it less evident that all our particular affections rest
each in its object. “The very nature of affection (says an excellentwriter)1
consists in tending towards, and resting on its objects as an end. We do
indeed often in common language say, that things are loved, desired,
esteemed, not for themselves, but for somewhat further, somewhat out
of and beyond them; yet in these cases, whoever will attend, will see that
these things are not in reality the objects of the affections, i.e. are not
loved, desired, esteemed, but the somewhat further out of and beyond
them. If we have no affections which rest in what are called their objects,
then what is called affection, love, desire, hope, in human nature, is only
an uneasiness in being at rest, an unquiet disposition to action, progress
and pursuit, without end or meaning. But if there be any such thing as
delight in the company of one person rather than of another, whether
in the <256> way of friendship, ormirth and entertainment, it is all one,
if it be without respect to fortune, honour, or increasing our stores of
knowledge, or any thing beyond the present time; here is an instance,
of an affection absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being grat-
ified in the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with food. Yet
nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage a man
hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular friendships, or in any
other; nothing, I say is more common, than to hear such a question put,
in a way which supposes no gain, advantage, or interest, but as a means
to somewhat further: And if so, then there is no such thing at all as a
real interest, gain or advantage. This is the same absurdity with respect
to life, as an infinite series of effects without a cause is in speculation.
The gain, advantage or interest consists in the delight itself arising from
such a faculty’s having its object: Neither is there any such thing as hap-
piness or enjoyment but what arises from hence. The pleasures of hope
and of reflexion are not exceptions.The formerbeingonly thishappiness
anticipated, the latter the same happiness enjoyed over again after its
time. Self-love, or a general desire of happiness, is inseparable from all
1. Joseph Butler, sermon XIII, “Upon the Love of God,” 259, in Butler, Fifteen
Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel.
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sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves, and their own in-
terest or happiness, so as to make that interest an object to their minds.
But self-love does not constitute this or that to be our interest or good;
but our interest or good being constituted by nature, and supposed, self-
love only puts upon gaining, or making use of those objects which are
by nature adapted to afford us satisfaction. Happiness or satisfaction
consists only in the enjoyment of those objects, which are by nature
suited to our several particular appetites, passions and affections. And
there is therefore a distinction between the cool principle of self-love,
or general desire of our own happiness, as one part of <257> our nature,
and one principle of action, and the particular affections towards par-
ticular objects as another part of our nature, and another principle of
action, without which there could be absolutely no such thing at all as
happiness or enjoyment of any kind whatsoever.” From all which it fol-
lows, 1. That it is absurd to speak of self-love as engrossing the whole of
our nature, and making the sole principle of action. And, 2. That in
order to know what we ought to pursue, or what happiness we are ca-
pable of, it is absolutely necessary to know our particular affections
which constitute our capacities of enjoyment or happiness, and the ob-
jects adapted by nature to them.
But why we have insisted so long on this observation, will appear
when we come to mention several of our particular affections and their
objects.
s e c t i on v i
Now, if we attend to ourselves, we shall find that we have affections of
various kinds. 1. Affections to several sensible objects, adapted by nature
to give us pleasure, whichmay be called sensitive appetites, someof which
are absolutely necessary to put us upon pursuits requisite to our suste-
nance, or the support and preservation of our bodily frame, such as hun-
ger and thirst, &c: and others which are not so necessary to that end,
but are given us to be capacities of enjoyment, such as the pleasures we
receive from light and colours by the eyes, and from sounds by the ear,
&c. About these affections there is no dispute. 2. But these are not the
The particular
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only affections belonging to our nature. We have other affectionswhich
are called intellectual: such as, a capacity of receiving pleasure by the
discernment of the relations of ideas or things by our understanding or
reason, properly called the perception of truth, or knowledge; a taste or
sense of beauty, which may be defined to be that agreeable percep-
<258>tion which objects that have uniformity amidst variety or regu-
larity and unity of design, are adapted to afford us, &c. And, 3. Besides
these there is yet another class of affections, which may be justly called
social. Inclination to union and society, delight in the happiness of oth-
ers, compassion toward the distressed or suffering, resentment against
injustice or wrong, love of esteem or good reputation, desire of power
to help and assist others, gratitude to benefactors, desire of friendship,
and several other such like, which have some things in our fellow crea-
tures for their objects. I do not pretend that this is a full enumeration
of all the particular affections belonging to human nature. Some others
shall be mentioned afterwards. But I am apt to think the principal af-
fections constituting our nature, or our capacities of gratification and
enjoyment, will be found to be reducible into one of these three classes.
And let me observe with regard to them, before we go further, 1. That
the greater part of these affections rest in some external object, andmay
therefore properly be said to have something without ourselves for their
object, towards which they tend. As hunger hath food for its object, so
hath the love of arts, arts for its object, and the love of reputation, rep-
utation for its object; and as none of these objects is more or less external
than another, and none of these affections is more or less distinct from
self-love, or the general desire of happiness, than another; so benevo-
lence, or delight in the good of another, hath an object which is neither
more nor less external than the objects of those other above-named af-
fections; and is an affection which is neither more nor less distinct from
self-love than these other affections. And therefore all the grave perplex-
ity with which moral writings have been tortured with respect to the
interestedness and disinterestedness of certain affections, might as well
have been objected against any other affections as against <259> those,
the reality of which it hath been thought sufficient to explode, to say,
that if they are allowed to take place in our frame, then would there be
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a disinterested principle of action in the nature of a being, which like
every sensible being, can only be moved by self-love, or regard to itself,
which is absurd. It is sufficient to evince the impertinence and absurdity
of this jangling, to shew that by the same argument it may be proved,
that we have no affections which tend towards and rest in external ob-
jects. And yet it is certain, that had we not particular affections towards
external objects, there could absolutely be no such thing as happiness at
all, or enjoyment of any kind. If by saying that all our affections must
be interested, and that none of them can be disinterested, bemeant that
they are our own affections, and that the gratifications they afford us are
gratifications to ourselves, our own pleasures, or our own perceptions,
then are all our affections in that sense equally interested; they are all
equally our own, for they are all equally felt by ourselves. But if by saying
none of our affections are or can be disinterested, be meant, that none
of our affections can tend towards, or rest in an external object: This is
to say, not merely that the good of others cannot be the object of any
affection in our nature; but to say that nothing without us can be the
object of our desire, whether animate or inanimate, which none will
assert. This I mention, because all the arguments brought by certainphi-
losophers against a principle of benevolence in our nature, turn upon
an imagined contrariety between such a principle and self-love, as a prin-
ciple of action. But, 2. It is in the gratifications of these particular af-
fections in our nature, that the greater part of the enjoyments of which
we aremade capable by nature consists. And therefore, if wewouldknow
the laws or connexions of nature with regard to our happiness, wemust
know the establish-<260>ed laws or connexions of nature with regard
to these affections, and the objects adapted to them. That is, we must
know in what manner and to what degree they give pleasure to us; what
are the consequences of indulging any one of them too little or too
much; the several tones and proportions nature hath prescribed to them,
by fixing the boundaries of pain and pleasure; their relations one to an-
other; their agreements or disagreements; their jarrings and interferings,
or coalitions and mixtures; and, in one word, as many of their effects
and consequences in different circumstances of action, as we can ob-
serve, in order to know how to regulate them, so as to have the greatest
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pleasure and the least pain we can. The rules of our conduct, in order
to have happiness, can only be deduced from the laws or rules, according
to which, in consequence of the frame and constitution of our minds,
and the relations we stand in to external objects, our particular affections
operate, or are operated upon by objects, or by one another.
s e c t i on v i i
Now, it is the business of our reason to find out these rules or laws of
nature, and the rules of conduct which they indicate or point out to us.
Reason is as plainly given us for this purpose, as our eyes are given us for
seeing. It is the eye of the mind which is to look out for us in order to
direct our paths, i.e. to discover what we ought to pursue, and what we
ought to avoid. It must be given us for this purpose. And if we do not
exercise it to this purpose, it is of no use to us. It cannot be owned to
be implanted in us, without owning that it is the intention of nature
that it should be exercised by us as our guide and director. Nor is there
indeed any other way by which beings can be guided, who have reason
to discover how they ought to regulate their affections and actions, that
<261> is, how their happiness requires that they should regulate them,
besides their reason. Their nature admits of no other guidance. For in
this does the difference consist between them and other beings, which
have no reflecting or guiding principle, but are led by mere impulse to-
ward an end, without foresight, intention or choice, that they have the
direction of themselves; and being endued with a principle of obser-
vation and reflexion, are left to its guidance. Beings without reason are
directed, or rather driven by particular affections excited in their minds
to pursuits, which can in no sense be called their pursuits, but are prop-
erly the pursuits of the principle by which their affections are excited in
them. But beings who have a reflecting and guiding principle in them,
are so constituted that they may and must guide themselves; and there-
fore their particular affections must necessarily be considered as sub-
jected by their frame to their guiding principle as such. Their directing
principlemust be considered as the superior and chief principle in them,
and that to which the direction, the rule, command or guidance of all
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their particular affections, is committed by nature. And indeed, if we
attend to our own minds, we shall find, 1. That our reason claims a su-
periority to itself, and talks to us (if I may so speak) with the authority
of a law-giver or ruler. It often, whether wewill or will not, takes to itself
the power and authority of a judge, a censor, and pronounces sentence
upon our conduct. And, 2. We are so framed that our greatest inward
satisfaction depends upon the approbation of our reason, or our con-
sciousness of our acting by its direction, and in conformity to its rules.
Nothing gives us so much torment as the consciousness of despised and
contradicted reason: and no pleasure is equal to that themind feelswhen
reason approves its conduct. The approbation with which a mind, con-
scious of its habitually giving the autho-<262>rity due to its guiding
principle in the government of its affections and actions, applauds itself,
is sincere and abiding satisfaction. So are we made: And therefore,
The first law of nature with regard to our conduct, is to maintain
reason in our mind as our governing principle over all our affections and
pursuits. It was said before (§3), that we are under a necessity of knowing
the connexions relative to our happiness, in order to conform our con-
duct to them, and under a necessity of conforming our conduct to them
in order to be happy. And we have just now seen what that principle is
which is given us by nature, both to discover the connexions relative to
our happiness, and to conform our conduct to them.Whence it follows,
that according to our frame, we can neither be sure of avoiding evil, nor
attaining to good, unless reason be our steady ruler; which implies two
things. 1. That we be at due pains to know the connexions relative to
our happiness, and to lay up this knowledge in our minds, in order to
have counsel at hand upon every emergency: in order not tobe surprized,
and to have our directory to seek, when occasion calls upon us imme-
diately to determine and act. And, 2. To accustom our particular affec-
tions to submit to, and receive their commands from our reason; not to
sally forth at random upon every invitation offered to them by objects,
but to await the decision of our reason, and to obey it. The first is the
hability or sufficiency of reason to direct. The other is its actual com-
mand. And that reason may be very well informed, and consequently
very well qualified to direct us, and yet not be actually our ruler and
The first law
of nature with
regard to our
conduct, is
to maintain
reason in our
mind as our
guiding
principle.
566 the nature and orig ine
commander, but a slave to our headstrong passions, is too evident to
experience to be denied. Nor is any one who hath ever given any atten-
tion to his own mind, a stranger to the only way in which rea-<263>son
can become our habitual ruler and guide, and our affections become
habitually subject to its government, which is the habitual accustomance
or inurance of our appetites, affections and passions, to receive their
orders from our reason, or the habitual upholding of our reason in the
exercise of directing all our pursuits. And indeed to what purpose can
the knowledge qualifying reason to direct our affections serve, but to
upbraid us, if reason be not actually our habitual director; if ourpassions
are quite tumultuous and undisciplined, and reason hath no power over
them, to restrain, direct, or govern them? This therefore is the first law
of nature pointed out by our constitution, and the necessity of nature,
even to set up and maintain our reason as our governing or directing
principle. Till this be done we are not masters of ourselves; and however
well any one’s affections may happen to operate, in consequence of a
particular happiness of constitution, or in consequence of his necessary
submission to others upon whom he depends, none can have a title to
the character of rational, but in proportion as his own reason is his di-
rector and ruler; in proportion as his passions are submitted to reason,
and he acts in obedience to its authority. But this rational temper may
be called by different names, as it is considered in different views. It is
prudence, as it discerns the connexions relative to our happiness, and
the rules of our conduct resulting from thence. It is virtue or strength
of mind, as it enables one to hold his passions in due discipline and
subjection, and to act as prudence directs. It is self-love, as it is firm and
steady adherence to the rules of happiness. It is self-command, as it is
empire over ourselves, dominion over our affections and actions, all our
choices and pursuits. And it is health or soundness of mind, as thus all
our affections and appetites are in their regular, na-<264>tural and
proper order, i.e. duly submitted to the principle to which the authority
of guiding them is due. It is indeed the whole of virtue, human excel-
lence or duty, as this empire being once obtained, all must go right; every
affection will be duly obedient to the principle that ought to govern; and
thus the mind will be conscious to itself of inward order and harmony,
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and of being in the state it ought to be in: for no other general definition
of human excellence or duty can be given, but acting conformably to
reason. But still it remains to be enquired what general rules for our
conduct reason discovers to us.
s e c t i on v i i i
We may however observe, before we go farther, 1. That unless the mind
be early rendered of a temper for thinking and enquiring about the
proper rules of conduct, it will not set itself to find them out, but will
give up the reins to its affections, and be tossed to and fro by them in a
most desultory irregular manner; and the longer this unthinking way of
living takes place, the more difficult will it be to recover the mind from
the tyranny of its passions, and to establish reason into its due authority
and command over them. And therefore the great end of education
ought to be to produce the love and patience of thinking; to establish
the deliberative disposition and temper, or the habit of consulting rea-
son, and weighing things maturely before one chooses and determines.
This is the chief end of education. And if one be not obliged to wise
education for this happy temper of mind, it seldom happens that one
ever attains to it, till he is awakened and roused to think, by some great
suffering brought upon himself, by his not having exercised his reason,
but suffered his passions and appetites to drive him whithersoever they
listed. The reason is, that by repeated acts, habits are formed, <265>
which it is exceeding difficult to undo, and which cannot be undone but
by the strong opposition of reason. And therefore, if the habit of ruling
ourselves by reason, be not early formed in us by right education, the
habit of indulging every passion and appetite that assails us, andof living
without exercising our reason, must soon become too fixed, settled and
inveterate to be easily conquered. It is fit, highly fit, nay absolutely nec-
essary for us, that the law of habits should take place in our constitution.
Yet this must be the effect of it, that unless great care be taken, by proper
education and discipline, early to form the reflecting and considering
habit, in young minds, which is to establish the government of reason
in them, it must be extremely difficult for us ever to become reasonable
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creatures, or to attain to self-command, and to establish our reason as
our ruler and guide, in the room of appetite, humour and passion. Mr.
Locke hathmade admirable observations on this subject, in his excellent
treatise of education.2
But, 2. When the love and patience of thinking are once attained,
and the sedate, deliberative temper is fairly established, it is then very
easy to find out the proper rules of action, or what is the most eligible
course of life and behaviour, and how the affections ought to be gov-
erned. The affections then range themselves, as it were, spontaneously
into good order. The understanding is then clear and undisturbed, and
duty is easily discerned. Whatever difficulty reason may find in estab-
lishing its authority, it is no sooner fixed and settled in the mind, as the
ruling and commanding principle, than the rules which ought to be ob-
served in conduct are immediately discovered. True happiness is then
immediately felt to consist chiefly in the very consciousness of this tem-
per, in the consciousness of reason’s having this sway within us. And
when this is looked upon to be the chief part of <266> happiness, the
chief part of our happiness is then somethingdependentuponourselves,
which nothing can deprive us of, while reason presides and rules in our
breast. A source of inward consolation, far superior to all other enjoy-
ments, and which is as steady as all other things are uncertain, is thus
discovered. And the mind, which hath once fixed upon this as its main
good, will be proof against all the most specious appearances of plea-
sures, till their pretentions have been examined, and their consistency
with this chief principle of happiness hath been duly considered; and
will therefore be a calm and impartial judge of what pleasures it may
allow itself, and of what it ought not to give indulgence to. But if the
mind be calm and unbiassed, and resolved to act the part that shall ap-
pear wisest and best upon due attention to the laws of nature fixing the
connexions relative to our happiness, the whole difficulty is over. Till
then it is not capable of judging; but when that point is gained, it is very
easy to judge right. In every case, not to judge, but to be fit to judge, is
the difficult part. The first thing therefore that our frame and consti-
2. Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, pp. 142–43.
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tution points out to us as the law of our conduct, is to take care to es-
tablish reason in our mind, as the ruler, without consulting which we
will not allow our passions to indulge themselves, and the dictates of
which we are resolved steadily to obey, that we may always enjoy that
delightful consciousness of having been guided by our reason, which is
by our make the greatest of all enjoyments. But to this education ought,
and must contribute; otherwise the establishment of this excellent tem-
per, in proportion to the prevalence of which one is more or less a rea-
sonable being, must be a very difficult, a very hard task; and to assist in
conquering the contrary habit, distress and suffering will be necessary.
And why should we not look upon the evils that are brought upon our-
selves by thoughtlessness, <267> folly, or, in one word, by not governing
ourselves by reason, to be intended chiefly for this very end; even to
awaken, rouze, and excite us to think, by making us feel the necessity of
exercising our reason, and obeying it, instead of indulging every ap-
petite that assails us, without considering the consequences of living in
such an irrational manner! For this is self-evident, that were not agents
placed in a state where certain manners of acting produce good, and
others evil, there would in such a state be no place for choice and agency;
for prudence and imprudence; nor consequently, for reason and self-
approbation. And therefore to the existence of the highest rank of cre-
ated beings, it is necessary that certain methods of acting be attended
with evil consequences. For tho’ we may, by adding more and more to
our own active powers, conceive various species of created agents above
us, till we rise in our contemplation to the Supreme Being, in whom all
perfections meet, and are united in their highest degree; yet we can con-
ceive no order of beings above mere passive ones, without conceiving
them to be disposers of their own actions by their reason, understanding
and choice: And as formore or less, i.e. a larger or lesser sphereof activity,
here the known rule takes place,That more and less do not alter the species.
If any one should ask what the proper method of education is in order
to produce the reasonable thinking temper? it is sufficient to answerhere,
that the chief business is to accustom youth early to examine the asso-
ciations of ideas in their minds, and to consider whether these associa-
tions be founded in, and agreeable to nature, or not; which ought to be
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the unintermitted exercise during life of every one whowouldmaintain
the empire of his reason. But because this would lead me into a digres-
sion, or rather into a subject, for which we have not yet sufficiently pre-
pared the way, we shall only refer those who ask this question <268> to
the above mentioned treatise of Mr. Locke, and go on to take notice of
some particular laws of our conduct, pointed out to us by the make of
the human mind, and the circumstances in which we are placed by the
Author of nature.
s e c t i on i x
The pleasures we are capable of, are gratifications to our particular af-
fections, the principal of which have been named (§6); for hardly can
any enjoyment we are susceptible of, be specified, which is not a grati-
fication of one or other of these outward or inward faculties or senses
of pleasure. Our pleasures may therefore be divided into two classes; the
goods of the body, and the goods of the mind. For all our affections, all
our senses of pleasure, either have some sensitive, or some intellectual
and moral gratification for their objects. Gratification to our eyes, our
ears, our touch, and our other organs of sense, are bodily gratifications.
Gratifications to our discernment of truth, and our delight in it; to our
taste of beauty and harmony and delight in it; to our public sense, or
our delight in the happiness of others,&c. are gratifications tocapacities,
senses of pleasure, or affections, which, to distinguish them from those
afforded by corporeal objects to our sensitive organs, may be called in-
tellectual or moral, or goods of the mind. But however the goods or plea-
sures we are capable of be divided or classed, this is certain, with regard
to them all, that they are made to be the purchase of our activity or
industry to have them; they do not drop into the mouth (if we may so
speak) of the sluggard; but we must exert ourselves to attain to them. As
we cannot otherwise have the pleasures of sense, or the goods of the
body; so no more can we, without industry and application, have the
pleasures of knowledge, refined taste, benevolence, &c. And hence that
antient observation concern-<269>ing the government or frame of the
world with respect to man; jeoi ta◊gaja toi`c ponoic polou˜ntai. God or
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nature sells all to industry.3 This truth is so plain to daily experience, that
we need not stay to prove it. But from this general law of nature arises
a law to us, viz. the law of industry; or the necessity of our activity,
application or industry, in order to attain to any goods. And if we will
reflect a little upon our minds, we shall find, that as no goods can be
attained by us, but by exerting ourselves actively to have them; so activity
or exercise is necessary to our happiness in another sense, i.e. immedi-
ately, or in itself. The mind of man is made for exercise, exercise is its
natural pleasure. It is of a restless temper, and must be employed. If it
is not, it preys upon, and consumes itself. Nor is exercise less necessary
to the health, soundness, vigour, and agreeable feeling of the body, than
employment is to the strength, agility, soundness, and pleasant state of
the mind. We need not insist long to prove this; for daily experience
shews, that as it happens among mankind, that whilst some are by ne-
cessity confined to labour, others are providedwith abundance of things
by the industry and labour of others; so if, among the superior and easy
sort, who are thus relieved frombodily drudgery, there be not something
of fit and proper employment raised in the room of what is wanting in
common labour; if, instead of an application to any sort of work, such
as hath an useful end in society (as letters, sciences, arts, husbandry, pub-
lic affairs, &c.) there be a thorough neglect of all study or employment,
a settled idleness, supineness and inactivity; this does of necessity oc-
casion a most uneasy, as well as disorderly state of mind; a total disso-
lution of its natural vigour, which ends in peevishness, discontent, and
sickly nauseating at life, and all its enjoyments. So necessary is some
employment to the mind, that to supply exercise to <270> it, many
strange amusements and unaccountable occupations for time, thought,
and passion have been invented by those, whom fortune hath rescued
from drudgery to their backs and bellies, but good education hath not
3. “The Gods sell good things in exchange for toil”: Turnbull’s Greek appears not
to be accurate, but this is probably a phrase attributed to Epicharmus by Xenophon
in his Memorabilia 2.1.20. Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. We are very
grateful to Dr. Antony Hatzistavrou for identifying the probable source of this
quotation.
572 the nature and orig ine
directed into proper pursuits and employments, which are their only
security against utter discontent with themselves, and every thing about
them, amidst the greatest abundance. Such strange occupations are their
sole relief. But they are such only as they are some exercise to the mind,
and prevent that languishing, fretting and nauseating, which total su-
pineness and ease produces. And how feeble a security they are against
the misery, which employment more suited to a mind capable of higher
pursuits would absolutely prevent, is plain from the many bitter, sickly,
discontented moments the men of pleasure, as they are absurdly called,
cannot, by all their amusements, escape, comparedwith the equablecon-
tentedness of an honest daily labourer, conscious of the usefulness of
his toil; not tomention the sedate, uniform satisfaction and cheerfulness
of one, who having qualified himself for it, divides (as Scipio is said to
have done) his time between elegant studies and public services to his
country. The mind of man must have exercise and employment. Exer-
cise itself is agreeable, and it is absolutely necessary to relief from the
greatest of uneasinesses. And no goods can be attained without appli-
cation and industry. If one would preserve his health and relish for sen-
sitive pleasures, he must exercise his body. And if he would have the
pleasures of knowledge, of refined imagination and good taste, the plea-
sures of power and authority, or the pleasures of benevolence and doing
good, he must be diligent in the culture of his moral powers, and be ever
intent upon some truly useful pursuit. If these ends do not employ him,
he must either find other pursuits for himself, or he will be exceedingly
unhappy. But <271> what other pursuits can one devise to himself be-
sides those of which he can say any thing better, than that they employ
his mind, and keep time from hanging upon his hands, as the phrase is,
or, more properly speaking, murder it? Can he name any other besides
those that bear any congruity to themore noble and distinguishingpow-
ers and affections of the human mind? or that he can depend upon for
steady and uncloying satisfaction? any other that can be re-enjoyed by
reflection? any other that will stand a cool and serious review and
examination?
But that I may not be thought to proceed too fast in my conclusions,
and to have determined concerning the comparative value of pursuits
too hastily, all I desire to have concluded at present, is, that according
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to the constitution of the human mind, and in consequence of the nat-
ural state of things, no goods, no enjoyments can be procured by us
without application and industry, and that we aremade to be busied and
employed for exercise, or to be engaged in some pursuit. The greatest
abundance of outward things, tho’ it relieves from certain toils, towhich
the necessities of life subject others; yet it does not, it cannot make one
happy, if, in the room of the pursuits from which it delivers him, he do
not find out some other satisfactory pursuit or employment for himself.
Under this necessity hath nature laid us; nay, properly speaking, this
necessity constitutes our dignity above inactive, or merely passive crea-
tures, as free agents. For it is implied in the very notion of agency. One
cannot otherwise be an agent, than as he ismade to procurehis happiness
to himself by the active application of his powers in the pursuit of goods
within his reach, if laboured for according to the way nature hath fixed
and chalked out for attaining to them.And as the pleasureof considering
goods as one’s own acquisition, is a pleasure that a being must be so
framed to have; so <272> this is a very high satisfaction, and an excellent
natural reward to industry. How insipid are the satisfactions in which
this is not an ingredient, in comparison of those which one owes to his
own skill, prudence and industry, and in which he therefore triumphs
as his own purchase, his own conquest, the product of his own abilities
and virtues! ’Tis only beings so framed as that they must work out their
own happiness, who can be capable of self-approbation. And who doth
not feel the difference with which one reflects on the goods which are
not of his own procurance to himself, such as beauty and the advantages
of birth, for instance, and those accomplishments which he can vindi-
cate to himself as his own proper purchase? And where self-approbation
can take place, there only can good desert, with regard to others, take
place; or can there be any foundation for praise and esteem from others,
without which, how dull and insipid would life be? This is the general
voice of mankind.
Ergo ut miremur te, non tua, primum aliquid da
Quod possim titulis incidere praeter honores
Quos illis damus, & dedimus, quibus omnia debes.4
4. “So if I’m to be impressed by you and not your heritage, offer me something
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Thus far then are we advanced in finding out the connexions or laws of
nature with regard to our happiness. We are made to work out our own
happiness by our industry; we are made for activity and exercise. But
how ought our industry to be directed, in consequence of what hath
been observed concerning the presidence which reason ought to have in
our minds (§8)? Must not the objects of our industry be chosen by rea-
son, and all our exercises directed by it, in order to our having the sat-
isfaction of reflecting upon our exercise as conformable to reason; and
that it may be agreeable to the connexions of nature relative to our hap-
piness; and so prove neither vain nor hurtful but turn to good account,
and not produce repentance and suf-<273>fering for having mistaken
our end, andmisapplied our labour anddiligence; but contentmentwith
ourselves for having acted with prudence, by the direction of reason for
an approveable end, and in the proper manner for attaining that end.
This therefore is one characteristic of our proper happiness, that it con-
sists in a course of industry to attain ends which reason approves, under
the direction and guidance of reason, as to the use of means.
s e c t i on x
But another special characteristic of our proper pursuits, in consequence
of our frame, and the connexions of nature relative to our happiness,
will immediately appear, if we reflect how strictly mankind are bound
together; by how many close ties and dependencies they are cemented;
ties arising from mutual wants, and ties arising from certain affections
common tomankind, exactly corresponding to theirmutualwants.First
of all, it is evident, that we can attain to no goods of whatever kind,
external or internal, by our single industry, or without social assistances.
Nothing can be more manifest than this. 2. Nor is it less evident, that
there is no enjoyment, of which mankind are capable, which does not,
as our excellent poet very happily expresses it, Some may lean and hearken
personal, something I can inscribe in your record of achievement, apart from those
titles which we gave and (continue to give) to those men to whom you owe every-
thing” ( Juvenal, Juvenal and Persius, Satire 8, lines 68–70).
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to our kind.5 If we separate communication and participation from all
our pleasures of whatever kind, we really abstract from them the main
ingredient that gives them relish. Take all of the social kind away from
sensitive gratifications, and what remains but mere allay to some raging
appetite, mere relief from pain? And as for all our other pleasures, what
are they but participation, or communicating and sharing with our fel-
low creatures? Such is the joy of relieving the distressed, or of promoting
the happiness of the deserving. <274> Such is a sense of merited esteem;
such is gratitude to a benefactor; such is creating dependence upon us,
&c. And as for knowledge, however pleasant it is in itself, yet is it not
doubly agreeable, when considered as qualifying us to be useful, and as
procuring us authority and regard? In short, the chief article in all our
pleasures, in consequence of our make, consists in mutually giving and
receiving; it is of a social kind. And we are formed, and placed as we are,
that there might be variety of exercise to our social affections. Nature
hath so framed us, that our chief happiness must be sought from com-
munication and participation with others; and so placed us, that all such
dependencies might arise as were necessary to gratify our social appetites
and affections. This will more fully appear afterwards, when we come
to consider some of the principal dependencies by which mankind are
united and cemented together; which, tho’ they be objected against by
narrow thinkers,6will be found to be in reality somanyproofs of nature’s
kind care about us; or to make proper provision for the exercises, from
which alone our social happiness, or gratification to our social affections
can arise, since it must consist in mutual giving and receiving, which
cannot take place but where there are mutual dependencies.Mean time,
let it only be observed, 1. That such is the constitution of things with
respect to mankind, that no man can attain to any considerable share of
the goods either of the body or of the mind by his single endeavours;
5. “Some may lean and hearken to our kind.” Turnbull uses a similar phrase in
his Observations upon Liberal Education, 99.
6. Presumably Turnbull has Thomas Hobbes in mind, since he denied that a nat-
ural sense of benevolence would allow for man’s security and happiness. See Levia-
than, chap. 13.
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but he must, in order to that, engagemany others to help and assist him:
nay, such is the constitution of things, that no man can subsist in any
convenient, not to say comfortable degree or manner, without receiving
many services and good offices from others. Mankind are therefore, by
the necessity of nature, obliged to seek mutual assistances from one an-
other, to unite together, and to com-<275>municate their industry.But,
2.Mankind are so framed, that this union and communication is in itself
as agreeable as it is necessary.Our best enjoyments are acts of social com-
munication. Assisting, relieving, herding, concerting, confederating,
and such like social dealings, are all of them in themselvesmost pleasing
and agreeable exercises. So that there is something in them that rewards
them, and invites to them independently of their necessity to our having
any of the conveniencies or comforts of life. Need I stay to prove this
to any onewhohath ever felt any of the generous emotions andworkings
of the soul? or to any one who can reflect upon his having at any time
done a good office? For nothing is more certain, than that it is only acts
of compassion, humanity, friendship, gratitude, benevolence, that af-
ford any considerable satisfaction to the mind upon reflexion; or that it
is the generous mind alone that can reiterate its actions in its reflexion,
memory, or conscience, (let it be called what you will) with thorough
delight; and thus feast most agreeably upon them after they are past.
Indeed so social is our make, that the highest entertainment even the
poetic art or ingenious fictions can give us, is by exciting generous be-
nevolent emotions in our minds, and deeply interesting us in the affairs
of others. For of the satisfaction we receive in this way, which we so
readily own to be preferable to any mere sensitive enjoyment, no other
account can be given but this; “Homo sum, & nihil humanum a me al-
ienum puto.” 7 Whatever concerns man, tenderly interests every man in
it, in consequence of the human make. We are therefore formed by na-
ture for social exercises; for the pursuit of public good; for offices of
benevolence or charity, and for uniting together in the interchange of
various acts of kindness and sociality.
7. “I’m human, and I regard no human business as other people’s”: Terence,The
Self-tormentor (Heauton timoroumenos ), act 1, scene 1, line 77, in Terence, vol. 1.
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And thus there appears another character of the happiness and the
employment or industry we are <276> intended for by nature: It is in-
dustry beneficial to mankind, for which we are framed and intended:
Industry proper to make human life as comfortable and agreeable as it
can be rendered. For this is the industry or employment, which, in con-
sequence of our social make, gives us the greatest pleasure. And this in-
dustry alone can give a satisfying account of itself to our reason. For this
also is found to be true by experience, that no sooner is the idea of in-
dustry beneficial to mankind, or of activity to relieve mankind from as
many pains, and to give them as much pleasure as we can; no sooner is
this idea presented to our reflexion, than our mind is necessarily deter-
mined to approve of it, and pronounce it the best part, nay the only
commendable, worthy part one can act. And therefore we have now at-
tained to a very distinguishing characteristic of the pleasures we ought
to pursue, i.e. of those which are made by nature of the highest, the
most uncloying, satisfactory and durable relish to us, viz. exercises of
our abilities or powers, which tend to promote the public good. If it is
said that there is no reasoning in all this deduction, but simply appeal
to experience: let me ask how we can prove any quality, affection or
power to belong to us, or any sensation to be pleasant, but from expe-
rience? What are all the conclusions of natural philosophers, but in-
ductions from experience, the experience of our senses? And is outward
experience a proper proof of matters of outward experience; and inward
experience not a proper proof of matters of inward experience? If it is
objected, that experience proves that some men have high pleasure in
acts of cruelty and malice: to this I answer, the gradual degeneracy of
the mind into savageness and malignity, can be accounted for from the
laws according to which social affections, and a moral or public sense
are impaired and corrupted. But that any degree of this state of mind
<277> cannot be happiness, is plain, since where there is a total apostacy,
an absolute degeneracy from all candour, equity and trust, sociableness
or friendship, there is none who will not acknowledge the absolutemis-
ery of such a temper of mind. For sure here, as in other distempers, the
calamity must of necessity keep pace and hold proportion with the dis-
ease, the corruption. It is impossible that it can be complete misery, to
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be absolutely immoral and inhumane, and not be proportionablemisery
or ill, to be so in any however so small a degree. And indeed, tho’ there
were no considerable ill in any single exercise of inhumanity and un-
sociality, yet it must be contrary to interest, as it necessarily tends, in
consequence of the structure of our minds, that is, the dependence of
our affections, and the law of habits, to bring on the habitual temper,
which is so readily owned by every one to be consummate misery, and
to render incapable of any enjoyment, even amidst the most luxurious
circumstances of sensitive gratification. But having insisted very fully on
this subject in another treatise;8 and chiefly, because it is impossible to
set the sociability of our nature in a clearer and stronger light than my
Lord Shaftsbury has done, in his Essay on virtue,9 I shall only add, that
if it be really true (as I think he has demonstrated) that, in consequence
of the constitution of the human mind, and of the connexions relative
to our happiness, the affectionswhichwork towards public gooddo like-
wise work towards the greatest good of every individual, then are we by
a necessity of nature under obligation to be social, humane, and well
affectioned towards our kind: And consequently, sociality is a law of
nature to us. For this being the case, in it hath nature, whose constitu-
tions we cannot alter, placed our chief happiness. But this general truth
will be yet more evident, when we consider the particular dependencies
by which mankind are strictly linked and tied together. <278>
s e c t i on x i
Which we now proceed to point out, that we may shew the particular
order inwhich nature at once impels and obliges us to exercise andgratify
our social affections. Nature may, as we have already seen, be very prop-
erly said to oblige, or lay us under a necessity of regulating our affections
and actions in the way that the constitution of our mind, and the cir-
cumstances in which we are placed, make necessary to our happiness.
And nature may be said to impel us to exert our affections in the way in
8. Turnbull, Principles of Moral Philosophy.
9. Shaftesbury, An Enquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], in Shaftesbury,
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times.
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which they naturally tend to work or exert themselves. And if we attend
to our affections, and the order in which they naturally tend to operate
or exert themselves, we will find that it is that very order which our con-
stitution and circumstances make necessary to our well being and hap-
piness; so exactly are our constitution and our circumstances adapted
the one to the other. It is plain that social affections could not have their
proper exercises, except where many mutual dependencies take place;
because giving and receiving, or communication, can not take place but
where there aremutual wants.Now, ourmutualwants anddependencies
must be wants and dependencies either with respect to the goods of the
body, or the goods of the mind. For all our goods, as hath been observed
(§9), are reducible into these two classes: Wherefore, mutual wants and
dependencies in these respects, are necessary to the exercises of our social
affections, or to our social enjoyments. Take away frommankind all the
exercises of social affection, and we reduce them into a state of mere
indolence and inactivity, and leave nothing in human life to employmen
agreeably, or actuate themwarmly or strongly:We take away all thatgives
the highest relish to life, all its most touching and interesting exercises
and employments. But if we take away the objects of af-<279>fections
or exercises, we to all intents and purposes destroy the affections them-
selves; for it is to all intents and purposes the same, whether they do not
take place in a constitution, or taking place, have not objects to call them
forth into action and employ them. The differences therefore which ob-
tain among mankind, in consequence of the different talents, genius’s
and temperatures of mind, or of different circumstances, necessarilyoc-
casioning different operations, various degrees and turns of the same
powers and affections, do indeed serve to cement and unite mankind
together, and to produce a constitution of things, in which alone our
social affections can have various proper exercises; a constitution of
things, in which alone various social enjoyments can take place. And
therefore, with regard to us,
All nature’s diff ’rence keeps all nature’s peace.10
10. Pope, An Essay on Man, epistle IV, 56.
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This will be evident, if we but consider what the affections and em-
ployments arewhich give us social enjoyment. For howcanbenevolence,
love of power, compassion, charity, gratitude, or any other affection,
which hath the qualities, conditions, and actions of others for their ob-
jects, take place but where wants are supplied, dependence is created,
happiness is given; or where beings can mutually gratify one another in
various manners, by mutually adding to one another’s happiness and
enjoyment, or alleviating one another’s pains? But it will still be more
evident, when we consider the dependencies which actually obtain
among mankind, and the affections in human nature, corresponding to
these dependencies.Now, 1. In general, to the very supportof ourbodies,
many labours are necessary, and consequently, various communications
of labour: nor are various united labours less necessary to our having the
pleasures which arise from knowledge, and the improvements of the
understanding and ima-<280>gination. These two facts are too evident
to stand in need of any proof. And in order to our having enjoyments
of both these kinds by united labours, mankind are enduedwith various
talents, various genius’s and turns of mind. Some are fitted for one kind
of labour and employment, and some for another. Every one stands in
need of many, and every one is peculiarly adapted by nature to assist the
rest in some particular way. It is in order to promote a general commerce
among mankind, that through the whole globe, the habitation of man-
kind, every climate, every country, produces something peculiar to it,
which is necessary to the greater convenience, or at least to the greater
comfort and ornament of the inhabitants in every other. So in every
country, throughout all mankind in general, there prevails a division of
talents, genius’s and abilities, which makes every one necessary in a par-
ticular way to the general good, or at least renders every one capable of
contributing something towards general happiness, by the application
of his talents in their proper way, or to the end for which they are pe-
culiarly adapted. And indeed in the narrowest view we can take of hu-
man happiness, that is, even when we confine it to our bodily subsis-
tence, to eating, drinking, protection against the injuries of weather, and
such other conveniencies, which will be readily acknowledged not to be
all that mankind are qualified to have and enjoy, even tho’ we should
Several of
these depen-
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quite abstract from the higher pursuits of understanding and imagina-
tion, in the improvements of arts and sciences, from every thing that
comes under the notion of ornament, elegancy or grandeur; yet even in
this confined view,many labours, various industry is necessary.Andcon-
sequently, men are laid by a necessity of nature under obligation mu-
tually to engage one another, to unite their labours, and communicate
their industry for one another’s subsistence. But as men would <281>
have but very little pleasure in labour, and the communications of their
industry which are necessary to their subsistence, were not exercise, as
hath been observed (§9), naturally agreeable to men, and were we not
so constituted as to have immediate pleasure in social communication,
in every social exercise; somen, as we are constituted, cannot engage one
another inmutual assistance, but by shewing eachhiswillingness toassist
the rest, and his sincere cordial regard to the well-being and interest of
the whole body. Every one, in order to be liked and regarded by others,
must at least put on the shew of liking and regarding others; for one
would otherwise be looked upon as a common enemy, and as such be
abandoned, nay, hated and persecuted by all men. And let me just ob-
serve here, in opposition to those who assert that there is not really any
benevolence or regard to the interests of others in human nature, but
that it is self-love which assumes the affected appearance of it, in order
to deceive, well knowing the necessity of seeming to love others, in order
to be assisted by them, as our necessities require.11 Let me observe, that
were there not generally prevailing among mankind a real principle of
sociality and benevolence, this imposition, this counterfeit regard tooth-
ers, would not be able to answer its end. Were all men utterly devoid of
any such principle, and were the appearance of sociality every where
counterfeited, the false appearance would nowhere take; it would no-
where be believed, and nothing like trust, or harmony and union could
prevail among mankind, but they would live in continual jealousies and
11. Turnbull is again criticizing Hobbes and Mandeville. See, for example,
Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 13; Mandeville, “A Search into the Nature of Society,” in
The Fable of the Bees, vol. I, 344, andMandeville, “Dialogue betweenHoratio, Cleo-
menes, and Fulvia,” in The Fable of the Bees, vol. II, 132.
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suspicions. So that of necessity it must be owned, that there is in the
generality of mankind naturally a real principle of sociality and benev-
olence. This is plain from the necessary effect of one’s being discovered
to have acted under a mask of benevolence and honest regard to others;
for in that case, hardly can any power or <282> strength such a person
may have acquired, protect him against just resentment. Such aonemust
indeed be strongly defended to secure himself against the condign ven-
geance of mankind. And whatever his power may be, in consequence
of hiswrath and guards, or armies attached tohimbyhiswealth,hanging
upon him by the teeth (to use the phrase of a very great author),12 yet
he cannot avoid being hated by all the rest, and he cannot be loved even
by them who are thus tied to him: And consequently, it is no wonder,
that every one of this character, and in this situationwith regard toman-
kind, in consequence of his known character, hath ever been foundmost
compleatly miserable; tormented by galling fears, suspicions and jeal-
ousies. There never was a tyrant who was not in this terrible condition,
as Cicero observes, Offices, book 2.13
Mankind then are not only under a necessity bynatureof beingsocial,
but they are actually provided with affections which make them such,
as well as with the various talents necessary to a variety of industry, and
communication of industry. So that thus far nature obliges and impels
to the same course of life, viz. a course of social industry and com-
munication, a course of honest and cordial interchanges of mutual as-
sistances and services. 2. But besides this general dependence diffused
throughout the whole species, there are dependencies of another kind
12. “Hanging upon him by the teeth.” This phrase is derived from James Har-
rington’s Oceana: “To begin with riches, in regard that men are hung upon these,
not of choice as upon the other [that is, authority], but of necessity and by the teeth:
for as much as he who wanteth bread is his servant that will feed him, if a man thus
feed an whole people, they are under his empire,” Harrington, Political Works, 163.
Harrington distinguishes between “authority” and “power.” The former is based on
“prudence, or the reputation of prudence.” Contrary to Hobbes, however, Harring-
ton believes that this authority is insufficient as a basis of political power, whichmust
rest on “riches,” in particular land ownership. See the discussion in Fukuda, Sover-
eignty and the Sword.
13. Cicero, De officiis 2.7.23–26.
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among mankind, to which likewise there are correspondent affections
in human nature, that without such dependencies would not have ex-
ercise or employment. The Author of nature hath spread overmankind
a natural aristocracy, which appears in every assembly of mankind.Some
are superior in understanding to the greater part, in every casual or de-
signed meeting of men, consisting of suppose ten, twenty, or any other
number. And what is the natural effect of this, in consequence of the
hu-<283>man frame? Superiority in wisdom, by fitting to give proper
counsel inmatters of commonconcernment, naturallyproducesesteem,
veneration, submission, and gratitude in those who feel the benefit of
their superior wisdom, or to whom it serves as a light to direct them;
that is, it gives authority to the men of superior wisdom; and it excites
cordial dependence and confidence upon them in the breasts of those
who reap the advantages of it. And thus those who excel in wisdom,
have the pleasure of having authority and respect paid to them. And
those who receive counsel and direction from them, have the pleasure
of being instructed by them, and the sincere satisfaction which arises
from gratitude and affection to benefactors, which is naturally so strong,
that it is hard to say who are happiest, those who give, or those who
receive. Thiswemay observe, fromthepleasurewithwhichyouthreceive
information from a prudent affectionate teacher: and in general, from
the warm and zealous affectionwith which persons obliged attach them-
selves to a wise and generous patron, follow his directions: and espouse
his interest.
Condition, circumstance is not the thing:
Bliss is the same, in subject or in king,
In who obtain defence, or who defend,
In him who is, or him who finds a friend.
Essay on man.14
But let it be observed, that this is only the case while those of superior
parts shew a sincere regard in their counsels and directions to the general
good; and do not attempt to deceive those who depend upon them into
14. Pope, An Essay on Man, epistle IV, 57–60.
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hurtful measures, with a selfish narrow view. For so soon as that is per-
ceived, veneration is changed into contempt and hatred. And thus the
superior in parts deprives himself of one chief reward of superior pru-
dence, which is, the authority, leading and dependence it would other-
<284>wise give him.History is full of instances, which are somany clear
proofs of this. TheRomanhistory in particular, in the languageof which
republic, as an excellent author hath observed, the influence of superi-
ority in wisdom united with benevolence, was called auctoritas patrum;
and the veneration paid by the people to it was called verecundia plebis.15
There is in every man naturally a desire of power. It indeed enlarges and
becomes stronger, in proportion as the mind enlarges and opens. But it
is so strong, even in the meanest, that unless they depend, or hang upon
others by the teeth, theymay be led, but theywill not be driven. If nature
had not implanted in all men a desire of power, and a strong sensibility
to wrong and injury, the veneration which superiority in parts naturally
inspires, would have rendered the generality of mankind, who stand in
need of leading and direction, too submissive, too tame and humble.
But notwithstanding the natural aristocracy diffused over mankind, yet
such is the general temper of mankind, that not only superiority inparts,
without benevolence, will not gain respect and submission, but even a
stricter and closer dependence will hardly be able to keep men in sub-
jectionwhenpower over them is abused, if it canby anymeansbe shaken
off. 3. And this leads me to take notice of another kind of dependence
among mankind; a dependence necessarily resulting from inequality in
property. I need not stay to prove that earth, the habitationof men,being
given by nature to be possessed and appropriated by the industry of the
first occupants, the world could no sooner be tolerably well peopled, but
in every district there would be inequality of property. I need not stay
to prove how this would naturally happen in consequence of themanner
in which mankind is propagated by successive generations, the natural
aristocracy among mankind, which <285> hath been mentioned, and
other causes; nor to shew what revolutions in property, commerce, not
15. Auctoritas patrum is the “authority of the fathers,” verecundia plebis the “rev-
erence of the people.” See Harrington, “The Prerogative of Popular Government,”
bk. I, chap. v., p. 416, in Political Works.
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to mention force, will naturally be ever bringing about, where the bal-
ance of property is not fixed by civil laws and constitutions; far less need
I stay to prove that an over-balance of property will produce power or
dominion proportional to it. These things have been sufficiently ex-
plained by the most ingenious Harrington.16 All that it belongs to our
present purpose to observe with relation to it, is, that as inferiorities and
superiorities, with regard to the good of the body as well as of themind,
are necessary to social communication; necessary tomakemankindmu-
tually dependent, or to lay a foundation formutual giving and receiving;
so, with respect to external dependencies, or hanging by the teeth, that
must necessarily take place among mankind in consequence of unequal
property, men are furnished by nature with all the affections such de-
pendencies require, in order to render them a means of agreeable union
and coherence, or to found upon them very various social commerce.
For, 1.Men have a principle of benevolence to excite them to takedelight
in doing good, and in being serviceable to one another. And, 2. They
have a sensibility to oppression and injustice, which impels them toward
against injury, and resent it with great vehemence.Wherefore, aswithout
some sort of dependencies there could be no such thing as social com-
merce; so mankind could not be better provided by nature than they are
for reaping all the advantages of mutual dependencies, and for securing
themselves against all the inconveniencies that can arise from mutual
dependency. And as reciprocal dependence lays mankind under a ne-
cessity of social communication; so the natural affections with which
men are endued, point out to us the manner in which social commu-
nication ought to be carried on. For benevolence <286> naturally pro-
duces love and gratitude. But no one can be so powerful as not to want
assistance inmany respects; and the indignation against injury, and aver-
sion to slavery or absolute subjection, natural to mankind, will render
power very ineffectual to true happiness without benevolence. Since that
alone can excite love, affection, trust, or esteem; and hewho knowshim-
self to be hated and despised, must be very unhappy amidst the greatest
16. Harrington argued that political power depended on the distribution of
wealth, especially landed property. See note 12, p. 583.
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affluence of outward enjoyments, as well as very unsecure of long pos-
sessing them. Thus therefore nature hath made the exercises of benev-
olence, good-will, compassion, generosity, gratitude, fidelity, integrity
and friendship, to be, in every respect, the happiness of mankind, and
the happiness of every individual. And therefore, of the mutual wants
and dependencies among mankind, which some look upon as an objec-
tion against the good government of the world, it may justly be said,
To these we owe true friendship, love sincere,
Each home-felt joy which life inherits here.
Essay on man.17
But this will yet more clearly appear, when we consider, 4. The nec-
essary dependence of children upon their parents, in consequenceof the
manner in which nature hath appointed the propagation of mankind,
and the affectionswhich nature hath implanted inmen, inorder todirect
and impel them to the care of their infant-offspring, and to the prop-
agation of mankind in the way necessary to the general happiness of
mankind. It is evident, that proper care cannot be taken of infants, as
they come into the world in a most helpless condition, unless their par-
ents unite together in concern about bringing them up to a state capable
of doing for themselves. Neither their bodies nor their minds can oth-
erwise be taken <287> due care of. Now, in order to excite us to this
care, nature hath implanted in us several strong affections, all centering
in it as their end; so that a great part of human happiness, a great part
of ourmost agreeable employments, really consists in parental cares, and
filial returns to such cares. There is not only a strong mutual sympathy
between the sexes, founded in, and supported by many mutual wants
and ties. But mankind have a strong natural inclination to continue
themselves in a new race, which they may look upon as their own; to
which a regular union between the sexes, in such a manner, that love
and fidelity may bemost securely depended upon, is evidently necessary.
And no sooner are children born to parents in such a way, that there is
no doubt of their being the offspring of faithful embraces, than a warm
17. Pope, Essay on Man, epistle II, 255–56.
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love springs up in their minds towards this progeny, which is consid-
erably increased by our sense of their absolute dependence upon our
care, and soon receives an additional warmth from the gratitude, love
and attachment to us, which they very early discover, andwhich become
firmer, by becomingmore rational, in proportion to the care parents take
of what is principal in relation to their childrens happiness, the for-
mation of their minds. Desire to be a parent, and the head of a family,
is an affection that early sprouts up in every mind, and hath betimes a
great share in all our pursuits. And when the marital and parental ties
are once formed, then nature points our views more immediately to-
wards our offspring and family, as the most proper object of our care.
And this is evidently the manner in which benevolence should operate
in order to the general happiness of mankind.Thusnaturemakescertain
persons nearer and dearer to one another, and by so doing ascertains or
appropriates to every one certainmore immediate objects of his concern
and affection; and, at the same <288> time, instead of severing or di-
viding mankind by this means into so many separate bodies, with sepa-
rate interests, binds mankind together by so many more ties. For every
one, who hath a warm attachment to the welfare of many endeared to
himby special bonds and affections,must feel a stronger obligation, than
those who are strangers to such motives, to gain the love of mankind,
without which his own power to do good to such would be of very little
consequence, however great it might be with it. There is this remarkable
difference between the instinct of brutes, that impels them to the care
of their offspring, and the natural affections of mankind.
Not man alone, but all that roam the wood,
Or wing the sky, or roll along the flood;
Each loves itself, but not itself alone,
Each sex desires alike, till two are one;
Nor ends the pleasure with the fierce embrace,
They love themselves a third time in their race.
Thus beast and bird their common charge attend,
The mothers nurse it, and the sires defend;
The young dismiss’d to wander earth or air,
There stops the instinct, and there ends the care.
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The link dissolves, each seeks a fresh embrace,
Another love succeeds another race.
A longer care man’s helpless kind demands,
That longer care contracts more lasting bands;
Reflexion, reason, still the ties improve,
At once extend the interest and the love.
With choice we fix, with sympathy we burn,
Each virtue in each passion takes its turn;
And still new needs, new helps, new habits rise,
That graft benevolence on charities.
Essay on man.18
Nownature, by thus ordering the propagationof mankind, andenduing
us with corresponding affections as parents and as children, assigns to
eve-<289>ry one amore immediate and particular task or care; the faith-
ful discharge of which by each in his sphere, would make human life all
peace, love and harmony.Our general benevolence hath thus aparticular
biass, which points it into its proper road, or into its first cares and prin-
cipal employments. Were mankind to be propagated as they are, andwe
not endued with the affections which are really implanted in us by na-
ture, to how many bad chances, with regard to their education more
especially, would mankind be exposed in their infant-state? And, on the
other hand, if we had not those natural affections in us which tend to
regular propagation, in order to have certain children, and to due care
of our thus certain offspring; would notwewantmany sincerepleasures,
many warm, interesting, delightful cares? Would it not our general be-
nevolence want a strong source for nourishing and supporting it? And
would not be left too vague and undetermined by nature? But being
constituted as we are, our benevolence is properly directed, and properly
invigorated; and nature hath given us affections to impel us to what ne-
cessity obliges us; with affections which makes every one feel immediate
satisfaction in that regular exertion of benevolence, which the interest
of all in general requires. Thus, while every man touches us as such,
certain particulars strongly call upon our special attention; and we have
18. Ibid., III, 119–38.
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each a particular province assigned to us by the natural tendency of our
affections, the faithful discharge of which is contributing a very great
share towards the public good. And this determination of our mind to
particular exercises of benevolence, is so far from stinting and confining
benevolence, or from having a natural tendency to degenerate into a
narrow clannish disposition, that it naturally produces a fellow-feeling
with all other parents and their cares, i.e. with all mankind; and renders
the mind in general much <290> more tender and sympathizing than
it can be without frequently feeling such kindly emotions. For this plain
reason, that humanity and benevolence, like all other affections, grow
stronger and stronger by exercise; or, in other words, repeated exercises
form a general temper correspondent to them.
We have now therefore found that nature lays us under the necessity
of social communication, and impels us to it by strong affections; and
lays us under the necessity of social communication in a certain order,
to which it likewise prompts and impels us by very strong affections,
giving particular determinations to our benevolence, or assigning a
nearer, a more immediate province to it. And hitherto certainly we have
found our nature to be very well constituted, even in that respect against
which the greatest objections have been made (viz. differences or in-
equalities among mankind): and hitherto also we have found the obli-
gations arising from our constitution, and the connexions of things rela-
tive to our happiness, to be very obvious. They stare every one, who
considers human nature with any attention, so to speak, in the face.
s e c t i on x i i
But we will still perceive another security in our constitution against the
degeneracy of family attachments into too narrow, confined, andpartial
benevolence, when we consider another determination in our nature,
excellently adapted to check not only self-love, but partial affection of
whatever sort, whether towards relatives by blood or friends; and ad-
mirably adapted to the circumstances of human life in general; which
is the sympathy and pity distress immediately excites in the human
breast, violently interesting us in the miseries of others. An embodied
Other affec-
tions in the
human mind
explained.
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state must necessarily be liable to various calamities, in consequence of
the very laws of matter and motion, which make the best, the most or-
<291>derly, convenient and beautiful system, as our mundan system is
well known to natural philosophers to be. And nature hath, by wise and
kind care, implanted in the human heart a principle of compassion,
which is admirably well adjusted to such a condition. For by this we are
impelled to sympathize with the afflicted, and to run without delay to
their relief. And howmuch doth even sympathy itself alleviate pain and
suffering! Such is the nature of compassion, that it considers or attends
to no more but distress, is immediately excited, and directly pushes to
give the relief which the calamity calls for, without counting kindred,
or so much as asking who the sufferer is; and gives indeed no small pain,
when help is not in our power. Now, surely nature could not have more
clearly pointed out to us the order in which our benevolence ought to
work, than by determining it to receive such an impression, such a ten-
dency from distress. It is true, this affection may be too strong to answer
its end, as it plainly is, when it quite overpowers and enfeebles one. And
by pains taken to harden the heart, it may, on the other hand, become
very weak, nay, be almost quite erazed out of the mind. But have we not
reason to guide all our affections to their proper end, obedience towhich
is, as hath been observed, our first duty or obligation by the laws of our
nature? Andwhat can bemore evident to a considering person, than that
the end of this passion is to knit mankind together, and to give them a
fellow-feeling with one another, that they might thus be kept from in-
juring one another, and be prompted to assist one another in the calam-
ities and distresses to which all men in common are obnoxious? Or who
will say, that tho’ there be a mixture of pain in this affection, yet it is
not, notwithstanding, so agreeable an emotion of the mind, that the
pleasures arising from the exercises of it, make a counterbalance to the
bodily evils resulting <292> from the necessity of nature sufficient to
vindicate providence, when we reflect at the same time upon the many
other goods arising from the same excellent laws which make these evils
necessary? That the exercise of compassion is a high satisfaction, the
tragic art, the principal charm of which lies in violently moving and
agitating our pity, is a sufficient proof. And indeed, by the consent of
of moral and civ il laws 591
all mankind, a breast quite devoid of compassion, is pronounced inhu-
man; i.e. unfit for human life; a stranger to the best feelings, the most
agreeable and becoming emotions of the human heart. The reason is,
because such are in fact found to be equally strangers to natural affections,
to friendship, to a sense of honour, and consequently to all the richest
sources of human delight; the richest sources of human delight for these
affections being removed, what remains but the palate, and a few other
organs of sense, in the whole list of human means or capacities of grat-
ification?Butwherever compassion prevails, there naturehathgivenapar-
ticular determination to our benevolence, the use of which to mankind
in general is very evident; there nature hathmade a connexionwith regard
to public and private happiness that merits our attention; there nature
hath given a sense, a capacity of pleasure, that deserves our care and keep-
ing: it cannot be impaired or corrupted, without sadly diminishing the
provision nature hathmade for our enjoyment, for the happiness of every
individual, as well as the common happiness of our kind. Every road that
nature hathmade to true happiness, is a lawof nature tous.And therefore,
if natural affections belong to us, or if compassion belongs to us, they are,
in this sense, laws of nature toman, that they indicate tous a certaincourse
of affection and action, which nature hath made to be one considerable
source of enjoyment to us. For can happiness be found but where nature
hath placed it? <293> Can we change and alter the natures of things at
our pleasure, and make any thing painful or agreeable as we will? If we
cannot, wemust take nature’s paths, and seek happiness where nature has
laid it. But nature hath placed it in industry, benevolence, natural affec-
tion, compassion, and the presidence of reason. These are the chief
sources from which we must draw it. We can no more alter these con-
nexions than we can change the laws of motion and gravity. They are
therefore laws to us in the same sense, that the laws of motion are laws to
human arts for the attainment of their ends.
But the human mind is a very complicated structure: It is composed
not of one, but many principles of action, all of which are sources of
very considerable enjoyment, and at the same time mutual checks or
poises one to another, in order to point and lead us into, and keep us in
the course of behaviour, which is at once the interest of every individual,
Other affec-
tions adapted
to our depen-
dencies and
necessities
explained.
592 the nature and orig ine
and of the whole species. Several such have been alreadymentioned, and
there are yet two others, the use of which in our frame well deserve our
attention. 1. The first is a principle of resentment. By this we mean not
merely sudden anger, which is nothing else but the necessary operation
of self-defence, or sensibility to danger and hurt, and hath hurt as such
for its object; for this is common to man with all sensible creatures: But
we understand that indignation which injury or wrong, as such, nec-
essarily excites in ourmind, which supposes a sense of injustice or injury,
and can only take place in minds capable of distinguishing equity and
iniquity. In this do these two principles, which are often confounded
together, in treating of the human affections, differ, that one hath suf-
fering for its object andmotive cause, the other that suffering onlywhich
is apprehended to be injurious. It is opposition, sudden hurt, violence,
which naturally <294> excites sudden ormomentary anger; reflexionon
the real demerit or fault of him who offers that violence, or is the cause
of that opposition or hurt, is not necessary to occasion this mere sen-
sation or feeling. It is mere instinct, as merely so, as the disposition to
shut our eyes upon the apprehension of something falling into them,
and no more necessarily implies any degree of reason. For it works in
infants, in the lower species of animals, and (not seldom) inmen towards
them, in none of which instances this passion can be imagined to be the
effect of reason, or any thing but mere instinct or sensation. And no
doubt the reason and end for which man was made thus liable to this
passion, was to qualify and arm him to prevent (or perhaps chiefly) to
resist and defeat sudden violence, considered merely as such, and with-
out regard to the fault of him who is the author of it.
But resentment, which on account of what it hath in common with
sudden anger, may be called deliberate anger, is not naturally excited by
mere harm, but in order to move it, harm must be apprehended as in-
jurious or wrong. “This is somuch (says an excellent author)understood
by mankind, that a person would be reckoned quite distracted, who
should coolly resent an harm, which had not to himself the appearance
of injury or wrong.”19 Now that the reason and end for which this prin-
19. Butler, SermonVIII, “UponResentment,” Fifteen Sermons, 145. There aremi-
nor discrepancies between the original text and Turnbull’s quotation.
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ciple is implanted in us by nature, is to fill us with indignation against
injury, and to excite us to resist, defeat and punish it, is evident; for this
is the end to which it naturally tends. And therefore, with regard to it,
it is plain, that it is in its nature a social affection: it is a fellow-feeling
which each individual hath in behalf of the whole species. For tho’ in-
jury to ourselves must affect usmore intimately than injury done to oth-
ers, in consequence of the nearer sensibility to one’s self, which is in-
separable from the constitution of every sensible being; yet we find that
<295> the way in which injuries to others affect us, is exactly the same
in kind. To be convinced of this, we need only attend to the manner in
which a feigned story of baseness and villainy works up this passion in
us. And such being the nature of this passion, it is far from being any
defect or fault in our constitution, or from being in the least degree a-
kin to malice: It is, on the contrary, so connected with a sense of moral
good and evil, or of virtue and vice, that it could not take place without
it; andmay be properly said to be resentment or indignation against vice
and wickedness. Far less still can this affection in our constitution be
reckoned of a pernicious tendency, when we consider it as united in our
frame with the other affections we have already mentioned, as compas-
sion in particular; for as it is counter-balanced by them, and intended
to co-operate with them, it can be designed for no other end but tomake
the resistance and opposition to vicewhich vice demerits, and not to give
pain for the sake of tormenting others. For our compassionbeingmoved
by the suffering of another as such, and our resentment being only ex-
cited by wrong as such, we are thus by nature equally furnished for re-
pelling injuries, and for commiserating innocent sufferers. Reason hath
thus, as it were, two handles to guide us by, whether in repelling injuries,
or in pitying sufferers, by each of which the other is kept within due
bounds. Compassion is of use to moderate resentment, and resentment
to hinder compassion from misplacing its tenderness upon the unde-
serving and vicious, to the prejudice of innocence and merit. So social
then is our frame, that there is no passion in our nature which delights
immediately in misery as such. But, on the contrary, misery always ex-
cites compassion, unless when it is apprehended as the just desert of
injury. And so far is resentment generally from being too strong in hu-
man nature, that however eagerly it may desire and pur-<296>sue the
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punishment of injustice, yet the punishment, which is the end of the
passion, is no sooner gained, than commonly it gives way to compassion
to such a degree, that it requires keeping the injustice of the sufferer very
fully and strongly in our view, not to succumb entirely to pity. 2. But I
have chiefly mentioned this principle in our nature here, as it, together
with what I am now to take notice of, viz. the love of fame and power,
renders mankind capable of several great actions. For if we examinenar-
rowly into what it is that impels the humanmind to dangerous and bold
atchievements, and gives heroic spirits such high delight in pursuits
seemingly so opposite to self-love, we will find that these are the sources
in our nature, fromwhence the delight in them, and themotives to them
principally flow; I say, principally flow, because no doubt a moral sense
of beauty in actions (of which afterwards) hath no small share in true
heroism; and religious principles, as they are of a very proper nature to
promote true fortitude, patience and courage, so they have often pro-
duced the greatest actions, the bravest heroes.
Whence the hazardous enterprizes with which the history of all ages
and countries is filled, that strike us with such admiration and amaze-
ment?Towhat dohistorians ascribe them?And towhat sourcedoes every
reader chiefly refer them in his own mind? Is it not to the love of power
or empire, and the love of fame? Now surely, if these be the main in-
centives to atchievements, in which life and all its advantages are so
boldly risked; we may justly conclude, that the love of power and fame
may arrive to a very great pitch of vigour and force in the humanmind.
And such indeed are the circumstances of severalmost renownedactions
in history, that so much of the motives to them must needs be ascribed
to these sources, as makes it very proper in an analysis of the human
<297> affections, to give particular attention to the love of fame and
power, and the ends for which they are implanted in us by nature. Now,
into whatever extravagancies the love of fame and power may run; (as
what passion in our nature may not be perverted, and so degenerate into
something very wild, foolish and hurtful) yet they are implanted in us
for very useful purposes. Let us consider the two separately. 1. The love
of fame. Is it not a passion that takes its rise from sociability, and that
strongly cements us to the interests of our kind? For what is it at bottom
but regard to the esteem and love of mankind? Can we love mankind
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without desiring to be respected, esteemed and honoured by them? or
can we like actions which tend to gain us the love of mankind, without
liking the love they tend to gain? Love of fame is inseparable from so-
ciality; and true honour consisting in the merited real esteem of man-
kind, is a noble aim; not a mean or mercenary view, but a truly generous
and laudable motive. Nay, so nearly allied is this praise-worthy ambition
to virtue, that he who despises fame will soon forsake the paths which
lead to it. And therefore Cicero justly says, Vult plane virtus honorem nec
est virtutis alia merces.20 2. As for the love of power. It is absolutely nec-
essary to beings made for progress in perfection, and to extend and en-
large their faculties. For what else is it at bottom, but desire to expand
and enlarge ourselves, to dilate and widen our sphere of activity?With-
out this impulse, without being made to receive high delight from the
consciousness of our growing and advancing in perfection, in knowl-
edge, in authority, in power to serve others, and promote their interests,
how listless and inactive would our minds be? And how listless indeed,
sluggish and inactive are theminds, where the love of encreasing all their
powers, the desire of being as independent of others, and as sufficient
to themselves as they can <298> be, does not prevail in some degree!
3. And in a life subject to evils of various sorts, to many natural calam-
ities, and many greater moral ones, arising from the perverted, corrupt
affections of men, how necessary are both these principles to fortify our
minds with patience and courage, and to qualify us to oppose and de-
feat these evils? Where these passions do not obtain in a great degree,
how easy a conquest are a people to every proud usurper or tyrant;
how tamely and submissively do they yield their necks to the yoke of
arbitrary power? But as useful as these noble principles are in our
nature, and as great a share as they have in the great actions which
chiefly render the history of human life capable of attracting or de-
taining our attention, yet all must not be ascribed to them. For that
just resentment against injury, just indignation against oppression, tyr-
anny and despotic insolence, often kindle the heroe’s breast with a gen-
20. “Virtue clearly desires honour, and has no other reward.”CiceroDe re publica,
III, xxviii, 40.
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erous ardour to destroy and root out these enemies of mankind, and
make him rush intrepidly into the thickest dangers to rescue his fellow-
creatures, his country, from slavery and misery;—that this passion is of-
ten the patriot’s chief motive in his most perilous and brave enterprizes,
almost the only thing he hath in his view to animate and invigorate him,
might be proved by many shining instances from history. But all that it
belongs to our present purpose to observe is, that none of these passions
are inconsistent with a social principle, but on the contrary take their
rise from it: it is the only root from which they can spring: Nor are these
affections weakened or perverted by any other means than those which
equally weaken or pervert every other generous or great affection in our
minds. Thus, the same long subjection to arbitrary power, which almost
quite effaces all ideas of liberty, all greatness, boldness and freedom of
mind, is it not likewise observed to render them, who have been long
inured to it, sluggish, indolent, ungenerous, revengeful, and rather
nearer to the <299> temper of monkeys or buffoons in all respects, than
to the spirit and temper of men? However these principles or disposi-
tions may be corrupted, they are to us, as they naturally stand in our
frame, sources of very noble pleasures, and motives to very great and
laudable activity. We cannot suppose them removed out of our consti-
tution, without reducing mankind to a very low and contemptible crea-
ture, in comparison of what it is the natural tendency of these affections
to render us, as they are united in our frame with benevolence, com-
passion, and natural affections to our parents andoffspring.Theycannot
be taken from us, without cutting off from mankind all capacity of the
greater pursuits that now adorn and bless human life. Nor can they in-
deed be objected against in our frame, when they are thus considered.
Andwhen the Author of nature is blamed by any philosopher for having
implanted them in our frame, they are represented by such as making
the only principles of action in our minds; and are thus disjoined from
other principles in us, with which they are naturally united, and con-
sequently intended by nature to co-operate. But certainly, in order to
judge of a constitution, we must consider all its parts as they mutually
respect one another, and by these mutual respects make a whole. Thus
we judge of all other constitutions or structures, natural or artificial.And
thus likewise ought we to judge of the fabric of the human mind.
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Now, having thus analized the human mind into the chief principles,
dispositions or affections of which it is compounded; what follows, but
that, this mind so constituted is a law to itself; or that it, and the con-
nexions relative to it, which have likewise been explained as we pro-
ceeded in this resolution of the human mind into its component parts,
make to man the laws and rules of his ac-<300>tions? Thus laws of
conduct are constituted to man for the government of his affections, in
order to the attainment of happiness in the same manner that the laws
of matter and motion constitute rules to human arts for the attainment
of their ends. In the same sense that it is necessary for man to act con-
sonantly to the properties of air and water, in order to gain certain pur-
poses, such as raising water, &c. in the same sense are the connexions
relative to our affections, laws or rules to us, how to regulate and direct
them, in order to avoid certain evils and to obtain certain goods. We
have not in this enquiry meddled with a question, the manner of han-
dling which hath greatly perplexed the science of morality, viz. the free-
dom of human will: For this evident reason, that it neither more nor
less concerns morals, than it does an enquiry into the connexions of
nature, whence the rules in mechanical arts must be deduced. This is
manifest. Because, if man be not at all master of his actions, it must be
as much in vain to direct him how to act in any one way, as how to direct
him in any other. Directions and counsels, or exhortations, can only be
of usewith respect to things in humanpower.But if directions,counsels,
or exhortations, with regard to industry in cultivating mechanical arts
for the benefit or ornament of human life, can be of any use to man,
then must man be acknowledged to be master of almost all the powers,
faculties and affections to which any other counsels, directions or ex-
hortations can be addressed. For then must he be master of getting
knowledge, if he will; master of applying himself to study and labour;
he must be capable of being moved by representations of what the in-
terests of society require, and of making that the end of his pursuits;
master of despising toil and hardships in that view; andmaster of aiming
at fame and honour, by doing some laudable service to mankind in that
way. But if he be so farmaster of his af-<301>fections and actions,which
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affections and actions is he not master of in the same sense? Indeed all
the grave sophistry about liberty and necessity, with which moral en-
quiries have been so sadly embarrassed, to the great obstruction of true
and useful knowledge, might as well be prefixed to a system of physics
as of morals. For if they prove any thing at all, they prove thatmankind
ought to fold their arms, and let things go as they will. If they prove, or
are designed to prove this, are not rules about sowing in seed-time in
order to reap in harvest, rules about building ships, or any other ma-
chines, as idle as rules about the government of the affections? And if
they are not designed to prove this, what are they intended for? For till
this is proved to be a necessary consequence of God’s foreknowledge,
or of our being influenced by motives, or of whatever other truth from
which necessity is thought to follow,—till this be proved, what is called
necessity, cannot be contrary to what is called liberty, viz. our having cer-
tain things in our power, or our being the disposers or masters of our
actions. In fine, whatever proves any thing repugnant toour liberty,must
prove that we are not at all masters of doing, or not doing as we will in
any case; that we have no power, no dominion, no sphere of activity; or,
in one word, that we are not agents: and this being proved, mechanical
arts, which are rules to certain actions, or rules for our attaining certain
ends, are just as much affected by it, as the science of morals, which is
a system of rules to certain other actions, or for our attaining certain
other ends. The arguments brought against human liberty, were never
said only to prove that necessity extends merely a certain length, and no
further. Nor can it be said; for if they prove any thing at all, they must
prove universal necessity. And if they do indeed prove universal neces-
sity, then human action in every sense is absurd, and<302>consequently
all rules to human actions of any sort or kind are equally absurd; or by
the universal necessity they are said to prove, and brought to prove, is
meant a necessity with which human agency is very consistent; which
will be to say, that they are brought to prove, and do prove that we are
not agents in a sense that is however very compatible with our being
agents. Surely the controversy about liberty and necessity must be of
very little moment, nay, a very idle, impertinent logomachy, if any as-
serters of necessity think that the necessity they plead for is absolutely
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consistent with our being masters of our actions, our having a sphere of
power which we are capable of using well or abusing, as we please. For
never was liberty understood to mean more than dominion and power,
and accountableness, in consequence of our being disposers of our ac-
tions. And so in this case their necessity is our liberty. But if they really
mean an universal necessity, absolutely repugnant to our agency, i.e. to
our having the disposal of our actions,which renders rules anddirections
about actions absurd, as proceeding upon a false supposition; then are
those, who treat of gaining certain natural ends by certain actions ad-
justed to natural connexions, as much concerned in the controversy as
moralists, when they treat of attaining certain other ends by actions ad-
justed to other natural connexions. And for this reason, we may dismiss
it as a questionwhichdoes not particularly concernour subject; butevery
subject equally, which supposes man to be an agent.
And therefore, to go on with our conclusion, we say, that the con-
nexions which we have found to be fixed by nature, relative to our hap-
piness, are laws of nature to our conduct in the same sense that the con-
nexions in nature, relative to certain physical ends, are laws with regard
to certain physical arts. They are laws we cannot alter, but to which we
must conform, in order to attain our greatest <303> happiness, our best
enjoyments, or greatest goods. And they are laws appointed by the Au-
thor of nature to our conduct. For all established connexions in nature
must mean connexions appointed and upheld, or subsisting by virtue
of the will of the Author of nature, who gave being to all things, and
to all orders and connexions of things (§3). Now, all this being true,
it follows, that man is in the same sense made for prudence and self-
government; for industry; for acting with reason, and agreeably to its
dictates; for benevolence, or the pursuit of public good; forpaternalcares
and filial gratitude; for indignation against injury and oppression, and
for compassion towards our suffering or distressed fellow-creatures; it
follows, I say, that we are made for these ends in the same sense that the
eye is made to see, the ear to hear, that a certain structure is made for
flying, and another for swiming and living in water, or that bodies are
made to gravitate in proportion to their quantities of matter, or are to
be considered as having that property in human arts. The Author of
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nature, who hath made the one kind of connexions, hath likewisemade
and fixed the other. And if the preceding account of human nature, or
of our internal principles and dispositions, and the connexions relative
to them be true, to say man is not made for the exercises above-
mentioned, to which we may now certainly give the name of virtues,
without taking any thing in morals for granted, is to say, a being endued
with a governing principle, by which it is intended he should govern
himself, is not intended to be so governed; which is to assert, that a gov-
erning principle is not, in its nature and end, a governing principle: it is
to say, a being endued with a governing principle, the use and end of
which is to give him self-command, or the mastership of his affections,
is not made to be master of his affections by his governing principle;
which is to assert, that he hath a principle which hath an end and <304>
use which it hath not: It is to say, that a being who hath social affections,
and a principle of benevolence, determined, or adapted to receive dif-
ferent kindly impressions from different objects, is not intended to have
these social, affectionate, generous impressions, nor to exercise these af-
fections; but has them for no end at all, or for a quite opposite and con-
trary end. In fine, let any man consider these virtues, and compare them
with the make of the human mind, and all our internal principles and
dispositions, and then say that man is made for imprudence, folly, wil-
fulness, and precipitancy; to be tossed to and fro by tumultuous con-
tradictory affections, without any order or government; and to be cruel,
tyrannical, abusive, oppressive, uncompassionate, quite unsocial. Let
him say what reason he can give for affirming that the eye is made to
enjoy the light, the ear to receive pleasure from music; or, in one word,
what reason he can give for saying any thing natural or artificial is made
for an end, that will not equally oblige him to say, man is framed, made
and intended for rational government of his affections, for benevolence,
and the other virtues which have been named. If he says, whatever af-
fectionsmenmay have, man ismade to pursue his pleasure, let him shew
how men can have pleasure but from the gratifications of particular af-
fections; and let him shew that the affections we have named are not
belonging to humannature, or that they are not belonging to it as sources
of pleasure and enjoyment. In fine, let him shewwhat other enjoyments
of moral and civ il laws 601
human nature is provided for which are superior to the presidence of
reason, affections disciplined by reason, and exerting themselves in the
order of benevolence that hath been described. We reason from fact or
experiment; and what we havemaintained, can only be refuted by shew-
ing our analysis of the human mind not to be fact. For if the resolution
of the human mind <305> that hath been given be just, our conclusion
stands upon the same bottom with all the reasonings in natural philos-
ophy concerning the structures, properties, laws, and final causes of
things. The only thing that can be objected against this deduction of
the ends for which men are made and intended, is, that men are in fact
very irregular; that the affections of mankind are generally very tumul-
tuous and undisciplined, and there is much malignity, ill humour, envy
and hatred amongst them; and that the love of power and fame do not
generally leadmen to benevolent, but rather tomischievous actions.But
let mankind be represented as villainous as they have ever been said to
be, by any philosopher or politician; or, if you will, more black and de-
formed than any hath ever yet called them, it will not shake or weaken
our reasoning. For though that be not true, but, on the contrary, a very
false charge, yet we can sufficiently account for the vilest corruptions
that ever have, or ever can take place among mankind, very consistently
with the preceding analysis of human nature, and the deduction of our
duties; i.e. our natural ends, from that analysis. 1. First of all, there is no
other conceivable way of furnishing or qualifying any agent for pursuing
the virtues above-named, but by giving them the affections above de-
scribed, and reason to conduct them. There is no way of qualifying one
for doing all under the direction of reason, but by giving him faculties
to be guided by reason, and reason to guide them. There is no other way
of qualifying one for benevolence, but by giving him a benevolent dis-
position, and so disposing him, as that he may feel great pleasure in its
exercises. Let the objectors against human nature point out what else
could be done. Let them name what is wanting to make us rational and
benevolent in our behaviour, that nature hath not done for us. If <306>
they say reason is too weak in human nature, or does not grow up fast
enough to do us great service as a guide, this leads to the second thing
to be considered on this head. 2. Which is, that reason must grow and
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improve by culture. It can only become strong by exercise and improve-
ment. It can only become so powerful as to be habitually our fixed and
settled guide and ruler, by repeated acts. For thus alone can any habits
be wrought in us; thus alone can any affections, dispositions, principles,
or powers and faculties of action in us become habits; i.e. become strong
and prevalent. Repeated exercise is the sole way of acquiring habits. It
is therefore the sole way of perfecting reason, or any faculty or principle
in our constitution; and what other way can we conceive, by which it is
better to attain to perfection of any kind than by industry, diligence, and
repeated acts? But if this be a necessary or fit law of our nature, in order
to our attainment to perfection, that habits should be formed by re-
peated exercise, and only be so formed; must not the effect of this be,
that bad and hurtful habits will be contracted by repeated bad exercises,
and that false or wrong associations of ideas will be very powerful, very
difficult to be disjoined or undone? Must not the effect of it be, that if
bad habits are suffered to grow up to a great degree of strength in our
minds by bad education, or through carelesness about our education,
and reason is not early accustomed to rule and govern in young minds,
that rational dominion over the affections will be very difficultly ac-
quired; the sensitive appetites will be exceeding riotous; and every pas-
sion that has been often called forth, or incited to indulge itself by tempt-
ing shews of pleasure, will become imperious, headstrong, and unruly?
For it must be remembered, that we are not merely intellectual beings,
but that we have senses and corporeal appetites, <307> which will nec-
essarily become, in consequence of the law of habits, too strong for rea-
son and benevolence to govern, if they are not early accustomed to the
government and discipline of reason. And it must likewise be remem-
bered, that our opinions of goods must regulate our affections; and
therefore, if false ideas have been imbibed early, and have long passed
unexamined, uncontroverted in the mind, these wrong associations of
ideas, and false judgments of things, will be very hard to overcome; it
will be extremely difficult to eradicate or correct them. But what is all
this, but, in one word, a long habit of acting without reason, or of de-
spising reason, instead of inuring our ideas, fancies, opinions, and ap-
petites, to receive their direction from our reason, and to act under its
presidence and government. And therefore, in speaking of our being
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made to consult reason, and act under its conduct and guidance,we took
notice of the necessity of right education, in order to establish reason
early into our governing principle (§8). Buthavingelsewhere*discoursed
at great length of the power of habits, and the way in which they are
formed, and of the chief sources of corrupt affections amongst man-
kind, it is sufficient to take notice here in general, that there are almost
no vices among mankind which could take place amongst them, were
we not endued by nature with the best affections; affections necessary
to make us social, benevolent, great and good. They are corruptions or
misguidances of them. Every hurtful affection is a very good one per-
verted. Accordingly Mr. Locke hath shewn us in his excellent treatise on
education,21 how easily all the vices may be early engendered, nay,
brought to a very great height of obstinacy by bad example and wrong
methods of education; but he hath, at the same time, shewn us how all
the vir-<308>tues may be yet more easily formed in tender minds. And
indeed there is no character in human life however enormous, that shews
any affection naturally belonging to us, which is not of the greatest use,
however hurtful its wrong turns, degeneracies, perversions or corrup-
tions may be. Nor is there any other cause of degeneracy and corruption
but bad habit, or not accustoming ourselves to exert our reason, and to
act under its direction; which, how nature could have better furnished
us for doing, than by giving us reason capable of high improvements;
or have better impelled us to do, than bymakingus to see fromexamples,
and feel from our own experience, as it does, the dismal effects of not
acting rationally, the sad consequences of not consulting, or not obeying
our reason, and of rashly giving way to every passion or appetite that
circumstances may tempt into hurtful indulgences to specious sem-
blance of pleasure, is inconceivable.
Nature well known, no miracles remain,
Comets are regular, and Clodio plain.
Pope’s Ethic. Ep. to Lord Cobham.22
* Principles of moral philosophy.
21. Locke, Thoughts Concerning Education, 127–34.
22. Pope, An Epistle to the Right Honourable Richard Lord Viscount Cobham, 11.
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For howsoever odd, whimsical, or foolish the ruling passion in any heart
may be, it is some passion necessary to excellent enjoyments and grati-
fications, that is become so odd, fantastical, or unreasonable. If it is any
sensual appetite that is the ruler, and triumphs over all other affections
of whatever kind, intellectual or social, will it follow from hence, that
we ought not to have had senses, or to have been capable of sensitive
pleasure? If it is the lust of power that has got the ascendant over
benevolence in any one, to such a degree, that it is become his maxim;
Si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia violandum est; aliis rebus pietatem
colas.
If ever we break the ties of right,
’Tis when a kingdom is the glorious prize:
In other things be strictly just.23 <309>
Which is almost as great a height of villainy as it can arrive at. Yet ought
the desire of power to have had no place in our frame, or is it of no use
in it? Or finally, because the desire of getting riches to support a vain
and extravagantway of living, if not severely checked, graduallycorrupts
the honestest minds, and at last engages them in pursuits, which some
time before they could not think of without abhorrence; are for this
reason all desire of property and power, of preeminence and honour, or
even of elegance and grandeur, passions, absolutely condemnable in
themselves, and to which human nature ought to have been an utter
stranger? What we learn from Salust, Sueton, and other Authors, is by
no means improbable, viz. That Julius Caesar had never attempted to
destroy the liberties of his country, had he been able to have paid the
debts which he had contracted by his excessive prodigality; and that
abundance of people sided either with him orPompey, only because they
wanted wherewithal to supply their luxury, and were in hopes of getting
by the civil wars, enough to support andmaintain their former pride and
greatness. But does it follow from hence, that all taste of elegance, all
desire of glory, all love of power and wealth, are absolutely pernicious,
23. Cicero, De officiis 3.21.82. The passage is a Latin translation from Euripides’
play Phoenician Women, lines 524–25, in Euripides, vol. 5.
of moral and civ il laws 605
and that they ought to have no place in our frame, or that we ought to
have been made totally incapable of forming any ideas or affections that
could ever degenerate into such perverse opinions and lusts?Howmuch
more just and truly philosophical is this reasoning in our excellent poet
concerning human passions.
Envy, to which th’ ignoble mind’s a slave,
Is emulation in the learned and brave:
Lust, thro’ some certain strainers well refin’d,
Is gentle love, and charms all womankind.
Nor virtue, male and female can we name,
But what will grow on pride, or grow on shame. <310>
Thus nature gives us (let it check our pride)
The virtue nearest to our vice ally’d;
Reason, the biass turns to good from ill,
And Nero reigns a Titus, if he will.
The fiery soul abhorr’d in Cataline,
In Decius charms, in Curtius is divine.
The same ambition can destroy, or save,
And makes a patriot, as it makes a knave.
Essay on Man.24
Nature, in order to make a necessary diversity of tempers among man-
kind,must either havemade someparticular affectionoriginallystronger
in one breast, and another in another; or have so ordered the situations
of mankind, that the same original affections should of necessity take
various turns in consequence of different circumstances calling forth
more frequently, some one and some another affection, equally natural
to all men. But what follows from hence, but that there is a vice, or a
hurtful turn, into which every affection is in peculiar danger of degen-
erating, as is well known to poets, who describe characters, and place
them in various circumstances of actions? Sure it does not follow that
any of the affections implanted in the human mind by nature, ought to
be wanting. Take them away, and the vices or diseases to which they are
24. Pope, An Essay on Man, epistle II, 191–202.
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incident, will likewise be removed: But so will the perfections or virtues
to which they may rise and be improved by due culture, likewise be sent
apacking. And to what a low size will men be thus reduced? Tho’ it be
reason that forms the virtues, yet our affections are the principles orma-
terials that are formed into virtues by reason. Reason would indeed have
nothing to guide, nothing to work upon, if we were not endued with
all the affections, from the misguidances of which the most hurtful dis-
turbances of human life proceed. <311>
Now what is the result of this, but that man is excellently furnished
by nature for attaining, by the due discipline of the affections implanted
in him, to prudence, to self-command, to benevolence, to fortitude, and
to all that is called virtue; and that this is the end for which he is somade
and framed, in the same sense that any thing is said to be made for the
end to which its frame and constitution is well adapted; that this is his
happiness, his perfection, the ultimate scope and design of his frame and
all the laws relative to it, in any sense of end, scope or design.
s e c t i on x i v
’Tis true, we are not merely intellectual beings; we have senses and sen-
sitive appetites, as well as moral capacities and social affections (§6): But
it hath appeared, that we are made to govern all our appetites and af-
fections by our reason; that our sensitive appetites ought to be under its
command, and not to be allowed to obscure it, far less to triumph over
it, and trample it under foot; and that our sensitive appetites are so far
from engrossing or making the whole of our constitution, that we have
other affections, the regular exercises of which, under the presidenceand
direction of reason, are our highest and noblest enjoyments. This hath
been fully proved. And therefore, let it be nowobserved, that kindnature
hath not only placed our happiness in the virtuous exercises which have
been described, but hath so constituted and framed us, that the ideas of
the presidence of reason, and of benevolence, can no sooner be pre-
sented to ourminds thanwemust necessarily assent to and approve those
two general rules of life, “That reason ought to hold the reins of gov-
ernment in our minds.” And, “That benevolence, or regard to public
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good, ought to be the reigning affection in them.”None can reflectupon
these two rules without per-<312>ceiving their fitness, and that imme-
diately without making any calculations about their consequences. And
therefore we may justly say with an excellent author (Domat in his trea-
tise of laws ) “That the first principles of morality or laws, havea character
of truth, which touches and persuades more than that of the principles
of other human sciences; that whereas the principles of other sciences,
and the particular truths which depend upon them, are only the objects
of the mind, and not of the heart, and that they do not even enter into
the minds of all persons; the first principles of morals or laws, and the
particular rules essential to these principles, have a character of truth
which every body is capable of knowing, and which affects the mind
and the heart alike. The whole man is penetrated by them, and more
strongly convinced of them, than of the truths of all the other human
sciences.”25 Or with another admirable moralist (Hutcheson in his En-
quiry, &c. ) “The Author of nature has much better furnished us for
virtuous conduct, than many philosophers seem to imagine, or at least
are willing to grant, by almost as quick and powerful instructions as we
have for the preservation of our bodies.He has given us strong affections
to be the springs of each virtuous action, andmade virtue a lovely form,
that we might easily distinguish it from its contrary, and bemade happy
by the pursuit of it. As the Author of nature has determined us to receive
by our outward senses, pleasant or disagreeable ideas of objects, accord-
ing as they are useful or hurtful to our bodies, and to receive from uni-
form objects the pleasures of beauty and harmony, to excite us to the
pursuit of knowledge, and to reward us for it; in the same manner, he
has given us amoral sense to direct our actions, and to give us still nobler
pleasures; so that while we are only intending the good of others, we
undesignedly promote our owngreatest private good.”26Buthavingelse-
25. Jean Domat (1625–96), Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel. Turnbull quotes
(with near accuracy) from the English translation:The Civil Law in Its Natural Order:
Together with the Publick Law, page ii (in both eds.).
26. Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue (London, 1725; 3rd ed. 1729; 4th ed. 1738), pp. 9 and 99. Turnbull spliced
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where <313> handled this subject at great length,27 it will be sufficient
to remark here, 1. That in consequence of the sense of beauty in outward
forms, and of the sense of beauty in affections, actions and characters,
with which the human mind is endued, all the pleasures which man is
intended by nature to pursue, may properly be comprized under the
general notion of order or beauty: For they have all this general or com-
mon character, that they proceed from well disciplined and regulated
affections, and they all tend to produce order within and without the
mind. What is the presidence of reason, but reason maintaining order
and harmony; and what do the regular exercises of benevolence which
have been described produce, but inward and outward harmony?What
makes the pleasure of contemplation and knowledge, besides the views
of regularity, order andharmony?What is it that charms the imagination
in any of the imitative arts? Or what hath what is called good taste for
its object and scope, besides order and harmony in composition? And
how gross and contemptible are all the pleasures of sense, when we ab-
stract from them all elegance, all symmetry, proportion and order?Man
therefore, may in general be said to be framed by nature to pursue order
and harmony. And this is indeed the pursuit of the Author of nature
himself, universal order and harmony, or, which is the same, universal
good. But, 2. As the presidence of reason over all our appetites and af-
fections, and the prevalence of benevolence in our temper, cannot be
considered by us without being perceived, or rather felt to be our most
reasonable and becoming part, nor the opposite character be reflected
upon, without being disapproved and condemned by us; so we cannot
consider the Author of nature, without immediately perceiving, that he
deserves our highest adoration and love; and that benevolence, and the
rational government of our affections, can alone render us like him, or
recom-<314>mend us to his favour, uponwhomall our interestsdepend.
We must of necessity own an universal cause, by which all things are
made, and are upheld in being and governed. And our moral sense of
together two separate passages and also inserted a few words of his own. He used
either the third or the fourth edition.
27. In his Principles of Moral Philosophy of 1740.
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what is the best, the most perfect disposition of mind, naturally leads
us at once to ascribe perfect reason and benevolence to the first cause of
all things, our Creator: And to apprehend it, 1. “To be his will, that we
should act a rational and benevolent part in all our conduct.” And, 2.
“That according to the constitution of things in his universal govern-
ment, such conduct must be the only road to true happiness in the sum
of things; so that whatever difficulties and trials may be necessary to the
first state of rational agents, for their improvement in moral perfection,
yet upon the whole, sincere virtue shall make happy, and confirmed vice
shall render miserable.” These truths are obvious necessary conse-
quences, from the idea of an all-perfect Maker and Governor of the
universe. But these truths being fixed, then are we under obligation to
benevolence and rational government, in this strict and proper sense of
obligation, “That the Author and Governor of the Universe, our Lord
and Creator, wills or commands us to exert our reason, as the Governor
of our affections, and to pursue in all our conduct the goodof ourkind.”
The virtues for which we have foundman to be furnished and intended,
do, when considered in this light, take the character of laws in a sense
applicable to them only, i.e. of universal unalterable commands laid
upon us by the Author of nature, the Sovereign disposer of all our in-
terests. The connexions observed bynature in theproductionof physical
effects, are very properly called laws of matter and motion, or laws by
which the Author of nature has willed that matter should operate, or
more properly be operated upon; and they are of necessity laws tohuman
arts, since human art cannot accomplish any end but by acting in con-
formity to <315> them. But the connexions relative to ourmoral powers,
our reason, our social affections, and the subordinacy of all our appetites
and affections to reason, in consequence of which certain rules must be
observed by us in order to private and public happiness, are not only
laws to us in this respect, that we can only attain to our best enjoyments
by acting conformably to them; they are also laws to us in this sense, that
acting conformably to them is agreeable to our Creator; and it is his will
thatwe should conformour conduct to them. So that they arenotmerely
moral laws, as they are laws of nature respecting moral ends; but they
are moral laws in this respect, that they are rules for the conduct of our
And conse-
quently to be
enjoined by
moral laws
properly so
called.
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life and manners, which cannot be transgressed or departed from with-
out incurring guilt in the sight of God, without offending against his
will and authority, and rendering ourselves obnoxious to all the conse-
quences of his regard to virtue or moral perfection, and his disappro-
bation or detestation of vice. They are rules which he hath necessarily
determined our minds to approve, and to conceive as his commands, as
often as we consider them, and take a view of the perfectionswhichmust
belong to the Divine Mind. And therefore, they are laws that come up
to this definition of a law, viz. “The will of a superior who hath a just
title to command, and sufficient power to enforce conformity to his
commands.” And indeed it is when prudence, temperance, fortitude,
benevolence, and all the other virtues are considered in this light, that
they alone can have their full force. For in this light only are they fully
and perfectly considered; or till we conceive of them in this view, we
have not an adequate notion of all the obligations to conform our prac-
tice to them, which essentially belong to them. It will be readily ac-
knowledged, that two motives must needs have more force than one.
But this is not all: No view that can be ta-<316>ken of the virtues above
described, can have so much power to influence mankind as the con-
ception of them under the notion of the divine will or law, not com-
manding arbitrarily or without reason, but for the good of rational
agents; since what is thus apprehended or considered, must work upon
us in various manners; excite our emulation to be like the most perfect
of Beings, and agreeable to him; stir up our gratitude to engage us to
act the part he approves and commands; influence our hope with high
expectations of great advantages from his love and favour; and raise our
fear of offending him to a due pitch of reverence towards his authority.
Now, regard to virtue, influenced by these considerations, is properly
called religion. And that man is made for religion, as well as for virtue,
is evident, since we cannot reason at all about the nature of things, with-
out being led to apprehend a first Supreme Cause: nor can we represent
to ourselves the perfections of an eternal all-sufficientMind, theCreator
and Governor of the Universe, without being filled with the highest
veneration towards him, and his will with relation to our conduct. And
meditation upon the divine perfections, is in reality the noblest source
Regard to the
divine law is
religion.
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of delight to the human mind, and an exercise that hath the sweetest,
the benignest influence upon the temper. But not to insist at present
upon the pleasures which a just sense of God and divine providence
afford to the mind; if the being of a God be owned, it must certainly
be true, that we are under religious obligation to that rational govern-
ment of our affections, and to the benevolence, for which we have been
found to be so excellently furnished and fitted by nature, i.e. under ob-
ligation to this conduct, in order to approve ourselves to God; under
obligation to it, as the conduct he commands, and will reward. And this
being true, this conduct is our duty. And in every sense are we obliged
to be virtuous. We <317> shall therefore only add, 1. That the sacred
writings give us a very just view of the whole of our duties, arising from
our nature, and our relation to our Creator, the Author and Ruler of the
universe, when they are reduced there into two commandments, thefirst
of which is to love God, and the other to love mankind; or when it is
there asserted that love is the fulfilment of the law of God. And there
is no other law which commands every one to love himself, because no
one can love himself better than by keeping the law which enjoins love
to God and love to our fellow-creatures. Self-love is not so properly a
law, as it is a principle inseparable from all beings capable of that re-
flection, without which they would be incapable of governing their ac-
tions, distinguishing rules for their conduct, or pursuing ends. And for
this reason the sacred writings do notmention self-love as a law; but they
suppose this general desire of happiness as a principle necessarily inher-
ent in us, which is to be directed by reason, i.e. by such rules or laws as
reason is able to discover, by due attention to the relations and connex-
ions of things. And these rules it justly reduces sometimes to two, the
love of God, and the love of mankind; and sometimes to one general
law, love. 2. Yet it may very justly be said, that the whole of our duty
consists in well regulated self-love, or in the pursuit of our true happi-
ness. For our greatest happiness consists, by our constitution, in such
government of our affections by reason as hath been described, in the
exercises of devotion towards God, and the approbation of our moral
sense or conscience. As our duties cannot be inferred but from the in-
ternal principles of action implanted by the Author of nature in our
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minds, and the connexions relative to them; so indeed no commands
repugnant to our internal principle, and the connexions relative to them,
repugnant towhat the <318>Author of naturehathplacedourhappiness
and perfection in, can come from the Author of nature. Now, the two
great commands which revelation tells us are the whole of human duty,
the whole of religion and virtue, love to God, and love to mankind, are
the very laws which our constitution prescribes, or makes necessary to
be observed by us in all our conduct, in order to attain to the greatest
happiness our nature is capable of. They are indicated or pointed out to
us by nature with so much clearness, that we may see plainly, that if any
man is ignorant of them, it is only because he does not know himself,
or does not reflect upon the frame of his mind, and turn his eyes inward
to consider the internal principles of action with which he is endued;
and therefore nothing is more astonishing than the blindness that hin-
ders any one from seeing them. 3. Tho’ many disputes have been raised
about the meaning of, as, in the divine commandment, to love our neigh-
bour as ourself, 28 by those who like jangling; yet it plainlymeans the same
with that other precept, to do as we would be done by; the equity of which
is so plain, that it hath been acknowledged in all ages and countries of
the world as a most perfect summary of all the duties we can owe one
to another, and to be a directory, which cannot be applied in any case,
without immediately perceiving, or rather feeling what we ought to do.
This Grotius, Puffendorf, and Barbeyrac, have fully proved. 4. These
two commands have amost strict and intimate alliance.One cannot love
God without loving mankind; nor love mankind, and having an idea of
an infinitely good supremeBeing, theCreator of all things, and the com-
mon Father of mankind, not love this all-perfect Being. And the best
security men can have for their living together in harmony and love, is
from the prevalence of true religion, or of a just notion of a supreme
Being, and due regard to <319> his will and authority, among them. It
is, in its nature or tendency, the strongest bond of society. And from
experience, or the history of mankind, there is reason to saywithCicero,
“I know not, but that upon taking away religion and piety, all faith and
28. For the golden rule, see Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31.
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society of human kind, and even the most excellent of virtues, justice,
would soon leave the world.”29
Upon the whole therefore, when we proceed from considering the
constitution of the human mind, and the connexions and relations of
things respecting man, to the contemplation of the supreme Author of
mankind and of these connexions, and of the whole frame of things,
we have good ground to conclude, with the same antient, in a passage
of his books de republica, preserved to us by Lactantius. “There is indeed
a law agreeable to nature, and founded in it, which is no other than right
reason, made known to all men, constant and immutable, that calls us
to duty by commands, and deters us from fraud and villany by threats;
neither are its commands and threats in vain to the good, tho’ they may
make but little impression upon the wicked and corrupt. This law we
can neither disannul nor diminish; nor is it possible that it should be
totally reversed; the senate or the people cannot free us from its authority.
Nor do we need any explainer of it besides our own consciences. It will
not be different at Rome and at Athens, now or hereafter, but will eter-
nally and unchangeably bind all persons in all places; God himself, the
universal Master and King, being its Founder and Author. ’Tis He who
is the Establisher, the Enactor, the Interpreter of this law; which, who-
soever refuses to obey, shall be afraid to look into his ownmind, or con-
verse with himself, because he contemns and vilifies his nature; and shall
thus undergo the severest penalties, tho’ he should escape every thing
else which falls under our common name and notion <320> of punish-
ment.”30 And thus I am naturally led to consider the origine and design
of civil laws.
29. “Atque haud scio an pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiamet societas generis
humani et una excellentissima virtus iustitia tollatur” (Cicero, De natura deorum,
I, 4).
30. This is from Cicero’s De re publica (see Cicero, De re publica, xxii, 33). Until
a major part was found in 1819, this work of Cicero was known only in the form of
few and brief quotations, especially by patristic authors such as Lactantius.
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Now, we may be very short on this head. For, having found what are the
laws and rules men must observe, in order to attain to the greatest per-
fection and happiness their nature is capable of, it is plain, that the rules
and laws they ought to observe, or agree to observe, when they unite
together in certain civil or political bodies for the promotion of their
common happiness, can be no other than those very laws of nature
which have been delineated. And it is very easy to trace the civil laws in
well regulated states into the principles above explained as their foun-
dations. The laws of a civil or political state may be divided into these
three classes; the laws relating to the private property, quiet and happi-
ness of persons; the laws relating to religion; and those which concern
the public order of the government. The first comprehends the laws
which regulate covenants or contracts of all kinds, the security of prop-
erty, alienation and prescription, regular propagation and education,
guardianships, successions, testaments, and othermatters of the like na-
ture. Now, all these laws are, or ought to be nothing else in their spirit,
but the order of that love which we reciprocally owe to one another.
Thus the spirit and substance of all the laws, with regard to engagements
or covenants, consists in forbidding all infidelity, treachery, double deal-
ing, deceit and knavery, and all other ways of doing hurt and wrong.
Thus the regular propagation and education of mankind, or the natural
order in which our benevolence ought to exert itself, are the foundation
of all the laws relating to marriage, and to parental and filial duties, and
to unlawful conjunctions. The same is likewise the foundation of the
laws relative to successions. For the order of successions is <321>
founded on the necessity of continuing and transmitting the state of
society fromone generation to another;which is done, bymakingcertain
persons to succeed in the place of those who die, and enter upon their
rights and offices, their relations and engagements, which are capable of
passing to posterity. Good laws of this kind have their foundation on
the order in which our benevolence ought to exert itself in parents to
children, and reciprocally in children to parents; and on that perfect se-
curity of property which is necessary to encourage industry; formen are
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spurred to industry, not merely by regard to themselves, but by regard
to their posterity; and would be very indifferent about making acqui-
sitions, were they not sure of disposing of them as they please, and of
transmitting them after they are gone to those they love best, and are
most nearly interested in. Many other laws have their foundation in the
same principles, and are merely intended to secure the perpetuity of
property, such as the regulations about prescription; or to render con-
tracts of various sorts about labour and property equally free and certain.
Sumptuary laws have their foundation likewise in the care that parents
ought to have of making and leaving suitable provisions to their chil-
dren; and, in general, in the necessity of promoting industry, and dis-
couraging that idleness, effeminacy and debauchery, which is known to
be the source of so many direful ills, and the greatest bane of mankind;
the very reverse of all that renders human society either great or happy.
The laws of religion, underwhichwemay comprehendall regulations
with regard to education, the main design of which is to tincture the
mind early with just notions of God and of human duties, and to form
goodhabits and dispositions; aswell as regulations aboutpublicworship:
these have their foundation in the strict alliance between religion and
virtue, in the chief duty of pa-<322>rents towards their children, and
in the general interest of society, which is universal virtue.
The public laws are those which fix or regulate the order of making,
and of executing laws for the general good. And what these ought to be,
must likewise be determined from the nature of mankind, and of that
happiness which they are made and intended for by nature. Men may
very properly be said to be intended for that civil state, in which, it is
plain, from experience, the happiness for which mankind are formed by
nature, may be best attained. And the orders of such a civil state must
be deduced from the lines of them, as a great author expresses it, which
appear in human nature. It is according to them, says he, that this building
must be limned. But we are not now to enter into this curious and im-
portant enquiry. All we would take notice of, with regard to the civil
laws, which it is the design of civil society to make and execute, is, 1.
That in all well-regulated states, the sum and substance of what is called
its civil laws, are really laws of natural anduniversal obligation.Whatever
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hath the force of civil law in civil courts, derives that force from civil
authority. Yet the chief part of civil law is really natural law. What be-
longs particularly to the civil law, may be reduced, as Pufendorff ob-
serves, to these twoheads:To certain formsprescribed, andcertainmeth-
ods to be observed in civil affairs, either in transferring rights, or else in
laying obligations upon persons, which shall be looked upon to be valid
in the civil courts; and to the several ways how a man is to prosecute his
rights in the same courts.31 So that if we give the law of nature all that
belongs to it, and take away from the Civilians what they have hitherto
promiscuously treated of, we shall bring the civil law to amuchnarrower
compass than it at first sight appears to be. In all commonwealths the
natural law supplies the defects of the civil. <323> And in all common-
wealths natural law ought to be the substance of the civil law; and the
regulations it adds about things which the law of nature prescribes only
in a general and indefinite manner, ought to be conformable to the spirit
and scope of the law of nature. For which reason, Hobbes calls the law
of nature the unwritten civil law; 32 and the constitutions of particular
commonwealths, justly adapted to the public good, (which, as Cicero
says, ought to be the end of all laws, and is the best comment upon, and
interpretation of them)33 are properly called, by some authors, append-
ages to the law of nature. 2. But all the laws of nature have not the force
of civil laws allowed them in commonwealths; but such only, upon the
observation of which the common quiet of mankind intirely depends;
as well because the controversies about the violation of them would be
very perplexed and intricate, as to prevent themultiplication of litigious
suits; and also, that the good and virtuous might not be deprived of the
most valuable part of their character, the doing well out of reverence to
their Creator, and sincere love to mankind, without regard to the fears
32. “Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but different parts of Law;
whereof one part being written, is called Civill, the other unwritten, Naturall”
(Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 26).
33. Perhaps a reference to Cicero’s statement in De legibus that “the well-being of
the people should be the supreme law” (“salus populi suprema lex esto”); see Cicero,
De legibus, III, iii, 8, in De re publica; De legibus.
31. See Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature, VIII.I.I.
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of human penalties. For this they must necessarily lose, when there is
no distinction made whether a man doth well out of love to virtue, or
out of fear of punishment. 3. Civil laws are justly said to respect external
actions only, whereas moral laws principally regard the habit of the
mind, because civil punishments can only be applied against what ap-
pears. Yet it is an antient and true observation, that the best and most
useful laws, and which are approved of by all such as are subject to them,
are of no use, unless subjects be trained up and educated in a manner
of living conformable to them. Plato says, that to lay the foundations
of a good government, wemust first begin by the education of children,
and must make them as virtuous as possible; as an experienced <324>
gardiner employs his care about the young and tender plants, and then
goes on to others.34
Quid leges sine moribus
Vanae proficiunt. Hor. l. 3. Od. 24.35
Isocrates (in Areopagit.) tells us, “The Athenians did not believe that
virtue derived somuch advantage and assistance in its growth fromgood
statutes as from custom and practice. The greatest part of men must,
said they, of necessity frame their minds according to those patterns by
which theywere first taught and instructed; but a numerous andaccurate
establishment of laws, is really a sign of the ill condition of the com-
monwealth, edicts and ordinances being then heap’d upon one another,
when governments find themselves obliged to endeavour the restraining
of vice, as it were by banks andmounds.That it becamewisemagistrates,
not to fill the public places with proclamations and decrees, but to take
care that the subjects should have the love of justice and honesty firmly
rooted in their minds. That not the orders of the senate or people, but
good and generous education was the thing which made a government
happy: Inasmuch as men would venture to break through the nicest ex-
34. The importance of children’s education for the political community was a
central theme in Plato’s Republic. See in particular the passages from 376d.
35. “What use are laws, vain as they are without morals?” Horace, Odes, 3.24.35–
36, in Odes and Epodes.
618 the nature and orig ine
actness of political constitutions, if they had not been bred up under a
strict obedience to them.Whereas those who had been formed to virtue
by a regular and constant discipline, were the only persons who by their
just conformity could make good laws obtain a good effect. The prin-
cipal design of the Athenians, when they made these reflexions, was not
how they might punish disorders, but how they might find a way of
making the people to be willing not to do any thing that might deserve
punishment. This last view seemed to them worthy of themselves and
their employment. But as for the other, or an exact <325> application to
punish people, they thought it a business proper only for an enemy.And
therefore they took care of all the subjects in general, but particularly of
the youth.”36
Thus I have endeavoured to deduce the laws of nature, and the end
of civil society and its laws, by an analysis of the humanmind, fromour
internal principles and dispositions. For the virtue or excellence of any
being can be nothing else but its nature brought to the perfection of
which it is capable. And therefore, the virtue, excellence, or happiness
of a being must be deduced from its constitution and situation. Virtus
enim in cujusque rei natura supremum est & perfectio.—Tum oculi, in oculi
natura, supremum & perfectio; tum hominis in hominis natura supremum
& perfectio.—Hominis virtus est hominis naturae perfectio, nam & equi
virtus est ea, quae naturam ejus ad supremum perducit.” Timaeus Locrus
de anima mundi, & Metopus Pythagoreus de virtute.37 So Cicero de
legibus, l. 1. n. 15. & de finibus passim.
F I N I S.
36. Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 182–83, in Isocrates, Opera omnia, vol. II, 174–91.
37. This quote is in fact fromHippodamusThurius,Peri eudaimonias: “For virtue
is the highest level and the perfection in the nature of everything. The highest level
and the perfection of the eye is in the nature of the eye. The highest level and the
perfection in a man is in the nature of a man.” In Gale, Opuscula mythologica, physica
et ethica, 660. It is also used by Turnbull in his Principles of Moral Philosophy, vol. I,
185.
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ship, 81n; superstructures of, 434;
tyrannical, 417–18, 421, 430, 527n,
540–41, 582. See also sovereignty
Monarchomachs, 440n
money (eminent price), 255, 258–60,
269–70
Montaigne, Michel de, 539–40
Montesquieu, Charles Louis de
Secondat, baron de, 28–29
Montzel, Carl Heinrich Brix von und
zu, 515n
moral cause, imputation of human
action to, 86
moral equality, Turnbull on, 154–58,
340–45
morality generally. See virtue
moral or human vs. natural or physi-
cal actions, 32. See also human
actions
moral person, society/civil state as,
335–36
moral philosophy, Turnbull on. See
Turnbull, George, on moral
philosophy
moral state, 324, 339–40
morgenatic marriage, 364–65
Mornac, Antoine, 265n
mortgages (hypotheca), 217, 282, 283
Mu¨ller, Johann Joachim, 209n, 520n
murder: of children, 373; monarch-
killers, doctrine of, 440; in self-
defense, 137–39; suicide, prohibition
on, 110
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Musaeus, Johann[es], 354n
Muslims. See Islam; Turkey
mutual disagreement, dissolution of
pacts and contracts by, 313
nations, law of. See law of nations
Native Americans. See American
Indians
natural and Christian obligation, 95
natural inequality, Turnbull on, 154–
58, 340–45, 582–86
natural law. See law of nature
natural or physical vs. moral or human
actions, 32. See human actions
natural philosophy, law of nature in,
553–54
natural reason. See reason
natural rights. See rights
natural servilitude, 384–85
natural state, 324–30; civil state pre-
ferred over, 330–31; compared to
state of animals, 325, 328; defined,
324–25; equality in, 326–27; family
in, 394–95; Hobbes on, 328; law of
nature in, 327; pacts in, 329; self-
defense in, 135–37; supposed mis-
ery of, 330; war, right to make,
328–29
necessity, 117–27; affirmative law and,
119–21; cannibalism, 124; on com-
merce, 253; defined, 118; duty to
God and, 117–21; executioners
required to put innocent person to
death, 125; liberty of human
actions and, 48–49, 597–99; mem-
ber, cutting off, 123; negative law
and, 120–21; of pacts, 297; seizing
another’s property due to, 126;
self-love and, 117–27; throwing
down one who hinders flight of
innocent, 125–26; Turnbull’s com-
mentary on, 127–30
negative law and necessity, 120–21
neglect of children, 373
Nehemiah, book of, 8:13, 80n
Neobulus, Huldricus ( Johann
Lening), 354n
Nepos, Cornelius, 116n, 140n, 274n,
306n, 525n
Neratius Priscus, Lucius, 179n
Nero (Roman emperor), 40n, 88n,
179n, 338n, 348n, 351n, 444n, 493n
Netherlands. See Holland
neutrality, treaties of, 513–14
Nicias, 437
Nicolaus Damascen (Nicholas of
Damascus), 395n
Nimrod, 409n, 429
Noahide law, law of nature not
derived from, 21–22, 58–59
non-resistance, doctrine of, 440–43
Noodt, Gerard, 267n, 281n
novation or renewal of pacts and
contracts, 315–16
Numbers, book of: 11:14, 430; 14,
412n; 20:21, 503n; 21:21–22, 503n;
27, 380n; 27:7, 80n; 27:8 et seq.,
228n; 36:5–6, 80n
Numidians, 405n
oaths, 149, 150–52
obedience: to God, 100, 103; love,
obedient or devotional, 66–67,
377–79; to parents, 379; of ser-
vants to masters, 387–88
obligations: application of rule to
human actions (see imputation); of
borrowers, 265; of buyers and sell-
ers, 270–76; of children to parents,
377–81; of clergy, 544–45; con-
tracts, dissolution of obligations
arising from, 309–16; of debtors,
280; defined, 13–14, 94; of depo-
nents, 269; discoverable by natural
674 index
obligations (continued )
reason, 18; in family, 396–99; of
freed slaves, 391–92; God as author
of, 16–17, 52–55; human actions, as
rule of, 12–13, 51–55; internal and
external, 14–16, 26–28; of land-
lords, 277; of lenders, 269; love as
principle of natural law not to be
confounded with, 51n; love of jus-
tice distinguished from benefi-
cence, 65–66; marital obligations,
359–60; marital prerogative of hus-
band, rights and duties associated
with, 360–63; marriage as obliga-
tion, 352; of masters and servants/
slaves, 387–91; of ministers and
magistrates, 491, 542–45; natural
and Christian, 95; pacts, dissolu-
tion of obligations arising from,
309–16; pacts, keeping, 297–98;
parental power over children, 367–
71; of parents, 371–77; of peace
treaties, 520–21; perfect and imper-
fect, 16, 95; of proxies, 267–68,
269; punishment, obligation of
delinquent to suffer, 476–77; pun-
ishment for crimes, obligation to
inflict, 477; of and to slaves, 390–
91; of societies, 336–38; of sover-
eign magistrates, 545–50; of
subjects or citizens, 523–29, 538–
42; succession to rights and obliga-
tions of deceased, 231; of sureties,
286; of tenants, 277–78; of trea-
ties, 517, 520–21; of trustees, 266.
See also God, duties of man to;
other persons, duties toward; prop-
erty, rights and duties arising from;
self-love
obligatory pacts, 298–99
obnoxii. See slaves
Obrecht, Ulrich, 513n
occupancy, property acquired by,
182–88
ocean, dominion over, 488n
Ochinus, Bernardinus, 354n
ochlocracies, 423
Oedipus, 136n, 547n
officiousness, 165, 169
oligarchies, 417–18, 422, 430
Origen, 94n, 119n, 499n
other persons, duties toward: civil
states’ obligations toward members
and other civil states, 337–38;
defined, 132; distinguishing perfect
from imperfect duties, 131; equality
of mankind as basis for, 131; hypo-
thetical duties (rendering to every-
one his due), 133, 175–205 (see also
property); love of others, 68, 70,
130; as type of obligation, 95, 131;
types of duties, 131–33; war waged
for others, 503–4. See also absolute
and perfect duties toward other
persons; imperfect duties toward
other persons
Otho (Roman emperor), 453n
Ottanes of Persia, 413n
Otto, V. C. Everardus, 188, 420n
Ottoman empire. See Islam; Turkey
Otto of Freising, 152–53n
Ovid, 15n, 161n, 181n, 252n, 357–58n,
528–29
pacts, 296–308; acquittance, dissolu-
tion by, 312; of betrothal and mar-
riage, 296, 314, 349–50; civil states,
fundamental law of, 414–15; com-
pensation, dissolution by, 311–12;
conditions not fulfilled or
changed, dissolution due to, 314–
15; consent in, 300, 303; contracts
and, 296, 308 (see also contracts);
about deeds and things of others,
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305–6; delegation, 315–16; depen-
dent upon particular person’s per-
formance, 314; dissolution of
obligations arising from, 309–16;
exceptions and conditions, 306–8;
force or compulsion, made under,
303; with foreign nations (see trea-
ties); fraudulent, 302; Hobbes on
right derived from, 328; in igno-
rance or error, 301–2; impossibility
in, 304–5, 307–8; marital, 296, 314,
349–50, 362; mutual disagreement,
dissolution by, 313; in natural state,
329; necessity of, 297; obligation to
keep, 297–98; payment, dissolu-
tion by, 310–11; persons able to
make, 301; by proxy, 308; renewal
or novation (change or substitu-
tion), 315–16; sovereigns limited by,
449; succession to property and,
238–39, 314; tacit or express, 300–
301; time elapsed, dissolution due
to, 314; treachery dissolving, 313;
types of, 298–301; unconscionable,
304–5, 307–8
painting, property by, 197
Palthen, Samuel, 362n
Palthen[ius], Johann Philipp, 362n
Panaetius, 93n
Panchaeans, 180n
Papal monarchy, 412n
Paraeus, David, 440n
parents and children, 366–82; aban-
donment, mistreatment, or neglect
of children, 373; breastfeeding,
372n; dissolution of parental
power, 379–81; education as end of
relationship, 366–67; family and,
393, 396, 397; grandparents, rela-
tives, pedagogues, and adopters,
parental powers of, 368–69, 382;
love between, 371–72, 377–79, 380;
obligations of children, 377–81;
obligations of parents, 371–77;
powers of both parents over chil-
dren, 367–71; presumed consent
between, 333n, 366; punishment of
children by parents, 369–70, 379;
punishment of children for crimes
of parents, 478n; under Roman
law, 315n, 368, 370, 380; succession
to property, 226–27, 373, 380;
Turnbull on, 586–89; veneration of
children for parents, 377–79
Parliament, 452n
Parrhasius, 197n, 257n
partnerships, 209n, 287–90, 332n
Pascal, Blaise, 37n
passions. See affections and passions
paternal power: civil state and abso-
lute monarchy, as origin of, 399–
404; in family, 394–96; marital
prerogative, rights and duties asso-
ciated with, 360–63; of parents
over children, 367–71; in Roman
law, 315n, 368, 370, 380. See also
family; marriage; parents and
children
patrimonial sovereignty, 459–60
Paullus (Roman lawyer), 83n, 132n,
137n, 258n, 269n, 442n, 484n
Paulus Macedonicus, Lucius Aemi-
lius, 463, 464, 465
Pausanias, 385n
pawns or pledges, 217, 282–83
payment, dissolution of pacts and
contracts by, 310–11
peace treaties, 517–21
pedagogy. See education
Pegu, kingdom of, 291n
Peiresc, Nicolaus-Claude Fabri de, 528
perfect and absolute duties toward
other persons. See absolute and
perfect duties toward other persons
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perfect and imperfect obligation, 16, 95
perfect servitude. See slavery
Peripatetics, 128
Perizonius, Jacob, 258n, 363n, 380n
Persius, 109n, 112n
personal treaties, 514
Peruvians, 171, 260n
Pescennius Niger (Roman emperor),
453n
Peter, first letter of: 3:1, 362n; 4:15, 94n
Peter I (emperor of Russia), 420n,
458n
Petit, Pierre, 151n, 364n
Petronius Arbiter, 179n, 255n, 279n,
307n
Phaedrus, Fabulae, 59n, 77n, 82n,
166n, 210n, 384n, 423n
Pharisees, 37n, 80n, 89n
Phidias, 257n
Philip II (king of Spain), 454n
Philip of Hessia, 354n
Philip of Macedon, 370n, 463, 464,
465
Philo of Alexandria, 228–29n
Philostratus, 188n
physical cause, imputation of human
action to, 86
physical or natural vs. moral or
human actions, 32. See also human
actions
physical state, 324, 339–40
Pindar, 225n
Pisistratus, 432
Pittacus, 43n
Placcius, Vincenz, 354–55n
plants, as property, 198–99
Plato: on civil states, 406, 426; on
contracts, 273n; on education, 617;
on eminent dominion, 482n; on
family, 395n; on imputation, 77n;
on necessity, 128; on obligations of
sovereign magistrates, 549; on
polygamy and polyandry, 354; on
property, 185–86n, 245; on self-
love, 112n, 128
Plautus: on contracts, 267n, 274n; on
masters and servants, 332–33n,
389n; on property, 182–83n, 187n,
188n; sovereignty and, 451n; on
succession to property, 215n
pleasure, recalling children’s minds
from pursuit of, 375–76
pledges or pawns, 217, 282–83
Plessen, Christian Siegfried von,
497n
Pliny the Elder, 68n, 261n, 406n, 511n
Pliny the Younger, 546
Plutarch: on civil states, 436; on com-
merce, 259n; on duties of man to
God, 93n; on duties to others,
162n, 167n; on family, 397–98n; on
human actions, 32–33n, 36n, 43n;
on marriage, 360n, 361; on masters
and servants, 385n; on obligations
of sovereign magistrates, 549n; on
parents and children, 372n, 376n;
on polygamy, 356n; on principle of
law of nature, 69n; on property,
184n; on sovereignty, 454n; on suc-
cession to property, 221n; on war,
508n
poison, in war, 507n
Poland, 452n
politeness in natural vs. civil state,
406
Polyaenus, 259n
Polybius: on civil states, 417n, 418,
418n, 421n, 426; on commerce and
contracts, 258n, 277n; on duties to
others, 135n, 167n; on imputation,
81n; on treaties, 515n, 519n; on war,
507n
Polycarpus, 119n
polygamy and polyandry, 354–57
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Pontanus, Johann Isaac, 282n, 488n
Pope, Alexander: on dependencies
and affections, 579, 583, 586, 587–
88; on golden rule, 173; on knowl-
edge of natural law, 603; on
natural inequalities, 340–41, 579;
on property, 201; on relationship
between virtue and vice, 605; on
sovereignty, 466n; translation of
Iliad, 264n; translation of Odyssey,
224n
popular government (democracies),
417–18, 423, 431, 434–35
Porphyry, 68–69n, 177n
Posidonius, 93n
possession, right of: property, 232,
234; slaves, 389
poverty, servitude resulting from, 385
power: authority vs., 343–44, 582n; of
eminent dominion, 481–85; of
family head, 394–96; judiciary,
472–73 (see also punishment); leg-
islative, 469–72 (see also civil law);
of masters over servants and slaves,
387–91; of parents over children,
367–71; of sovereignty (rights of
majesty), 420–23, 450–52 (see also
immanent rights of majesty; tran-
seunt rights of majesty); Turnbull
on human zeal for, 594–96, 604.
See also rights
Praetextatus, Papirius, 353n
Pregitzer, Johann Eberhard, 487n
prescription of property, 243–51
pressing, 485
pretextual causes of war, 504
price (value of goods and labor)
required for commerce, 254–60
primogeniture, 457n
principalities. See monarchies
private property, origins of, 178–81
private vs. public war, 501–2
procreation and education as ends of
marriage, 347–48, 367n
proper or vulgar price, 254–57
Propertius, 255n
property: abandoned, 188, 243; by
accession, 189–94, 235–37; acquisi-
tion of, 182, 509 (see also derivative
acquisitions); by adjunction, 195–
98; agricultural, 198–99; alluvial
lands, 191–93; by building, 196–97;
cession of, 206, 211–12; civil state
and, 291–95, 401–2, 429–38; credi-
tors’ rights over, 217; of debtors,
279–80; definitions pertinent to,
175–76; delivery or quasi-delivery
of, 213; division of, 206, 208–11;
eminent dominion, sovereign right
of, 481–85; feudal holding of, 216;
finding, 187–88; fruits as, 198–99,
235–37; imperfect dominion over,
215–16; indivisible, 209; inequality
of, Turnbull on, 154–58, 582–84;
intent to transfer, 214–15; mixture
of, 197–98; mortgages (hypotheca),
217, 282, 283; natural right to cre-
ated things, 176–77; necessity, seiz-
ing another’s property due to, 126;
new islands, cast up or artificial,
190–91; by occupancy, 182–88;
original acquisition of, 182; pre-
scription, 243–51; private holding,
origins of, 178–81; self-love and
acquisition of, 114–15; sovereignty
and, 461–67; by specification, 194–
95; tradition or transferring of,
206, 212–18; in trusts, loaned, or
leased, 214; Turnbull’s commen-
tary on origins, foundation, and
necessary effects of, 199–205; usu-
capio, 243–51; war, occupancy by,
186–87; wild animals as, 185–86; by
writing and painting, 197. See also
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alienation of property; communal
property; derivative acquisitions;
property, rights and duties arising
from; succession to property
property, rights and duties arising
from, 232–51; abandoned property,
243; abuse of property, 233–34,
238; accessions and fruits, 235–37;
civil laws affecting, 238; fraudulent
possession, 237, 241; injury from
prevention of use or enjoyment,
239–41; pacts of former owners,
238–39; possession, 232, 234; pre-
scription, 243–51; recovery, 232,
234–35, 242–43; succession to
property, 231, 238–39, 314; theft,
robbery, or violent ejection, 240–
41; Turnbull’s commentary on,
243–51; use rights, 216, 233; usuca-
pio, 243–51
proportionality in punishment, 478–
79
Proverbs: 17:18, 286n; 20:16, 286n
proxy: contracts by commission,
duties in, 267–68, 269; pacts made
by, 308
prudence, beneficence to be dis-
pensed with, 166–67
Psalm 15:5, 281n
Pseudo-Justinus, 98n
public office. See ministers and
magistrates
public vs. private war, 501–2
Pufendorf, Samuel: on abandoned
things, 188; Alberti vs., 60; on civil
law, 616; on civil states, 408n,
412n, 419n; on commerce, 259n;
on contracts, 269n, 271n, 272n,
275n, 283n, 285n, 313; curious
examples, use of, 316; on dissolu-
tion of pacts and contracts, 313; on
distributive justice, 210–11n; on
eminent dominion, 484n; on
golden rule, 158, 170, 171, 612; on
gratitude, 168n; Heineccius and,
ix, xi–xii; on imputation, 81; on
injury of others, 135n, 138n; on
loan contracts, 284; on marriage,
351n, 353n, 354n; on masters and
servants, 384–85n; on natural state,
325n, 330; on necessity, 122, 125n,
127, 128, 129; on pacts, 296n, 299n,
300, 313; on parents and children,
367n, 369n, 370n; on polygamy,
354n; on principle of law of
nature, 41, 57n, 60, 61n, 68; on
property, 185n, 186–87n, 188, 194n,
195n, 199–200, 210–11n, 212, 213n,
244, 246, 249, 250, 251; rebellious
subjects, on peace treaties with,
520; on reparation of injury to
others, 154; sea, dominion over,
488n; on self-defense, 138; on
sociability, 327n; on sovereignty,
443n, 445n, 449–50n, 455–56n,
457n, 460n; state, on concept of,
325n; subjects, obligations of, 526n;
on succession to property, 222,
225n; Titius’s commentary on, 41;
on treaties, 513n, 514, 514n, 518n,
519n, 520, 521n; utility to students,
538; on war, 505n, 506n, 508, 510n
punishment: of children by parents,
369–70, 379; of children for crimes
of parents, 478n; circumstantial
considerations, 479; civil law, penal
sanctions in, 471, 472; ends of,
475–76; among equals, 474–75; as
immanent right of majesty, 473–
81; imputation followed by, 77–78;
judicial power of, 473–74; lex ta-
lionis (retaliatory or like for like
punishment), 478–79; obligation
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of delinquent to suffer, 476–77;
obligation to inflict for crimes,
477; persons who may be pun-
ished, 477–78; proportionality in,
478–79; quantity of, determining,
478; reformatory purpose of, 481;
reputation, regard for, 481. See also
capital punishment
pupils and tutors, mutual obligations
of, 368–69, 382
Pythagoras and Pythagoreans: on
duties toward others, 144n, 163–
64n; on imputation, 77n; love as
principle of law of nature and,
68n; on parents and children,
377n, 378–79n; on property, 177n,
181n
quasi-delivery of property, 213
Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintili-
anus): on absolute and perfect
duties toward others, 138n; on
commerce, 256n; on human
actions, 42n; on marriage, 351n; on
pacts, 300n; on property, 200,
214n; on punishment, 476n; on
succession to property, 219n, 220n
Quintus (potential martyr of
Smyrna), 119n
Rachel, Samuel, 37n
Radevicus, 299n
rape or seduction, 142, 348–49
rapine, 240
real treaties, 514
reason: affections and passions,
knowledge of, 564–67; conduct, as
guide for, 565–67; conscience and,
34–37; education as means of
developing government of, 567–
70; imputation by means of, 75;
law of nature discoverable by, 18,
21–22, 56–57; moral reasoning
from fact, Turnbull on, 157–58; in
Turnbull’s moral philosophy, 564–
70
rebellious subjects, peace treaties
with, 520
recovery of property, 232, 234–35,
242–43
rectoreal societies, 335
reformatory purpose of punishment,
481
Reid, Thomas, xiv
relatives: degree of relationship and
affinity affecting duties toward
others, 163–64, 167; marriage
between, degrees of kindred pre-
venting, 357; parental powers exer-
cised in place of parents by, 368–
69; succession to property by line
of descent, 225–30. See also family
religion, 493; clergy, obligations of,
544–45; immanent rights of maj-
esty regarding issues of, 492–95;
internal and external worship, 102–
4, 494; as natural to man, 610–13;
treaties with infidels, 516; virtue
and, 615. See also God; Islam; Jews;
Roman Catholicism
renewal or novation of pacts and
contracts, 315–16
renting or letting, 214, 270–71, 276–
78
reparation for injury to others, 153–54
Repgow, Eike von, 196n
reprisals, 510
republics, 439n. See also civil states
reputation: injury to others in, 141–
42; punishment with regard to,
481; self-defense in preservation of,
139; self-love and duty to preserve,
116–17; Turnbull on human zeal
for, 594–96
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resentment, 592–94
resistance theory, 440–43, 443–50n
retaliatory or like for like punish-
ment, 478–79
revolution, 291
reward, imputation followed by, 77–
78
Ricaut, Paul, 144n, 351n
Richard II (king of England), 444n
Rigault, Nicolas, 191n, 212n
rights: animals, use of, 158; of debt-
ors, 279; emigration, 528–29; of
majesty (sovereignty), 420–23,
450–52 (see also immanent rights of
majesty; transeunt rights of maj-
esty); to property, 176–77 (see also
property, rights and duties arising
from); self-defense, 135–39; succes-
sion to rights and obligations of
deceased, 231; use vs. ownership,
216; war, right to make, 498, 500–
502. See also power
risk in sales contracts, 273
rivers, new lands formed by course
of, 191–93
robbery, 240
Roman Catholicism: James, Duke of
York, as heir to English throne,
441n; Papal monarchy, 412n; puri-
fied versions of System used by, x
Roman law: on adoption, 368n; on
betrothal and marriage, 349n, 357,
358n, 359n, 363n; on contracts,
263n, 272–73, 284, 288n, 289,
309n, 314n; on eminent dominion,
483–84n; on judicial power, 473n;
law of nature and, 538; on legisla-
tive powers, 469; on letting and
hiring contracts, 276; on manu-
mission, 391n, 392n; on pacts, 299–
300, 307n, 309n, 314n; on
partnerships, 209n, 289; on pater-
nal powers, 315n, 368, 370, 380; on
property, 191–93, 197, 199n, 207n,
212, 213n, 244, 246; on sovereign
right over sacred things, 492n; on
sponsions, 516; succession to prop-
erty in, 219–22, 223n, 231n; on
treaties, 521n; twelve tables, laws
of, 478–79n. See also specific Roman
lawyers and lawgivers, e.g. Justin-
ian, Paullus
Romans, letter to the: 2:1, 76n; 2:14,
18n; 2:15, 21, 35n; 13:9, 63n; 14:4,
76n; 14:5, 37n; 24:23, 41n
Roo, Gerardus de, 140n
Rudolph I (Holy Roman Emperor),
487n
Rufus, Quintus Curtius, 44n, 125n,
135n, 459n
Rump Parliament (1653), 202n
Russel, Eberhardo, 482n
Russian imperial families, 458n
Rutgers, Jan, 385n
Ryssel, Johannes Jacobus von, 516n
Sabines, 332n, 349n, 413n, 415n
Sabinus, Massurius, 377n
Sachsenspiegel, 196n
sacred things. See God; religion
Sadduceans, 99n
Sagittarius, Caspar, 364n
Saguntines, 515n
sales contracts, 270–76
Salic law, 186n
Sallust, 15n, 280n, 313n, 405n, 544,
604
Salmasius, Claudius (Claude Sau-
maise, Alexius a Massalia), 132n,
279–80n, 393n
Salvianus, 87n
Samians, 416n
Samuel, first book of: 8, 430; 13:19–
20, 511n; 25:21–22, 329n; 25:32, 36n
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Samuel, second book of: 5:11, 516n;
8:10, 517n; 11:15, 135n; 12:9, 135n;
50:15, 305n
satisfaction for injury to others, 153–
54
Saumaise, Claude (Claudius Salma-
sius, Alexius a Massalia), 132n,
279–80n, 393n
Schaffnab, Lambert, 376n
Scheffer, Johannes, 177n
Schickard, Wilhelm, 470n
Schilter, Johann, 286n, 512n, 521n
Schoock, Martin, 281n
schools. See education
Schroeter, Wilhelm, 491n
Schweder, Gabriel, 487n
Scripture. See Bible
Scymnus Chius, 181n
Scythians, 42n, 180n, 181n, 261n
sea, dominion over, 488n
Seckendus (Veit Ludwig von Secken-
dorff), 354n
seduction or rape, 142, 348–49
seizing another’s property due to
necessity, 126
Selden, John: on contracts, 281n; on
divine and civil law, 470n; on
injury to others, 150n; on marriage,
352n; on origins of law of nature,
21n; on property, 188n; sea, domin-
ion over, 488n; on succession to
property, 221n, 229n
self-defense, right of, 135–39
self-love, 107–30; of both body and
mind, 108–14; defined, 107; happi-
ness and, 559, 560–61; industry, law
of, 115; member, necessity of cut-
ting off, 123; necessity and, 117–27;
preservation of life and avoidance
of death, 109; as principle of law
of nature, 68, 69–70; reputation,
duty to preserve, 116–17; suicide,
prohibition on, 110; Turnbull’s
commentary on, 127–30; as type of
obligation, 95, 107; understanding
and, 108, 111–12; will and, 108, 112–
13
selling, contracts of, 270–76
Senckenberg, Christoph, 190n
Seneca the Elder, 161n, 165n, 303n
Seneca the Younger: on beneficence,
164n; on civil states, 416n; on com-
merce, 253n, 259n; on contracts,
285n; on duties of man to God,
96n; on duties to others, 167n; on
human actions, 15n, 38n; on impu-
tation, 75–76n, 87n; on marriage,
346–47n, 348n, 364n; on masters
and servants, 389n; on natural
state, 326n; on necessity, 121n; on
obligations of sovereign magis-
trates, 548; on pacts, 304n; on par-
ents and children, 372n; on
principle of law of nature, 61n,
64–65n, 66n; on property, 176n,
180n; on punishment, 474n; on
self-love, 113n; on societies, 335n;
on succession to property, 220n
seraglios, 356n
Serres, Jean, 395n
servants. See masters and servants;
slaves
Servius, 38n
Sesostris, 277n
Severus, Septimius (Roman
emperor), 453–54n
Sextus Empiricus, 18n
sexuality: adultery, 359, 363–64n; celi-
bacy, 352; concubinage, 364n; con-
jugal duties, 359–60; impotence
and sterility, 351; incest, 84n, 357;
intercourse outside of marriage,
352–53; procreation and education
as end of marriage, 347–48, 367n;
682 index
sexuality (continued )
rape or seduction, 142, 348–49. See
also marriage
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper,
Earl of, 91–92n, 578
Sharrock, Robert, 171
shipwreck: cannibalism as necessity
due to, 124; imputation regarding,
81n
Shute, John, 61n
Sicilians, 406n
Sicyon, 245
Sidney, Algernon, 129, 426, 440n,
444n, 445n
sign language, 144n
Sigonius, Carolus, 525n
silence, when allowable, 147
Simler, Josias, 424n
Simonides, 148n
simple bartering, 261–62
simple vs. complex societies, 333–34,
346, 393
Simplicius: on duties toward other
persons, 134n, 142n; on human
actions, 11n, 12n, 33n; on natural
state, 325n; on parents and chil-
dren, 377n, 378n; on self-love,
108n, 117n
single combat, 501
Sirach 33:24, 222n
Sixtinus, Regnerus, 451n
slaves: birth into state of, 386–87;
children sold by parents as, 290–
91n, 370; defined, 383–84; disposi-
tion of, 388; dissolution of bond,
391; freed, 391–92; marriage of,
386–87n; obligations regarding,
390–91; possession, master’s right
of, 389; as property, 190n; society
between masters and, 332–33n. See
also masters and servants
sociality, 60–61, 327n, 573–78
societies, 323–45; defined, 331; happi-
ness as law of, 338; human prefer-
ence for, 330–31; members,
obligations of and toward, 337; as
moral persons, 335–36; obligations
of, 336–38; obligations toward
other societies, 337–38; self-defense
in, 137; superiors and inferiors in,
340–45; Turnbull’s commentary
on, 339–45; types of, 332–35. See
also family and relatives; marriage;
masters and servants; parents and
children
Socrates, 77n, 108n, 128, 158, 397n,
542
solidity between debtors in surety-
ship, 285, 287
Solon, 221n, 313n, 463
Sophocles, 53n, 98n, 111n, 136n, 362n,
371n
sovereignty, 439–67; alienation of,
459–61; over communal property,
487–88; consent to, 459; elected
sovereigns, 453–55; by force or
compulsion, 458; foreign govern-
ments, power to deal with, 450–52;
liberty and, 443–50n, 461–67, 540–
41; limitations on, 443, 449;
machiavellian flatterers of, 441;
monarch-killers, doctrine of, 440;
obligations of, 545–49; pacts limit-
ing, 449; paternal power as origin
of, 399–404; patrimonial, 459–60;
resistance to, 440–43; rights of
majesty, 420–23, 450–52 (see also
immanent rights of majesty; trans-
eunt rights of majesty); sacred
nature of, 442; subjects, obliga-
tions of, 523–29, 538–42; subjects’
respect due to, 539–40; by succes-
sion, 456–58; supreme and absolute
nature of, 439; Turnbull’s com-
index 683
mentary on, 443–50n, 461–67;
usufructuary, 459–60
Sozomenos, 518n
Spanheim, Ezekiel, 512n
Spanish wars against American Indi-
ans, 504n
Spartianus, Aelius, 188, 211n, 312n
specification, property acquired by,
194–95
speech. See language
Sphaerus, 93n
Spinoza, Baruch, 21n
spirits, no duty to love, 68
sponsions, 515–16
Stagiritae, 187
states: adventitious, 324–25; of ani-
mals, 325; concept of, 324–25;
contra-natural, 325; physical and
moral, 324, 339–40. See also civil
states; natural state; societies
Statius, 113n, 225n
Stauffer, Johann Ferdinand, 513n
Stephani, Daniel de, 513n
sterility, 351
stipulations, 299
Stobaeus, Joannes, 16n, 202
Stoics, 32n, 38n, 93, 94, 128, 326n,
474n
Strabo, 260n, 261n, 316, 334n, 405n,
486n
Strauchius, Johannes, 213n
Stryck, Samuel, x
subjects or citizens, obligations of,
523–29, 538–42
succession, sovereignty by, 456–58
succession to property, 218, 219–31; in
ascendant line, 228–29; by chil-
dren, 226–27, 373, 380; of children
to parents, 226–27; under civil law,
230; by collateral descent, 220–21;
definitions of testament, 219, 222;
disposal of inheritance, 223–24;
donations, 290; among Germanic
tribes, 221; among Greeks, 221;
intestates, 225–26; under law of
nature, 222–23; laws not part of
law of nature, 219–22; by line of
descent, 225–30; no necessity of,
230; obligation to accept inheri-
tance, 224–25; rights and obliga-
tions of deceased, 231, 238–39, 314;
in Roman law, 219–21
Suetonius: on civil states, 421n; on
contracts, 277n; on dissolution of
pacts and contracts, 313n; on emi-
nent dominion, 484n; on human
actions, 40n; on marriage, 313n,
351n; on masters and servants,
390n; on patriarchal powers, 370n;
on power-mongering, 604; on self-
love, 116n; on war, 501n
suffetes (“suffes”), 437n
suicide, prohibition on, 110
Suidas, 407n
Sulla (Sylla), 313n
superiors and inferiors, 154–58, 340–45
superstition, duty to avoid, 100–101
Surenhuys, Willem, 150n
suretyships, 285–87
Sweden, 452n
Switzerland, 424n, 435, 500n
Sykes, Arthur Ashley, 28
Sylla (Sulla), 313n
Syracides, 148n
System (Heineccius). See Methodical
System of Universal Law: Or, the
Laws of Nature and Nations
systems of republics or confederacies,
418, 424–25
Tabor, Johann Otto, 278n
tacit or express consent in societies,
333
tacit or express pacts, 300–301
684 index
taciturnity, 147–48
Tacitus: on civil states, 430; on com-
merce, 261n; on eminent domin-
ion, 484n; on human actions, 15n;
on imputation, 81n, 88n; on injury
to others, 140n; on marriage, 361;
on masters and servants, 385n,
386n, 391n; on property, 180n; on
public office, 544; on societies,
335n, 338n; on succession to prop-
erty, 221
Talbot, Charles, first baron Talbot of
Hensol, lord chancellor, 536–37
Talmud. See Jews
Tarquinians, 373n, 514n
Tartars, 507n
Tatianus, 98n
taxation, 481–90; alienation of sover-
eign’s demenial goods, 487; com-
munal property, sovereignty over,
488; eminent dominion, 481–85;
exchequer and treasury, 485–90;
foreigners, goods of, 485; justice in,
490
teeth, hanging by or on, 155n, 156,
202, 582, 585
temperament: of children, 374–75;
imputation of actions affected by,
85; will affected by, 45
Temple, Richard, 424n
tenants, obligations of, 277–78
Tencteri, 338n
Terence: on beneficence, 165; on con-
tracts, 267n; on duties to others,
161n; on human actions, 42n; on
imputation, 88n; on masters and
servants, 392n; on necessity, 123,
123n; on punishment, 475n; on
sociality, 576n; on war, 506n
Tertullian, 98n, 214n, 499n
testamentary property. See succession
to property
Teutones, 337n
Thales Milesius (Thales of Miletus),
77n, 103n, 148n, 286n
theft, 240
Themistius, 163n
Themistocles, 412n
Theocritus, 135n
Theodoret, 147n
Theophilus Antiochenus, 98n
Theophrastus, 100n
thirty tyrants of Athens, 527n, 541
Thomasius, Christian: Alberti vs., 60;
biographical information, 57n; on
civil states, 412n; on contracts,
279n, 281n; on duties of man to
God, 102n; Heineccius influenced
by, ix, x, xii–xiv; on injury of oth-
ers, 138n; on liberty, 326–27n; on
necessity, 122n; on principle of law
of nature, 57n, 60, 61n; on prop-
erty, 194n, 208n, 246; on punish-
ment, 474n, 475n; sea, dominion
over, 488n; on sovereignty, 441n,
442n, 451n, 459; on treaties, 516n;
on war, 505n
Thomasius, Jacob, 491n
Thucydides, 411, 528n
Timars and Timariots, 291, 432,
434
Timothy, first letter to: 1:5, 63n; 2:2,
410n; 2:11, 362n; 4:2, 39n
Titius, Gottlieb Gerhard, 41, 246,
330, 419n
Titus (Roman emperor), 116n
Tobit 4:16, 67
Toland, John, 34n, 402n
trade. See commerce
tradition or transferring of property,
206, 212–18
transeunt rights of majesty, 451–52,
498–522; ambassadors, 521–22;
leagues, 515–16, 521; peace, mainte-
index 685
nance and restoration of, 517–21.
See also treaties; war
treachery, dissolution of pacts and
contracts by, 313
treasures, abandoned, 188
treasury of civil state, 485–90
treaties, 511–21; advantageous to allies,
515; barrier-treaties, 513; equality/
inequality in, 511, 518; force or
stratagem not lawful against part-
ners in, 508; of general friendship,
512; with infidels, 516, 518n;
leagues, 515–16, 521; of neutrality,
513–14; obligations with respect to,
517, 520–21; of particular obliga-
tion, 512; of peace, 517–21; peace,
made in time of, 512–13; personal
vs. real, 514; sovereign right to
make, 452; sponsions, 515–16; war,
made in time of, 513–14
Trebatius, 186n
trees, as property, 198–99
Troglodytes, 406n
truces, 518
trust, property held in, 214
trustees, duties of, 266
trust in God, 102, 103–4
truth and dishonesty, 89, 146–48
Tully. See Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Tulpius (Nicolaas Tulp), 124n
Turkey: as civil state, 430, 431, 432,
433, 434; conquest of Byzantium
by, 459n; marriage in, 351n; peace
treaties with Christians, 518n; poi-
soned arrows used by, 507n; polyg-
amy in, 354, 356; sign language in,
144n
Turmair, Johannes (Aventinus), 190n
Turnbull, George: biographical infor-
mation, xiv; Harrington’s influence
on, xvii; Heineccius’s System and, x,
xiv–xvii; writings of, xivn20
Turnbull, George, commentaries of,
xv–xvii; on civil states’ origins and
development, 425–38; on com-
merce, 291–95; curious examples,
on Heineccius’s use of, 316–18; on
duties of man to God, 104–6; on
equality, 154–58, 340–45, 582–84; on
family, 399–404; on golden rule,
170–74; on human actions, 48–50;
on imputation, 89–92; on love as
central principle of natural law, 71–
74; on moral equality, 154–58, 340–
45; on moral reasoning from fact,
157–58; on natural inequality, 154–
58, 340–45, 582–86; on necessity,
127–30; on origins and foundation
of law of nature and nations, 26–
29; on perfect and imperfect duties
toward other persons, 169–74; on
property origins, foundations, and
necessary effects, 199–205; on prop-
erty prescription and usucapio, 243–
51; on self-love, 127–30; on societies,
339–45; on sovereignty and liberty,
443–50n, 461–67
Turnbull, George, on moral philoso-
phy, 553–618; Cicero’s contribu-
tions, 533–36; civil law, natural
basis for, 614–18; dependencies and
affections, ordering of, 578–89;
ends and means, moral, 555–56;
experience, law of nature learned
by, 557–58; Heineccius’s contribu-
tions, 531–38; human actions as
natural law, 556–57; industry, law
of, xvi–xvii, 115, 570–73, 577, 614–
15; law of nature in moral philoso-
phy, 554–56; moral philosophy, law
of nature in, 554–56; natural moral
sense in man, 606–13; natural phi-
losophy, law of nature in, 553–54;
particular affections, 559–64; rea-
686 index
Turnbull, George (continued )
son, 564–70; sociality, 573–78. See
also virtue, happiness, and prosper-
ity, connection between
tutors and tutoring. See education
twelve tables, laws of, 478–79n
tyrannies, 417–18, 421, 430, 527n,
540–41, 582
Ulpian[us], Domitius (Roman law-
yer): on civil states, 326, 469; on
commerce, 251; on family, 393n; on
injury to others, 137n; on origins
of law of nature, 22n, 24; on prop-
erty, 190; on punishment, 472; on
succession to property, 221
unconscionability: in contracts, 290;
in pacts, 304–5, 307–8
understanding: of children, 373–74;
human action and, 33–34; injury to
others in, 139; self-love and, 108,
111–12
unhurt utility, 159, 160–61
unilateral pacts, 298
United Provinces. See Holland
unjust actions. See justice and
injustice
use of property, right to, 216, 233
Usipetii, 338n
usucapio, 243–51
usufructuary sovereignty, 459–60
usury, 280–82, 291–95
Vaccaeans, 180n
Vaillant, Johannes, 512n
Valens (Roman emperor), 163n
Valerius Flaccus, 406n
Valerius Maximus, 109n, 116n, 276n,
373n, 411n, 518n
Valois, Henri de, 528
Vandals, 291
Varro, 212n, 214n, 252n, 326n
Vazquez, Fernando, 504n
Vega, Garcilaso de la, 260n
Velleius Paterculus, 468, 537n
veneration of children for parents,
377–79
venereal disease, 82n
veracity and dishonesty, 89, 146–48
Vespasian (Roman emperor), 453–54n
Virgil, 125n, 178n, 200, 220n, 252n,
253n
virtue: commerce, necessity of, 253;
honor and reputation, human zeal
for, 595; immoral things, pacts and
contracts about (see unconsciona-
bility); religion and, 615
virtue, happiness, and prosperity,
connection between, xv–xvii, 597–
606; dependencies and affections,
ordering of, 578–89; industry, law
of, xvi–xvii, 115, 570–73, 577, 614–
15; natural moral sense in man,
606–13; particular affections caus-
ing our happiness, 559–61; reason,
development of, 568–70; sociality,
573–78; ubiquity of vice, objection
based on, 601–6
Viselius, 269n
Visigoths, 190n
Vitellius (Roman emperor), 444n,
453–54n
Vitoria, Francisco de, 504n
Vitruvius, 256n
vivum vadium, 217n
voluntary societies, 332
vulgar or proper price, 254–57
Wachter, Johan Georg, 16n
war, 498–511; acquisition of property
in, 509; armies, types of, 500n;
civil war, 502; conquest, empires
acquired by, 509–10; defined, 499;
eminent dominion in time of, 483;
index 687
inferior magistrates’ right to make,
501; just causes of, 502–6; in natu-
ral state, 328–29; nonenemies, use
against, 508–9; occupancy by, 186–
87; others, waged for, 503–4; pre-
textual causes of, 504; private vs.
public, 501–2; reprisals, 510; right
to make, 498, 500–502; servitude
resulting from, 386; single combat,
501; solemn and less solemn, 505;
things lawful against enemies in,
506–10; truces, 518
warranty in sales contracts, 273
Wehner, Paul Matthias, 209n
Welwood, William, 488n
Wicquefort, Abraham van, 522
wild animals. See animals
will: of children, 374–75; human
action and, 33, 43–48; injury to
others in, 140; self-love and, 108,
112–13
willed property. See succession to
property
William, Duke of Cumberland, 3
William, Prince of Orange, 459n,
484n
Wissenbach, Johann Jakob, 279n
Wolff, Christian, xi, 38n, 39n, 53n,
62n, 110n, 396n
Wolsius, Johannes, 100n
women: powers of both parents over
children, 367–71; powers of family
head, 394–96; prerogative of hus-
band, rights and duties associated
with, 360–63; as sovereigns, 362n,
456, 457. See also family; marriage;
parents and children; sexuality
words. See language
worship, internal and external, 102–4,
494
writing, property by, 197
Xenophon: on civil states, 416n; on
eminent dominion, 485n; on fam-
ily, 397, 398n; on imperfect duties
toward others, 168; on industry,
571n; on magistrates and ministers,
492n; on marriage, 350n; on neces-
sity, 128; on obligations of sover-
eign magistrates, 546n; on
principle of law of nature, 53n,
55n; on sovereignty, 459n; on suc-
cession to property, 222n, 226n
York, James, Duke of, 441n, 536
Yorke, Philip, first earl of Hardwicke,
lord chancellor, 537
Zaunschliffer, Philipp, 309n
Zeno, 93n, 419n
Ziegler, Caspar, 124n, 369n, 510n
Zoroaster, 158
This book is set in Adobe Garamond, a modern adaptation by
Robert Slimbach of the typeface originally cut around 1540 by the
French typographer and printer Claude Garamond. The Garamond
face, with its small lowercase height and restrained contrast between
thick and thin strokes, is a classic “old-style” face and has long been
one of the most influential and widely used typefaces.
Printed on paper that is acid-free and meets the requirements of
the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for
Printed Library Materials, z39.48-1992.A
Book design by Louise OFarrell
Gainesville, Florida
Typography by Apex Publishing, LLC
Madison, Wisconsin
Printed and bound by Worzalla Publishing Company
Stevens Point, Wisconsin
